Himachal Pradesh High Court
Hans Raj And Another vs Cr. Revision No. 244 Of 2019 on 3 July, 2025
2025:HHC:21080
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision Nos. 245, 244, 249 and
.
462 of 2019
Reserved on: 24.04.2025
Date of Decision: 03.07.2025.
1. Cr. Revision No. 245 of 2019
Hans Raj and another …Petitioners
2.
State of H.P.
r to
Versus
Cr. Revision No. 244 of 2019
...Respondent
Vakil Ram ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
3. Cr. Revision No. 249 of 2019
Hans Raj and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
4. Cr. Revision No. 462 of 2019
Gian Chand ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
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Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
.
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate,
with Mr. R.P. Raina, Advocate, for
the petitioner in Cr. Revision No.
245 of 2019, Mr. R.P. Raina,
Advocate, for the petitioner(s) in
Cr. Revision Nos. 244 and 249 of
2019 and M/s Narinder Sharma and
Suraj Sharma, Advocates, for the
petitioner in Cr. Revision No. 462 of
2019.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General, for the
respondent-State, in all the
petitions.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revisions are directed against the order
dated 22.3.2019, vide which the learned Trial Court ordered the
framing of charges as under: –
Sr. No. Name of the accused Offence/Sections
1. Hans Raj S/o Sh. Munshi 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Ram, R/o Village Hatli, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
P.O. Draman, Tehsil Prevention of Corruption Act.
Bhatiyat, District
Chamba, H.P.
2. Purshotam Chand S/o 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Sh. Ved Prakash, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Village Dhanoa, P.O. and Prevention of Corruption Act.
Tehsil Badoh, District
Kangra, H.P.
.
3. Vakil Ram S/o Sh. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Munshi Ram, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
Village Sachuien, Tehsil Prevention of Corruption Act.
Bharmour, District
Chamba, H.P.
4. Hans Raj S/o Sh. Madho 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Ram, R/o Village Moda, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
Tehsil Salooni, District Prevention of Corruption Act.
Chamba, H.P.
5. Om Raj S/o Sh. Bidhia 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Ram, R/o VPO Jasur, of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
Tehsil Nurpur, District Prevention of Corruption Act.
Kangra, H.P.
6. Rajinder Kumar S/o Sh. 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Sarba Nand, R/o of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
Mohalla Hardaspura, Prevention of Corruption Act.
Tehsil and District
Chamba H.P.
7. Tilak Raj S/o Sh. Dumnu 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B
Ram, R/o Village of IPC and Section 13(2) of the
Dhampu, P.O. Saru, Prevention of Corruption Act.
Tehsil and District
Chamba, H.P.
8. Gian Chand S/o Sh. 120-B of IPC and Section 13(2)
Chaman Lal, R/o Village of the Prevention of
Dehra, Tehsil and Corruption Act.
District Chamba, H.P.
(The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as
they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revisions are that the police presented a challan before the
.
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 379, 120-B, 420, 467, 468,
and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 33 of the Indian
Forest Act (Forest Act) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (PC Act). It was asserted that the informant,
Divisional Forest Officer, Chamba, noticed the illicit felling of
trees in Lot bearing No. 1/2013-15, comprising 1016 salvage trees
in Chandruni Dhar DPF Almi Beat, Kundehal Block of Upper
Chamba Range. This forest was handed over to the Forest
Working Division, H.P. State Forest Development Corporation
Limited, Chamba, for the felling of salvage-marked trees. The
trees were marked with Hammer No. C/A 2012-13/3 during
November 2012. The informant received a telephonic message
from the Director, HPSFDC, Dharamshala on 14.11.2014 regarding
the illicit felling. Range Officer, Upper Chamba and Assistant
Manager, HPSFDC, Chamba inspected the area and found that 12
trees of Fir/Spruce were illicitly felled. A damage bill of
₹3,53,375/- was issued to the Divisional Manager, FWD, Chamba.
Another Committee headed by ACF, Chamba, Forest Division
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inspected the forest area and reported that 88 numbers of trees
(Deodar 13, Fir/Spruce 75) were illicitly felled. A damage bill of
.
₹67,50,727/- was issued. The police registered the FIR and
constituted a Special Investigation Team. The police seized
various documents and inspected the jungle in the presence of
forest officials. The counting could not be completed because of
excessive snowfall. The police seized various documents
regarding the allotment and the work carried out by the forest
contractor. The police also found a report prepared by Nek Raj and
signed by Gehra Ram, Om Kumar, Uttam Chand, Baldev Ram,
Chattar Singh, Darshan Singh, Jeshi Ram and Contractor Dev Raj,
in which no illicit felling was reported. These were sent to FSL for
comparison with the specimen admitted signatures and were
found to have been signed by the persons mentioned in the
report. The Special Investigation Team carried out the
demarcation and counting of the illicitly felled trees and found
that the number of illicitly felled trees was much more than
reported. 1843 trees of different categories were felled in Lot No.
