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Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Vanam Simmanna Antakapalli5 Ors vs Kplli Venkata Narasingarao, … on 9 July, 2025
1
APHC010330772000
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF JULY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
I.A.No.1 of 2022
in
SECOND APPEAL No.768 of 2000
Between:
1. VANAM SIMMANNA ANTAKAPALLI&5 ORS, -
...APPELLANTS
...APPELLANT
AND
1. KOLLI
LLI VENKATA NARASINGARAO ANTAKAPALLI, -
...RESPONDENT
IA NO: 1 OF 2022
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
permit the appellants to adduce additional evidence to bring on record the
documents annexed to the petition in the interest of justice
justice.
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. S.V.S.S.SIVA RAM (15095)
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. N SUBBA RAO
The Court made the following ORDER:
1. This Interlocutory Application, Under section 151 of Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 (for short, ‘C.P.C.,’), is filed by the petitioners/appellants seeking
2to permit them to adduce additional evidence to bring on record the
documents annexed to the petition in the interest of justice.
2. The brief averments of the petition enclosed to the 6th Petitioner’s
affidavit as follows:
The petitioners/appellants preferred Second Appeal No.768 of 2000
under Section 100 CPC, challenging the judgment and decree dated
30.03.2000 in A.S.No.49/1995 (Senior Civil Judge, Yellamanchili),
which confirmed the decree in O.S.No.377/1988 dated 13.04.1989
(Principal District Munsif, Yellamanchili). The High Court granted an
interim stay on 11.09.2000, restraining eviction from the suit property,
Ac. 3.26 in Antakapalli Village, Sabbavaram Mandal, Visakhapatnam
District.
Initially, the respondent/plaintiff had filed O.S.No.377/1988 seeking
a declaration of title and possession based on a D Form Patta
allegedly granted in 1978. The petitioners/defendants contended in the
suit that the Respondent’s father, a former village Karanam,
fraudulently obtained the patta. The petitioners have been in
continuous possession, with B-memos issued and penalties paid.
Upon a complaint to the Tahsildar in 1989, the patta granted to the
Respondent was cancelled after due enquiry. This was upheld by the
R.D.O., and the Joint Collector and subsequently by the High Court in
W.P.No.6771/1995. Following the cancellation, D Form Pattas was
granted to the petitioners, and revenue records mutated in their favour,
recognizing their long-standing possession and cultivation. Despite the
significance of these documents, they were not brought on record
during the first appeal due to oversight. The appellants were under the
mistaken belief that these records had been submitted, especially as
their previous counsel, now deceased, had possession of them. After
the Second Appeal was dismissed for default and later restored, the
3
present counsel noticed the omission. This application is filed to seek
leave to place these vital documents on record. The delay is neither
deliberate nor negligent but due to genuine circumstances. Admitting
these documents is essential for fair adjudication and will not prejudice
the Respondent.
3. The Respondent filed a counter, denying all averments in the petition
and submitted that the suit schedule property, comprising Ac.3.26 cents of
agricultural land in Sy. Nos. 618/22 (2.27 acres) and 626/3A (Ac.0.99 cents) of
Antaapalli Village, Sabbavaram Mandal, was initially Government poramboke
land. In 1974, Respondent occupied portions of the land, improved about
Ac.1.60 cents by spending Rs.5,000/-, and subsequently applied for
assignment in 1977. The Government assigned the land through D-form Patta
dated 19.09.1977 after subdivision into Sy.Nos.618/22, 626/3, and 252/12,
thereby vesting ownership and possession in favour of the Respondent. In
1978, the Defendants, aided by others, obstructed the Respondent’s levelling
work. The Respondent filed M.C.No.4/78 under Sec.144 Cr.P.C., and secured
restraining orders. Defendants later filed O.S.No.143/78 with a misdescription
of the property, along with I.A.No.744/78, seeking a temporary injunction,
which was not granted. The Tahsildar’s initial orders were suspended, and a
criminal revision petition by the Respondent was dismissed due to delay.
