Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 04.07.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 9 July, 2025
2025:HHC:21857
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 974 of 2025
.
Reserved on: 04.07.2025
Date of Decision: 09.07.2025
Abhi Kumar ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore,
Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General,
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 295 of 2023, dated 11.10.2023, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short
‘the ND&PS Act‘) at Police Station Sadar Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner has been in
custody since 11.10.2023. The allegations against the petitioner are
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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false. The prosecution’s case is highly improbable. The petitioner
has no role in the commission of crime. There is no link evidence
.
to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. The
prosecution has examined five witnesses out of 15 cited by it, and
there is no possibility of an early conclusion of the trial. The
petitioner has spent one year and seven months in custody, and he
is entitled to bail because his right to a speedy trial is being
violated. Hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
11.10.2023. The police reached Rajhak Thach at noon. They
associated Sher Singh. After some distance, the police saw two
tents with huge quantities of cannabis plants and some people.
The police started walking towards the tents. All of them gathered
near one tent. The police enquired about the reason, but they could
not give any satisfactory answer. The police went inside the tent
and found one carry bag containing 3.519 Kgs of charas. The police
seized the charas. The police also searched the tents and found 5
bags containing the seeds of cannabis. The total weight of the
seeds was found to be 110.572 kgs. The police also seized the seeds.
The police made enquiries from the accused, and they revealed
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that one person named Ramu had employed them to extract
cannabis on a daily wage. The police sent the charas to FSL, and as
.
per the report of analysis, the exhibit was an extract of cannabis
and a sample of charas. The challan was prepared and presented
before the Court on 30.12.2023. The prosecution has cited 16
witnesses, out of whom the statements of five witnesses have been
recorded. The matter was listed for recording the statements of
prosecution witnesses on 27.05.2025. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned
counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. Ramu, who is stated to have employed the
petitioner, was not examined by the prosecution, and there is no
evidence on record to connect the petitioner with the commission
of crime. The petitioner has been behind the bars for the last one
year and seven months. The prosecution has only examined five
witnesses out of the sixteen cited by it. The right to a speedy trial
of the petitioner is being violated; hence, he prayed that the
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present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
He submitted in the alternative that directions be issued to the
.
learned Trial Court to conclude the trial within six months.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of
a commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of Section 37 of
the ND&PS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not
satisfied the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The
prosecution has already examined five witnesses, and there is no
delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the
Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
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2025:HHC:21857obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of
justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused
on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri).
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1SCC (Cri) 558] .]
8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under: –
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly relatedto this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for thegrant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
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2025:HHC:21857empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the.
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused
and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstructthe course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can
legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed
in the following terms: —
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonablecondition acceptable in the facts permissible in the
circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of theview that the present facts and circumstances of the case
do not warrant such an extreme condition to beimposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken intoconsideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant
or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on
the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The
factors to be taken into consideration while considering an
application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the
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2025:HHC:21857nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or
apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses;
the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the.
accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his
abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the
accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or theaccused and larger interest of the public or the State and
similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising
jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not
expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues ofthe complainant, and that too, without any trial.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. As per the status report, the police found the petitioner
with cannabis plants outside the tent along with the other accused.
The police recovered the charas from the tent. The police also
recovered five bags of cannabis seeds from the tent. The fact that
the petitioner was found with the cannabis plants and that the
charas and the cannabis seeds were found in the tent can lead to a
prima facie conclusion, at this stage, that he was in possession of
the cannabis. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC
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(Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, that a person is in possession if
he is in a position to exercise control over the article. It was
.
observed on page 111:
25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn.
The respondent has been accused of an offence under
Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under
Sections 21, 27-A, 29, 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the
Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic drug
or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession
recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment
for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of
H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1664] this Court held that: (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 &
26)
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on
record are that all the accused persons were travelling
in a vehicle and as noted by the trial court they were
known to each other and it has not been explained or
shown as to how they travelled together from the same
destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband
articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of
the Act, which relates to offences for possession of
such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the
possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was
coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e.
conscious possession and not mere custody without
awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20
is not attracted.
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22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous
term which assumes different colours in different
contexts. It may carry different meanings in
.
contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as
was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of
Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC
274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] to work out a completely
logical and precise definition of “possession”
uniform[ly] applicable to all situations in the context of
all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a
particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate
or intended.
