Srinwati Mukherji vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 4 July, 2025

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Bombay High Court

Srinwati Mukherji vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 4 July, 2025

2025:BHC-AS:26973

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                                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                                 WRIT PETITION NO. 424 OF 2025
                              Srinwati Mukherji                                   Petitioner
                              Age - 45 years;
                              Temporarily residing at :
                              3C - 1407 Mhada Complex, Prem Nagar,
                              S.V. Road, Goregaon, Mumbai - 400 104.
                                          Versus
                         1) State of Maharashtra;                                 Respondents
                         2) Prateek Thukral
                            Age - 55 years;
                            Residing at : Mapsko Casa Bella Tower,
                            N-2, Apartment 601 Sector 8,
                            Gurugram, Haryana - 122 004;
                         3) Anil Thukral
                            Age - 41 years;
                         4) Ranjana Thukral,
                            Age - 39 years;
                            Both 3 and 4 Residing at J8, 128,
                            Rajouri Garden, New Delhi 110 027
                            and
                            1/80, Paschim Vihar,
                            New Delhi - 110 027.
                                                       .....
                         Mr.Archit Jaykar a/w. Ms.Bhoomi Upadhyay, Advocate for the
                         Petitioner.
                         Mrs.Dhanlakshmi S. Krishnaiyar, APP for Respondent - State.
                         Mr.Raghavendra S. Mehrotra a/w. Mr.Irfan Shaikh, Mr.Maddhat
                         Shaikh and Mohini Tekale i/b. M/s.Lawkhart Legal, Advocate
                         and Legal Consultants, Advocate for Respondent Nos.2 and 4.
                                                      .....

                                    CORAM                   : MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.
            Digitally
            signed by
            RAJESHRI
   RAJESHRI PRAKASH                 RESERVED ON             : 18th JUNE, 2025.
   PRAKASH AHER
   AHER     Date:                   PRONOUNCED ON           : 4th JULY, 2025.
            2025.07.05
            11:02:51
            +0530
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JUDGMENT :

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith.

2. Writ Petition is taken up for final disposal with the consent

of parties.

3. The Petitioner by this Petition is seeking directions to the

Respondent No.2-husband to pay remaining two installments

for the “Shared Household”, or such other amount as is payable

to the developer towards the balance consideration in respect of

a flat admeasuring 1029 square feet carpet area situated at

Malad West, Mumbai. This prayer is made claiming to be under

Section 2(s) i.e. “Shared Household”, as defined under the

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

(hereinafter referred to as, “the DV Act“, for brevity).

4. The Petitioner is challenging the order dated 19.10.2024

passed by the Sessions Judge at Dindoshi, Borivali Division,

Goregaon, Mumbai, in Criminal Appeal No.150 of 2024, thereby

confirming the order dated 03.06.2024, passed by the

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 24th Court, Borivali,

Mumbai, (hereinafter referred to as “ACMM”, for brevity) in CC
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No.182/DV/2022. Both the Courts have refused to entertain the

prayer made by the Petitioner on the ground that, such prayer

cannot be granted since the flat i.e. the “Shared Household” is

only booked and not in possession of either of the parties,

therefore it cannot be considered as a “Shared Household”, as

defined under Section 2(s) of the DV Act.

5. The case of the Petitioner in the nutshell is that, the

Petitioner who was residing at Kolkata married to Respondent

No.2 on 11.05.2013. After her marriage, she shifted in

Maharashtra and started residing at Thane alongwith

Respondent No.2 in a rented premises. According to her, she

was subjected to physical and emotional domestic violence by

Respondent No.2. In the year 2019, Respondent No.2 shifted to

Seattle in United States of America (USA). He was working as a

Senior Software Development Engineer at Amazon Luna.

6. During his stay in the USA, Respondent No.2 had indulged

in adulterous relationship with other woman. In February 2020,

Respondent No.2 returned to Mumbai and the Petitioner and

Respondent No.2 attempted to reconcile their relationship. She

agreed to give a chance to their marriage, on the assurance

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given by Respondent No.2 that he would permanently shift to

Mumbai and would settle down and they would start their own

family. As a gesture of commitment, the Respondent No.2 had

executed an registered “Agreement for Sale” of a Flat No.5704

admeasuring 1029 sq. ft. carpet area, situated at Tower 3, Auris

Serenity Guriya Pada, Malad West, Mumbai. The total

consideration of the flat, was Rs.3,52,00,000/-. A loan of

Rs.3,24,00,000/- was availed by Respondent No.2 from HDFC

Bank, Malad West Branch, Mumbai.