1/2013-2015. The police also seized the samples of stumps, trees
and the timber lying on the spot. These were also sent to the FSL,
and the reports matched each other.
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3. It was found after the investigation that Gehra Ram
was In-charge of Lot No.7/9-10, Lot No. 6/9-10 and Lot No. 1/13-
.
15. He supervised the work of felling. He was to ensure that no
illicit felling took place and to report any illicit felling to the
higher authorities. He signed the report prepared by Nek Raj, in
which no illicit felling was reported. This false report was
prepared to benefit the Forest contractor.
4. It was found after the investigation that Hans Raj was
assigned the additional charge of Chamba Unit. He, Om Raj,
Rajinder Kumar and Tilak Singh were directed to report the illicit
felling carried on the spot in Lot No.1/13-15. He issued a report
dated 25.11.2014 in which 12 trees of Rai Tos Species were shown
to have been illicitly felled, and 662 trees of different species duly
marked and hammered were felled. However, 1843 trees of
different species were felled till November 2014, out of which 438
stumps (402 green and 36 dried) were hammered. 1402 stumps
did not have any hammers, and three stumps were burnt. He
prepared a false report showing that only 12 trees were cut, and
failed to mention the illicitly felled 1843 trees.
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5. Purshotam Chand was In-charge of Lot N. 1/13-15. He
signed the report prepared by Nek Raj, Forest Guard, stating that
.
no illicit felling was found by the Committee till 29.5.2014. A false
report was prepared because 1843 trees were felled.
6. Gian Chand was posted as a Beat Officer in the Forest
Department. He had prepared an incorrect Monthly Progress
Report showing that only 12 trees were felled and no green tree
was marked as cut in the forest. 1804 trees were illicitly felled and
removed, which caused a loss of ₹9,46,59,044/- to the State.
7. Vakil Ram was posted as Range Officer, Chamba. Lot
No. 1/12-13 was allotted during his tenure. 1909 trees were
marked. He verified the marking list. He issued a certificate
stating that no dry tree remained for marking in the Jungle. He
forwarded an application filed by Baldev Prasad for allotting a
marking hammer. The marking hammer was allotted by the DFO
on 3.11.2012. 1016 trees were marked in Lot No. 1/13-15. He failed
to check the trees on the spot and forwarded the marking list
without verification. He was supposed to check 25% of the
marked trees, and his lack of supervision led to the loss of
₹9,46,59,044/-.
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8. Hans Raj, son of Madho Ram, Om Raj, Rajinder Kumar
and Tilak Raj, was given additional charge of the Chamba Unit.
.
They were directed to report the illicit felling vide order dated
19.11.2014. They showed only 12 trees of Rai Tos were illicitly
felled, whereas 662 of all different species were illicitly felled,
duly marked and hammered. It was found during the
investigation that 1843 trees of different species were felled till
November 2014, out of which 438 stumps were hammered. 1402
stumps were not hammered, and 03 stumps were burnt.
9. Learned Trial Court held that the Court had to see a
prima facie case while framing the charge. The findings regarding
guilt or innocence were not required to be recorded. The material
collected by the prosecution had to be accepted as correct. No
full-fledged inquiry is to be conducted into the matter, and the
evidence is not to be weighed as if the trial were being conducted.
The material on record made out a prima facie case against the
accused for the commission of charged offences.
10. Being aggrieved by the orders framing charges, the
petitioners filed separate revision petitions assailing the orders. It
was asserted in the petitions filed by Hans Raj and Purshotam
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Chand that the illicit felling was noticed by the Director (North) of
the Corporation, but no action was taken. As per the agreement,
.
recourse was to be had to arbitration to recover the damages.
Petitioners and other persons were made accused under the
political influence. The material collected by the prosecution,
even assuming to be correct, will not lead to the conviction of the
accused. No theft was committed, and Section 379 of the IPC was
wrongly invoked.
r The DM, Chamba, claimed a sum of
₹91,03,994/- from Mangi Ram. Lot No. 1/2013-15 was located at a
high altitude, which was covered with snow. It was inaccessible,
and no theft of trees or timber could be committed by any person.
No person intended to take away the Government property. One
FIR was registered and three separate challans were prepared,
which is contrary to the provisions of the law. There was no
evidence of the conspiracy. The markings were not made in the
trees allotted in the earlier lot. Ram Pal Sharma, ACF, sent a letter
dated 28.11.2014 mentioning the list of 134 trees; however, this
list did not form part of the record. The information under the
Right to Information Act was sought to be produced under Section
91 of Cr.P.C., but the same was not taken on record. The statement
of Kirpa Shanker recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is contrary to
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the statement of Ram Pal Sharma, which made the prosecution’s
case highly suspicious. The quantity of timber to be extracted as
.
per the agreement was fixed as 1317 M3 by converting 1016 trees.
