Chattisgarh High Court
Jai Prakash Shukla vs The State Of Chhattisgarh on 3 July, 2025
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
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2025:CGHC:30297
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order reserved on : 03-04-2025
Order passed on : 03-07-2025
WPS No. 3773 of 2018
Jai Prakash Shukla S/o Late Shri G.P. Shukla, Aged About 58 Years
R/o Behind Sai Mandir, Danganiya, College Ward Raipur, P.S. D.D.
Nagar, Tahsil And District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
The State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of
Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya,
Naya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Petitioner : Mr. SC Verma through VC and Mr. Manharan Lal
Sahu, Advocates.
For Respondent : Mr. Ajay Pandey, Govt. Advocate.
Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey, J
C A V Order
This petition is filed for setting aside the order dated 25.1.2017
passed by the respondent denying monetary benefits of the
suspension period claimed by the petitioner as per Rule 10 of CG Civil
Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 .
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02. Case of the petitioner in brief is that while he was working as
Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Jaijaipur, a complaint was
filed under Section 200 of CrPC by one Shankar Lal Sahis alleging
misappropriation, embezzlement and illegality against the petitioner in
respect of the government fund received under the Employment
Guarantee Scheme. On 4.4.2014 charges under Sections 420, 467,
468, 471 read with 34 of IPC were framed against the petitioner by the
trial Court. Consequently, on 3.12.2014 (Annexure P/3) the respondent
issued an order of suspension of the petitioner without obtaining prior
permission or sanction for criminal prosecution of the petitioner.
However, on a petition CRMP No.656/2016 being filed by the petitioner,
this Court vide order dated 2.1.2017 (Annexure P/2) quashed the entire
criminal case and discharged him from the charges leveled against
him. Thereafter, the petitioner sought the monetary benefits for which
he is entitled as per Rule 10 of CG Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 {in short “the CCA Rules of 1966”) on
account of suspension order being declared illegal whereupon
impugned order dated 25.1.2017 (Annexure P/1) was passed by the
respondent observing that revoking the suspension of the petitioner his
services are immediately repatriated to his parent department i.e.
Social Welfare Department and treating the subsistence allowance
extended to him during suspension period as sufficient, reckoned the
suspension period as service period for all practical purposes.
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03. On 9.3.2017 the petitioner further moved a representation before
the respondent and prayed for monetary benefits in view of Rule 10 of
the CCA Rules of 1966 vide Annexure P/5. He made a similar
representation on 28.8.2017 also to the respondent vide Annexure P/6.
Thereafter, the respondent initiated proceedings for consideration of
claim of the petitioner vide letter dated 6.11.2017 (Annexure P/7).
However, the respondent/department refused to grant monetary
benefits to the petitioner on the ground that he did not submit
application for joining his services within time whereas the petitioner on
19.12.2014 had duly submitted his joining letter and joined his services
vide Annexure P/8. Hence on 6.4.2018 (Annexure P/9) the petitioner
again submitted a representation before the respondent for payment of
monetary benefits of the suspension period but of no avail. Hence this
petition for the following relief:
“10.1 That, this Hon’ble Court may be kind enough in issuing a
writ, order/directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or
likewise any other appropriate writ commanding and directing the
respondent to produce all the records concerning with the present
case.
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may be kind enough in issuing a
writ, order/directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or
likewise any other appropriate writ, commanding and directing the
respondents to quash the order Annexure-P/1 as bad in law. The
petitioner may kindly be awarded the complete monetary benefits
for illegal suspension period.
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10.3 That, this Hon’ble Court may be kind enough in issuing a
writ, order/directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or
likewise any other appropriate writ commanding and directing the
respondent to declare the suspension period of the petitioner and
his illegal suspension period, in view of the Rule 10 of
Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rule 1966.
10.4 That, this Hon’ble Court may be kind enough in issuing a
writ, order/directions in the nature of mandamus. certiorari or
likewise any other appropriate writ, commanding and directing the
respondent-State to initiate appropriate recovery proceedings
against the erring officers and Mr. Shankar Lal Sahis who had
lodged a false and frivolous complaint against the petitioner,
particularly when the petitioner was not at all appointed at
relevant point of time and he was not at all concerned with the
crime concerned.
10.5 That, this Hon’ble Court may be kind enough in issuing a
writ, order/directions in the nature of mandamus, certiorari or
likewise any other appropriate writ commanding and directing to
award just and proper compensation to the petitioner along with
all the monetary service benefits for illegal suspension period.
