Telangana High Court
N. Muralidhar Rao, vs Nacharam Yadagiri, on 26 June, 2025
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
APPEAL SUIT No.505 of 2012
JUDGMENT:
Challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.01.2012
passed in O.S.No.253 of 2008 by the learned III Additional
District and Sessions Judge (FTC), Ranga Reddy District, the
present Appeal Suit is filed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a
suit for specific performance and possession based on an
agreement of sale dated 06.10.2005, allegedly executed by
defendant No.1, for a consideration of Rs.13,56,750/-, of
which Rs.4,00,000/- had been paid. The plaintiff relied on
corroborative evidence, including oral depositions (P.Ws.1 and
2) and documentary evidence (Exs.A-1 to A-10),
demonstrating both execution of the agreement and his
continued readiness to perform. Defendant No.1 denied
executing the agreement and contended the property was
ancestral. Defendant Nos.2 and 3, impleaded as legal
representatives and co-sharers, reaffirmed that the property
was ancestral and had been allotted to them in a previous
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partition suit vide O.S.No.118 of 2006, finalized through a Lok
Adalat award. The trial Court held that while the execution of
the agreement was proved, it was not enforceable against the
full extent of the property as defendant No.1 lacked exclusive
title. The trial Court observed that defendant No.1 could
alienate only his 1/3rd undivided share, particularly since the
agreement did not purport to be executed by defendant No.1
as kartha or on behalf of other co-parceners. As such, the suit
was decreed in part: specific performance was granted for the
share of defendant No.1 alone, subject to the plaintiff
depositing the balance consideration of Rs.52,250/- with 12%
interest. The prayer of the plaintiff for entire possession was
declined; instead, he was granted liberty to pursue partition
and allied remedies under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act.
The trial Court thus balanced contractual obligations with
coparcenary rights by limiting enforcement to individual share
of defendant No.1. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal suit
is filed.
3. Heard Sri Vedula Srinivas, learned Senior Counsel
representing Smt. Vedula Chithralekha, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as Sri Police
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Venkat Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is contrary to
settled legal principles, the weight of evidence, and the overall
probabilities of the case and that the trial Court failed to take
into consideration the amended pleadings brought on record
through I.A.No.237 of 2008, specifically Paragraph Nos.5(a)
and 5(b), and the additional relief sought therein, namely, the
plea that the partition decree in O.S.No.118 of 2006 (Ex.B1) is
a collusive one and not binding on the plaintiff. He further
submitted that the trial Court, however, overlooked this
crucial amendment and rendered findings without
adjudicating that prayer, thereby vitiating the judgment.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the
agreement of sale in Ex.A-1 unequivocally records that the
first defendant was the absolute owner of the suit land at the
time of execution, and the plaintiff acted upon this
representation and that the defence now taken by the
defendant No.1 that the property was ancestral and hence
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jointly owned is not only an afterthought but also remains
unsubstantiated, particularly since defendant No.1 chose not
to enter the witness box. He further submitted that as per the
law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in AIR 1999 SC
1441, such failure to testify mandates drawing an adverse
inference against him.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
alleged partition decree (Ex.B1), passed subsequently in
favour of his minor children through a compromise in the Lok
Adalat, lacks probative value and that the minors were
represented by their mother and were impleaded only later in
the present suit. Their testimony after attaining majority
cannot retrospectively validate the partition, especially when
no documentary evidence has been filed to establish the joint
family nature of the property. Therefore, he submitted that
the trial Court had no basis to limit the relief of specific
performance to only 1/3rd of the property, particularly when
all findings otherwise support the case of the plaintiff.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant further contended
that the trial Court exceeded its scope by delving into the
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question of partitionability of the suit land, which was not
necessary for determining the enforceability of the agreement
of sale. The suit being one for specific performance, the limited
role of the Court was to examine the validity and enforceability
of the sale agreement, which stood clearly proved through oral
and documentary evidence. Therefore, he prayed the Court to
set aside the judgment of the trial Court by allowing this
Appeal Suit.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court are as follows:
a. In the case of Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao 1, wherein in
paragraph No.17, it is held as follows
17. Where a party to the suit does not appear in
the witness-box and states his own case on oath
and does not offer himself to be cross-examined
by the other side, a presumption would arise
that the case set up by him is not correct as has
been held in a series of decisions passed by
various High Courts and the Privy Council
beginning from the decision in Sardar1
(1999) 3 SCC 573
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A.S.No.505 of 2012Gurbakhsh Singh v. Gurdial Singh [AIR 1927 PC
230 : 32 CWN 119] . This was followed by the
Lahore High Court in Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal
Singh [AIR 1930 Lah 1 : ILR 11 Lah 142] and the
Bombay High Court in Martand Pandharinath
Chaudhari v. Radhabai Krishnarao Deshmukh
[AIR 1931 Bom 97 : 32 Bom LR 924] . The
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulla Kharagjit
Carpenter v. Narsingh Nandkishore Rawat [AIR
1970 MP 225 : 1970 MPLJ 586] also followed the
Privy Council decision in Sardar Gurbakhsh
Singh case [AIR 1927 PC 230 : 32 CWN 119] .
The Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v.
Virendra Nath [AIR 1971 All 29] held that if a
party abstains from entering the witness-box, it
would give rise to an adverse inference against
him. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in Bhagwan Dass v.
Bhishan Chand [AIR 1974 P&H 7] drew a
presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 against a party who did not enter the
witness-box
b. In the case of Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal Kaur 2 ,
wherein in paragraph No.7.3, it is held as follows:
7.3. Under Mitakshara law, whenever a male
ancestor inherits any property from any of his
paternal ancestors up to three degrees above
him, then his male legal heirs up to three2
(2020) 14 SCC 436
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A.S.No.505 of 2012degrees below him, would get an equal right as
coparceners in that property.
c. In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major 3,
wherein in paragraph No.13, it is held as follows:
13. In other words, the court must enquire
whether a document has recorded unqualified
and unconditional words of present demise of
right, title and interest in the property and
included the essential terms of the same; if the
document, including a compromise memo,
extinguishes the rights of one and seeks to
confer right, title or interest in praesenti in
favour of the other, relating to immovable
property of the value of Rs 100 and upwards, the
document or record or compromise memo shall
be compulsorily registered.
d. In the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v.
Ujagar Singh 4, wherein in paragraph Nos.7 and 8, it is held
as follows:
7. The law in England also appears to be the
same, that no independent suit is necessary. In
Spencer-Bower and Turner on Res Judicata (2nd
Edn., 1969) it is stated (para 359) that there are
exceptions to the principle of res judicata. If the3
(1995) 5 SCC 709
4
(2000) 7 SCC 543
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A.S.No.505 of 2012party setting up res judicata as an estoppel has
alleged all the elements of an estoppel (i.e.
ingredients of res judicata), it is still open to the
latter (the opposite party) to defeat the estoppel
by setting up and establishing certain affirmative
answers. Of these there are four main classes —
fraud, cross-estoppel, contract and public policy.
The authors clearly say that no active
proceedings for “rescission” of the earlier
judgment are necessary. They state (para 370)
as follows:
“The avoidance of a judicial act on the ground of
fraud or collusion is effected not only by active
proceedings for rescission … but also by setting
up the fraud as a defence to an action on the
decision, or as an answer to any case which,
whether by way of estoppel or otherwise,
depends for its success on the decision being
treated as incontrovertible.”
Thus, the law is well settled that no independent
suit as a condition precedent is necessary.
8. Collusion, say Spencer-Bower and Turner
(para 378), is essentially play-acting by two or
more persons for one common purpose — a
concerted performance of a fabula disguised as a
judicium — an unreal and fictitious pretence of a
contest by confederates whose game is the same.
As stated by Lord Selborne, L.C. in Boswell v.