7. After that Respondent No.2 returned to USA in March

2020. In 2021, Petitioner and Respondent No.2 were residing in

a rented flat in Silver Oak Apartment, Lourdes Colony, Malad

West, Mumbai. However, while residing together, it is alleged

that Respondent No.2 would get angry and threatened to stop

making payment towards rent, electricity etc., and he would

often ask the Petitioner to go back to Kolkata and reside with

her parents. It is during this period, fed up with the behaviour of

Respondent No.2, the Petitioner filed DV complaint against

Respondent No.2 in May 2022.

8. On 02.02.2023, an interim order was passed by the

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ACMM, 24th Court, Borivali, Mumbai, directing Respondent No.2

to pay an amount of Rs.45,000/- per month as interim

maintenance from the date of application. Though, Respondent

No.2 was paying rent of the flat of Rs.34,000/- per month

alongwith the maintenance charges of Rs.45,000/-, upto May

2022, no sooner the DV complaint was filed, Respondent No.2

stopped paying the rent for the Malad flat from June 2022. She

was not in a position to continue to pay the rent as a result, she

fell into arrears of rent over a year. To clear the pending dues,

she was forced to sell her car and subsequently vacated the

rented premises in February 2024.

9. Though order of interim maintenance was passed on

02.02.2023, the Respondent No.2 continued to disobey the

interim order of maintenance. Therefore, the Petitioner was

constrained to file an application for issuance of distress

warrant. Accordingly on 06.07.2023, a distress warrant came to

be issued by ACMM, which was also served on Respondent No.2,

who was then residing at Seattle in USA. In the meanwhile, as

per the schedule of payment, the 7 th installment of

Rs.52,32,000/- inclusive GST and TDS became due and payable

to the Developer in January 2024. Considering that the

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Petitioner’s name is shown as a joint owner, the developer sent a

demand letter to the Petitioner.

10. In response to the E-mail, Respondent No.2 sent an E-mail

to the Developer’s representative alleging that, the Petitioner

had cheated on him, hence, he was not interested to purchase

the flat. Respondent No.2 unilaterally and arbitrarily asked the

developer to sell the flat to someone else. The Petitioner

immediately apprised the Developer about the pendency of the

DV complaint and the non-compliance of the interim order by

Respondent No.2.

11. Apart from the application for issuing of lookout notice

against Respondent No.2. The Petitioner has also filed an

application, for directions to the employer of the Respondent

No.2, to pay the arrears of interim maintenance alongwith

future interim maintenance. In the interregnum, the HDFC

Bank, from whom Respondent No.2 had availed the loan,

contacted the Petitioner and insisted that she should pay the

installments, which were due on behalf of Respondent No.2. In

the meanwhile, Respondent No.2 has made ad-hoc payment of

Rs.4,00,000/- to the Petitioner, towards the arrears of interim

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maintenance against the due and payable sum of Rs.6,85,000/-.

On receiving the notice from the Developer for cancellation of

Agreement for non-receipt of installments within 30 days, an

application was moved for urgent hearing of the interim

application seeking directions to the Respondent-husband to

pay the remaining two EMIs of the flat or direct the employer of

Respondent-husband to pay the balance consideration to the

developer.

12. After hearing the Interim Application at length on

04.05.2024. The ACMM passed an order on 03.06.2024 thereby

refusing to entertain the prayer Clauses (a) and (b) of the

Application. Prayer Clause (b) was for directions to Respondent

No.2 to pay balance consideration to the developer, which was

rejected. However, Prayer clause (c) came to be granted,

thereby restraining Respondent No.2 from creating any third

party interest in the shared household. The Petitioner preferred

Appeal against the impugned order passed by the ACMM 24 th

Court Borivali, Mumbai, but even the Appeal preferred against

the impugned order has been dismissed vide order dated

19.10.2024 by the Judge, Sessions Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai.