10.6 Any other relief, which the Hon’ble Court deems fit and
proper looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, may
also be granted.”
04. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the
impugned order of Annexure P/1 is passed contrary to the provisions of
Rule 10 of the CCA Rules,1966 and as such untenable in the eyes of
law and liable to be set aside. The respondent/State ought to have
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initiated recovery as also criminal proceedings against complainant Mr.
Shankar Lal Sahis for the losses suffered by the petitioner due to filing
of false and frivolous complaint against him as the petitioner was not at
all posted at the relevant time when the embezzlement was committed.
The petitioner not only suffered monetary loss but also suffered
mentally on account of these false allegations. The respondent/State
also ought to have initiated appropriate criminal proceedings against
the erring officials who did not seek any permission under Section 197
of CrPC for criminal prosecution of the petitioner which adversely
affected the service prospects of the petitioner. Therefore, the instant
petition deserves to be allowed and the petitioner be granted the relief
claimed.
Reliance has been placed on the order dated 10.7.2018 passed
by this Court in WPS No.3463/2010 in the matter of Vyas Narayan
Pandey Vs. State of CG and others and the order date 9.7.2021
passed in WPS No.994/2010 in the matter of Shankar Lal Soni (dead)
through LR Vs. State of CG and others.
05. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the
contention of the petitioner would argue that the petitioner cannot claim
monetary benefits for the period when he did not work. Mere quashing
of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would itself not make
the suspension period illegal and entitle the petitioner for monetary
benefits of the said period, therefore, his claim has rightly been
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rejected by the respondent. As regards recovery proceedings against
complainant Mr. Shankar Lal Sahi and direction for awarding
compensation to the petitioner, the same cannot be granted in exercise
of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it falls
within the domain of the competent civil Court. Thus, the present
petition being devoid of any substance is liable to be dismissed.
06. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
07. It is not disputed in this case that the petitioner was appointed at
Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Jaijaipur and was
suspended on the basis of institution of criminal case No.244/09 which
was later quashed by this Court in CrMP No.656/2016 filed by the
petitioner. The main objection of the respondent is that for the period
during which the petitioner was under suspension and did not work, he
is not entitled for any monetary benefits and he has no legitimate right
for claiming monetary benefits of this period. As per the respondent,
mere quashing of criminal proceedings against the petitioner would
itself not make the suspension period illegal and the petitioner entitled
for entire monetary benefits as claimed.
08. This Court in the matter of Shankar Lal Soni, dead through LR
(supra) referring to various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
observed in paras 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 & 36 of the order as under:
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“31. The principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ is based upon a
fundamental concept in a Law of Contact of Employment namely
wages and salary are paid by the employer in consideration of
work / service rendered by the employee. ‘No Work No Pay’
principle has been laid down keeping in view public interest that
a Government servant who does not discharge his duty is not
allowed pay and arrears at the cost of public exchequer. (See
Union Territory, Chandigrh v. Brijmohan Kaur, (2007) 11 SCC
488).
32. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Bihar and
others v. Kripa Nand Singh and another (2014) 14 SCC 375
has observed that ‘No Work No Pay’ is the rule and ‘No Work Yet
Pay’ is the exception. It was pointed out that exception would
apply only when employee is compelled (compulsory waiting
period) not to attend his duty without any violation or without any
fault on his part.
33. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh
and others v. Madhav Prasad Sahrma (2011) 2 SCC 212 has
held that principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ cannot be applied as a
rule of thumb. Full back wages in certain circumstances may be
justified particularly when promotion is wrongly denied.
34. Similarly, in the matter of Commissioner, Karnataka
Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah (2007) 7 SCC 689 the Supreme
Court has reiterated that principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ is not
absolute in a given case, if it is that the person was willing to
work but he was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so, the
Court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him
all benefits considering “as if he had worked”.
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35. In the considered opinion of this Court, the principle of ‘No
Work No Pay’ would not be applicable where the rule expressly
direct otherwise like sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental
Rules, which clearly provides that the Government servant who
had been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired has been
fully exonerated, shall be paid full pay and allowances to which
he would have been entitled, had he not been dismissed,
removed or compulsorily retired, but subject to proviso to subrule
(2) of Rule 54 and if the termination of the proceedings instituted
against the Government servant had been delayed due to
reasons directly attributable to the Government servant, but in
that case also, the amount determined under proviso to sub-rule
(2) shall not be less than the subsistence allowance and other
allowances admissible under Rule 53, as such, when the rule
expressly provides for grant of full pay and allowances on full
exoneration of the Government servant from punishment/criminal
charges, the principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ would have no
application and said principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ would not
override sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the the Fundamental Rules
which provides full pay and allowances on full exoneration.