Defendants then filed W.P.No.2787/78 challenging the patta and Tahsildar’s
orders. Despite the pendency of the suit, Defendants trespassed into the land
on 08.06.1980, prompting Respondent to file I.A.No.390/80 for receiver
appointment. Ultimately, O.S.No.143/78 was dismissed for default on
11.03.1981. Respondent filed O.S.No.377/1998 for declaration of title and
recovery of possession. The Trial Court decreed in Respondent’s favor on
13.04.1989. The Appellants’ A.S.No.49/1995 was dismissed by the First
Appellate Court on 30.03.2000, affirming the Trial Court’s findings. In the
Second Appeal, the Appellants seek to adduce additional documents under
Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. Respondent contends that the petition is not
4
maintainable either in fact or law. The documents are neither certified nor
introduced at earlier stages and seek to expand the scope of the original suit,
the petition lacks valid justification, is legally untenable, and be dismissed with
costs to prevent miscarriage of justice.
4. Heard Sri S.V.S.S.Siva Ram, learned counsel for the petitioners /
appellants / defendants and Sri N. Subba Rao, learned counsel for the
respondent / respondent / plaintiff.
5. This Court heard the Second Appeal along with the Interlocutory
Application to consider whether the admission of additional evidence is
necessary for the proper disposal of the appeal in light of the observations
made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malayalam Plantations Ltd. V. State
of Kerala.1, wherein it was held that:
16. If any petition is filed under Order 41 Rule 27 in an appeal, it is incumbent
on the part of the appellate Court to consider at the time of hearing the appeal
on merits to find out whether the documents or evidence sought to be adduced
have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. It is trite to observe that
under Order 41 Rule 27, additional evidence could be adduced in one of the
three situations, namely, (a) whether the trial Court has illegally refused the
evidence although it ought to have been permitted; (b) whether the evidence
sought to be adduced by the party was not available to it despite the exercise
of due diligence; (c) whether additional evidence was necessary in order to
enable the appellate Court to pronounce the judgment or any other substantial
cause of similar nature.
17. It is equally well settled that additional evidence cannot be permitted to be
adduced so as to fill in the lacunae or to patch up the weak points in the case.
Adducing additional evidence is in the interest of justice. Evidence relating to
subsequent happenings or events which are relevant for disposal of the appeal,
however, it is not open to any party, at the stage of appeal, to make fresh
allegations and call upon the other side to admit or deny the same. Any such
attempt is contrary to the requirements of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Additional
evidence cannot be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable the
other party to remove certain lacunae present in that case.
18. In the light of the separate application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for
the reception of additional evidence by both sides, it is for the High Court to
1
(2010) 13 SCC 487
5
consider and take a decision one way or the other as to the applicability of the
same and decide the appeal with reference to the said conclusion………..
6. The learned counsel for the Respondent relied on the decision in Union
of India V. Ibrahim Uddin2, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
49. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time
of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or
the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues
involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the
relevancy to the issue on hand or on the fact whether the applicant had an
opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends
upon whether or not the appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be
adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause.
The true test, therefore, is whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce
judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the
additional evidence sought to be adduced.”
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners/appellants contends that, to
establish their case, specifically, that the patta granted in favour of the plaintiff
(Respondent) was subsequently cancelled, an opportunity may be afforded to
the appellants/petitioners to adduce additional evidence and if these
documents are excluded, the appellants will be deprived of their valuable
rights. He submits that allowing such evidence would facilitate a proper
adjudication of the substantive issues involved, based on all relevant and
material facts, and that procedural shortcomings should not preclude the
Court from arriving at a just and fair decision.
8. The learned counsel on either side relied on the decision in Chapala
Chinnabbayi and Ors. V. Naralasetti Anusuyama and Ors.3, wherein the
composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
1. This is a reference made by a learned single Judge of this Court to answer
the following questions by a Division Bench:
(1) Whether additional documents throwing light by way of
subsequent events can be brought on record in a Second
Appeal, and if so, what is the scope ambit and the applicability of2
(2012) 8 SCC 148
3
MANU/AP/0856/2005
6Order 41 Rule 27 r/w. Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure in such a case?
(2) Whether the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court
in Anisetti Bhagyavathi v. Andaluri Satyanarayana and Ors.
MANU/AP/0049/1992, can be extended to cases of bringing
subsequent events to the notice of the High Court in Second
Appeals?
29…………. The observations of the Supreme Court would indicate that
permitting one of the parties to adduce additional evidence in the second
appeal by invoking Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is permissible so long as it does not
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The above judgment of the Supreme
Court further indicates that such prejudice to the opposite party can be avoided
by invoking the procedure for taking additional evidence under Order 41 Rule
28 CPC.
32. After making a combined reading of Sections 100, 103, Order 41 Rule 27,
28 and Order 42 CPC and in view of the latest legal position, we are coming to
a different conclusion from the conclusion in Anisetti Bhagyavathi‘s case
(supra).
