Delhi High Court
Mrs Madhurbhashani & Ors vs Ranjit Sing on 2 July, 2025
Author: Anup Jairam Bhambhani
Bench: Anup Jairam Bhambhani
$~J-
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 2nd July, 2025
+ RC.REV. 95/2014, CM APPL. 70078/2024
MRS MADHURBHASHANI & ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Devna Soni, Mr. Jatin Sehgal,
Mr. Ashish Garg, Ms. Simran Bajaj
and Mr. Shubham Aggarwal,
Advocates.
versus
RANJIT SINGH .....Respondent
Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal, Mr. Saideep
Kaushik and Mr. Parth Mahajan,
Advocates.
+ RC.REV. 112/2014, CM APPL. 70084/2024
MRS MADHURBHASHANI & ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Devna Soni, Mr.Jatin Sehgal,
Mr. Ashish Garg, Ms. Simran Bajaj
and Mr. Shubham Aggarwal,
Advocates.
versus
ARJUN LAL THR LRS .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Sajan Kr. Singh, Ms. Sangeeta
Singh, Mr. Hem Kumar and Ms. Sona
Singh, Advocates.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
J U D G M E N T
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI J.
By way of the present revision petitions filed under section
25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 („DRC Act‟) read with
section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 („CPC‟), the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 1 of 19
petitioners challenge similar but separate judgments dated 25.07.2013
passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Dwarka Courts,
New Delhi („ARC‟).
2. Notice on these petitions was issued on 26.02.2014 and 12.03.2014
respectively. Written submissions dated 26.02.2025 have been filed
by the petitioners in both the petitions. Written submissions dated
01.03.2025 and 28.02.2025 have also been filed by the respondents in
RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and RC. REV. No. 112/2014 respectively. No
reply has been filed in either of the petitions.
3. The court has heard Ms. Devna Soni, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners; as well as Mr. S.C. Singhal, learned counsel appearing
for the respondent in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and Mr. Sajan Kr. Singh,
learned counsel appearing for the respondent in RC. REV. No.
112/2014, at length.
4. For the sake of completeness, it ought to be recorded that vide two
separate orders, both dated 20.08.2019, the legal representatives of
deceased respondent in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and deceased
respondent No.2 in RC. REV. No. 112/2014 were impleaded in the
present proceedings and amended memos of parties were taken on
record.
5. Furthermore, as recorded in order dated 29.04.2025, the additional
documents placed before this court in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 have
not been considered in the present revisional proceedings, since those
documents did not form part of the record before the learned ARC.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 2 of 19
FACTUAL MATRIX
6. Briefly, RC. REV. No. 95/2014 pertains to premises bearing No.
II/40/8, Dalip Singh Block, Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantonment, New
Delhi and RC. REV. 112/2014 pertains to premises bearing No.
II/40/9, Dalip Singh Block, Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantonment, New
Delhi respectively, which premises are presently fetching paltry rents
of Rs. 40/- per month each. As the record would show, both premises
have been in the occupation of the concerned respondents for the last
more than 50 years. The premises are stated to be old constructions
and no rent agreement is stated to have been executed between the
landlord and the tenant(s). Both the above-mentioned premises are
hereinafter, individually and jointly, referred to as the „subject
premises‟.
7. Two eviction petitions, both dated 17.04.2009, were filed by the
petitioners under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act seeking eviction of
the respondents (tenants) from the subject premises on the ground that
petitioner No.2, who runs 02 restaurants by the name of „Dhaba‟ in
London, United Kingdom bona-fidé requires the subject premises for
expanding his business in India.
8. The respondents filed their respective applications seeking leave to
defend, which applications came to be allowed vide orders dated
08.09.2009 and 17.11.2009 respectively passed by the learned ARC.
The eviction proceedings culminated in passing of the impugned
judgments dated 25.07.2013, which judgments, while acknowledging
the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 3 of 19
proceeded to dismiss the eviction petitions on the ground that the
petitioners had failed to prove that they had any bona-fidé
requirement for the subject premises.
9. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned ARC relied on the fact that
the petitioners are Non-Resident Indians („NRIs‟) who have been
residing outside India since the 1970s; and on the evidence of PW-
1/petitioner No.2 recorded on 22.05.2010, where he stated that given
the measurements of the subject premises, a restaurant cannot be run
from those premises alone. Furthermore, the learned ARC also
reasoned that petitioner No.1 (who is the mother of petitioners Nos. 2
and 3) cannot run a business due to her ill-health; and since petitioner
Nos. 2 and 3 are settled-in and are running their businesses in London
and Dubai respectively, the petitioners did not require the subject
premises for their “subsistence or survival”; and therefore their bona-
fidé requirement did not amount to being an “actual need”; and that
two of the eviction petitioners (petitioners Nos. 1 and 3) did not even
depose in the proceedings.
PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSIONS
10. Ms. Devna Soni learned counsel for the petitioners would submit, that
the learned ARC has failed to appreciate, that it is settled law that
tenants cannot dictate the terms of use of a tenanted property to their
landlords. In this regard, counsel has relied on the decision of a Co-
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 4 of 19
ordinate Bench of this court in Satya Pal Pathak vs. Vijay Kumar
Kaushik.1
11. Inasmuch as PW-1‟s statement dated 22.05.2010 is concerned, Ms.
Soni would argue that the learned ARC has only selectively
appreciated that statement, and in doing so, has erroneously
concluded that the petitioners do not have any bona-fidé requirement
for the subject premises. To substantiate this argument, learned
counsel has drawn attention of the court to the following excerpt of
PW-1‟s statement recorded on 22.05.2010
“… The tenanted premises has now fallen to my share out of
the ancestral property and I therefore want to use the same for
opening a restaurant in Delhi where I have been born and brought
up. It is incorrect to suggest that this eviction petition has only been
filed because the same has fallen to my share. According to me the
approximate measurement of the tenanted premises is 15′ X 12′. It
is correct that a restaurant cannot be run from this shop alone.
Vol. I can however run a take away/delivery joint from the said
shop….”
(emphasis supplied)
Ms. Soni accordingly would submit that the learned ARC has
failed to appreciate that even if the subject premises alone cannot be
used to run a sit-down restaurant, it can certainly be used to operate a
food take-away business or delivery joint, which is essentially like
running a restaurant. Counsel would further submit that the petitioners
have also filed proceedings seeking eviction of tenants from other
contiguous premises; and the combined size of these premises would
1
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8846
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 5 of 19
even allow the running of a full-fledged restaurant. To further
substantiate this argument, counsel has also drawn attention of this
court to the following excerpt of statement dated 17.09.2010 of PW-2,
who is the power of attorney holder of PW-1/petitioner No.2 :
“Q. How can Mr. Jonny Loyal run a restaurant business
from the tenanted shop which is having an area of 10X12 feet?
Ans. Mr. Jonny Loyal intends to start a take away business from
the tenanted shop and he also plans to merge all the three
tenanted shops for starting his restaurant business.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Insofar as the learned ARC‟s conclusion is premised on the
petitioners being NRIs and being well-established abroad is
concerned, Ms. Soni would place reliance on verdicts of the Supreme
Court in Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd vs. Vimalabai
Prabhulal,2 and Raghunath G. Panhale vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and
Co., 3 to argue that it is neither unnatural for a landlord to seek
eviction to expand his business; nor should a landlord necessarily be
on the verge of destitution to seek to establish his business. In this
regard counsel has also relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court
in Prativa Devi (Smt.) vs. T.V. Krishnan, 4 and Sarla Ahuja vs.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,5 to submit, that a landlord is free to
decide his own requirements and it is unnecessary to enquire into
“how else the landlord could have adjusted himself”.
2
(2005) 8 SCC 252
3
(1999) 8 SCC 1
4
(1996) 5 SCC 353
5
(1998) 8 SCC 119
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 6 of 19
13. Additionally, Ms. Soni would also cite a judgment of a Co-ordinate
Bench of this court in Satpal Singh Sarna vs. Satya Prakash
Bansal,6 to argue that an NRI need not settle in India nor return to
India permanently to show his bona-fidé requirement.
14. Upon being queried as regards the limited jurisdiction vested in this
court in a revision petition, learned counsel would place reliance on
Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani,7 to submit that though this court
would not ordinarily interfere in pure findings of fact arrived-at by the
learned ARC, such findings can however be set-aside if they are
based on a wrong legal premise. Learned counsel would also rely on
John Impex (P) Ltd. vs. Dr. Surinder Singh, 8 to argue that “the
scope of scrutiny in a rent revision would be more than a revision
petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
15. Ms. Soni would accordingly submit, that since the learned ARC has
dismissed the eviction petitions by enquiring into whether the
petitioners need to expand their business, and such enquiry is
impermissible in law as per the judgments cited, the impugned
judgments passed by the learned ARC deserve to be set-aside.
RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
16. On the other hand, Mr. S.C. Singhal, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent in RC.REV. No. 95/2014 would argue that the learned
ARC has justifiably rejected the eviction petitions, since the
6
2024 SCC OnLine Del 3005
7
(1999) 1 SCC 141
8
2006 SCC OnLine Del 1505
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 7 of 19
petitioners were unable to make-out a case of bona-fidé need even
after a full-dressed trial. In this regard, Mr. Singhal has principally
made the following 03 arguments :
16.1. First, that the petitioners are neither owners of the subject
premises nor are they landlords of the respondent;
16.2. Second, that the petitioners are NRIs and British passport
holders, who had migrated from India in the 1970s; and
16.3. Third, that the petitioners have themselves admitted in the
course of their deposition that a „restaurant‟ – which is their
pleaded bona-fidé requirement and which is fundamentally
distinct from a take-away/delivery joint – cannot be run from
the subject premises by reason of its small size. Furthermore,
the contention is that the petitioners have even admitted that
they “do not require the tenanted premises for any subsistence
and survival”.
17. Elucidating on the first prong of his argument, learned counsel for the
tenant would submit, that the subject premises forms part of a
residential building that was held by one Dalip Singh HUF; and the
father of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 had ceased to be a member of that
HUF prior to 1960. Furthermore, it is argued that a partition suit
pertaining to the residential building was disposed-of based on a
settlement agreement, and it is under such settlement that the
petitioners are claiming to be owners and landlords of the subject
premises; however, that settlement and disposal of the suit based
thereon cannot be said to be good in law, since it was entered withSignature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIKSigning Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 8 of 19
one Jasbir Singh Loyal, who was neither Karta nor Manager of the
HUF and an application challenging the decree passed in that suit has
already been moved by one Kuldeep Singh Loyal.
18. Inasmuch as the second and third arguments are concerned, Mr.
Singhal would submit that the petitioners are well-settled abroad, and
admittedly do not need the subject premises for their survival, and as
a result, their claimed bona-fidé need is merely a desire or want and
cannot be the basis for evicting statutorily protected tenants from the
subject premises. It has also been highlighted by counsel that
petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 did not even step-into the witness box to
prove their alleged bona-fidé requirement.
19. In this regard, learned counsel would also rely on the decision of the
Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Mahesh Chand Gupta (Dr),9
to submit that :
“the phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative
intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is
not taken note of by the rent control legislation”.
20. It has accordingly been argued that since the petitioners are well-
settled abroad and have not shown any intention of returning to or
settling in India, least of all for setting-up a business here, the learned
ARC has rightly rejected the eviction petitions.
21. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent would also emphasize the
limited scope of scrutiny available in the revisional jurisdiction. In
this behalf Mr. Singhal would rely on the decision of the Supreme
9
(1999) 6 SCC 222
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 9 of 19
Court in Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua,10 to submit that while
exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, the High Court is not to
substitute or supplant its views in place of those of the trial court.
22. Counsel would also rely on the Supreme Court decision in Sri Raja
Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar,11 to submit, that
findings of fact arrived-at by the Rent Controller ought not to be
interfered-with merely because the High Court does not agree with
those findings.
23. In the circumstances, Mr. Singhal would submit that the learned ARC
has correctly appreciated the evidence and material on record to
conclude that the petitioners‟ alleged bona-fidé requirement is only a
fanciful and whimsical desire; and that such a finding ought not to be
interfered-with by this court; and in his case the impugned judgment
deserves to be upheld.
24. Mr. Sajan Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
in RC. REV. No. 112/2014 has essentially adopted the submissions
made by Mr. Singhal and would call for dismissal of the present
revision petitions, on merits as well as on the ground that the scope of
these revisional proceedings is limited.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
25. Upon considering the arguments made on behalf of the parties, while
being conscious of the narrow scope of the revisional jurisdiction of
10
(2022) 6 SCC 30
11
(1980) 4 SCC 259
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 10 of 19
this court under section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this court is
persuaded by the aspects of the matter as discussed hereinafter.
