Nitai Chandra Mandal & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 11 July, 2025

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)

Nitai Chandra Mandal & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 11 July, 2025

                   IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                  CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
                           APPELLATE SIDE


PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE BIVAS PATTANAYAK

                           W.P.A. 21492 of 2019
                              CAN 1 of 2023
                       Nitai Chandra Mandal & Ors.
                                   versus
                      The State of West Bengal & Ors.


For the Petitioners      : Mr. Debjyoti Basu, Advocate
                           Mr. Anuran Samanta, Advocate

For the State            : Mr. Susovan Sengupta, Advocate
                           Mr. Subir Pal, Advocate

Heard on                 : 21.11.2024, 05.12.2024

Judgment on              : 11.07.2025


Bivas Pattanayak, J. :-

1.   This writ petition is filed by the petitioners seeking direction upon the

respondent      authorities   to   immediately    disburse    the   statutory

compensation for acquisition of land in question in favour of the

petitioners on pro-rata basis in terms of the provisions of Right to

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2013) with

immediate effect.

2. The petitioners contend as follows:

(i) The petitioners are the owners of the respective plots by way of

purchase from the erstwhile owners, which is morefully described in

tabular statement contained in paragraph no.3 of the writ petition.

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(ii) The plots of land mentioned in paragraph no.3 of the writ

petition measuring more or less 4.5 acres were initially acquired for

the purpose of construction of project work SPUR 4 at Khiderpur (14

to 15 Kilometres) in district of Malda, by the State Government and a

net compensation of Rs.27,32,180/- has been awarded under the old

Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(iii) While the aforesaid compensation was pending disposal and the

amount not being credited to the bank accounts of the respective land

owners and the compensation amount was withheld despite passing

of the award, during the interregnum period the erstwhile land

owners as vendors transferred their plots to the vendees namely the

petitioners herein comprising 5.03 acres by way of deeds of

conveyance.

(iv) From the aforesaid deeds of conveyance executed by the

erstwhile owners, it is evident that the petitioners herein were alive of

the fact that the plots of land in question were acquired land in which

compensation has already been awarded which have been clearly

indicated in respective deeds of conveyance.

(v) The petitioners made several representations from time to time

for release payment of the compensation amount on priority basis to

the respective petitioners out of the aforesaid compensation amount.

As the land has already been acquired and award passed and the land

has vested with the State, hence the question of mutating the

respective names in the record of rights cannot arise.
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(vi) It has come to the knowledge of the petitioners that the Deputy

Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Land and

Land Reforms, Refugee, Relief and Rehabilitation, L.A Branch directed

the Collector, Malda to look into the prayer for land acquisition

compensation in respect of the acquired plots and take necessary

action. However, even after coming into force of Act of 2013 on 1st

January 2014, the State Government has failed and neglected to

disburse the awarded amount to the petitioners despite repeated

requests.

(vii) As per provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 since the

compensation amount has not been paid till date, the same has to be

made in terms of Act of 2013 and not otherwise.

(viii) In light of the aforesaid, the petitioners prayed for disbursement

of the statutory compensation for acquisition of land in question as

per provisions of Act of 2013.

3. The writ petition has been keenly contested by the State respondents

by filing affidavit-in-opposition contending, inter alia, as follows.

(i) As per records the land measuring 4.58 acres mentioned in

paragraph no. 5(a) of the affidavit was requisitioned under the

provisions of West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948

(hereinafter referred to as the Act-II of 1948) on 22nd April 1988 for the

purpose of protection work to the left bank of river Fulhara and

Excavation at pilot channel to induce cut-off at Debipur in LA Case

no. 40/1987-88.

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(ii) The possession was handed over to the Requiring Body i.e.

Executive Engineer, Mahananda Embankment Division, Malda on 6th

May, 1988.

(iii) An estimate amounting to Rs.65,952/-was prepared on 22nd

June, 1988 and 80% advance payment as compensation was

approved by the Collector, Malda on 28th March, 1989.

(iv) Notice under section 4(1A) of the Act-II of 1948 was not

published as the said Act was repealed with effect from 31st March,

1997. The case was drawn up as a proceeding under Section 9(3A) of

the West Bengal Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1997 for

finalisation.

(v) The payment of the case was kept pending for finalisation as

Special Leave Petitions were pending before the Hon’ble Supreme

Court.

(vi) A deemed lapse of land acquisition proceeding under Section

24(2) take place where due to inaction of the authorities for five years

or more prior to commencement of the said Act, possession of the

land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In the

present case, the possession of the land has been taken and the

compensation has been declared and approved by the Collector.

Hence there cannot be deemed lapse of proceedings.