33. The High Court may interfere with the findings of fact when material or
relevant evidence is not considered by the Courts below, which, if considered,
would have led to an opposite conclusion and when a finding has been arrived
at by the appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence which, if
omitted, an opposite conclusion was possible. Though the High Court should
not interfere in pure findings of fact reached by the Courts below without
coming to the conclusion that the findings of fact are either perverse or are not
based on material on record, it may interfere with the findings of fact also if it
finds that those findings are perverse or that they were made on imaginary
basis without any material available on record. If the High Court considers it
necessary and appropriate to receive further evidence at the stage of the
second appeal and in the interest of justice and both parties, it may permit the
additional evidence to be adduced by invoking Order 42 CPC and by taking the
aid of Order 41 Rule 27C.P.C. Though the parties to the proceedings in a
second appeal are not entitled as a matter of right to adduce additional
evidence, in exceptional and compelling circumstances, the High Court may
take the aid of Order 42 CPC and permit adducing of additional evidence in the
second appeal in the interest of justice.
34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court may permit
a party to adduce additional evidence in the Second Appeal under the following
circumstances:-
(1) Adducing additional evidence is in the interest of justice;
(2) Evidence relating to the subsequent happenings or events which are
relevant for disposal of the Second Appeal.
7
9. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the following decisions which
are relied on by the learned counsel for the Respondent:
(i) In K.Venkataramiah V. A. Seetharama Reddy 4 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
16. ……………….., it is well to remember that the appellate Court has the
power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence “to
enable it to pronounce judgment” but also for “any other substantial cause”.
There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to
pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is. So, it cannot strictly say
that it requires additional evidence “be enable it to pronounce judgment”; it still
considers that in the interest of justice, something which remains obscure
should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory
manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence “for any other
substantial cause” under Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code.
(ii) In Karnataka Board of Wakf V. Govt. of India 5, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
6. ………………….. The scope of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is very clear to the
effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional
evidence, whether oral or documentary unless they have shown that in spite of
due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents
are required to enable the Court to pronounce proper judgment………………..
(iii) In Akbar Quadri V. K.Singaraju6, the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh held that:
(5) The only reason given in the petition for adducing additional evidence is
that, by inadvertence, the petitioner did not file those documents either in the
trial Court or in the First Appeal. Inadvertence is not one of the grounds
recognised by Order 41, Rule 27 CPC to enable the party to seek the
production of additional evidence, nor does the inadvertence of a party
constitute a substantial cause for permitting the petitioner to produce additional
evidence.
(iv) In Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil V. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi7, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:
4
1963 SCC OnLine SC 216
5
(2004) 10 SCC 779
6
1992 0 Supreme(AP) 540
7
(1987) 1 SCC 227
8
27. …………….. The basic principle of admission of additional evidence is that
the person seeking the admission of additional evidence should be able to
establish that with the best efforts, such additional evidence could not have been
adduced at the first instance. Secondly, the party affected by the admission of
additional evidence should have an opportunity to rebut such additional
evidence. Thirdly, that additional evidence was relevant for the determination of
the issue………………..
(v) In Penna Venku Reddi V. Konda Pichi Reddi8, the composite
High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
(6) …………………………. I do not think there is anything either in section 103
or in Order 41, rule 27, Civil Procedure Code, which excludes the applicability
of the latter provision to second appeals. The terms of rule 27 are general in
application, and my view is that in appropriate cases, it is open to this Court in
a second appeal to admit additional evidence. It may be that this Court will be
reluctant to adopt the course indicated in that rule unless there are special
circumstances. But it is different to say that it is not competent for a second
appellate Court to let in additional evidence under any circumstances.
10. Upon a careful examination of the decisions relied upon by both parties,
this Court is of the view that, in the interest of justice, the Court may permit a
party to adduce additional evidence at the stage of the Second Appeal. Such
evidence may pertain to subsequent events or developments that are relevant
to the adjudication of the appeal. However, the admission of such evidence
must be justified either on the ground that the Court must pronounce a proper
judgment or that it serves some other substantial cause. The right to a fair
hearing is inherent to the concept of due process of law and ascertainment of
truth. There can be a failure of justice if this discretion to allow additional
evidence at the appellate stage is exercised in a routine and liberal manner,
without the Court being satisfied that the prayer has imprints of
reasonableness and genuineness to at least consider the worth, credibility and
acceptability of the material sought to be brought on record. The power to take
additional evidence in an appeal is to be exercised to prevent injustice and
failure of justice, and thus, must be exercised for good and valid reasons
necessitating the acceptance of the prayer.
