Karnataka High Court
Sri R M Manjunath Gowda vs Directorate Of Enforcement on 2 July, 2025
Author: S Vishwajith Shetty
Bench: S Vishwajith Shetty
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CRL.P No. 7473 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF JULY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S VISHWAJITH SHETTY
CRIMINAL PETITION No.7473 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
SRI R.M. MANJUNATH GOWDA
S/O RAMAPPA GOWDA
AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS
R/O KARAKUCCHI, SIRIGEREPONT
SHIVAMOGGA - 577 211
CURRENTLY IN JUDICIAL CUSTODY)
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI JAYKUMAR S. PATIL, SR. COUNSEL FOR
SRI VARUN JAYKUMAR PATIL, ADV.)
AND:
DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND
DEPARTMENT OF REFENUE
Digitally
III FLOOR, B BLOCK BMTC
signed by K.H. ROAD, SHANTINAGAR
NANDINI M S BANGALORE - 560 027.
Location: ...RESPONDENT
HIGH COURT
OF (BY SRI ARAVIND KUMAR, ASG A/W
KARNATAKA SRI MODHUKAR DESHPANDE, ADV.)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 439 CR.PC (FILED U/S 483 BNSS)
PRAYING TO ENLARGE THE ACCUSED ON BAIL IN ECIR/BGO/05/2021
FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 4 OF PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
ACT 2002 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE COURT OF PRL.CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPL.COURT FOR PMLA CASES AT
BENGALURU.
THIS PETITION, HAVING BEEN RESEREVED FOR ORDERS ON
27.06.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
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CORAM: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE S VISHWAJITH SHETTY
CAV ORDER
(PER: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE S VISHWAJITH SHETTY)
1. Accused in ECIR/BGO/05/2021 registered for the offence
punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the Act’) pending before the
Court of Prl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, is before
this Court in this petition filed under Section 439 of Cr.PC
seeking regular bail.
2. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
3. Petitioner was the elected President of Shivamogga
District Co-operative Central Bank, Shivamogga (for short,
‘SDCC Bank’) during the years 1997-1998, 1999-2010, 2011-
2014 and 2015-2020. FIR in Crime No.325/2014 was registered
by Doddapete Police Station, Shivamogga, against B.Shobha –
Branch Manager of SDCC Bank and others for the offences
punishable under Sections 406, 408, 409, 420, 34 of IPC, and
in the said case, petitioner was arrayed as accused no.15 in the
FIR. Subsequently, the case was transferred to CID for further
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investigation. After completing investigation in the said case,
charge sheet was filed for the offences punishable under
Sections 409, 420, 465, 471, 120B, 201 read with 37 of IPC.
However, petitioner was dropped in the said charge sheet.
Subsequently, FIR in Crime No.16/2021 was registered by
Jayanagar Police Station, Shivamogga, against the petitioner
for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 168, 200,
403, 405, 409, 418, 419, 420, 424, 425, 427, 467, 468, 474
read with 34 of IPC and Section 109 of the Karnataka Co-
operative Societies Act, 1959. After registration of FIR in Crime
No.16/2021, additional charge sheet was filed in Crime
No.325/2014 against the petitioner on 30.07.2021 for the
offences punishable under Sections 409, 202 read with 36 of
IPC.
4. FIR in Crime No.4/2014 was registered against the
petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(e)
& 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short,
‘P.C.Act’), and after completing investigation in the said case,
charge sheet has been already filed against the petitioner for
the aforesaid offences. It is in this background,
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ECIR/BGO/05/2021 was registered against the petitioner by the
respondent alleging that proceeds of crime in the aforesaid
criminal cases was utilized directly or indirectly by the
petitioner for the purpose of deriving/obtaining property. In the
said proceedings, petitioner was arrested on 09.04.2025 and
subsequently remanded to judicial custody. His bail application
filed before the Special Court in ECIR/BGO/05/2021, was
rejected on 20.05.2025. Therefore, petitioner is before this
Court.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that in Crime No.325/2014 which was registered for
the schedule offences, after investigation, no charge sheet was
filed initially against the petitioner. On the very same
allegations, FIR in Crime No.16/2021 was registered by
Jayanagar Police Station, Shivamogga, and the said FIR was
quashed by this Court in W.P.No.8294/2021 on the ground that
the allegations made in Crime No.325/2014 and Crime
No.16/2021 and the period during which the alleged offences
were committed were one and the same. Though additional
charge sheet has been filed in Crime No.325/2014 against the
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petitioner, in the additional charge sheet, schedule offences are
not invoked against the petitioner. Further, proceedings in
Crime No.4/2014 registered against the petitioner for the
offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(e) & 13(2) of the
P.C.Act, has been stayed by the coordinate bench of this Court
in W.P.No.10108/2024. He submits that investigation of the
present case is completed and complaint is already filed before
the Trial Court. Referring to Section 45 of the Act, he submits
that there is no absolute bar for granting bail to an accused in a
case registered for the offences punishable under the Act.