The converted volume was shown as 1295.17 M3 after felling 1843
trees, which shows that the number of trees felled was more than
marked. It cannot be reconciled with the volume extracted by the
Forest Contractor. Joint Committee Report shows that 39 trees of
sapling (no class), 286 trees of Class-5, 692 trees of Class-4 and
452 of Class-3, a total of 1469 trees, measuring 11 cms to 40 cms
in diameter, were felled. The felling of these trees was not
beneficial to the Labour Supply Mate. This type of timber is
generally used by the shepherds to cross the rivulets (nallahs). As
per the report, the hammer used for marking the trees was
destroyed on 15.12.2014, which would have an adverse effect on
the trial. Baldev Parshal, the Deputy Range Officer, was alleged to
be marking the trees wrongly, and the possibilities of wrong
marking in the present case could not be ruled out. The sale
proceeds belong to the Government, and it was not the case of the
prosecution that the contractor had taken the trees away. The
petitioners were the Chairman or Members of different
Committees. They completed the work assigned to them with
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great zeal. The Divisional Manager did not find fault in the report
prepared by the petitioners. The learned Trial Court failed to
.
apply its mind; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside.
11. Almost similar pleas were taken in the petitions filed
by Hans Raj, Om Raj, Rajinder Kumar and Tilak Raj. It was
asserted that a damage bill of 12 illicit trees worth ₹3,53,375/-
was issued. Another bill of ₹67,50,727/- was sent to the
Divisional Manager, Forest Corporation, for felling 88 trees.
These bills were not accepted. The illicit feeling came to the notice
of higher authorities like the Director (North) of the Corporation,
but no action was taken. The agreement between the Forest
Corporation and Labour Supply Mate Shubh Karan provided for
the arbitration. FIR could not have been registered in the present
case. The area was inaccessible, and it was not possible to carry
out the extraction. There were contradictions in the statements of
witnesses. No person benefited from the felling of the trees. The
Divisional Manager filed a false complaint to save himself. The
investigation was not properly carried out. Relevant documents
were not produced. The allegations against the petitioners could
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have been made subject matter of the inquiry, but no criminal
case could have been registered based on these allegations.
.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the charges framed by the learned Trial Court be quashed.
12. Similar pleas were taken in the petition filed by Vakil
Ram.
13.
In the petition filed by Gian Chand, it was asserted that
the ingredients of the Sections were not satisfied. The petitioner
held four assignments and was not in a position to have direct
supervision. He was dependent upon the report/information
furnished by his subordinates. There is no evidence of a meeting
of the minds. No theft was committed, and Sections 379 of the IPC
and Section 33 of the Forest Act were wrongly mentioned. The
penalty could be recovered from the Forest Contractor violating
the conditions of the agreement. The petitioner was never
interrogated to explain his position. The hammer was destroyed.
Baldev was habitual of marking the wrong trees or not marking
the trees, and the possibility of wrong marking/non-marking in
the present case could not be ruled out. Therefore, it was prayed
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that the present petition be allowed and the charges framed by
the learned Trial Court be quashed.
.
14. I have heard Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel,
assisted by Mr. R.P. Raina, learned counsel for the petitioners in
Criminal Revision No. 245 of 2012, Mr. R.P. Raina, learned counsel
for the petitioners in Criminal Revision Nos. 244 and 249, and
M/s Narinder Sharma and Suraj Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2012, and Mr.
Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the
respondent/State, in all the petitions.
15. Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 245 of 2012 submitted that
the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The
material collected by the prosecution, even if accepted to be true,
does not make out a case for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 379 of the IPC. No person committed
the theft of any tree. The trees of diameter 11 to 45 cms were
alleged to have been felled but it is not economical to fell the trees
of such small diameters. The possibility of the Shepherds felling
the trees to cross the rivulet cannot be ruled out. The area is
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inaccessible, and even the police could not reach it due to the
snowfall. There is no possibility of the commission of theft in
.
these circumstances. Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate
these aspects. An application for producing the documents on
record was filed under Section 91 of Cr.P.C., which was wrongly
rejected by the learned Trial Court. There is no evidence of
conspiracy. The allegations made against the petitioner can give
rise to a departmental proceeding and not to a criminal case.
Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate this aspect. Therefore, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order passed
by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
16. Mr. R.P. Raina and Mr. Narinder Sharma, learned
counsel, adopted these submissions.
17. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the Court is not
to sift the evidence and is to see a prima facie case while framing
the charges. The accused has no right to produce the document at
the stage of framing the charges, and the learned Trial Court had
rightly rejected the application to this effect. The contradictions
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are not to be weighed at this stage. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petitions be dismissed.
.
18. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1582 that the Court framing the charges has to see a
prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material
threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be
convicted or not. It was observed:-
12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of
charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and
at this stage, the probative value of materials on recordneed not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier
decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som NathThapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal
Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to
be made by the court at the stage of framing of the chargeis to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also
held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to
form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual
ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not
expected to go deep into the probative value of the material
on record and to check whether the material on record
would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.