***
26. Once possession is established, the person who
claims that it was not a conscious possession has to
establish it, because how he came to be in possession is
within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act
gives a statutory recognition of this position because of
the presumption available in law. Similar is the
position in terms of Section 54, where also
presumption is also available to be drawn from
possession of illicit articles.”
26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also
considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab [Dharampal
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1431], where it was held that the knowledge of possession of
contraband has to be gleaned from the facts and
circumstances of a case. The standard of conscious
possession would be different in the case of a public
transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to a
private vehicle with a few persons known to one another. In
Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 881], this
Court also observed that the term “possession” could mean
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physical possession with animus; custody over the
prohibited substances with animus; exercise of dominion
and control as a result of concealment; or personal
.
knowledge as to the existence of the contraband and the
intention based on this knowledge.
12. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that he was not
in possession when he was found outside the tent with the
cannabis plants and the recovery of charas and cannabis seed was
effected from the tents. Once the petitioner is found in
possession, the burden would shift upon him to establish that the
possession was not conscious.
13. It was submitted that Ramu has not been apprehended,
and there is no evidence that the petitioner was employed by
Ramu. This submission will not help the petitioner. The
petitioner was in possession of the charas and if the person
employing him was not found, his possession would not be taken
away.
14. The petitioner was found in possession of 3.519 Kg of
charas, which is a commercial quantity; therefore, the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. Section 37 of
the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving commercial
quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not
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guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as
.
under:
“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A,
and also for offences involving commercial quantity,shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he isnot likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to thelimitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being
in force, on granting of bail.”
15. This Section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an
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offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
.
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are :
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as
it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application for bail to a person accused of the
enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such aperson, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied
in addition to the normal requirements under the
provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the personis not guilty of such an offence;
(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
16. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail
moved by the accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors.,
(1999) 9 SCC 429, it has been elaborated as under:-
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“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in
a murder case, the accused commits the murder.
of one or two persons, while those persons who
are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard
to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would
continue their nefarious activities of trafficking
and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The
reason may be the large stake and illegal profit
r involved. This Court, dealing with the contention
with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act,
has succinctly observed about the adverse effect
of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy.,
Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out
that the organised activities of the
underworld and the clandestine smugglingof narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances into this country and illegaltrafficking in such drugs and substances
have led to drug addiction among asizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious and
alarming proportions in the recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control
and eradicate this proliferating and
booming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and deadly impact on
society as a whole, Parliament, in its
wisdom, has made effective provisions by
introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying
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mandatory minimum imprisonment and
fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
.
the market, Parliament has provided that the
person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section
37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of
such offence; and
r to
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail are satisfied. The
High Court has not given any justifiable
reason for not abiding by the aforesaid
mandate while ordering the release of the
respondent accused on bail. Instead of
attempting to take a holistic view of the
harmful socio-economic consequences
and health hazards which would
accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with
which Parliament, after due deliberation,
has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the
limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC
but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section
37, which commences with the non-obstante clause.
The operative part of the said section is in the negative
form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person
accused of the commission of an offence under the Act
unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first
condition is that the prosecution must be given an
opportunity to oppose the application, and the second
is that the Court must be satisfied that there are
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reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty
of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is
not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates.
.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision
requires the existence of such facts and circumstances
as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In
the case on hand, the High Court seems to have
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section
37 that in addition to the limitations provided under
the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force,
regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the
matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled
for.”
17. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A
and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity
to oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that: (a) the person is not guilty of such
an offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person
is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard
of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge
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Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of
India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3
SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 &
10-11)
.
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. Itconnotes substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged,
and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn
points to the existence of such facts andcircumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged.
r 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to thosecircumstances of which the actor, called on to
act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is
difficult to give an exact definition of the word“reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
Reason varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The
reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic
sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok
Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4
SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors
(Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P)
Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]]
***
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10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate
analysis, it is a question of fact whether a
particular act is reasonable or not, depends on
.
the circumstances in a given situation.
(See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is
not called upon to record a finding of not guilty.
It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined
to the question of releasing the accused on bail,
that the court is called upon to see if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction
about the existence of such grounds. But the
court has not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the
High Court and this Court are required to apply while
granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the accused has not committed an
offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence
while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences
punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb
the menace of drug trafficking in the country,
stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the
NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
18. This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control Bureau
v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was
observed:
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“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante
clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions
imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are
certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when.
granting bail to a person accused of having committed an
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations
imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed under
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be
factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of
Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be
given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an
accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is
opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is
not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must
be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit
any offence while on bail.