36. Coming to the facts of the instant case in light of aforesaid
legal analysis, though the original petitioner has been honourably
acquitted from criminal charges by this Court and it has been
clearly stated by this Court while acquitting the petitioner that he
is an honest officer, he is innocent and he has been trapped in
criminal case by deceitful means, as such, it is also established
that he was honourably acquitted from criminal cases levelled
against him and that amounts to “fully exoneration” within the
meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules
and therefore, by virtue of said Rules, the petitioner is entitled for
full pay and allowances from 1.11.1994 to 31.1.2003 as the
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authority competent to order reinstatement did not say that the
petitioner was responsible for delay in termination of the
proceedings, as such, proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the
Fundamental Rules would not be applicable, on the other hand,
the authority competent to direct reinstatement while considering
under sub-rule (1) of Rule 54 held that on account of principle of
‘No Work No Pay he is not entitled for full pay and allowances
from 1.4.1994 to 31.1.2003, which the authority could not have
directed in view of mandatory provisions contained in sub-rule
(2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules. Two options were
available to the authority competent to direct reinstatement on
the petitioner’s full exoneration from criminal charges either firstly
to pay full pay and allowances in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 54
or secondly in case according to him proviso to sub-rule (2) of
Rule 54 is applicable, then he would be entitled for amount not
less than the subsistence allowance and other allowances
admissible under Rule 53 and no third option of invoking
principle of ‘No Work No Pay’ was available to the authority
competent to direct reinstatement to the petitioner in teeth of
sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules, as such, the
State Government is absolutely unjustified in holding that the
petitioner is not entitled for pay and allowances from 1.11.1994
to 31.1.2003 on the principle of ‘NO Work No Pay’, which is
absolutely without jurisdiction and without authority of law and it
is held that the petitioner is entitled for full pay and allowances as
per sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 as it is not the case of the State
Government that he was responsible for any delay in which
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 can be applied.”
09. In the present case also it is clear that the petition CRMP
No.656/2016 filed by the petitioner against the criminal charges leveled
10
against him, was allowed by this Court vide order dated 2.1.2017
(Annexure P/2) quashing the entire criminal prosecution of the
petitioner and he was discharged of all the charges. This Court
observed in paras 22 and 23 of its order as under:
“22. If we look into the judicial pronouncements referred to in the
preceding paragraphs, the land-mark judgment in case of Bhajan
Lal (supra) clearly enunciates the principle, that even if the entire
contents of the charge-sheet are taken on its face value and
accepted in its entirety, there was no prima facie material to
constitute offence against the Petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court also held that with the uncontroverted allegation made in
the complaint or FIR and the evidence which have been
collected during the course of the investigation do not disclose
commission of any offence or that the available material in the
charge-sheet if any prudent person cannot reach to a conclusion
there being sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused,
the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of
CrPC would be justified in quashing the proceeding so as to
prevent misuse of process of law.
23. The Criminal Misc. Petition thus deserves to be and is
accordingly allowed. The criminal prosecution so far as the
Petitioner is concerned in Criminal Case No. 157 of 2013 stands
quashed and he is discharged from the charges levelled against
him.”
10. From the above, it is clear that the petitioner is discharged from
all the criminal charges leveled against him and that amounts to full
exoneration within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 of the
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Fundamental Rules and therefore, by virtue of such rule and in light of
aforesaid order of this Court and the guidelines of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on the subject matter, the petitioner is entitled for full
pay and allowances of the suspension period as it not the case of the
respondent/State that the petitioner was in any manner responsible for
delay in termination of the proceedings in which event the proviso to
sub-rule (2) of Rule 54 can be applied.
11. On the basis of aforesaid discussion and observation, para 4 of
the impugned order dated 25.1.2017 (Annexure P/1) is hereby set
aside to the extent that the petitioner is entitled for full pay and
allowances of the suspension period after deduction of the subsistence
allowance. The respondent/State is directed to make this payment to
the petitioner within 60 days from the date of passing of this order. The
writ petition stands allowed to the above extent. No order as to cost.
Sd/
(Rajani Dubey)
Judge
Digitally signed
by MOHD
MOHD AKHTAR
KHAN
AKHTAR Date:
KHAN 2025.07.03
16:37:20
+0530
Khan