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20. This position was reiterated in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther
v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, wherein it was
.
observed:
16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section
227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted therewith
and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there isno sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused,
he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for
doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge, the
court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis ofthe materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is
required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient
grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words,
the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to
initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be sothat at the end of the trial, the accused may still be
acquitted. At the stage of discharge, the court is only
required to consider as to whether there are sufficientmaterials which can justify the launch of a criminal trial
against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at ahigher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of
the trial process, may be for a technicality or on the benefit
of doubt, or the prosecution could not prove the chargeagainst the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it
means that there are no materials to justify the launch of a
criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged,
he is no longer an accused.
21. The present petitions have to be adjudicated as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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22. It was submitted that the accused had filed an
application under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. for producing the
.
documents, which was wrongly rejected by the learned Trial
Court. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilip Singh Kishor
Singh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that the Judge has to examine
the evidence collected by the prosecution while framing a charge
and determine whether or not sufficient grounds exist to proceed
against the accused based on the material placed before him or
not. The accused does not have any right to produce the
documents at the time of framing charges. It was observed: –
“7. It is trite law that the application of judicial mind is
necessary to determine whether a case has been made outby the prosecution for proceeding with trial, and it would
not be necessary to dwell on the pros and cons of thematter by examining the defence of the accused when an
application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial
judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by theprosecution in order to determine whether or not the
grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on
the basis of the charge sheet material. The nature of the
evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency
or the documents produced in which prima facie reveal that
there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so
as to frame a charge, would suffice, and such material
would be taken into account for the purposes of framing
the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused necessarily, the accused would be
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presuming that the accused has committed the offence
which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed.
.
8. At the time of framing the charge and taking cognisance, the
accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the
court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any
right to the accused to file any material or document at thestage of framing of the charge. The trial court has to apply its
judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to
determine whether a case has been made out by the
prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet materialonly.
9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge-
sheet material at the stage of framing the charge, whichmight drastically affect the very sustainability of the case,
it is unfair to suggest that such material should not beconsidered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main
intention of granting a chance to the accused of making
submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr.
P.C. is to assist the court in determining whether it is
required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the
Code limits the ambit of such hearing to oral hearing andoral arguments only, and therefore, the trial court can
consider the material produced by the accused before theI.O.
10. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of
considering an application for discharge the court mustproceed on an assumption that the material which has been
brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate
said material in order to determine whether the facts
emerging from the material taken on its face value,
disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the
offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N.
Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709, adverting to the earlier
propositions of law laid down on this subject has held:
“29. We have bestowed our consideration on the rival
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2025:HHC:21080Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of
consideration of the applications for discharge, the
court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution
or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order.
to find out whether or not the allegations made are
groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is
trite that at the stage of consideration of anapplication for discharge, the court has to proceed
with an assumption that the materials brought on
record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the
said materials and documents with a view to find outwhether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their
face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the
probative value of the materials has to be gone into,and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant
a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be
considered is whether there is a ground for
presuming that the offence has been committed andnot whether a ground for convicting the accused has
been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed theoffence on the basis of the materials on record on its
probative value, it can frame the charge; though forconviction, the court has to come to the conclusion
that the accused has committed the offence. The law
does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.”
11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the
stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression
“the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be
understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by
the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the
accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the
charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the
material produced by the investigating agency.” (Emphasis
supplied)
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23. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly rejected
the application for producing the documents on record.
.
24. It was submitted that one FIR was registered, and the
learned Trial Court erred in entertaining three separate challans.
This submission is not acceptable. Section 218 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that for every distinct offence of
which a person is accused, there shall be a separate charge, and
every such charge shall be tried separately. Section 219 of the
Cr.P.C. provides an exception to this principle and reads that a
person accused of more offences than one of the same kinds
committed within a space of 12 months from the first to the last
of such offences may be charged with and tried at one trial for any
number of them not exceeding three.
25. Thus, the normal rule is that every offence of which a
person is charged is to be tried separately. The exception is that
the offences committed within a space of twelve months can be
tried together by taking recourse to Section 219 of Cr.P.C. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Nasib Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 89: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 361: 2021 SCC OnLine SC
924 that Section 218 provides for the separate trials and Sections
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219 to 223 provide exceptions to this rule. It was observed at page
117:
.
35. Chapter 17 CrPC, 1973 deals with “the charge”. Part A,
comprising of Sections 211 to 217, is titled “form of
charges”. Part B, comprising of Sections 218 to 224, istitled “joinder of charges”.