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13. On this factual background, the Petitioner has approached

this Court. Mr.Jaykar learned advocate representing the

Petitioner has made following submissions:

(i) Admittedly, there is ‘domestic relationship’,

between the Petitioner and Respondent No.2;

(ii) The Application is filed under Section 19(d) and

(e) of the DV Act for the directions to Respondent

No.2 to pay the EMI installments;

(iii) It is claimed that since the Petitioner has no place

to reside, she has filed the application seeking

directions to Respondent No.2 to pay the

installments of the house, which is her “Shared

Household”;

(iv) The “Agreement to Sale” has already been

executed in the joint names of the Petitioner and

Respondent No. 2, with only two installments

remaining to be paid;

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(v) Since she has no place for her own residence, she

had every right to reside in the house that is on

the verge of completion;

(vi) According to the definition of “Shared Household”

irrespective of the fact that whether she has any

right, title or interest in the “Shared Household”,

Petitioner can seek protection orders;

(vii)In the present case, her right, title or interest in

the property cannot be disputed, since she is a co-

owner of the property.

(viii)Respondent No. 2 has not taken a stand that he

is economically incapacitated to pay the EMI.

Relying on Section 19(6) of the DV Act, it is

submitted that while making an order under Sub-

section (1), the Magistrate may impose on the

Respondent obligations relating to the discharge

of rent and other payments, having regard to the

financial needs and resources of the parties.




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(ix) The Petitioner’s case very much fits in Clause (6)

of Section 19 of the DV Act. The definition of

“Shared Household”, is wide enough to

encompass various circumstances in a domestic

relationship, reflecting the legislature’s intent to

give it a wider/broader meaning. Therefore, even

the future house, which the couple proposes to

reside would fall within the definition of “Shared

Household”.

14. In this regard reliance is placed by the learned advocate

appearing for the Petitioner on the Judgment of Apex Court in

the case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi1, wherein the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘right to

reside in the Shared Household’, would include not only actual

residence, but also constructive residence in the “Shared

Household”. Right to reside therein, cannot be excluded vis-à-

vis an aggrieved person except in accordance with the

procedure established by law.

15. If a woman is sought to be evicted from the “Shared

Household”, she would be an aggrieved person.


1   (2022) 8 SCC 90
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Relying on paragraph 42 of the judgment in of Prabha

Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra), it is submitted by the

Petitioner that the right to reside in a shared household cannot

be restricted to actual residence. Even in a case where the

woman in a domestic relationship and is residing elsewhere on

account of a reasonable cause, she has the right to reside in a

“Shared Household”. Not only she has right to reside in the

house of her husband, if it is located in another place, which is

also a shared household but also in the “Shared Household”

which may be in a different location, in which the family of her

husband resides. Therefore, she cannot be excluded from the

“Shared Household”, even if she has not actually resided

therein. Hence, the right to share household includes not only

actual residence, but also constructive residence in a shared

household i.e. right to reside therein which cannot be excluded

vis-a-vis an aggrieved women.

16. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has also placed on

record the following Judgments:

      i.         Vandana Vs. T . Srikanth2;
      ii.        Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra);

2   2007 (5) CTC 679;
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      iii.       Aditya Anand Varma and Ors. Vs. State of
                 Maharashtra3;
      iv.        Rashmi Mehrotra and Anr. Vs. Manvi Sheth and
                 Anr.4 &
      v.         Mst Shameema Begum Vs. Javid Iqbal Khan5




In support of his submission about “Shared Household”, it

is contended that, parties in a domestic relationship need not

have resided at the place claimed as “Shared Household”; even

an intention or right to reside therein would fall within the

definition of “Shared Household” under Section 2(s) of the DV

Act. It is his contention that while passing the impugned order,

though the judgment in the case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh

Devi (Supra) was brought to the notice of the judge of the

Sessions Court, without taking into consideration the correct

interpretation of the term “shared household”, as explained in

the judgment of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra) , the

Appellate Court has dismissed the Appeal filed by the Petitioner.

According to him, the plethora of Judgments which are cited by

him unequivocally makes it clear that, it is not mandatory for

the aggrieved person, when she is in a domestic relationship at

3 (2022) Bom CR (Cri) 48 : (2022) 3 AIR Bom R (Cri) 67;
4 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 351;

5 CRM(M) No.36/2023, High Court of Jammun & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar;

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any point of time, to actually reside in a “Shared Household”,

with those persons against whom relief is sought, so long as the

aggrieved woman had lived in a domestic relationship at any

point of time, and thus acquires a right to “Shared Household”

under Section 17(1) of the DV Act.