Unless the foundational facts are made out against the
accused, the burden does not shift on the petitioner. He
submits that except the confession statement of the co-
accused, in cases registered for predicate offences, there is no
material collected against the petitioner which would prima
facie make out a case against him for the offences punishable
under the Act. In support of his arguments, he has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of VIJAY MADANLAL CHOUDHARY & OTHERS VS UNION
OF INDIA & OTHERS – (2023)12 SCC 1.
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6. Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General who has
appeared on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the
petition. He submits that petitioner had filed
W.P.No.11786/2025 questioning the grounds of arrest, order of
arrest, arrest memo, etc., before this Court and in the said
petition, he has raised all the grounds urged in this petition.
W.P.No.11786/2025 was dismissed by this Court on
17.04.2025 and assailing the same, petitioner has approached
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, it is not open for the
petitioner to urge the very same grounds before this Court. He
submits that there is a presumption under Section 24 of the Act
against the petitioner, which he needs to rebut, otherwise he is
liable to be punished for the alleged offences. He submits that
even a person as against whom a criminal case for committing
the schedule offences is not registered, can be prosecuted for
the offences punishable under the Act, if it is found that the
proceeds of the crime of schedule offences has been directly or
indirectly utilized by him or if he is in any manner connected for
utilization of the proceeds of crime. He submits that in view of
the twin conditions found in Section 45 of the Act, the prayer
made by the petitioner as against whom there is a prima facie
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case for the alleged offences for grant of regular bail needs to
be rejected. In support of his arguments, he has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Y.S.JAGAN MOHAN REDDY VS CENTRAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION – (2013)7 SCC 439, and in the case of THE
UNION OF INDIA THROUGH THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR VS
KANHAIYA PRASAD – 2025 INSC 210.
7. In reply, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that trial in the case registered for predicate
offences has not yet commenced. In the present case, after
completing investigation, complaint has been already filed
before the Trial Court. Except the confession statement of the
co-accused, there is no other strong material collected by the
prosecution which would prima facie make out the alleged
offences against the petitioner. He submits that confession of
co-accused alone cannot be based to hold accused guilty of the
offences committed under the Act. In support of his arguments,
he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of PREM PRAKASH VS UNION OF INDIA
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THROUGH THE DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT – (2024)9
SCC 787.
8. The offence of money laundering is defined under Section
3 of the Act, which reads as under:
“3. Offence of money-laundering.–Whosoever
directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly
assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in
any process or activity connected with the proceeds of
crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition
or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted
property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering.
[Explanation.–For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that,–
(i) a person shall be guilty of offence of money-
laundering if such person is found to have directly or
indirectly attempted to indulge or knowingly assisted or
knowingly is a party or is actually involved in one or
more of the following processes or activities connected
with proceeds of crime, namely:–
(a) concealment; or
(b) possession; or
(c) acquisition; or
(d) use; or
(e) projecting as untainted property; or
(f) claiming as untainted property,
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in any manner whatsoever;
(ii) the process or activity connected with
proceeds of crime is a continuing activity and continues
till such time a person is directly or indirectly enjoying
the proceeds of crime by its concealment or possession
or acquisition or use or projecting it as untainted
property or claiming it as untainted property in any
manner whatsoever.”
9. Punishment for money laundering is provided under
Section 4 of the Act, which reads as under:
“4. Punishment for money-laundering.–
Whoever commits the offence of money-laundering shall
be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than three years but which may
extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine
***:
Provided that where the proceeds of crime
involved in money-laundering relates to any offence
specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the Schedule,
the provisions of this section shall have effect as if for
the words “which may extend to seven years”, the
words “which may extend to ten years” had been
substituted.”
10. The word ‘proceeds of crime’ is defined under Section
2(1)(u) of the Act, which reads as under:
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“2(1)(u) “proceeds of crime” means any
property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by
any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a
scheduled offence or the value of any such property or
where such property is taken or held outside the
country, then the property equivalent in value held
within the country or abroad;
Explanation.–For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby clarified that “proceeds of crime” include
property not only derived or obtained from the
scheduled offence but also any property which may
directly or indirectly be derived or obtained as a result of
any criminal activity relatable to the scheduled offence.”