Coaks [(1894) 6 Rep 167 : 86 LT 365n (HL)] :
9
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A.S.No.505 of 2012There is no Judge; but a person invested with
the ensigns of a judicial office, is misemployed in
listening to a fictitious cause proposed to him,
there is no party litigating … no real interest
brought into question and to use the words of a
very sensible civilian on this point, fabula non
judicium, hoc est; in scena, non in foro, res agitur.
That, in our view, is the true meaning of the
word “collusion” as applied to a judicial
proceeding.
e. In the case of Angadi Chandranna Versus Shankar
and Others 5 , wherein in paragraph No.17, it is held as
follows:
17. It cannot be disputed that the properties
divided among Defendant No. 1 and his brothers
through partition deed dated 09.05.1986, are
joint family properties. However, as per Hindu
law, after partition, each party gets a separate
and distinct share and this share becomes their
self-acquired property and they have absolute
rights over it and they can sell, transfer, or
bequeath it as they wish. Accordingly, the
properties bequeathed through partition, become
the self-acquired properties of the respective
sharers5
2025 SCC OnLine SC 877
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9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents
submitted that there is no illegality in the judgment and
decree passed by the trial Court from any legal infirmity and is
in accordance with settled principles of law and that the suit
property is a joint family property, and therefore, defendant
No.1 alone did not have the authority to unilaterally enter into
an agreement of sale in respect of the entire property. He
further submitted that in his written statement, defendant
No.1 had categorically denied the execution of the agreement
of sale as alleged and had also clearly contested the legal
notices issued by the appellant and that the trial Court rightly
appreciated the evidence on record, and instead of dismissing
the suit in its entirety, as was warranted, extended equitable
relief by granting specific performance only to the extent of
1/3rd undivided share of defendant No.1. He contended that
there is no credible evidence from the appellant to rebut the
joint family character of the suit property, and the execution
of the agreement by defendant No.1 cannot bind the shares of
the other co-parceners. Therefore, as there are no merits in
the appeal, he prayed the Court to dismiss the appeal suit.
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
10. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
respondents relied upon the Judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court and this Court are as follows:
a. In the case of Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh,
wherein in paragraph No.7 to 14, it is held as follows:
7. The relevant portion of the judgment of the
lower appellate court reads as follows:
“13. In the light of abovesaid precedents it can
be readily concluded that only when the property
which is received by a person from his ancestors
by survivorship can be held to be
ancestral/coparcenary property and any other
property which although, might have been
received from the ancestors by means of will or
consent decree or a father partitioned the
property, will lose its character as that of
coparcenary property and will become self-
acquired property in the hands of the person
receiving it. Applying these precedents to the
facts of the present case, this Court will
conclude that approximately 96 kanals of land
was received by Gulab Singh from his father
Budhu on the basis of consent decree or on the
basis of will and not by survivorship and this
property lost the character of coparcenary
property and was self-acquired property of Gulab
Singh. The version of the plaintiff-Respondent 1
in the present case is that rest of the property
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
was acquired by Gulab Singh with the funds
originated from joint Hindu family property and
the said property also assumed the character of
joint Hindu family property, also cannot be
sustained because the major chunk of land in
the hands of Gulab Singh has been held to be
non-ancestral property and rather self-acquired
property of Gulab Singh.
14. Once the property involved in the suit has
been held to be self-acquired property of Gulab
Singh then Gulab Singh was having every right
to deal with the same in any manner he liked
and no embargo can be put on the rights of
Gulab Singh as well as his rights to alienate the
suit property are concerned and thus neither
release deed nor sale deeds executed by Gulab
Singh can be questioned by anyone much less
by son of Gulab Singh….”
Accordingly, the lower appellate court allowed
the appeal and set aside the judgment and
decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit.
8. The plaintiff, aggrieved by the same, preferred
second appeal and the High Court dismissed
[Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh, RSA No. 1992
of 2011, order dated 4-5-2011 (P&H)] the second
appeal in limine and, while doing so, observed as
follows:
“… Finding of the lower appellate court that the
suit land is not proved to be ancestral or
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A.S.No.505 of 2012coparcenary property is fully justified by the
documentary evidence and admitted facts….”