17. If a woman has a right to reside in a “Shared Household”

under Section 17(1) of the DV Act, and such woman is sought to

be wrongly evicted, she is a victim of domestic violence, and she

can seek relief under the provisions of DV Act, including

enforcement of her right to live in a “Shared Household”.

18. According to the learned Advocate, it is an undisputed fact

that the Petitioner is in a domestic relationship with the

Respondent No.2-husband, due to which she has every right to

reside in the house of the husband. Hence, the ACMM, as well as

the Sessions Judge, have failed in their duty to exercise the

jurisdiction conferred upon them under the DV Act.

19. Per contra, it is contended by the Advocate Mr.Mehrotra

appearing for Respondents, that the case of the Petitioner has to

be viewed in the light of the definition of Section 2(s) of the DV

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Act. The meaning of “Shared Household” cannot travel beyond

what has been defined under Section 2(s), and interpreted by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Though, the Petitioner has claimed

relief on the basis of the definition of “Shared Household”, in the

DV complaint filed by her, there is not even a whisper about the

premises at Auris Serenity, Malad to be her shared household.

Though the so called “Shared Household”, was booked in

February 2020 itself and the DV complaint is filed in May 2022,

and the order on the interim Application for rent was passed in

February 2023. Despite the considerable period that has

passed, during such period the Petitioner has not claimed any

relief for the alleged “Shared Household”. The only prayer made

in the DV complaint is to provide permanent accommodation or

to compensate her monetarily in order to purchase property for

herself.

20. It is the contention of the advocate Mr.Mehrotra that,

Section 2(s) of the DV Act requires that, the aggrieved person

should have lived in the “Shared Household”, at any stage while

in a domestic relationship either singly or along with

Respondent. In the present case, the Petitioner has never

resided alongwith Respondent No.2 at the given address, for

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which the Petitioner is seeking directions for payment of

installments. The advocate for Respondent No.2 also relies on

the judgment of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra).

According to him, the facts of case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh

Devi (Supra) are totally different from that of the present

Petitioner. The facts that, case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh

Devi (Supra) cannot be compared to the facts of the present

case.

21. The Respondents places reliance on the following

judgments:

        i.       Manmohan Attavar Vs. Neelam Manmohan
                 Attavar6;
        ii.      Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja7;
        iii.     Pradeep Shriprakash Agrawal and Ors. Vs.
                 Pratibha Pramod Agrawal8;
        iv.      Smt.S. Vanitha Vs. Deputy Commissioner,
                 Bengaluru Urban District & Ors.9


It is his contention that, the subject property which is still

under construction and not yet in possession of Respondent,

does not fall within the ambit of Section 2(s) of the DV Act.

6 (2014) 16 SCC 711;

7 (2020) 11 SCC 770;

8 Cr.W.P.62 of 2021, dt.26.07.2021 (Nagpur Bench of Bombay High Court)
9 2021(15) SCC 730
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According to him, in order to attract Section 2(s), there

are five different components; (i) there has to be existence of

household; (ii) The aggrieved persons lives or has at any point

of time lived in a domestic relationship singly or with the

Respondent; (iii) the household may be owned or tenanted

jointly or individually by the aggrieved person or the

Respondent; (iv) either party has or had a right, title, interest

or equity in the premises; and (v) it may be part of joint family

property, of which Respondent is a member regardless of legal

title. The learned advocate has laid emphasis on the words,

“lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship”.

According to him, the words in the clause makes it abundantly

clear that, actual residence at some point of time, either by the

aggrieved party or by the Respondent is necessary. Since

neither of the parties have ever resided in the said premises, or

even the possession of the said proposed flat has not been

handed over to the Respondent, the premises does not qualify

the definition of “Shared Household”.

22. In support of his submissions, which requires party to

reside in the said shared household, or atleast should be in

possession of the shared household, the Respondent places

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reliance on the judgment in the case of Manmohan Attavar Vs.

Neelam Manmohan Attavar (Supra) . He also places reliance in

the case of Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja , wherein the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of

actual co-habitation. According to him, the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has held that the words, “lives or at any stage has lived”,

must be given a purposeful interpretation. The residence of

aggrieved person in a household must have some permanency,

fleeting or casual residence is not sufficient.