8
1956 0 Supreme(AP) 101
9
11. In light of the well-settled legal principles, it is to be determined whether
a failure of justice would result if the additional evidence is not brought on
record and whether such evidence is necessary either for the proper
pronouncement of judgment or for any other substantial cause.
12. To appreciate the respective submissions made by both parties, this
Court finds it necessary to refer to the respective stands projected by both
parties.
13. The record reflects that the Respondent herein (plaintiff) instituted the
suit before the Principal District Munsif, Yelamanchili, seeking a declaration of
title and recovery of possession concerning the schedule property. The
plaintiff’s case is that he had encroached upon the suit schedule property,
which is classified as government land, and based on his possession, he was
granted a D-form patta in the year 1978. He contends that the defendants
subsequently committed criminal trespass and unlawfully occupied the said
property.
14. Conversely, the defendants filed their written statement contending that
the D-form patta relied upon by the plaintiff is fabricated and not legally valid.
They assert that they have been in uninterrupted and exclusive possession
and enjoyment of the schedule property for several years. They further claim
that the Government has issued B-memos against them for their alleged
encroachment, indicating that they, not the plaintiff, have been in actual and
physical possession, actively cultivating the land in question.
15. The Trial Court, upon evaluation of the evidence on record, observed
that the settlement register marked as Ex.X.3 confirms the plaintiff as the patta
holder of Patta No.1528, which encompasses the suit land. A perusal of
Ex.A.11 indicates that a B-memo was issued by the Tahsildar on 16.05.1975
against the plaintiff for unauthorised occupation of land under Survey
No.626/3. Furthermore, Ex.A.1 establishes that a D-form patta was issued in
favour of the plaintiff by the Tahsildar, Anakapalli, in 1977, specifically for the
10
suit land. Relying on this evidence, the Trial Court concluded that the plaintiff
holds absolute title. It further held that the defendant’s occupation of the said
land amounted to trespass and, accordingly, decreed the suit by declaring the
plaintiff’s title and granting consequential relief of possession. The Trial
Court’s judgment reflects its acceptance of the plaintiff’s case regarding the
grant of D-form patta and its characterization of the defendants as
trespassers. The First Appellate Court affirmed these findings in its judgment
delivered in A.S. No.49 of 1995, dated 30.03.2000.
16. A reading of the judgment of the First Appellate Court reveals that the
plaintiff contended that the defendants had filed Writ Petition No.2787 of 1978
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, seeking cancellation of the D-form
patta marked as Ex.A.1, which had been issued in favour of the plaintiff.
However, the said writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. The First
Appellate Court proceeded to dismiss the appeal, holding that the plaintiff had
established valid right and title to the suit schedule property. At the same time,
the defendants had failed to substantiate any superior title with respect to it.
Both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court relied upon Ex.A.1, the D-
form patta, to conclude that the plaintiff had acquired lawful title over the
property. Furthermore, both Courts concurred in recognizing the defendants’
possession as unauthorized and held them to be trespassers.
17. The appellants/defendants contend that the plaintiff never cultivated the
suit schedule property and that it is, in fact, the appellants who have been in
continuous physical possession and cultivation of the property. In support of
their claim, the appellants filed a petition before the Tahsildar, Sabbavaram, in
1989, requesting the cancellation of the assignment made in favour of the
plaintiff. In response, the Tahsildar, Sabbavaram, issued a show cause notice
to the plaintiff, asking why the D-form patta should not be cancelled. As the
plaintiff failed to prove cultivation and possession of the suit property, despite
being given an opportunity, and due to the plaintiff’s non-compliance with the
terms and conditions of the patta, the Tahsildar, by order dated 12.07.1989,
11
cancelled the D-form patta issued in favour of the plaintiff. The appellants
submitted a copy of the order dated 12.07.1989, which cancelled the patta
concerning the suit property, and the order indicated that notice had been duly
served to the plaintiff. Dissatisfied with the Mandal Revenue Officer’s order,
the plaintiff filed an appeal before the Revenue Divisional Officer (R.D.O.),
Visakhapatnam, who on 25.09.1991 upheld the order of the M.R.O., and
dismissed the appeal. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a revision petition before
the Joint Collector, Visakhapatnam, which was also dismissed on 04.03.1994.