11. Under Section 45 of the Act, the offences under the Act
are classified as cognizable and non-bailable offences. Section
45(1)(ii) of the Act provides that in the event the Public
Prosecutor opposes the bail application of an accused, it is only
if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and he
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, the person
accused of committing the offence under the provisions of the
Act, can be released on bail.
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12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary’s case supra, having reiterated the law laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of RANJITSING
BRAHMAJEETSING SHARMA VS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA –
(2005)5 SCC 294, in paragraphs 302 & 303, has observed as
under:
“302. It is important to note that the twin
conditions provided under Section 45 of the 2002 Act,
though restrict the right of the accused to grant of bail,
but it cannot be said that the conditions provided under
Section 45 impose absolute restraint on the grant of
bail. The discretion vests in the court which is not
arbitrary or irrational but judicial, guided by the
principles of law as provided under Section 45 of the
2002 Act. While dealing with a similar provision
prescribing twin conditions in MCOCA, this Court in
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma held as under :
(SCC pp. 318-19, paras 44-46)
“44. The wording of Section 21(4), in
our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion
that the court must arrive at a positive
finding that the applicant for bail has not
committed an offence under the Act. If
such a construction is placed, the court
intending to grant bail must arrive at a
finding that the applicant has not
committed such an offence. In such an
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event, it will be impossible for the
prosecution to obtain a judgment of
conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be
the intention of the legislature. Section
21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be
construed reasonably. It must be so
construed that the court is able to maintain
a delicate balance between a judgment of
acquittal and conviction and an order
granting bail much before commencement
of trial. Similarly, the court will be required
to record a finding as to the possibility of
his committing a crime after grant of bail.
However, such an offence in futuro must be
an offence under the Act and not any other
offence. Since it is difficult to predict the
future conduct of an accused, the court
must necessarily consider this aspect of the
matter having regard to the antecedents of
the accused, his propensities and the
nature and manner in which he is alleged
to have committed the offence.
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for
the purpose of considering an application
for grant of bail, although detailed reasons
are not necessary to be assigned, the order
granting bail must demonstrate application
of mind at least in serious cases as to why
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the applicant has been granted or denied
the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this
stage is not to weigh the evidence
meticulously but to arrive at a finding on
the basis of broad probabilities. However,
while dealing with a special statute like
MCOCA having regard to the provisions
contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21
of the Act, the court may have to probe
into the matter deeper so as to enable it to
arrive at a finding that the materials
collected against the accused during the
investigation may not justify a judgment of
conviction. The findings recorded by the
court while granting or refusing bail
undoubtedly would be tentative in nature,
which may not have any bearing on the
merit of the case and the trial court would,
thus, be free to decide the case on the
basis of evidence adduced at the trial,
without in any manner being prejudiced
thereby.”
(emphasis supplied)
303. We are in agreement with the observation
made by the Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma. The Court while dealing with the application for
grant of bail need not delve deep into the merits of the
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case and only a view of the court based on available
material on record is required. The court will not weigh
the evidence to find the guilt of the accused which is, of
course, the work of the trial court. The court is only
required to place its view based on probability on the
basis of reasonable material collected during
investigation and the said view will not be taken into
consideration by the trial court in recording its finding of
the guilt or acquittal during trial which is based on the
evidence adduced during the trial. As explained by this
Court in Nimmagadda Prasad, the words used in Section
45 of the 2002 Act are “reasonable grounds for
believing” which means the court has to see only if there
is a genuine case against the accused and the
prosecution is not required to prove the charge beyond
reasonable doubt.”
13. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the Court while dealing
with the application for bail, need not give a finding on the
merits of the case, and on the other hand, based on the
material placed before the Court, a finding is required to be
recorded why bail has been granted to the accused
demonstrating the application of mind by the Court.