26. First and foremost, this court notices the observations of the Supreme
Court in Ram Narain Arora, wherein the Supreme Court has held the
following :
“12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition
under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a
very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety
of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court
could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he
had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on
record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to
be interfered with, but (sic, if) in a given case, the finding of fact is
given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the
revisional court to interfere with such a matter. In this case, the
Rent Controller proceeded to analyse the matter that non-disclosure
of a particular information was fatal and, therefore, dismissed the
claim made by the landlord. It is in these circumstances that it
became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the matter and
then decide the entire question. We do not think that any of the
decisions referred to by the learned counsel decides the question of
the same nature with which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed
reference to them is not required.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. In fact the view taken in Ram Narain Arora has been re-articulated by
a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum
Corpn. Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh,12 in the following words :
“43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of
fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority12
(2014) 9 SCC 78Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIKSigning Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 11 of 19
because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from
the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the
evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these
Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from
any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority
below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of
the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or
misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed
to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law.
In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the
impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is
entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety
of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above.
However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or
propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court
shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate
or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts.
Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of
reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal.
Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is
according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned
before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. When the present cases are viewed in light of the aforesaid
observations of the Supreme Court, it is clearly discernible that the
learned ARC has attempted to foist his own assessment of whether the
petitioners could run a restaurant from the subject premises, by
holding that the size of the subject premises is too small to run a
„restaurant‟ [not even taking into account that there are contiguous
premises for which also the petitioners have filed eviction petition(s)].
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 12 of 19
The learned ARC has also ignored the deposition of PW-1/petitioner
No. 2 who had clarified, that while it may be true that it is not
possible to run a „restaurant‟ from the subject premises taken
individually, the petitioners may run a food take-away facility or
delivery joint from the subject premises; and, if the petitioners obtain
eviction of the other contiguous premises, they may yet be able to run
a sit-down restaurant from the combined premises.
29. Upon a meaningful reading of the eviction petitions and the
depositions of the petitioners‟ witnesses, it is clear that the bona-fidé
requirement that the petitioners are canvassing is, that since they are
engaged in the restaurant business in London, United Kingdom, they
would want to open a food-related business in Delhi, India which is
where they originally belong. Now, whether they are able to run a
full-fledged, sit-down restaurant or a smaller food take-away vend is
entirely the petitioners‟ prerogative; and the bona-fidés of their
requirement cannot be discounted based merely on the learned ARC‟s
assessment of whether a food business can be run from the subject
premises. This view taken by the learned ARC is flawed when tested
on the touchstone of the Supreme Court‟s observations in Ram Narain
Arora and Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
30. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has yet again articulated the
same position as referred-to above in its most recent judgment in
Kanhaiya Lal Arya vs. Mohd. Ehshan13 :
13
2025 SCC OnLine SC 432
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIKSigning Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 13 of 19
“10.The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit
premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is well
settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to
get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide
which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his
particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which
premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in
the suit for eviction.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. Next, the learned ARC has also accepted the respondents‟ contention
that since the petitioners had migrated from India in the 1970s and are
presently British passport holders and NRIs, and especially since they
have done well for themselves financially and do not require the
subject premises for their subsistence or survival, the requirement
cited in the eviction petitions is not bona-fidé but a mere desire, whim
or fancy which cannot be the basis for the respondents‟ eviction. This
view taken by the learned ARC is wholly uncalled-for and illegal
especially in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in
Raghunath G. Panhale, the relevant extract of which reads as follows:
“11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate
court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of
“need or requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or
compelling necessity”. According to them, if the plaintiff had not
permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not
resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any
means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to
an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the
proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it
nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get
possession of his premises for establishing a business…….”
(emphasis supplied)
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 14 of 19
32. Furthermore, it may be observed that the financial well-being of a
landlord, or the financial ill-health of a tenant, are not relevant
considerations while deciding an eviction petition under section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
33. In the impugned judgments, the learned ARC also records that it is
not considered necessary to delve into the question of availability of
suitable, alternate accommodation, observing that since the petitioners
had failed to make-out a case of bona-fidé requirement, there was no
need to delve into the other aspect of section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
Para 26 of the impugned judgments may be perused for this purpose :
“26. Suitable alternative accommodation: Once this Court
has reached to a conclusion that the requirement of the petitioners
in respect of tenanted shop is not bonafide and genuine then the
question whether the petitioners have any other suitable
accommodation available with them or not is not required to be
gone into.”