23. I have heard the respective parties at length. Upon going

through the Application filed under Section 19(d) and (e) of the

DV Act, it can be noticed that the Petitioner has made following

prayers:

“(a) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass an Order
directing the Respondent No.1 to pay the remaining
two installments for the Shared Household or such
other amount as is payable to the Developer, towards
the balance Consideration in respect of the Shared
Household i.e. Flat No.5704, admeasuring 1029 sq.
ft. carpet area, situated at Tower 3, Auris Serenity,
Guriya Pada, Malad (West), Mumbai-400 064;

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(b) In the alternative to payer clause (a) above, this
Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct the employer of
Respondent No.1 to pay the sum of the 7th and 8th
installment(s) , from the salary of the Respondent,
into the account of the Aplicant, so that the
Applicant can pay the same to the Developer;

(c) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass an Order
directing the Respondent No.1 to refrain from
alienating and/or disposing off and/or encumbering
the Shared Household i.e. Flat No.5704,
admeasuring 1029 sq. ft. carpet area, situated at
Tower 3, Auris Serenity, Guriya Pada, Malad (West)
Mumbai – 400 064 in any manner whatsoever;”

24. This application is necessarily made under Section 19 of

the DV Act, which provides for protection by passing residence

order. The Petitioner is claiming protection by invoking Clauses

(d) and (e) of Section 19 of the DV Act, which read thus:

“19. Residence orders

(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1)
of section 12, the Magistrate may, on being satisfied
that domestic violence has taken place, pass a
residence order

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(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or
disposing off the shared household or
encumbering the same;

(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing
his rights in the shared household except with
the leave of the Magistrate;”

25. Both the sub-sections contemplate that the aggrieved

person can seek protection from dispossession of their “Shared

Household”. In order to invoke Section 19 of the DV Act, the

necessary condition is that there has to be a “Shared

Household”. Only in case of “Shared Household”, the protection

orders with regard to residence are capable of being issued by

the competent Courts.

26. “Shared Household” is defined under Section 2(s) of the

DV Act. Section 2(s) of the DV Act reads as under:

“2(s) “shared household means a household where the
person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a
domestic relationship either singly or along with the
respondent and includes such a household whether
owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved
person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by

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either of them in respect of which either the
aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly
or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and
includes such a household(s)shared household
means a household where the person aggrieved lives
or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
either singly or along with the respondent and
includes such a household whether owned or
tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of
them in respect of which either the aggrieved
person or the respondent or both jointly or singly
have any right, title, interest or equity and includes
such a household which may belong to the joint
family of which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or the
aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in
the shared household; which may belong to the joint
family of which the respondent is a member,
irrespective of whether the respondent or the
aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in
the shared household;”

27. Various contingencies are contained in the definition itself,

which is further interpreted by the High Courts as well as by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in their judicial pronouncements. Both

the parties have produced on record various judgments in

support of their own interpretation, during the course of
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arguments. Among those judgments, the judgment of Prabha

Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra), has given widest

interpretation of the word, “Shared Household”. To interpret the

term “Shared Household”, various illustrations have been given

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

28. Section 17 of the DV Act provides that the aggrieved

person cannot be evicted or excluded from the, “Shared

Household” or any part thereof by the Respondent. Aggrieved

person cannot be evicted who is already sharing a household.

The aggrieved person has right to stay in the household though

she may not own it, irrespective of her right, title and interest,

she can continue to reside in the “Shared Household”.

29. Section 19 of the DV Act whereas provides protection to

the aggrieved person if Respondent is alienating, dispossessing

or disposing of the “Shared Household”, or restraining the

Respondent from renouncing his right in shared household.

Orders under Section 19 of the DV Act are to be passed by the

Magistrate on being satisfied about commission of the domestic

violence.




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30. In an application under Section 17 of the DV Act, it is not

necessary to prove domestic violence. In the present case, the

Application is filed by the Petitioner under Section 19(d) and (e)

of the Act, which is reproduced hereinabove. While deciding the

Application, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate 24 th

Court, Bandra, Mumbai, has partly allowed the Application of

the Petitioner, thereby restraining the Respondent from

alienating and dispossessing the Respondent from the “Shared

Household”. However, the prayer clauses (a) and (b) have been

rejected. It is against the order refusing to entertain the prayers

(a) and (b), the Respondent have preferred Criminal Appeal

before the Sessions Court at Dindoshi, Mumbai.