14. So far as the presumption that arises under Section 24 of
the Act is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vijay
Madanlal Choudhary’s case supra, has held that prosecution is
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required to primarily establish the basic foundational facts and
it is only then a legal presumption would arise against the
accused that he is involved in money laundering. In paragraphs
237, 239 & 240 of the judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary’s
case supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“237. Be that as it may, we may now proceed to
decipher the purport of Section 24 of the 2002 Act. In
the first place, it must be noticed that the legal
presumption in either case is about the involvement of
proceeds of crime in money laundering. This fact
becomes relevant, only if, the prosecution or the
authorities have succeeded in establishing at least three
basic or foundational facts. First, that the criminal
activity relating to a scheduled offence has been
committed. Second, that the property in question has
been derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any
person as a result of that criminal activity. Third, the
person concerned is, directly or indirectly, involved in
any process or activity connected with the said property
being proceeds of crime. On establishing the fact that
there existed proceeds of crime and the person
concerned was involved in any process or activity
connected therewith, itself, constitutes offence of money
laundering. The nature of process or activity has now
been elaborated in the form of the Explanation inserted
vide Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019. On establishing these
foundational facts in terms of Section 24 of the 2002
Act, a legal presumption would arise that such proceeds
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of crime are involved in money laundering. The fact that
the person concerned had no causal connection with
such proceeds of crime and he is able to disprove the
fact about his involvement in any process or activity
connected therewith, by producing evidence in that
regard, the legal presumption would stand rebutted.
239. Be it noted that the legal presumption under
Section 24(a) of the 2002 Act, would apply when the
person is charged with the offence of money laundering
and his direct or indirect involvement in any process or
activity connected with the proceeds of crime, is
established. The existence of proceeds of crime is,
therefore, a foundational fact, to be established by the
prosecution, including the involvement of the person in
any process or activity connected therewith. Once these
foundational facts are established by the prosecution,
the onus must then shift on the person facing charge of
offence of money laundering — to rebut the legal
presumption that the proceeds of crime are not involved
in money laundering, by producing evidence which is
within his personal knowledge. In other words, the
expression “presume” is not conclusive. It also does not
follow that the legal presumption that the proceeds of
crime are involved in money laundering is to be invoked
by the authority or the court, without providing an
opportunity to the person to rebut the same by leading
evidence within his personal knowledge.
240. Such onus also flows from the purport of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Whereby, he must
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rebut the legal presumption in the manner he chooses
to do and as is permissible in law, including by replying
under Section 313 of the 1973 Code or even by cross-
examining prosecution witnesses. The person would get
enough opportunity in the proceeding before the
authority or the court, as the case may be. He may be
able to discharge his burden by showing that he is not
involved in any process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime. In any case, in terms of Section 114
of the Evidence Act, it is open to the court to presume
the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of
natural events, human conduct, and public and private
business, in their relation to the facts of the particular
case. Considering the above, the provision under
consideration [Section 24(a)] by no standards can be
said to be unreasonable much less manifestly arbitrary
and unconstitutional.”
15. FIR in Crime No.325/2014 was registered by Doddapete
Police Station, Shivamogga, for the offences punishable under
Sections 406, 408, 409, 420, 34 of IPC, and though in the said
case petitioner was arrayed as accused no.15 in the FIR, in the
charge sheet that was filed by the CID who had taken over
further investigation of the case, petitioner was not arrayed as
an accused. Subsequently, on 26.02.2025, Jayanagar Police
Station, Shivamogga, had registered FIR in Crime No.16/2021
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against the petitioner for the offences punishable under
Sections 120B, 168, 200, 403, 405, 409, 418, 419, 420, 424,
425, 427, 467, 468, 474 read with 34 of IPC and Section 109 of
the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. FIR in Crime
No.16/2021 was quashed by the coordinate bench of this Court
in W.P.No.8294/2021 disposed of on 31.08.2021 on the ground
that the allegations made against the petitioner in Crime
No.325/2014 and in Crime No.16/2021 are one and same and
they do not make out a separate and distinct offence. In
paragraphs 16 & 17 of the order passed in W.P.No.8294/2021,
the coordinate bench of this Court has observed as under:
“16. Now on comparing the two FIRs, it becomes
amply clear that FIR No.16/2021 is not in respect of
offences committed subsequent to 15.07.2014. Both the
FIRs relate to the same period. Though Sri Ashok
Haranahalli has made an attempt to point out from
Annexure-C that the transactions, in respect of which
FIR 16/2021 has been registered, are subsequent to the
transactions mentioned in FIR 325/2014, it is not
possible to accept his argument.