36. Section 218 provides as follows:
“218. Separate charges for distinct offences.–(1) For
every distinct offence of which any person is accused,there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge
shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an
application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate is
of the opinion that such person is not likely to be
prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together all
or any number of the charges framed against such
person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation
of the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 218 stipulates first, that there
must be a separate charge for every distinct offence of
which any person is accused and second, that every such
charge must be tried separately. However, under the
proviso, where the person accused makes a request in
writing to the Magistrate and the latter is of the opinion
that such person is not likely to be prejudiced, the
Magistrate may try all or any of the charges framed against
the person together. Sub-section (2) of Section 218
stipulates that nothing in sub-section (1) would affect the
operation of the provisions of Sections 219 to 221 and 223.
37. Section 219(1) stipulates that when a person is accused
of more than one offence of the same kind of offences, all
of which are committed within the space of twelve months
whether in respect of the same person or otherwise, he
may be charged with and tried at one trial for up to three of
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them. Sub-section (2) of Section 219 provides that offences
are of the same kind when they are punishable with the
same amount of punishment under the same section of the
IPC or of any special or local law.
.
26. A similar view was taken in State of Jharkhand v. Lalu
Prasad Yadav, (2017) 8 SCC 1: (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 569: 2017 SCC
OnLine SC 551 wherein it was observed at page 23:
“28. Section 219 CrPC provides that three offences of the
same kind within a year may be charged together. When a
person is accused of more offences than one of the same
kind committed within a period of one year, he may be
charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number ofthem not exceeding three of the same kind of offence
under Section 219(1). Section 219 is reproduced hereunder:
“219. Three offences of the same kind within a year may
be charged together.–(1) When a person is accused ofmore offences than one of the same kind committed
within the space of twelve months from the first to the
last of such offences, whether in respect of the sameperson or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one
trial for, any number of them not exceeding three.
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are
punishable with the same amount of punishment under
the same section of the Penal Code, 1860 or of anyspecial or local laws:
Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an
offence punishable under Section 379 of the Penal Code,
1860 shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind
as an offence punishable under Section 380 of the said
Code, and that an offence punishable under any section
of the said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be
deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt
to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an
offence.”
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29. It is apparent from Section 212 read with Section 219
that there have to be separate trials for different years
covering the period of more than one year. The same kind
of offence is a different thing from the “same offence” for.
the purpose of Sections 219, 220 or 300. The scheme of law
is clear that separate charges for distinct offences must be
framed separately, and they cannot be clubbed together for
more than one year.
30. This Court in Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of
Bombay [Natwarlal Sakarlal Mody v. State of Bombay, (1963)
65 Bom LR 660: 1964 Mah LJ 1: 1964 MP LJ 1 (SC)] considered
the question of joint trial of persons and offences for
conspiracy as per provisions contained in Section 239(d) of
the old CrPC. This Court has laid down that a separate trial
is the rule and a joint trial is an exception. Joint trial would
be an irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows
innumerable offences spread over a long period of time and
committed by a large number of persons to be under the
protecting wings of an all-embracing conspiracy, and if
each or some of the offences can be separately tried, it
would be appropriate and lawful. Joint trial prolongs the
trial and causes waste of judicial time and complicates the
matter, which might otherwise be simple, and it would
confuse the accused and cause prejudice to them. The court
should not be overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy
for a number of offences unless it is satisfied that the
persons who committed separate offences were parties to
the conspiracy and committed the separate acts pursuant
to the conspiracy. This Court has laid down thus: (Bom LR
p. 666)
“This discussion leads us to the following legal
position. Separate trial is the rule, and joint trial is an
exception. While Section 239 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure allows a joint trial of persons and offences
within defined limits, it is within the discretion of the
Court to permit such a joint trial or not, having regard to
the circumstances of each case. It would certainly be an
irregular exercise of discretion if a court allows an
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innumerable number of offences spread over a long
period of time and committed by a large number of
persons under the protecting wings of an all-embracing
conspiracy, if each or some of the offences can
.
legitimately and properly form the subject-matter of a
separate trial; such a joint trial would undoubtedly
prolong the trial and would be a cause of unnecessary
waste of judicial time. It would complicate matters
which might otherwise be simple; it would confuse the
accused and cause prejudice to them, for more often
than not accused who have taken part in one of the
minor offences might have not only to undergo the long
strain of protracted trial, but there might also be the
likelihood of the impact of the evidence adduced in
respect of other accused on the evidence adduced
against him working to his detriment. Nor can it be said
that such an omnibus charge or charges would always
be in favour of the prosecution for the confusion
introduced in the charges and consequently in the
evidence may ultimately benefit some of the accused, as
a clear case against one or other of the accused may be
complicated or confused by the attempt to put it in a
proper place in a larger setting. A Court should not be
overzealous to provide a cover of conspiracy for a number of
offences unless it is clearly satisfied on the material placed
before it that there is evidence to prove prima facie that the
persons who committed separate offences were parties to
the conspiracy and they committed the separate acts
attributed to them pursuant to the object of the said
conspiracy.” (emphasis supplied)
31. This Court in Ranchhod Lal v. State of M.P. [Ranchhod
Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1965 SC 1248: (1965) 2 Cri LJ 253] has
also considered the question of joint trial in the case of
criminal breach of trust. It has been observed that the
normal rule is that there should be a charge for each
distinct offence. The Court is authorised to lump up the
various items with respect to which criminal breach of
trust was committed and to mention the total amount
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misappropriated within a year in the charge. When so
done, the charge is deemed to be the charge of one offence.