(vii) In the light of the above, the State-respondents sought for

dismissal of the writ petition.

4. Mr. Debojyoti Basu, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners

submitted that the land in question was acquired by the State Government
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for the project of construction of embankment. The plots of land in

question were acquired in respect of which compensation has already been

awarded but no compensation paid/disbursed. The erstwhile vendors of

the petitioners, who were the owners of the land in question, have not been

paid any compensation amount. The petitioners are the subsequent

purchasers of the land in question and hence are therefore entitled to

compensation in terms of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. There is utter

violation of the Doctrine of Eminent Domain at the instance of the State

Government in not making payment of the compensation in respect of the

acquired land. To buttress his contention, he relied on the decision of

Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in U.P Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through its

Chairman and Ors versus Kalra Properties (P) Ltd, Lucknow and

Ors1.

5. On the contrary, Mr. Susovan Sengupta, learned advocate

representing State-respondents at the outset submitted that in the present

writ petition no challenge has been made to the acquisition proceedings.

The acquired land has absolutely vested with the State. Once the land is

vested unless expressly taken away, the vesting remains and such land

cannot be conveyed or divested. The petitioners being subsequent

purchasers are only entitled to compensation which their vendors are

entitled to. To buttress his contention, he relied on the decision of Hon’ble

Supreme Court passed in V. Chandrasekaran and Another versus

Administrative Officer and Others2. There is inordinate unexplained

1 (1996) 3 SCC 124
2 (2012) 12 SCC 133
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delay of 30 years in filing the writ petition pertaining to an estimate

prepared and 80% advance payment approved in the year 1989. Moreover,

section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not apply to the case of the petitioners

since the acquisition proceedings has been initiated under Act-II of 1948.

Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this court passed

in State of West Bengal & Ors versus Niladri Chatterjee & Ors3 and

State of West Bengal & Ors versus Sri Saktipada Saha Chowdhury &

Ors4 he submitted that section 24 of the Act of 2013 relates to proceedings

initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as

Act of 1894) and since in no stretch of imagination, the present

proceedings can be said to have been initiated under the Act of 1894,

therefore the aforesaid provisions cannot enure to the benefit of the

petitioners. Relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in

Indore Development Authoirty versus Monoharlal & Ors5 he submitted

that a deemed lapse of land acquisition proceeding under Section 24(2)

would take place where due to inaction of the authorities for five years or

more prior to commencement of the said Act, neither possession of the

land has been taken nor compensation has been paid. The words ‘or’ used

in section 24(2) of Act of 2013 between possession and compensation

should be read as ‘and’ which means both the aforesaid conditions are to

be fulfilled for deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In the present

case, the possession of the land has been taken and the compensation has

been declared and 80% of the advance payment of the compensation

3 MAT 86 of 2016
4 MAT 1545 of 2018
5 (2020) 8 SCC 129
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amount has been approved by the Collector. The amount of compensation

is deposited in the office of the Collector. Therefore, none of the conditions

enshrined in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is satisfied in the facts of the

case. Further, possession of land has been vested in State. Section 24 does

not provide for divesting of land acquired and it applies to a pending

proceedings on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 i.e. 1st January,

2014. The above provision does not revive time-barred claims or reopen

concluded proceedings. Further law does not allow the landowners to

question the legality of the proceedings. In light of his aforesaid

submissions, he prayed that the petitioners being the subsequent

purchasers are at best be entitled to compensation amount to which the

erstwhile vendors are entitled to.

6. In reply to the aforesaid contentions advanced on behalf of the State-

the respondents, Mr. Basu, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners

submitted that the Act-II of 1948 is a temporary Act which was introduced

for a definite purpose and upon fulfilment of purpose it has been repealed.

The acquisition proceedings initiated under Act-II of 1948 thus merges

with Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and therefore should be considered as a

proceeding under Act of 1894. In support of his contention, he relied on

the decision of the Hon’ble Divison Bench of this court passed in Niladri

Chatterjee (supra) (MAT 86 of 2016). Hence, provisions of Section 24 of Act

of 2013, is very much applicable to the facts of the case. He seeks for

appropriate orders for disbursement of compensation under Act of 2013.

7. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties falling

issues have fallen for consideration.

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(i) Whether the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case is

deemed to have been lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the Act of 2013?

(ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation under the

Act of 2013 or the compensation which their erstwhile vendors would

be entitled to?

Issue No. 1. Whether the land acquisition proceedings in the instant
case is deemed to have been lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the Act
of 2013?