This is how the plaintiff is before us. Leave
granted.
9. Mr L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff
submits that at the time when the plaintiff’s
father Gulab Singh got the property in partition,
it was his separate property vis-à-vis his
relations but after the birth of the plaintiff on
25-3-1982, the plaintiff acquired interest in the
property as a coparcener. Mr Satinder S. Gulati,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent-defendants, however, submits that
once the property fell into the share of the
plaintiff’s father Gulab Singh, it lost the
character of a coparcenary property and the said
status will not change on the birth of the
plaintiff. He points out that even if plaintiff Rohit
Chauhan was born at the time of partition
between Defendant 2, his father and brothers,
the plaintiff would not have got any share under
Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act.
10. In support of the submission Mr Rao has
placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in
Bhanwar Singh v. Puran [(2008) 3 SCC 87 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 779] , and our attention has
been drawn to the following passage from the
said judgment: (SCC pp. 90-91, para 13)
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A.S.No.505 of 2012“13. Section 6 of the Act, as it stood at the
relevant time, provided for devolution of interest
in the coparcenary property. Section 8 lays down
the general rules of succession that the property
of a male dying intestate devolves according to
the provisions of the Chapter as specified in
Clause (1) of the Schedule. In the Schedule
appended to the Act, natural sons and
daughters are placed as Class I heirs but a
grandson, so long as father is alive, has not been
included. Section 19 of the Act provides that in
the event of succession by two or more heirs,
they will take the property per capita and not per
stripes, as also tenants-in-common and not as
joint tenants.”
11. We have bestowed our consideration to the
rival submissions and we find substance in the
submission of Mr Rao. In our opinion
coparcenary property means the property which
consists of ancestral property and a coparcener
would mean a person who shares equally with
others in inheritance in the estate of common
ancestor. Coparcenary is a narrower body than
the joint Hindu family and before the
commencement of the Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005, only male members of
the family used to acquire by birth an interest in
the coparcenary property. A coparcener has no
definite share in the coparcenary property but he
has an undivided interest in it and one has to
bear in mind that it enlarges by deaths and
diminishes by births in the family. It is not
static. We are further of the opinion that so long,
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
on partition an ancestral property remains in the
hand of a single person, it has to be treated as a
separate property and such a person shall be
entitled to dispose of the coparcenary property
treating it to be his separate property but if a
son is subsequently born, the alienation made
before the birth cannot be questioned. But, the
moment a son is born, the property becomes a
coparcenary property and the son would acquire
interest in that and become a coparcener.
12. The view which we have taken finds support
from a judgment of this Court in M. Yogendra v.
Leelamma N. [(2009) 15 SCC 184 : (2009) 5 SCC
(Civ) 602] in which it has been held as follows:
(SCC p. 192, para 29)
“29. It is now well settled in view of several
decisions of this Court that the property in the
hands of a sole coparcener allotted to him in
partition shall be his separate property for the
same shall revive only when a son is born to
him. It is one thing to say that the property
remains a coparcenary property but it is another
thing to say that it revives. The distinction
between the two is absolutely clear and
unambiguous. In the case of former any sale or
alienation which has been done by the sole
survivor coparcener shall be valid whereas in the
case of a coparcener any alienation made by the
karta would be valid.”
13. Now referring to the decision of this Court in
Bhanwar Singh [(2008) 3 SCC 87 : (2008) 1 SCC
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
(Civ) 779] relied on by the respondents, the same
is clearly distinguishable. In the said case the
issue was in relation to succession whereas in
the present case we are concerned with the
status of the plaintiff vis-à-vis his father who got
property on partition of the ancestral property.
14. A person, who for the time being is the sole
surviving coparcener as in the present case
Gulab Singh was, before the birth of the plaintiff,
was entitled to dispose of the coparcenary
property as if it were his separate property.