(emphasis in original)
34. However, now that this court is of the view that the petitioners have
been able to substantiate their bona-fidé requirement, the aspect of
availability of suitable, alternate accommodation must also be
assessed.
35. In this respect, it is seen that in their written statements filed in
response to the eviction petitions, the respondents had taken the plea
that the petitioners have not disclosed in the petition the “non-
availability of an alternate accommodation to them”. The respondents
had accordingly contended, that the petitioners had failed to plead that
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 15 of 19
they did not have any suitable, alternate accommodation available
with them.
36. Insofar as this last contention is concerned, suffice it to say, that in the
present circumstances, mere omission on the part of the petitioners to
specifically say that they have no other suitable, alternate
accommodation would not be fatal to their case. It is noteworthy that
nowhere in their written statements did the respondents even say that
the petitioners had any suitable, alternate accommodation available;
nor did the respondents give specifics of any suitable alternate
accommodation available.
37. In this view of the matter, it appears that nothing was brought on the
record of the learned ARC to show that the petitioners had any
alternate accommodation, muchless any suitable alternate
accommodation, available with them in Delhi. That aspect would
therefore not stand in the way of the petitioners being entitled to
recovery of possession of the subject premises from the respondents.14
38. For the sake of completeness, it may also be recorded that the
respondents had contended that the petitioners were not owners of the
subject premises, and that therefore they were not landlords. This
objection was based on the respondents‟ allegation that the petitioners
had acquired title to the subject premises under a family settlement
entered into in the course of a partition suit; and that the family
14
Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141, para 11
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 16 of 19
settlement and partition decree had been challenged by one of the
family members of the petitioners.
39. It must be noted that the learned ARC has categorically held that
landlord-tenant relationship stands admitted as between the petitioners
and the respondents; and the respondents have also admitted that they
were paying rent to the HUF of which the petitioners were a part.
40. As a result, the contention raised by the respondents against the
petitioners‟ title is also without merit, since regardless of the fate of
the challenge to the partition decree, the admitted position today is,
that the petitioners are entitled to the subject premises based on the
partition decree. It is long-settled that to seek eviction, all that a
landlord needs to show is that he enjoys rights to the demised
premises that are better than that of the tenant. The vesting of
absolute title to a premises in a landlord is not a prerequisite for
deciding an eviction petition. The scope of an eviction proceeding
does not warrant any further enquiry into this aspect. The
observations of the Supreme Court in Shanti Sharma vs. Ved
Prabha,15 may be noticed in this behalf :
“14.The word “owner” has not been defined in this Act and
the word „owner‟ has also not been defined in the Transfer of
Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the
appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership
in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon.
Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by
the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is15
(1987) 4 SCC 193Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIKSigning Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 17 of 19
more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons
who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the
land on some term from the government or the authorities
constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be
thought of that the legislature when it used the term “owner” in the
provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute
ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only
will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that
the term “owner” has to be understood in the context of the
background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of
the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But
at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain
circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement
is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been
permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase
“owner” thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is
contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and
lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he
should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction the only thing
necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is
the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning
of the term “owner” is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be
something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where
the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the
landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as
the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the
matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall
within the ambit of the meaning of the term “owner” as is
contemplated under this section…….”
(emphasis supplied)
41. This court is compelled to record, that while manning the Rent
Control Roster it has found that cases abound where very well-off
tenants enjoying financial prosperity persist in unjustly occupying
premises for decades on-end, paying pittance for rent, while in the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 18 of 19
process their landlords are forced into impecunious and desperate
circumstances, resulting from egregious misuse of an anachronistic
piece of legislation, namely the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
42. As a sequitur to the above discussion, this court deems it fit to set-
aside the impugned judgments, both dated 25.07.2013, passed by the
learned ARC in eviction petitions bearing Nos. E-32/09 and E-33/09.
Consequently, the eviction petitions are allowed and the petitioners
are entitled to evict the respondents from the subject premises and
obtain vacant, physical possession thereof, in accordance with law.
43. The revision petitions are disposed-of in the above terms.
44. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.
JULY 02, 2025
HJ/ss
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:ANJALI KAUSHIK
Signing Date:02.07.2025
14:36:00 RC.REV. 95/2014 & RC.REV. 112/2014 Page 19 of 19