17. Annexure-C is an order passed by the Joint
Registrar on 16.02.2021 for initiating prosecution
against the petitioner and C.Rajanna Reddy for their
failure to comply with the deficiencies noticed during
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inspection and not complying with the order dated
29.02.2016 made under Section 68 of the Act. Writ
Petitions, WP Nos.20188-192/2016 was filed challenging
the order dated 29.02.2016 and as the order in the said
writ petition indicates, the Additional Advocate General
made a submission before the Court that Annexure ‘C’
was actually not an order made under Section 68 of the
Act, but it was in fact exercise of power under Section
65(3) of the Act. This aspect has no relevancy, however
on going through Annexure-C what can be made out is
that it came to be passed in relation to irregularities in
sanctioning loans and obtaining securities thereof during
the period 2004-05 to 15.07.2014. Annexure-C is the
basis for 4th respondent to lodge an FIR at Jayanagar
Police Station Shivamogga and therefore it is to be
stated that certainly FIR No.16/2021 does not indicate a
separate and distinct offence being committed
subsequent to 15.07.2014. As rightly argued by Sri
Jayakumar S Patil, FIR No.16/2021 is the second FIR for
the offences under IPC, and in this FIR, some offences
under IPC which were not included in FIR No.325/2014,
may have been included; but when the name of the
petitioner was dropped from the charge sheet filed
pursuant to FIR No.325/2014, he should not have been
implicated for any of the offences under IPC in FIR
No.16/2021. What was required was to initiate action
only for the offences under the Act for their failure to
take action pursuant to the report under section 68 of
the Act.”
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16. During the pendency of W.P.No.8294/2021, additional
charge sheet was filed against the petitioner in Crime
No.325/2014 and perusal of the said charge sheet would go to
show that schedule offences are not invoked against the
petitioner in the additional charge sheet. It is brought to the
notice of this Court that though the said additional charge sheet
was filed on 30.07.2021, till date, cognizance of the alleged
offences against the petitioner in the additional charge sheet is
not taken by the Trial Court.
17. FIR in Crime No.4/2014 was registered against the
petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 13(1)(e)
& 13(2) of the P.C.Act. The allegation against the petitioner in
the said case is that petitioner possessed assets
disproportionate to his known sources of income to the tune of
115.83%, during the check period from 11.01.1997 to
30.05.2014. It is not in dispute that further proceedings in
Crime No.4/2014 has been stayed by the coordinate bench of
this Court in W.P.No.10108/2024, wherein challenge is made
by the petitioner against the order of sanction issued by the
competent authority to prosecute him.
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18. Learned Counsel for the respondent has put forward a
contention that since the petitioner had challenged the grounds
of arrest, order of arrest, arrest memo, etc., before the
coordinate bench of this Court in W.P.No.11786/2025 raising all
the grounds urged in the petition, it is not open to the
petitioner to once again urge the very same grounds in this bail
petition. In the case of ARVIND KEJRIWAL VS DIRECTORATE
OF ENFORCEMENT – (2025)2 SCC 248, in paragraph 50, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“50. In our opinion, the key distinction between
Section 19(1) and Section 45 is the authority
undertaking the exercise, in each case. Under Section
19(1), it is the designated/authorised officer who
records in writing, their “reasons to believe” that the
arrestee is “guilty” of an offence under the PML Act.
Thus, the arrest is based on the opinion of such officer,
which opinion is open to judicial review, however not
merits review, in terms of the well-settled principles of
law. Contrastingly, under Section 45, it is the Special
Court which undertakes the exercise. The Special Court
independently examines pleas and contentions of both
the accused and DoE, and arrives at an objective
opinion. The Special Court is not bound by the opinion of
the designated/authorised officer recorded in the
“reasons to believe”. A court’s opinion is different and
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cannot be equated to an officer’s opinion. While the
Special Court’s opinion is determinative, and is only
subject to appeal before the higher courts, DoE’s opinion
is not in the same category as it is open to judicial
review.”
19. In Arvind Kejriwal’s case supra, writ petition was filed
before the High Court of Delhi challenging the arrest by the
Directorate of Enforcement on the ground of violation of
Section 19 of the Act and the proceedings pursuant thereto
including the order of remand passed by the Special Judge. In
other words, the validity of arrest under Section 19 of the Act
was questioned before the High Court. As against the dismissal
of writ petition, the petitioner therein had approached the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. While confirming the judgment of the
High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the operative
portion of the order, has observed that the application for
regular bail if pending consideration or required to be decided,
shall be decided on its own merits.
20. The criminal cases registered against the petitioner for
predicate offences, according to the prosecution, are pending in
Crime No.325/2014 and Crime No.4/2014. So far as Crime
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No.325/2014 is concerned, though petitioner was arrayed as
accused no.15 in the FIR, in the charge sheet which was filed
after investigation, he was not initially arrayed as an accused.