To challenge these decisions, the plaintiff filed Writ Petition No.6771 of 1995
before the High Court, which was dismissed by order dated 24.03.2005.
18. At this juncture, the Trial Court decreed the plaintiff’s suit on
13.03.1989. As previously mentioned, the Mandal Revenue Officer (M.R.O.)
passed an order on 12.07.1989 cancelling the D-form patta that had been
granted in favour of the plaintiff. Consequently, the defendants had no
opportunity to address or plead concerning the M.R.O.’s proceedings in the
original suit.
19. The petitioners/appellants before the 1st Appellate Court had filed an
application in I.A.No.226 of 1996 seeking the addition of parties to the appeal
while also informing the Court that the Revenue Authorities had cancelled the
patta granted to the Respondent and the appeal preferred by the Respondent
herein against the cancellation of the patta was dismissed on 31.10.1997.
However, the First Appellate Court did not refer to anything in the order with
respect to the cancellation of the D-form patta granted to the plaintiff. It
dismissed the application solely on the grounds of dominus litis.
20. The material on record indicates that the appellants made earnest
efforts to appraise the First Appellate Court of the cancellation of the D-form
patta in favour of the plaintiff. It is admitted that the plaintiff was a party to the
proceedings before the Mandal Revenue Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer,
Joint Collector, and the High Court. Despite this, the plaintiff failed to bring to
12
the notice of the Court the various orders passed by the Revenue Authorities.
Although the defendants/appellants attempted to highlight these
developments, those efforts did not engage the attention of the First Appellate
Court.
21. The petitioners/appellants have submitted the following documents,
requesting that they be admitted as additional evidence:
(i) A copy of the order dated 12.07.1989 was passed by Tahsildar,
Sabbavaram, along with a neat copy.
(ii) Copy of order, dated 25.05.1991, passed by R.D.O, Visakhapatnam, along
with translation.
(iii) A copy of the order, dated 04.03.1994, was passed by the Joint Collector,
Visakhapatnam, along with a neat copy.
(iv) Copy of order in W.P.No.6771 of 1995, dated 24.03.2005.
(v) Copies of D-Form pattas of appellants along with translations.
(vi) Copies of Pattadar passbooks along with translations.
(vii) Copies of Revenue records along with translations.
22. The Trial Court also upheld the defendants’ possession of the schedule
property. The revenue proceedings, as discussed above, prima facie establish
that the D-form patta granted in favour of the plaintiff was subsequently
cancelled, and D-form pattas were thereafter granted in favour of the
defendants; this transpired after the disposal of the suit by the Trial Court.
23. It is not the case of the respondent/plaintiff that he did not participate in
the enquiries conducted by the Revenue Authorities, as referenced above.
The record reveals that both parties failed to act with due diligence in bringing
these proceedings to the notice of the First Appellate Court. The appellants
stood to gain nothing by withholding such information. In fact, the burden was
greater on the plaintiff to disclose these facts, particularly because the claim in
the suit was premised on the D-form patta, which had already been cancelled.
Since pattas have been granted in favour of the appellants/defendants, the
foundation of the plaintiff’s title claim prima facie stands extinguished. This
Court cannot ignore that the D-form Patta, based on the suit, was cancelled
13
through due revenue proceedings in which the plaintiff participated. The
plaintiff had a duty to disclose this cancellation, particularly since it occurred
after the trial Court’s judgment. The pronouncement of judgment by this Court,
without consideration of the said revenue proceedings, would amount to
granting an undue advantage to the plaintiff, who failed to disclose a material
fact that directly impacts the outcome of the case. The documents now sought
to be brought on record are crucial and indispensable for a just and proper
adjudication of the lis between the parties.
24. Learned counsel for the Respondent contends that, since the suit is
pending before the competent civil Court, the revenue authorities ought not to
have entertained the petitioners’ request or proceeded to cancel the patta. In
support of his case, he relied on the following decisions:
(i) In Velagapudi Satyanarayana V. District Collector, Nalgonda9,
the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
12. ……………… Moreover, the respondents 2 to 7 have approached the civil
Court also by filing a suit in O.S.No.7 of 1989 praying for the same relief, which
they prayed in the revision petition. Therefore, respondents 2 to 7 should not
have initiated parallel proceedings simultaneously before the competent civil
Court and before the revisional authority, which is not permissible under the
law. …………..