This Court has laid down that a separate trial with respect
to each distinct offence of criminal breach of trust with
.
respect to an individual item is the correct mode of
proceeding with the trial of an offence of criminal breach
of trust. This Court has laid down thus: (AIR p. 1250, paras
14-16)
“14. Section 222 CrPC reads:
‘222. Particulars as to time, place and person. –(1) The
charge shall contain such particulars as to the timeand place of the alleged offence, and the person (if
any) against whom, or the thing (if any) in respect of
which, it was committed, as are reasonably sufficientto give the accused notice of the matter with which
he is charged.
(2) When the accused is charged with criminal breach of
trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, it shall
be sufficient to specify the gross sum in respect ofwhich the offence is alleged to have been committed,
and the dates between which the offence is alleged to
have been committed, without specifying particularitems or exact dates, and the charge so framed shall be
deemed to be a charge of one offence within themeaning of Section 234:
Provided that the time included between the first and
last of such dates shall not exceed one year.’
Sub-section (2) is an exception to meet a certain
contingency and is not the normal rule with respect to
framing of a charge in cases of criminal breach of trust.
The normal rule is that there should be a charge for each
distinct offence, as provided in Section 233 of the Code.
Section 222 mentions what the contents of the charge
should be. It is only when it may not be possible to
specify exactly particular items with respect to which
criminal breach of trust took place or the exact date on
which the individual items were misappropriated or in::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2025 21:20:58 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21080some similar contingency, that the Court is authorised
to lump up the various items with respect to which
criminal breach of trust was committed and to mention
the total amount misappropriated with a year in the.
charge. When so done, the charge is deemed to be the
charge of one offence. If several distinct items with
respect to which criminal breach of trust has beencommitted are not so lumped together, no illegality is
committed in the trial of those offences. In fact, a
separate trial with respect to each distinct offence of
criminal breach of trust with respect to an individualitem is the correct mode of proceeding with the trial of
an offence of criminal breach of trust.
15. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied on
Section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and urged
that three offences of criminal breach of trust could
have been tried at one trial as Section 234 provides that
when a person is accused of more offences than one of
the same kind committed within the space of twelve
months from the first to the last of such offences,
whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be
charged with, and tried at one trial for any number of
them not exceeding three. This again is an enabling
provision and is an exception to Section 233 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. If each of the several offences is
tried separately, there is nothing illegal about it. It may
also be mentioned that the total number of items
charged in the four cases exceeded three.
16. Lastly, reference was made, on behalf of the
appellant, to Section 235 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and it was urged that all these offences were
committed in the course of the same transaction, and
therefore, they should have been tried at one trial.
Assuming, without deciding, that these offences could
be said to have been committed in the course of the
same transaction, the separate trial of the appellant for
certain specific offences is not illegal. This section, too,
is an enabling section.”
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xxxxx
38. Section 218 deals with separate charges for distinct
offences. Section 219 quoted above provides that three
.
offences of the same kind can be clubbed in one trial,
committed within one year. Section 220 speaks of a trial for
more than one offence if it is the same transaction. In the
instant case, it cannot be said that defalcation is the same
transaction as the transactions are in different treasuries
for different years, different amounts, different allotment
letters, supply orders and suppliers. Thus, the provision of
Section 221 is not attracted in the instant case. There are
different sets of accused persons in different cases with
respect to defalcation.
27. In the present case, the offences were committed in
different years and could not have been tried together. They were
to be tried separately, and the prosecution was entitled to file one
charge sheet in respect of the offences committed within a space
of twelve months. Therefore, no exception can be made out for
filing three charge sheets.
28. It was submitted that no theft was committed, and
Section 379 of the IPC was wrongly added. This submission is not
acceptable. Section 378 of the IPC defines theft as taking any
movable property dishonestly out of the possession of another
without his consent, and the movement of the property to such
taking. Explanation-I provides that a thing, so long as it is
attached to the earth, not being movable property, is not the
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subject of the theft, but it may be capable of being the subject of
the theft as soon as it is severed from the earth. Explanation-II
.
provides that a moving effected by the same act which affects the
severance may be a theft. Illustration (a) to Section 378 of IPC
reads that if ‘A’ cuts down the tree on Z’s ground with the
intention of dishonestly taking the tree out of Z’s possession
without Z’s consent. Here, as soon as ‘A’ has severed the tree to
such taking, he has committed the theft.