8. In order to examine the aforesaid issue, it would be profitable to
reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 as
hereunder:

” 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,– (a)
where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act
has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award
under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if
the said Act has not been repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894
(1 of 1894),where an award under the said section 11
has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of
this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken
or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so
chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: 21 Provided
that where an award has been made and compensation in respect
of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land
Acquisition Act
, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.”

There cannot be any quarrel that the requisition for land acquisition in

respect of the land in question measuring more or less 4.58 acres has been
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initiated under the provisions of Act-II of 1948 and not under Act of 1894.

Notice under Section 4(1A) of the Act-II of 1948 was not published as the

said Act was repealed with effect from 31st March, 1997. The case was

drawn up as a proceeding under Section 9(3A) of the West Bengal Land

Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1997 for finalisation. The language of

Section 24(1) is “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any

case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 ….”. Such provisions clearly manifest that land acquisition

process shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases in respect of

proceedings initiated under Act of 1894.

8.1. Now the question arises is whether in the instant case where the

proceedings for land acquisition undisputedly have been initiated under

the Act-II of 1948, Section 24 of Act of 2013 has got any manner of

bearing. In order to find an answer to the aforesaid query it would be

apposite to reproduce the observation of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this

court in two appeals as hereunder.

In Niladri Chatterjee (supra) following observation was made:

” If one looks carefully, one would notice that in the facts of the
instant case, the land was requisitioned under LA Case No.
126R/1976-77 and was handed over to the Requiring Body on
29.04.1978 for construction of Ajoy Right Ex-Zamindary
Embankment, Sagira to Kogram. Notification under section 4(1a) of
the Act of 1948 was subsequently published in the Calcutta
Gazette on 2nd July, 1993. Although an amount of Rs.20,76,183/-
was sought for from the Requiring Body, i.e., Executive Engineer,
Damodar Head Works Division, Durgapur-2, but the said authority
simply failed to place the fund. Subsequently, after expiry of the
Act of 1948, the Collector of Burdwan simply abdicated his
statutory duty to issue notice under section 9(3B) of the Act of
1894. This could be either due to sheer callousness or negligence
on the part of the Collector of Burdwan. Undoubtedly, it is only due
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to the Collector’s failure to issue notice under section 9(3B) of the
Act of 1894, the land acquisition proceeding stood lapsed.
However, whether ipso facto such a lapse translates into a claim
for compensation under the provision of the Act of 2013 can be
answered simply by visiting section 24 of the Act of 2013. It will be
noticed from a plain reading of the said section that there is a
phrase, “proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894
“. In the facts of the instant case, it cannot be held – by any
stretch of imagination – that proceedings were ever “initiated” under
the said Act of 1894. As such, abdication of statutory duty on the
part of the Collector of Burdwan to issue notice under section 9(3B)
of the Act of 1894 – either due to sheer callousness or negligence on
his/her part – cannot ipso facto translate into a claim for
compensation under the Act of 2013. We do not know what
prevented the writ petitioners from approaching the writ Court any
time between initiation of L.A. Case No. 126R/1976-77 and the
year 2014, for the purpose of seeking appropriate relief(s). Merely
by making two representations – one on 20th December, 2011 and
the other on 30th July, 2014 – they have sought for a issuance of a
writ in the nature of mandamus for getting compensation under the
Act of 2013 upon filing a writ petition only in the year 2014, by
which time the said Act of 2013 has already come into force. We
find that in the facts of the instant case, the writ petitioners were
sleeping over their valuable right to get compensation for decades.
As such, they simply cannot approach the writ Court one fine
morning when the Act of 2013 has come into force in order to seek
compensation under the said Act of 2013, upon invoking section 24
of the said Act of 2013, when proceedings were never “initiated”

under the Act of 1894.”

In Sri Saktipada Saha Chowdhury (supra) the Court observed as follows.

” We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The order of the
learned Single Judge cannot be sustained since the acquisition of
the land in question was initiated under the Act-II of 1948 and not
under Act-I of the land acquisition act, 1894. Hence, Section 24 or
Section 26 of the 2013 Act cannot enure to the benefit of the writ
petitioners. This means, the writ petitioners will not be entitled to
the benefit of determination of compensation in terms of the
provisions of the 2013 Act. The order of the learned Single Judge,
therefore, is set aside…….”

Bearing in mind, the above observations of the Hon’ble division bench of

this Court, Section 24 of Act of 2013 cannot enure to the benefit of the writ

petitioners and does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case
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since the acquisition of the land in question was initiated under the Act-II

of 1948 and not under Act-I of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

8.2. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioners that since

the compensation has not been paid to the beneficiaries/petitioner upon

lapse of a considerable period of more five years, the proceedings initiated

for land acquisition in respect of the land in question is deemed to have

been lapsed. Although it has already been observed in the foregoing

paragraph that Section 24 of Act of 2013 has got no manner of application

in the facts of the instant case yet since consequence of none payment of

compensation is raised it needs to be dealt with. Before delving into the

aforesaid aspect raised on behalf of the petitioners it would be profitable to

refer to the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made in Indore

Development Authority (supra) with regard to the rule of construction and

the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 as hereunder.

