Macrotech Developers Limited vs Anuya Sunil Murkar And Ors on 3 July, 2025

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Bombay High Court

Macrotech Developers Limited vs Anuya Sunil Murkar And Ors on 3 July, 2025

Author: N. J. Jamadar

Bench: N. J. Jamadar

2025:BHC-AS:26580
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                                                                              Arun Sankpal



                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 13282 OF 2024


               Macrotech Developers Private Limited                         ..Petitioner
                    Versus
               Anuya Sunil Murkar & Ors                                 ...Respondents


               Mr. Amogh Singh, with Rahul Arora & Akash Gupta, i/b Jeet Gandhi,
                     for the Petitioner.
               Mr. Shailendra S. Kanetkar, for the Respondent.

                                  CORAM:                  N. J. JAMADAR, J.
                                  RESERVED ON :           30th JUNE 2025
                                  PRONOUNCED ON:          3 JULY 2025


               JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the

learned Counsel for the parties, heard finally.

2. The Petitioner is aggrieved by a judgment and order dated 7 th

November 2023, passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small

Causes in Miscellaneous Appeal Nos. 81 of 2023 and 86/2023, whereby

while partly allowing the Appeal, preferred by the Petitioner

(Miscellaneous Appeal No. 81 of 2023), the Appellate Bench directed

Defendant No.8/proposed Defendant No.9 to deposit an amount of

Rs.50,000/- per month with effect from 3 rd October 2022, towards the

Temporary Alternate Accommodation charges for Respondent No.1-
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original Plaintiff and to furnish solvent surety of Rs.50,000/-, for the

due compliance of the directions contained in the said order.

3. Respondent No.1 instituted the Suit for a declaration that the

Respondent No.1 and Sindhu Shivalkar (D1) were jointly entitled to

tenancy rights and have equal right, title and interest in the suit

premises. Late Raman Rajwadkar, her father was the tenant of the suit

premises of which Defendant Nos. 2 to 7 were the original landlords.

The Defendant No.8 has subsequently acquired interest in the suit

premises and has illegally issued the rent receipts in the joint names of

late Raman Rajwadkar and the Defendant No.1. The Plaintiff was in

joint possession of the suit premises. However, the Defendant No.1 has

unlawfully put another lock to the suit premises. Thus, the Plaintiff

sought declaratory and injunctive reliefs.

4. An Application for temporary injunction was filed in the said Suit.

By an order dated 4th August 2023, the learned Judge, Court of Small

Causes, was persuaded to allow the Application and restrain the

Defendant No.8 and/or proposed Defendant No.9, the Petitioner herein,

from demolishing the suit premises, from acting upon the Permanent

Alternate Accommodation Agreement dated 3rd October 2022 executed

in favour of original Defendant No.1, and also direct the Defendant

No.1 to deposit in Court the monetary consideration, which has been

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received by Defendant No.1 from the Defendant No.8 and/or proposed

Defendant No.9.

5. Being aggrieved, the Petitioner as well as Defendant No.1

preferred Miscellaneous Appeals before the Appellate Bench.

6. By the impugned order, the Appellate Bench was persuaded to

partly allow the Appeal preferred by the Petitioner, to the extent of

setting aside the order completely restraining the Defendant

No.8/proposed Defendant No.9 from demolishing the suit premises and

carrying out the development. The Appellate Bench, however, directed

Defendant No. 8/proposed Defendant No.9 to deposit an amount

Rs.50,000/- per month, with effect from 3rd October 2022, till the

deposit of the keys of the new premises in lieu of the suit premises,

towards Temporary Alternate Accommodation charges for the Plaintiff.