(ii) In D. Tulasi V. The District Revenue Officer and Ors.10, the
High Court of Madras held that:
21. The Revenue Authorities are granting patta, cancelling patta and mutating
revenue records during the pendency of the civil litigations between the parties
before the Competent Civil Court of Law. Such an exercise is perverse. During
the pendency of civil litigations, the revenue authorities are not empowered to
grant or cancel patta, which would cause further complications or create
unnecessary disputes between the parties. Patta would not confer any right of
title or ownership. The parties are bound to establish their case with reference
to the documents and evidence before the Competent Civil Court of Law.
Therefore, if the civil litigations are pending between the parties, then the
Revenue Authorities shall return the application with the liberty to represent the
same after the disposal of the civil litigations. If at all patta has already been
9
2000 SCC OnLine AP 522
10
MANU/TN/3462/2023
14
granted and the suit instituted subsequently is pending, then the Revenue
Authorities shall keep all further proceedings in abeyance till such time the civil
litigations are disposed of. The proceedings under the Patta Pass Book Act are
to be streamlined in the interest of the public and the interest of the aggrieved
persons. The anomalous situation now prevailing in the Land Administration
Departments is paving the way for illegalities and irregularities, and the land
grabbers are taking undue advantage of such administrative inconsistencies
and un-streamlined procedures.
22. An apprehension has been raised that if the parties are relegated to the
Civil Court, they will have to wait for several years for the disposal of the civil
litigations, and thereafter, there will be a delay in approaching the authorities. In
such circumstances, the Revenue Authorities have to take into consideration
the period during which the litigations were pending before the Courts of Law
and, accordingly, entertain the applications and decide the same on merits and
in accordance with the law. The continuing cause of action is to be established
in such circumstances for condoning the delay, and if the reasons are genuine
and acceptable, then the delay may be condoned.
(iii) In R. Siva Ramakrishna V. The State of Andhra Pradesh &
Others11, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
……………. When there are so many complications surrounding the land, be it
as regards attachment or the consequential sale, the issuance of pattadar
passbook and title deed in favour of the petitioner cannot be
sustained……………
(iv) In Peruri Venkata Chinna Krishnniah V. The Joint Collector,
Kakinada & Others12, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
8. In this case, the revenue record was amended on the strength of the alleged
Will. If it is an order within the meaning of Section 5(5) of the Act, we are
unable to accept the contention that the appellate authority has no jurisdiction
to decide when the suit is pending. However, the finality will reach subject to
Section 8(2) of the Act, which reads as under:
“8(2). If any person is aggrieved as to any rights of which he is in possession
by an entry made in any record of rights he may institute a suit against any
person denying or interested to deny his title to such right for declaration of his
right under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Central Act 47 of 1963)
and the entry in the record of rights shall be amended in accordance with any
such declaration.”
11
2012 0 Supreme(AP) 705
12
2014 0 Supreme(AP) 854
15
25. Both parties failed to bring to the notice of the First Appellate Court the
pendency of proceedings before the revenue authorities. Furthermore, they
were unable to submit a copy of the judgment passed by the Trial Court to the
revenue authorities. Both parties were aware of the ongoing proceedings
before both the civil Court and the revenue authorities concerning the suit
schedule property. However, neither party sincerely presented the relevant
documents before either the civil Court or the revenue authorities. Although it
was strongly argued before this Court that the revenue authorities lack the
jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties concerning the disputed
property, particularly when both parties had already approached the civil
Court, the records indicate that the civil suit does not pertain to the title of the
suit schedule property. However, the applicability of the principles laid down in
the cited decisions can be considered at the appropriate stage after the
relevant documents have been received. Accordingly, this Court is not inclined
to express any opinion at this stage regarding the binding nature of the orders
passed by the revenue authorities concerning the cancellation of the patta.
26. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the documents now
sought to be relied upon are public records. Since the plaintiff/respondent
admittedly participated in the proceedings related thereto, no prejudice would
be caused to the Respondent due to receiving the documents. It is further
submitted that all relevant records had been handed over to the appellants’
previous counsel, and the defendants were under the bona fide impression
that the same had been filed along with the Second Appeal. However, their
earlier counsel passed away, and the Second Appeal was dismissed for
default. Subsequently, this Hon’ble Court was pleased to allow the application
for restoration, and accordingly, the Second Appeal was restored to file.