29. Thus, it is apparent that the cutting of a tree is
sufficient to constitute theft. It was held by this Court in State of
H.P. Vs. Prem Singh ILR 1989 HP 172, that when the accused cut the
trees from the forest belonging to the State, the offence
punishable under Section 379 of the IPC was proved. In the
present case, the prosecution has come with the specific case that
the accused had cut the trees from Chandruni Dhar Jungle, and
these allegations are prima facie sufficient to attract Section 379
of the IPC.
30. Section 33 of the Forest Act deals with the felling of
the trees reserved under Section 30 of the Forest Act. It was
specifically stated in the FIR that the illicit felling was carried out
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in Chandruni Demarcated Protected Forest, which means that the
notification under Section 30 of the Forest Act was issued.
.
Therefore, prima facie, the provisions of Section 33 of the Forest
Act are attracted to the present case.
31. It was submitted that there is a provision of
arbitration in the agreement, and recourse could not be had to the
criminal law. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Trisuns Chemical
Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686: 2000 SCC (Cri) 47 that
the availability of the remedy of arbitration is no ground to quash
the criminal proceedings. It was observed at page 690:
“9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that the
provision incorporated in the agreement for referring thedisputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence.
Arbitration is a remedy for affording relief to the party
affected by a breach of the agreement, but the arbitratorcannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an
offence, albeit the same act may be connected with the
discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence,
those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down
the complaint at the threshold itself. The investigating
agency should have had the freedom to go into the whole
gamut of the allegations and to reach a conclusion of its
own. Pre-emption of such investigation would be justified
only in very extreme cases as indicated in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426].”
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32. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his
celebrated book Learning the Law (Tenth Edition, Stevens and Sons)
.
that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal
liability. The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil
liability. The distinction between the two is not the nature of the
act but the nature of the proceedings that are taken to seek
redressal. It was observed:
“The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though
capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is inessence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that
the distinction does not reside in the wrongful act itself.
This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the
same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong.
Occasionally, at a bus station, there is someone who makes
a living by looking after people’s impedimenta while they
are shopping. If I entrust my bag to such a person, and he
runs off with it, he commits the crime of theft and also twocivil wrongs–the tort of conversion and a breach of his
contract with me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two
sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against him: a
prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort andthe breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter
action will not get damages twice over merely because he
has two causes of action; he will get only one set of
damages.)
To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to
dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the
right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his
carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to
amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the tort
of negligence towards the victims of the accident and their
dependents and a breach of his contract with the Railway::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2025 21:20:58 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21080Executive to take due care in his work. It will be noticed
that this time, the right of action in tort and the right of
action in a contract are vested in different persons.
.
These examples show that the distinction between a crime
and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is
done, because what is done may be the same in each case.
The true distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature ofthe wrongful act but in the legal consequences that may
follow. If the wrongful act is capable of being followed by
what are called criminal proceedings, that means that it is
regarded as a crime (otherwise called an offence). If it iscapable of being followed by civil proceedings, that means
that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being
followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong.
Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case)easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the
outcome is different, and the terminology is different.”
33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer
Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942,
that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as, the
criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no
ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed:
“34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as
well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is
available may not be a ground to quash criminal
proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no
criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with
the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The
other accused, Rajan Kumar, has died.”
34. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra
Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625, wherein it was observed: –
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“13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the
dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not
allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our
opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case both.
civil suit and criminal complaint would be maintainable
although the cause of action for both the proceedings is the
same.”
35. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Puneet Beriwala Vs. State 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983 that simply
because a remedy is provided under the civil law cannot lead to an
inference that recourse cannot be had to the criminal law or that
the civil law remedy is the only remedy available to the parties. It
was observed:
28. It is trite law that the mere institution of civil
proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold
that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in
various judgments, has held that simply because there is aremedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by
itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is theonly remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in
any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court.
This Court is of the view that because the offence was
committed during a commercial transaction, it would not
be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a
further investigation and, if necessary, a trial. [See: Syed
Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi
Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee Kun Hee v. State of UP, (2012)
3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8
SCC 686]
36. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show
that the trees were illicitly felled, which constitutes the
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commission of a cognizable offence. Therefore, the prosecution
was within its right to file criminal proceedings before the
.
learned Trial Court.
37. It was submitted that there are contradictions in the
statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.
The hammer was also destroyed. These submissions will not help
the petitioners. The Court is not to sift the evidence at the stage of
framing the charges. It has to see a prima facie case. Hence, the
contradictions between the statements of two witnesses are not
sufficient to discharge a person when the other material on
record shows the prima facie involvement of the petitioners.
38. It was submitted that there is no evidence of any
conspiracy, and the charges under Section 120-B of the IPC were
wrongly framed. This submission cannot be accepted. The offence
of criminal conspiracy cannot be proved by direct evidence, as it
is impossible to collect any direct evidence of the conspiracy in
most cases. The Court has to draw an inference from the
circumstances proved on record. In the present case, the
allegations in the FIR show that the wrong reports were prepared.