7. Mr. Amogh Singh, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, would

urge that the Appellate Bench has fixed the quantum of transit

rent/charges towards the Temporary Alternate Accommodation in an

arbitrary manner. The Appellate Bench, in terms, recorded that there

was no material on the basis of which it could determine the interim

transit rent. Yet, by misconstruing the contention of the Petitioner that it

had incurred expenses to the tune of Rs.30 Crores towards the transit

rent and other charges for about 265 tenants, fixed transit rent at the

Rs.50,000/- per month. The Petitioner had already paid a sum of

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Rs.4,52,000/- to the Defendant No.1 towards the transit rent and other

charges, like the amount paid to other tenants. The transit rent has been

paid to all other tenants at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per month. The

Petitioner has already paid the transit rent for two years and other

charges to Defendant No.1, who was certified by MHADA as tenant, and

also in possession of the suit premises. Hence, the direction for payment

of transit rent at the exorbitant rate of Rs.50,000/- per month is clearly

penal imposition on the Petitioner and discriminatory also as all other

tenants have been paid transit rent at the rate of Rs.18,000/- per

month. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set

aside to the extent it directs payment of transit rent to the Plaintiff at

the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month.

8. Mr. Singh placed reliance on the copies of the letters and receipts

evidencing payments to Defendant No.1 and other tenants, to bolster up

the submission that all other tenants have been paid transit rent at the

rate of Rs.18,000/- per month.

9. In opposition to this Mr. Kanetkar, the learned Counsel for the

Respondent Nos. 1 to 5, would submit that the Petitioner made no effort

to place any material before the Appellate Bench. Thus, the Petitioner

cannot be permitted to assail the legality and correctness of the

impugned order on the basis of the material which is placed before this

Court, for the first time, and of which the Appellate Bench had no

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benefit. Therefore, the Petitioner be directed to approach the Trial Court

and satisfy the Trial Court regarding the factum of payment to the

Defendant No.1 and payment of transit rent at the rate of Rs.18,000/-

per month to the other tenants. The alleged PAAA is silent about the

payment of transit rent. Moreover, the said agreement was executed by

Defendant No.1 in breach of an interim order not to enter into any

agreement.

10. Mr. Kanetkar would urge, in any event, the Appellate Bench has

taken care to provide that the direction is of interim nature and it was

open for the parties to adduce evidence during the trial so that the Trial

Court can determine the appropriate amount towards Temporary

Alternate Accommodation charges. Thus no interference is warranted in

the impugned order, urged Mr. Kanetkar.

11. The challenge in this Petition is confined to the directions by the

Appellate Bench to pay transit rent / temporary alternate

accommodation charges to the Plaintiff, especially the quantum thereof.

The Appellate Bench, as is evident from the impugned order, found

itself not equipped with the material to determine the reasonable rate at

which the transit rent ought to be ordered to be paid by Defendant No.8

/ proposed Defendant No.9. The Appellate Bench, thus, considered it

appropriate to base its determination on the contentions in the affidavit

in reply of proposed Defendant No.9 that, it had spent around Rs.30

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Crores towards the payment of two years advance rent, shifting etc. for

265 tenants. Thus, the entitlement per tenant was computed at

Rs.47,700/- p.m. On such prima facie appraisal, the Appellate Bench

was persuaded to determine the charges towards temporary alternate

accommodation at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per month.

12. Whether the aforesaid approach of the Appellate Bench is

justifiable ? For an answer, it is necessary to note the prima facie

findings which the Appellate Bench recorded as regards the dispute

between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. It was found, the Plaintiff has

made out a prima facie case that she was one of the heirs of original

tenant; Plaintiff was in joint possession of the suit premises; defendant

No.1 had entered into agreement with Defendant No.8/proposed

Defendant No.9 in breach of an injunction order and the question as to

whether Defendant No.1 was certified by MHADA as a tenant and

occupant of the suit premises, was debatable. Thus, the Plaintiff was

entitled to receive the benefits emanating from the redevelopment in

her capacity as one of the joint tenants with Defendant No.1.

13. The Appellate Bench, however, found that the order restraining

the demolition and redevelopment of the property in which the suit

premises was situated, could not be sustained as it had the propensity to

cause prejudice to third parties. In its endeavour to protect the rights

of the Plaintiff, the Appellate Bench fashioned the aforesaid remedy.