Subsequently, a fresh FIR was registered against him in Crime
No.16/2021 which has been quashed by the coordinate bench
of this Court in W.P.No.8294/2021 on the ground that
allegations made against the petitioner in Crime No.325/2014
and Crime No.16/2021 are one and the same and they relate to
the same period. The said order has attained finality. During
the pendency of W.P.No.8294/2021, additional charge sheet
was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 409, 202
read with 34 of IPC which does not include any schedule
offence, and the Trial Court has not yet taken cognizance of the
additional charge sheet filed against the petitioner.
21. FIR in Crime No.4/2014 is filed against the petitioner
alleging that for the check period from 11.01.1997 to
30.05.2014, he had amassed property disproportionate to his
known sources of income. Further proceedings in the said case
has been stayed by this Court in W.P.No.10108/2024. The
allegations found in Crime No.4/2014 registered against the
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petitioner for the offences punishable under the provisions of
the P.C.Act, is primarily required to be proved based on
documentary evidence. It is trite that the presumption, if any,
arising against the petitioner can be rebutted by producing
necessary rebuttal evidence. Therefore, solely on the basis of
the material made available to the Court by the prosecution, at
this stage, there cannot be any conclusion that the petitioner is
guilty of the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of the
Act.
22. The FIRs for the predicate offences has been registered
against the petitioner in the year 2014 and it is not the case of
the prosecution that thereafter petitioner has indulged in
committing any other crime. Therefore, there is no reason for
this Court to believe that petitioner is likely to commit similar
crime in the event he is enlarged on bail.
23. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
Investigation Officer has not collected any independent material
against the petitioner, and on the other hand, the complaint
has been filed before the Special Court based on the statement
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of the co-accused in the criminal cases registered for predicate
offences.
24. In Prem Prakash’s case supra, in paragraph 44, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
“44. Being a co-accused with the appellant, his
statement against the appellant assuming there is
anything incriminating against the present appellant will
not have the character of substantive evidence. The
prosecution cannot start with such a statement to
establish its case.”
25. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P.KRISHNA
MOHAN REDDY VS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH – 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 1157, placing reliance on the judgment in the case
of KASHMIRA SINGH VS STATE OF M.P. – (1952)1 SCC 275,
has observed that assuming for a moment that confession of a
co-accused can be looked at the stage of anticipatory bail or
even regular bail, as per the judgment in Kashmira Singh’s
case supra, since such a confession can only be pressed into
consideration by the court as a rule of prudence to lend
assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused. Thus,
there must exist other evidence on record before the court
looks into such confession. Therefore, the court while
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considering the bail application is required to record a prima
facie finding and cannot hold a mini trial delving into the merits
of the case.
26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ANWAR
DHEBAR VS DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT- (CRL.A.NO.(S)
2669 OF 2025) following the law laid down in the case of V
SENTHIL BALAJI v. DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF
ENFORCEMENT – (2024) SCC ONLINE SC 2626, taking into
consideration the maximum punishment for the alleged
offences and that there is no possibility of trial commencing in
the near future, has granted bail to the accused. Similar view
has been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
ANIL TUTEJA V. DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT – (SLP
(CRL.) NO.3148/2025.
27. Petitioner is aged about 62 years and is in custody in the
present case from 09.04.2025. The material on record would go
to show that he is also suffering from certain medical conditions
and he has been advised to undergo cataract surgery.
Investigation of the case is completed and complaint is already
filed before the Trial Court. The trial in the cases registered for
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predicate offences and also in the present case is yet to
commence. The chances of trial being completed and case
being disposed of on merits in the near soon is remote.
28. Considering all the aforesaid aspects of the matter, I am
of the opinion that petitioner’s prayer for grant of regular bail is
required to be answered affirmatively. Accordingly, the
following order:
29. The petition is allowed. The petitioner is directed to be
enlarged on bail in ECIR/BGO/05/2021 registered for the
offence punishable under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002, pending before the Court of Prl. City Civil
& Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, subject to the following
conditions:
a) Petitioner shall execute personal bond for a
sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with two sureties for the
likesum, to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional
Court;
b) The petitioner shall appear regularly on all
the dates of hearing before the Trial Court unless
the Trial Court exempts his appearance for valid
reasons;
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c) The petitioner shall not directly or
indirectly threaten or tamper with the prosecution
witnesses;
d) The petitioner shall not involve in similar
offences in future.
Sd/-
(S VISHWAJITH SHETTY)
JUDGE
KK