The trees were stated to be existing when, in fact, the trees had
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been cut and removed. This was done to benefit the contractor.
These allegations prima facie show the conspiracy between the
.
accused and the learned Trial Court had rightly framed the
charges for committing the conspiracy.
39. It was submitted that the area was inaccessible, as is
evident from the report of the police, in which it was mentioned
that the investigation could not be carried out because of the
snowfall. Therefore, in these circumstances, the petitioners
cannot be faulted for not visiting the spot. It was also submitted
that the charge of multiple areas was given to the petitioner-Gian
Chand, and he had to depend upon the report of the subordinate
officials. These submissions will not help the petitioners. The
petitioners did not express their inability to carry out the
inspections due to the snowfall or the larger area. They signed
and submitted the reports, which were found to be incorrect.
Therefore, they cannot escape from the liability on the ground
that the area was inaccessible or a large area was put under their
charge.
40. The inspection report shows that the forest officials
failed to carry out the supervision, and when they were asked
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specifically to report about the felling, they prepared the wrong
reports showing that no illicit felling had taken place or that the
.
number of trees illicitly felled was less than the actual number.
These wrong reports were submitted to the higher officials, and
the State was deprived of the value of the trees that it would have
gained by the submission of the correct reports. Therefore, the
charges were rightly framed for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
41. The Forest officials prepared the wrong reports to
benefit the Forest contractor. In this manner, they abused their
official position to benefit a private person, and the charges
under the Prevention of Corruption Act were rightly framed.
42. The charges were also framed for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC
for submitting the wrong reports. These offences deal with the
forgery of documents. The term forgery has been defined in
Section 463 of the IPC as under:
“463. Forgery.–Whoever makes any false documents or
electronic record part of a document or electronic record
with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any
person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any
person to part with property, or to enter into any express or::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2025 21:20:58 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21080implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that
fraud may be committed, commits forgery.”
43. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to
.
make a false document before he can be said to have committed
forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of the
IPC. It reads as under:
464. Making a false document.–A person is said to make a
false document or false electronic record.
First.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently–
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or
r part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part
of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic
record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a
document or the authenticity of the electronic
signature,with the intention of causing it to be believed that such
document or part of a document, electronic record
or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed,
executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of aperson by whom or by whose authority he knows that it
was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or
Secondly.–Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document or an electronic record in any material part
thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed
with electronic signature either by himself or by any other
person, whether such person be living or dead at the time
of such alteration; or
Thirdly.–Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any
person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an::: Downloaded on – 03/07/2025 21:20:58 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21080electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any
electronic record knowing that such person by reason of
unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by
reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know.
the contents of the document or electronic record or the
nature of the alteration.
44. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
929: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1594 that the prosecution is required to
prove that the accused had forged a document by creating a false
document to establish the offence of forgery. A false document is
when a document is executed claiming to be executed by someone
else or authorised by someone else, or a document is tampered
with, or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It was
observed at page 756: –
“14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it
divides false documents into three categories:
1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently
makes or executes a document with the intention ofcausing it to be believed that such document was made or
executed by some other person, or by the authority of
some other person, by whom or by whose authority he
knows it was not made or executed.
2. The second is where a person dishonestly or
fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document in any material part, without lawful authority,
after it has been made or executed by either himself or any
other person.
3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently
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2025:HHC:21080knowing that such person could not by reason of (a)
unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception
practised upon him, know the contents of the document or
the nature of the alteration.
.
In short, a person is said to have made a “false document”, if
(i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone
else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or
tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by
practising deception, or from a person not in control of his
senses.
15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant clearly and
obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of
“false documents”. It therefore remains to be seen whether
the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds
by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the
land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with
the intention of taking possession of the complainant’s land
(and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and
stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution
and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case
under the first category.”
45. In the present case, the Forest officials signed the
reports in their name. It was not asserted that the signatures of
some other persons were forged. The documents may be false as
they are popularly understood; however, there is a distinction
between a document whose contents are false and a false
document as is understood in law. Therefore, these allegations
are not sufficient to constitute the offences punishable under
Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC.
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46. It was submitted that the contractor was not likely to
benefit from the felling of small trees, and the trees might have
.
been felled by the shepherds for laying the bridges over the
rivulets. These submissions involve factual disputes, which
cannot be adjudicated while considering the prayer for discharge.
47. No other point was urged.
48.
Therefore, the order passed by the learned Trial Court
framing charges is partly sustainable.
49. In view of the above, the present revisions are partly
allowed, and the order passed by the learned Trial Court framing
charges for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 467, 468, 471 of IPC is set aside, while the rest of the
order passed by the learned Trial Court is upheld.
50. The record of the learned Trial Court be returned.
51. The observation made hereinabove shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
3rd July, 2025
(Chander)
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