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14. To the extent of enforcement of the rights qua Defendant No.1

and the protection thereof by appropriate interim orders, the approach

of the Appellate Bench cannot be faulted at. However, the aspect of the

nature of the liability of Defendant No.8 /proposed Defendant No.9

cannot be lost sight of. The proposed developer cannot be saddled with

the liability far beyond the contractual obligations with the co-tenants

who are similarly circumstanced. Nor can disputes inter se Plaintiff

and Defendant No.1, who have, in a sense, unity of possession and

community of interest in one demised premises, make the developer

liable to satisfy the claim of the joint tenants, independently. The

liability of the developer to pay transit rent and other charges qua each

unit, in accordance with the terms of the contract, would be one and

indivisible.

15. Ordinarily, the transit rent is to be paid to a person who is

dishoused from the premises in the wake of redevelopment. Thus, the

contention on behalf of the Petitioner that it entered into PAAA with

Defendant No.1 as Defendant No.1 was allegedly certified as the tenant

by MHADA and also in possession of the subject premises cannot be

brushed aside completely as an act in derogation of the contractual

obligations of the proposed Defendant No.9.

16. In the case at hand, proposed Defendant No.9 claimed that he

had already paid a sum of Rs.4,52,000/- to the Defendant No.1 like

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other co-tenants. It is true, to substantiate the said claim, the Petitioner

tendered the documents, before this Court.

17. Mr. Kanetkar was justified in advancing criticism against the

reliance on the said documents, for the first time, before this Court.

However, the Court cannot loose sight of the fact that it does not appear

that the Appellate Bench had put the parties to notice that while

modifying the order of the Trial Court, it proposed to fix the transit rent.

Therefore, the failure on the part of the Petitioner to place those

documents on record before the Appellate Bench cannot be arrayed

against the Petitioner.

18. In the circumstances of the case, having regard to the fact that

the Appellate Bench had determined the transit rent on the basis of the

contentions in the affidavit in reply by resorting to an estimate of the

expenditure per tenant, and, conversely, the Petitioner has placed on

record documents, which prima facie lend credence to the Petitioner’s

version that the transit rent has been paid @ Rs.18,000/- per month

and the amount has already been disbursed to Defendant No.1, in my

considered view, the issue warrants determination based on

investigation into facts. The parties deserve an opportunity to produce

the documents to substantiate their contentions.

19. Moreover, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the Petitioner

had already paid the transit rent to Defendant No.1, then the aspect of

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appropriate orders qua Defendant No.1 in the nature of directions to

bring back the said amount or portion thereof, may also warrant

determination.

20. For the foregoing reasons, I deem it in the fitness of things to

remit the application for temporary injunction back to the Trial Court,

for the limited purpose of determining the rate at which the transit

rent / temporary alternate accommodation charges are to be paid by the

Petitioner/proposed Defendant No.9, and, whether the Petitioner has, in

fact, paid the said amount to Defendant No.1, and, if yes, to pass

consequential orders so as to balance the equities between the Plaintiff

and Defendant No.1. The Petition, therefore, deserves to be partly

allowed.

21. Hence, the following order :

ORDER

(i) The Writ Petition stands partly allowed.

(ii) The directions contained in clause 1(b) of the impugned order

dated 7 November 2023, stands quashed and set aside.

(iii) Injunction notice (Exh.56) stands remitted back to the Trial Court

for afresh determination :

(a) of the rate at which the temporary alternate

accommodation charges be paid by Defendant No.8 / proposed

Defendant No.9.

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(b) whether the Petitioner has already paid the temporary

alternate accommodation and other charges to Defendant No.1, and, if

that is the case, to pass appropriate orders so as to balance the equities

between Plaintiff and Defendant No.1.

(iv) Learned Judge, Court of Small Causes, shall allow the parties to

file further Affidavits and/or documents in support of their respective

contentions and shall decide the aforesaid issue after providing an

effective opportunity of hearing to the parties, as expeditiously as

possible, and, preferably, within a period of four months from the date

of communication of this order.

(v) By way of abundant caution, it is clarified that the aforesaid

observations are confined to determine the legality, propriety and

correctness of the impugned directions and this Court may not be

understood to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.

                           (vi)       Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

                           (vii) No costs.



                                                                           [N. J. JAMADAR, J.]




Signed by: S.S.Phadke                                            10/10
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 03/07/2025 18:05:17
 



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