” 195. The proviso thus, is not foreign to compensation to be paid
under section 24(2). It provides what is dealt with in Section 24(2)
and takes to its logical conclusion, and provides for higher
compensation, where there is and can be no lapsing of acquisition
proceedings. The rule of construction- as is clear from the preceding
case law discussed, is that the proviso should be limited in its
operation to the subject-matter in a clause. A proviso is ordinarily a
proviso and has to be harmoniously construed with the provisions.
In our opinion, the proviso is capable of being harmoniously
construed with Section 24(2) and not with section 24(1)(b), once we
interpret the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2).

196. In keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid decisions, this court
is of the considered view that the proviso cannot nullify the
provision of Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object
of the enactment, but it can further by providing higher
compensation, thus dealing with matters in Section 24 (2).
Therefore, in effect, where award is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as
well as where award is made but compensation is not deposited in
respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for
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acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable
in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013.

197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering the placement of the
proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2),
considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the
repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted
which is not permissible and particularly when we read the word
‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the
legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part
of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher
compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount
not deposited as required. Higher compensation is contemplated by
the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried forward by the
placement and interpretation.”

In view of the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court as above, if one reads

the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 the irresistible

conclusion which one can arrive is that in case of land acquisition

proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), the

said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed where an award under

the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the

commencement of this Act but (i) the physical possession of the land has

not been taken nor (ii) the compensation has been paid.

The State-respondents in its affidavit-in-opposition has stated that the

land in question measuring 4.58 acres was requisitioned under the

provisions of Act-II of 1948 on 22nd April, 1988 for the purpose of

protection work to the left bank of river Fulhara and Excavation at pilot

channel to induce cut-off at Debipur in LA Case no. 40/1987-88.

Thereafter, the possession of the land-in-question was handed over the

Requiring Body i.e. Executive Engineer, Mahananda Embankment

Division, Malda on 6th May, 1988. The petitioners contend that the land in

question has already been acquired and award has also been passed.
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Further the land in question has also vested with the State. The aforesaid

contention of the State-respondents of taking over possession in its

affidavit-in-opposition has not been denied and disputed by the petitioners

by filing any reply to the same. Therefore, it is an admitted position that

the possession of land in question was taken over. Although the

compensation amount of Rs.27,32,180/- was awarded and approved by

the Collector, Malda on 31st January, 2012, but the same has not been

paid to the petitioners. It is informed by learned advocate for the State that

the amount is deposited with the Collector. Be that as it may, the non-

payment of compensation cannot lead to deemed lapse and it becomes

inconsequential since twin conditions are to be satisfied. Thus, in the

above circumstances the proceedings does not lead to deemed lapse under

of Act of 1894.

Issue No.2: Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation
under the Act of 2013 or the compensation which their erstwhile
vendors would be entitled to?

9. It is the contention of the petitioners that during the interregnum

period of after declaration of award and pending payment of compensation,

the erstwhile land owners as vendors transferred their plots to the vendees

namely the petitioners herein comprising 4.58 acres by way of deeds of

conveyance. The petitioners have also contended that from the deeds of

conveyance executed by the erstwhile owners, it would be evident the

petitioners herein were alive of the fact that the plots of land in question

were acquired land in which compensation has already been awarded. The

aforesaid fact has not been denied and/or disputed by the State-

respondents. It is also not in dispute that the land in question vested with
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the State. Thus, facts reveal that the present petitioners are the

subsequent purchasers of the land in question which vested with the

State. Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P Jalnigam,

Lucknow (supra) it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that

subsequent purchasers can claim compensation. On the contrary, learned

advocate representing the State-respondents relying on V. Chandrasekaran

(supra) argued that the subsequent purchasers are only entitled to the

extent of compensation to which their vendors are entitled and cannot

challenge the acquisition proceedings.

In V. Chandrasekaran (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme considering its decision

in U.P Jalnigam, Lucknow (supra) as well as other decisions of Hon’ble

Supreme Court observed as follows.

“15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person
who purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued
under Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court time
and again. In Lila Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, this
Court held that, any one who deals with the land subsequent to a
Section 4 notification being issued, does so, at his own peril.
In
Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 540, this
Court held that a Section 4 notification gives a notice to the public
at large that the land in respect to which it has been issued, is
needed for a public purpose, and it further points out that there will
be “an impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired
thereunder.” The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the
beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to
receive compensation.
While deciding the said case, reliance was
placed on an earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Shri
Shiv Kumar Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.

16. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd.,
AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of land after
publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is
void against the State and at the most, the purchaser may be a
person- interested in compensation, since he steps into the shoes of
the erstwhile owner and may therefore, merely claim
compensation. (See also: Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana
& Ors.
, (1996) 11 SCC698).

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17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2677;
Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC
335; Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors.
, (2008) 9 SCC 177,
this Court categorically held that, a person who purchases land
after the publication of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is
not entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that his
title is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of
vendor’s title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a
Section 4 notification is void and the purchaser cannot challenge
the acquisition proceedings.
(See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 10 SCC 689).

18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized
to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the
issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings
on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed
executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at
the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor’s
title.”

Thus, is now settled principle of law that a person who purchases land

subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is

not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on

any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in his

favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim

compensation on the basis of his vendor’s title. As per the State-

respondents possession of land in question has been taken over on

requisition under the Act but the notice under Section 4 (1A) of Act-II of

1948 was not published and upon repeal of Act-II of 1948 with effect from

31st March, 1997, the proceedings were drawn up for finalisation in terms

of Section 9(3A) of West Bengal Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1997.

The aforesaid aspect has not been denied and disputed by the writ

petitioners. Section 9(3A) of the Act of 1997 is reproduced hereunder for

the sake of convenience of discussion:

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“(3A) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all such
persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to be entitled to
act for persons so interested, the possession whereof has already been
taken on requisition under section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition
and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to in this section as the
said Act), as re-enacted by the West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Re-enacting Act, 1977
, and, in every such case, the provisions
of sub-section (1) of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section 6, section 7,
and section 8 of this Act shall be deemed to have been complied with:

Provided that the date of notice under this sub-section shall be the date of
reference for the purpose of determining the value of such land under this
Act:

Provided further that when the Collector has made an award under
section 11 in respect of any such land, such land shall, upon such award,
vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.”

The aforesaid provisions clearly manifest that where the possession of the

land has already been taken on requisition under Act-II of 1948 and in

every such case, the provisions of the provisions of sub-section (1) of

Section 4, Section 5, Section 5A, Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 of this

Act shall be deemed to have been complied with. Therefore, keeping in

mind the above provisions of law and in the facts of the present case the

land-in-question already vested absolutely with the State.

Bearing in mind the above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the

petitioners being the subsequent purchasers after such vesting of land in

the State at the most can claim compensation on the basis of their

vendor’s title, for the reason that the sale deed executed in their favour by

erstwhile vendors does not confer upon them, any title to the land in

question. The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the

beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchasers are entitled only to

receive compensation, since they step into the shoes of their erstwhile

owner.

10. It has been vociferously argued on behalf of the State-respondents

that an estimate amounting to Rs.65,952/-was prepared on 22nd June,
17

1988 and 80% advance payment as compensation was approved by the

Collector, Malda on 28th March, 1989 and therefore, the amount

subsequently approved by the Collector is incorrect. Be that as it may, vide

under Memo No.1609/LA letter dated 31st January, 2012 at page 45 of the

writ petition, it is found that the Collector, Malda has accorded sanction of

estimate amounting to Rs.27,32,180/- in respect of acquisition made for

the said project calculated in Form 4A. Needless to mention that the

aforesaid letter has not been withdrawn by the State-respondents. It

manifests from the aforesaid letter that additional compensation @ 12%

per annum from date of taking over possession to the tentative date of

notice under Section 9(3A) of Land Acquisition Act, 1997 & 1999 (i.e. 8th

May, 1988 to 24th January, 2012) and from tentative date of notice till

tentative date of payment (25th January, 2012 to 24th March, 2012) has

been calculated and approved. Thus, the argument as above advanced on

behalf of the State-respondents is not at all tenable.

11. Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, the writ petition being

no. WPA 21492 of 2019 is disposed of directing the Competent Authority

under the State to disburse the compensation amount of Rs.27,32,180/-

together with interest @ 8% per annum to be calculated from 25th March,

2012 till the date of payment, in favour of the petitioners to the extent of

their share in the land in question, subject to scrutiny and verification,

within a period of two months from the date of communication of this

order.

12. Learned advocate for the petitioner is directed to communicate this

order to the Competent Authority of the State.

18

13. There shall be no order as to costs.

14. All connected applications stand disposed of.

15. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.

16. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if

applied, be supplied to the petitioners on completion of all necessary legal

formalities.

(Bivas Pattanayak, J.)

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