27. As noted, the plaintiff did not file the suit seeking a declaration of title.
The plaintiff’s claim rested solely on the D-form patta issued in his favour.
Relying on this, the suit was decreed, and the appeal was dismissed.
However, after the disposal of the suit, the patta granted in favour of the
16
plaintiff was cancelled by the competent Revenue Authorities. Notably, neither
party brought to the attention of the Court the proceedings initiated by the
Revenue Authorities. Even according to the plaintiff’s case, the defendants
were in possession of the property. The decree for possession was granted
solely based on the plaintiff’s alleged title, derived from the D-form patta. The
plaintiff’s title was later extinguished by the cancellation of the patta through
proper proceedings before the Revenue Authorities, it cannot be prima facie
contended that the Revenue Authorities lacked jurisdiction to conduct an
enquiry regarding the plaintiff’s title merely because the civil proceedings were
pending. The patta’s cancellation directly affects the legitimacy of the plaintiff’s
claim, and such developments cannot be ignored. However, the contentions
raised in this regard will be considered at the time of disposal of the appeal.
28. The learned counsel for the Respondent relied on a decision reported in
Guniputti Mallikarjuna Rao V. Principal Revenue Secretary, Government
of A.P., and others13, wherein the composite High Court of A.P., held that in
view of the direction given by the Revenue Divisional Officer, the parties have
to establish their rights before the civil Court. This Court set aside the
observations made by the Joint Collector with regard to the limitation aspect of
filing the application seeking delivery of the property. As seen from the
judgment, the decree-holder got the properties of J.Dr for sale, and in the
Court auction, the petitioner purchased the property and obtained the sale
certificate. On his application, M.R.O., issued pattadar passbooks and title
deeds in favour of the petitioner. Subsequently, a suit was filed for partition by
respondents 5 to 7 with respect to the properties of J.Dr and Lok Adalat. The
award was passed pursuant to the settlement arrived between the parties.
The Mandal Revenue Officer, without recalling the pattadar passbooks and
title deeds issued in favour of the petitioner, proceeded to issue fresh pattadar
passbooks and title deeds in favour of the respondents 5 to 7. After reading
13
SCC OnLine AP 983
17
the judgment, this Court views that the observations made by the Court
cannot be made applicable to the facts of the case.
29. The learned counsel for the Respondent submits that the ordinary rule
of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallized as on the date of
the institution of the suit, and in the absence of a proper amendment to the
pleadings, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence relating to
subsequent events. Furthermore, the petitioners failed to bring such
subsequent events to the notice of the Court promptly in accordance with the
applicable rules and procedural law. In support of his contention, he relied
upon the following decisions:
(i) In Indore Development Authority V. Manoharlal14, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
338. A wrongdoer, or, in the present context, a litigant who takes his chances,
cannot be permitted to gain by delaying tactics. It is the duty of the judicial
system to discourage undue enrichment or drawing of undue advantage by
using the Court as a tool. In Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania [ (2010) 9 SCC 437], it was observed that Courts should be careful
in neutralising the effect of consequential orders passed pursuant to interim
orders. Such directions are necessary to check the rising trend among the
litigants to secure reliefs as an interim measure and avoid adjudication of the
case on merits. Thus, the restitutionary principle recognises and gives shape to
the idea that advantages secured by a litigant, on account of orders of the
Court, at his behest, should not be perpetuated; this would encourage the
prolific or serial litigant to approach Courts time and again and defeat rights of
others — including undermining of public purposes underlying acquisition
proceedings. A different approach would mean that, for instance, where two
landowners (sought to be displaced from their lands by the same notification)
are awarded compensation, of whom one allows the issue to attain finality —
and moves on, the other obdurately seeks to stall the public purpose underlying
the acquisition, by filing one or series of litigation, during the pendency of which
interim orders might inure and bind the parties, the latter would profit and be
rewarded, with the deemed lapse condition under Section 24(2). Such a
consequence, in the opinion of this Court, was never intended by Parliament;
furthermore, the restitutionary principle requires that the advantage gained by
the litigant should be suitably offset, in favour of the other party.