12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for
discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of
Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC 549,
a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it
has been held thus:–
“7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only when
the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from
the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the
other twin conditions which really have relevance so faras the present accused-respondent is concerned, are the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and
not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding
the accused being not guilty has to be based on
reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds”
means something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
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2025:HHC:21857
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added]
.
13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for
discussion in “State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC
122 and this Court has observed as below:
“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Thereasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in
themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is notguilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High
Court seems to have completely overlooked theunderlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the
limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for
the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, itsliberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act
is indeed uncalled for.”[emphasis added]
14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in
clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean
credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe thatthe accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For
arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and
circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade theCourt to believe that the accused person would not have
committed such an offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused
person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.
15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining an
application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act,
the Court is not required to record a finding that the accused
person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh
the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the
accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or::: Downloaded on – 09/07/2025 21:22:39 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21857not. The entire exercise that the Court is expected to
undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of
releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability
of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not.
guilty of the offences that he has been charged with and that
he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on
bail.
19. In the present case, the petitioner was prima facie
found in possession of the commercial quantity of charas and
there is nothing to show that he would not commit the offence if
released on bail. Thus, he has failed to satisfy the requirements of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
20. It is submitted that a direction be issued to the learned
Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of six months.
This is not permissible. It was laid down in M. Gopalakrishnan v.
Pasumpon Muthuramalingam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1968, that any
order of expediting the hearing might upset the calendar and
schedule of the subordinate Court, and might result in assigning an
unwarranted priority to that particular case over and above other
cases pending in that Court. It was observed: –
“4. Looking to the nature of the order passed by the High
Court, we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal in this
matter but feel impelled to observe that ordinarily, before
passing any such order for expeditious proceedings in a
particular case (which might appear to be rather
innocuous), it would be appropriate for the higher Court to
appreciate that any such order for one case, without cogent::: Downloaded on – 09/07/2025 21:22:39 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:21857and extremely compelling reasons, might upset the
calendar and schedule of the subordinate Court; might
result in assigning an unwarranted priority to that
particular case over and above other cases pending in that.
Court; and progression of such other cases might suffer for
no reason and none of the faults of the litigants involved
therein.”
21. This position was reiterated in Shaikh Uzma Feroz Hussain
vs. State of Maharashtra Writ Petition Criminal no. 587 of 2023 decided
on 10.11.2023 (SC) wherein it was observed:
“We are of the view that since every High Court and every
Court in the country has a huge pendency, theConstitutional Court should avoid the temptation of fixing
a time-bound schedule for the disposal of any case before
any Court unless the situation is extraordinary.”
22. A similar view was taken in the Allahabad High Court Bar
Assn. v. State of U.P., (2024) 6 SCC 267: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 207
wherein it was observed:
41. Therefore, constitutional Courts should not normally fix
a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending in
any Court. The pattern of pendency of various categories ofcases pending in every Court, including High Courts, is
different. The situation at the grassroots level is better
known to the judges of the concerned Courts. Therefore, the
issue of giving out-of-turn priority to certain cases should
be best left to the concerned Courts. The orders fixing the
outer limit for the disposal of cases should be passed only in
exceptional circumstances to meet extraordinary
situations.
42. There is another important reason for adopting the said
approach. Not every litigant can easily afford to file
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2025:HHC:21857who can afford to approach the constitutional Courts
cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an
order directing out-of-turn disposal of their cases while all
other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their turn to.
come. The Courts, superior in the judicial hierarchy, cannot
interfere with the day-to-day functioning of the other
Courts by directing that only certain cases should be
decided out of turn within a time frame. In a sense, no Court
of law is inferior to the other. This Court is not superior to
the High Courts in the judicial hierarchy. Therefore, the
Judges of the High Courts should be allowed to set their
priorities on a rational basis. Thus, as far as setting the
outer limit is concerned, it should be best left to the
concerned Courts unless there are very extraordinary
circumstances.
23. Therefore, no direction can be issued to conclude the trial
within a period of six months. However, this Court hopes and trusts
that the learned Trial Court shall deal with the matter as
expeditiously as possible in the circumstances of the case.
24. No other point was urged.
25. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the
same is dismissed.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th July, 2025
(ravinder)
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