31. While rejecting the Appeal, the Sessions Court has held

that, the flat which is claimed to be a “Shared Household” is not

in a habitable condition, which is still under construction and

the title has not yet devolved upon the present Respondent, who

is a prospective purchaser. Therefore, the wife cannot compel

the husband to complete the transaction of sale agreement, by

paying remaining consideration by invoking provisions of DV

Act, including her right to live in a “Shared Household”.




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32. For issuing an order under Section 19 of the DV Act, there

has to be a “Shared Household”, in existence. The definition of

the term, “Shared Household” has been given a wider

interpretation by various judicial pronouncement. After going

through them, the definition of, “Shared Household” interpreted

by giving various illustration which contemplates variety of

situations and circumstances the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (Supra) , has held that,

even when a women in a domestic relationship is residing

elsewhere and she has never resided in the “Shared Household”

either with her in-laws or with her husband on account of

reasonable cause, she has right to reside in the “Shared

Household”. A woman who has resided in a domestic

relationship, has right to reside not only in the house of her

husband, if it is located in another place, but also in a shared

household which may be in a different location in which the

family or husband resides. Even, if the aggrieved person has

never resided in the shared household, her constructive right to

reside in the shared household has been recognized by this

judgment.




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33. In the present case, the flat which is booked by the

Respondent is claimed to be the “Shared Household” by the

Petitioner. The right of the aggrieved person is essentially based

on the right to live in a household which is in existence. The

protection provided under Section 19 of DV Act is a protection,

from being evicted from the “Shared Household”, which

aggrieved person has a right to reside under the DV Act. Even

the right of aggrieved person to restrain the Respondent from

alienating the shared household, is intended to protect, from

being evicted from the “Shared Household”, occupied by the

aggrieved person. The provision is intended to secure shelter to

an aggrieved person, who has proved domestic violence, from

being rendered without shelter. Both the provisions i.e. Sub –

Section (d) and (e) of Section 19 of the DV Act ensures,

continued residence of the aggrieved person in the premises,

that is in existence and occupied by a person aggrieved.

34. In the present case, the possession of the alleged “Shared

Household”, is not yet handed over, the installments are still not

fully paid. In the circumstances, it would be stretching it too far

to direct the Respondent to pay the remaining installments or

direct the employer to deduct the installments from his salary

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and pay it to the Bank. None of the parties are occupying the

said premises, they have never ever resided in that flat/house,

nor do they intend to live. More so, on the background of the

fact that the Respondent has already initiated divorce

proceedings against the Petitioner in 2020 itself.

35. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,

2005, is a social welfare legislation intended to provide

protection to victims of domestic violence and abuse occurring

within the family. The provisions ensure that the victims are

provided financially, as well as protection from being ousted

from their “Shared Household”, where the victim is residing,

victim can even seek alternate accommodation, or direction to

pay rent of the alternate accommodation. The victims right of

residence is covered under Section 19 of the DV Act, but the

kind of relief claimed by the Petitioner, unfortunately does not

fit under any of the reliefs provided under Section 19 of the DV

Act.

The prayer made by the Petitioner would not be

maintainable since the property/flat, is still under construction

and not in possession of either of the parties, therefore, it would
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not fall within the purview of “Shared Household”, as defined

under Section 2(s) of the DV Act. Hence, I do not find any

perversity in the findings recorded vide order dated 19.10.2024

passed by the Sessions Judge at Dindoshi, Borivali Division,

Goregaon, Mumbai, in Criminal Appeal No.150 of 2024, thereby

confirming the order dated 03.06.2024, passed by the

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 24th Court, Borivali,

Mumbai, in CC No.182/DV/2022. The prayer made by the

Petitioner is not capable of being granted considering the scope

of Section 19(d) and (e) of the D.V. Act.

36. There is no case made out by the Petitioner for causing

interference in the orders passed by both the Court by invoking

powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

37. In view of the above observations, the Writ Petition stands

dismissed.

38. Rule is discharged.

[MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.]

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