14
(2020) 8 SCC 129
18
(ii) In Om Prakash Gupta V. Ranbir B. Goyal 15 , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that:
11. The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand
crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore, the decree in
a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the
commencement of the lis. However, the Court has the power to take note of
subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly, subject to the following
conditions being satisfied: (i) that the relief, as claimed initially, has, by reason
of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that
taking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten
litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that
such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the Court promptly and in
accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not
taken by surprise. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders
[(1975) 1 SCC 770], this Court held that a fact arising after the lis, coming to
the notice of the Court and having a fundamental impact on the right to relief or
the manner of moulding it and brought diligently to the notice of the Court
cannot be blinked at. The Court may, in such cases, bend the rules of
procedure if no specific provision of law or rule of fair play is violated, for it
would promote substantial justice provided that there is the absence of other
disentitling factors or just circumstances. The Court, speaking through Krishna
Iyer, J., affirmed the proposition that the Court can, so long as the litigation
pends, take note of updated facts to promote substantial justice. However, the
Court cautioned: (i) the event should be one as would stultify or render inept
the decretal remedy, (ii) rules of procedure may be bent if no specific provision
or fair play is violated and there is no other special circumstance repelling
resort to that course in law or justice, (iii) such cognisance of subsequent
events and developments should be cautious, and (iv) the rules of fairness to
both sides should be scrupulously obeyed.
12. Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on facts. In
the former case, the Court may take judicial notice of the event and, before
acting thereon, put the parties on notice of how the change in law is going to
affect the rights and obligations of the parties and modify or mould the course
of litigation or the relief so as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter
case, the party relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not
beyond the pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is
expected to resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. In
such subsequent events, the Court may permit being introduced into the
pleadings by way of amendment as it would be necessary to do so for the
purpose of determining real questions in controversy between the parties. In
Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456], this Court has
held that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the
pleadings of the parties, and it is the case pleaded that has to be found; without
the amendment of the pleadings, the Court would not be entitled to modify or15
(2002) 2 SCC 256
19alter the relief. In Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1898) 25 IA 195
(PC)], Their Lordships observed that, as a rule, relief not founded on the
pleadings should not be granted
(iii) In Gunji Chittemma V. Kaki Immaniel 16 , the composite High
Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
(19) …………………………….. But concurrent findings had been recorded by
both the Courts below to the effect that inasmuch as, ex. A-1 came into
existence in contravention of the provisions of Act 9 of 1977. There is no
enforceable legal right in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, and hence, she is
liable to be non-suited…………………..
(20) Having gone through the findings recorded by the Court of first instance
and also the appellate Court and the oral and documentary evidence,
especially, Ex. A-10 and B-1, which came into existence subsequent to the
institution of the suit, it would be appropriate to permit the parties to amend the
pleadings on the strength of these subsequent events and frame necessary
issues and to decide all the questions afresh by permitting both the parties to
let in further evidence in this regard inclusive of the crucial aspect that when
the grant was made by the Government on payment of market value, whether
such land would fall within the definition of assigned land under the provisions
of the Act.
(21) In the light of the findings recorded above, this Court is left without no
other option, except to remand the matter to the Court of first instance after
setting aside the judgments and decrees made by the Courts below.
30. As to the submission regarding the absence of pleadings, the necessity
for amending the pleadings, and the potential remand of the matter to the trial
Court, such issues are to be considered at the appropriate stage of the
proceedings. At this juncture, this Court does not deem it necessary to
express any opinion on those aspects. In light of the foregoing observations,
this Court is of the view that the petitioners have established a case for the
admission of additional evidence. Since the petitioners seek to rely on
additional evidence in connection with the revenue proceedings between the
parties, and given that both parties participated in those proceedings, this
Court finds it appropriate to receive and mark the documents. However, if any
valid objections are raised concerning the admissibility of these documents,
the Court may pass appropriate orders at that stage.
16
2004 0 Supreme(AP) 210
20
31. In the result, the interlocutory application is allowed, and the petitioners
are permitted to adduce the additional evidence, subject to payment of costs
of Rs.3,000/- (Rupees Three Thousand Only) to the Respondent through their
counsel within two (02) weeks from the date of receipt of this order. Failure to
comply with the payment condition shall result in dismissal of the application.
______________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 09.07.2025
SAK
21
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
I.A.No.1 of 2022
in
SECOND APPEAL NO.768 OF 2000
Date: 09.07.2025
SAK
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