Gulab Singh, till the birth of plaintiff Rohit
Chauhan, was competent to sell, mortgage and
deal with the property as his property in the
manner he liked. Had he done so before the
birth of plaintiff, Rohit Chauhan, he was not
competent to object to the alienation made by
his father before he was born or begotten. But,
in the present case, it is an admitted position
that the property which Defendant 2 got on
partition was an ancestral property and till the
birth of the plaintiff he was the sole surviving
coparcener but the moment plaintiff was born,
he got a share in the father’s property and
became a coparcener. As observed earlier, in
view of the settled legal position, the property in
the hands of Defendant 2 allotted to him in
partition was a separate property till the birth of
the plaintiff and, therefore, after his birth
Defendant 2 could have alienated the property
only as karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s
case that Defendant 2 executed the sale deeds
and release deed as karta for any legal necessity.
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed
executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire
coparcenary property are illegal, null and void.
However, in respect of the property which would
have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the
time of execution of sale deeds and release deed,
the parties can work out their remedies in
appropriate proceeding.
b. In the case of S. Kondaiah v. C. Sreenivasa Rao,
wherein in paragraph No.9, it is held as follows:
9. The appellant tried to overcome the situation
by pleading that the 3rd respondent figured as a
witness, and since the whereabouts of the 2nd
respondent were not known, as on the date of
the agreement, his wife too joined as a witness.
It does not need any effort to maintain the
distinction between an executant on the one
hand, and the witness, on the other hand. The
terms of the agreement are binding on the
executant, and none else. The role played by the
witness is nothing, but the one, connoting his or
her presence at the time of the transaction. At
the most, one can attribute knowledge of the
transaction, to the witness. The terms of a
contract are not binding on every one who
knows the transaction. By no stretch of
imagination, a witness can be treated, or become
a party to the transaction, nor would he be
bound by the terms of the contract.
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
10. It is only when the executant of an
agreement pleads that he has the consent of the
persons, who figured as witnesses, that a
situation may emerge, where the witnesses need
to explain their stand. In the instant case, the
specific plea of the 1st respondent was that he
intended to sell his share of the property, and
not the entire property, covered by Ex. B2. There
did not exist any necessity for the respondents 2
and 3, to extricate themselves from the
transaction, because they were never party to it.
c. In the case of Kammana Sambamurthy v. Kalipatnapu
Atchutamma, wherein in paragraph No.23, it is held as
follows:
23. In Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh [(1990) 3
SCC 517] this Court was concerned with a case
where vendor brother and a sister had each half-
share in the suit properties. The agreement for
the sale was executed by the brother concerning
the suit properties in which the sister had half-
share. The sister was not executant to the
agreement; rather she refused to accept the
agreement. The question for consideration before
this Court was whether the agreement could be
enforced against the vendor brother to the extent
of his half-share. This Court considered Section
12 and held as under: (SCC pp. 520-21, paras 5-
6)
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
“5. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not
a case which is covered by Section 12 of the Act.
It is clear from Section 12 that it relates to the
specific performance of a part of a contract. The
present is not a case of the performance of a part
of the contract but of the whole of the contract
so far as the contracting party, namely, the
respondent is concerned. Under the agreement,
he had contracted to sell whole of his property.
The two contracts viz. for the sale of his share
and of his sister’s share were separate and were
severable from each other although they were
incorporated in one agreement. In fact, there
was no contract between the appellant and the
respondent’s sister and the only valid contract
was with the respondent in respect of his share
in the property.
6. As regards the difficulty pointed out by the
High Court, namely, that the decree of specific
performance cannot be granted since the
property will have to be partitioned, we are of the
view that this is not a legal difficulty. Whenever
a share in the property is sold the vendee has a
right to apply for the partition of the property
and get the share demarcated. We also do not
see any difficulty in granting specific
performance merely because the properties are
scattered at different places. There is no law that
the properties to be sold must be situated at one
place. As regards the apportionment of
consideration, since admittedly the appellant
and the respondent’s sister each have half-share
in the properties, the consideration can easily be
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
reduced by 50 per cent which is what the first
appellate court has rightly done.”
11. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal
are:
i. Whether the trial Court erred in granting specific
performance only to the extent of one-third share of
defendant No.1, despite allegations that the
subsequent partition decree in O.S.No.118 of 2006
was collusive and not binding on the appellant?
ii. Whether the execution of the agreement of sale by
defendant No.1, who represented himself as the
absolute owner and accepted a part of the sale
consideration, could be enforced in full against the
entire property, or only against his individual share.
12. Having regard to the submissions advanced by both the
learned counsel and upon a careful perusal of the material
placed on record, it appears that the appeal challenges the
partial decree passed in O.S.No.253 of 2008, wherein the trial
Court acknowledged the execution of the agreement of sale
dated 06.10.2005 by defendant No.1 and receipt of
Rs.4,00,000/- towards sale consideration, and also upheld the
issuance of legal notice by the plaintiff.
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
13. However, the trial Court declined to enforce the
agreement beyond the 1/3rd undivided share of defendant
No.1 on the ground that the suit schedule property was
ancestral in nature, forming part of a partition decree in
O.S.No.118 of 2006, finalized through a compromise in a Lok
Adalat. The trial Court reasoned that the terms of the
contract were binding only on the executants, defendant No.1,
and not on defendant Nos.2 and 3, who were not parties to the
agreement.
14. The appellant rightly contends that the amendment
sought through I.A.No.237 of 2008, particularly the plea that
the partition decree is collusive, was not adjudicated by the
trial Court. In the case of Gram Panchayat of Village
Naulakha (cited supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
that collusion in judicial proceedings can be raised as a
defense without requiring a separate suit. The failure of
defendant No.1 to disclose the pre-existing agreement of sale
in the partition suit significantly taints the decree, thereby
lending weight to the appellant’s claim of collusion. Therefore,
decree in partition suit is nothing but a collusive suit to cause
loss to the appellant herein, said decree cannot be a ground to
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refuse the relief in the present suit. The trial Court erred in
not considering this aspect.
15. Further, reliance placed by the appellant on
Vidhyadhar (cited supra) supports the contention that the
trial Court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against
defendant No.1 for failing to enter the witness box and submit
to cross-examination. The silence of defendants, especially
after accepting consideration and executing the agreement,
undermines the credibility of the defence raised in the written
statement.
16. Furthermore, the contention that the suit property is
ancestral also stands on fragile ground. The reliance of the
respondents on Rohit Chauhan and S. Kondaiah (cited
supra) is well-noted, but in the present case, no credible
documentary evidence has been produced to establish that
the property remained joint family property at the time of
execution of the agreement. On the contrary, it is clear that
defendant No.1 represented himself as the absolute owner,
received consideration, and never disclosed the transaction in
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A.S.No.505 of 2012
the subsequent partition proceedings, thereby creating an
equitable estoppel.
17. However, in view of the settled position in Kartar Singh
(cited supra), a contract by one co-sharer can be specifically
enforced at least to the extent of his share, even if other
sharers are not parties. Therefore, this Court is of the holds
that there is no illegality in the decision of the trial Court to
confine the relief to one-third share of defendant No.1. Yet,
given the admitted execution of the agreement and receipt of
consideration, defendant No.1 cannot now escape
performance of his obligation.
18. In view of the above discussion, the judgment of the
trial Court is modified to the extent that defendant No.1 is
directed to execute a registered sale deed in favour of the
plaintiff for the suit property as follows:
i. The appellant/plaintiff shall deposit the balance sale
consideration of Rs.52,250/- in the trial Court within a
period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of
the order.
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A.S.No.505 of 2012ii. Upon such deposit, defendant No.1 shall execute and
register the sale deed within a period of one month, with
defendants Nos.2 and 3 joining for effective conveyance.
iii. If defendant No.1 fails to execute the sale deed, the
plaintiff is permitted to have it executed through the
Court process.
19. In view thereof, this Appeal Suit is allowed in part.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date: 26.06.2025
SAI
25
SKS,J
A.S.No.505 of 2012
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA
P.D. JUDGMENT
IN
APPEAL SUIT No.505 of 2012
Date: 26.06.2025
SAI
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