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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Nasim Akhtar Parvej & Ors vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 11 July, 2025
2024:CHC-AS:2494
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE BIVAS PATTANAYAK
W.P.A. 21490 of 2019
CAN 1 of 2023
Nasim Akhtar Parvej & Ors.
versus
The State of West Bengal & Ors.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Debjyoti Basu, Advocate
Mr. Anuran Samanta, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Susovan Sengupta, Advocate
Mr. Soumitra Bandopadhyay, Advocate
Mr. Subhasis Bandopadhyay, Advocate
Heard on : 21.11.2024, 05.12.2024
Judgment on : 11.07.2025
Bivas Pattanayak, J. :-
1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioners seeking direction upon the
respondent authorities to immediately disburse the statutory
compensation for acquisition of land in question in favour of the
petitioners on pro-rata basis in terms of the provisions of Right to
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2013) with
immediate effect.
2. The petitioners contend as follows:
(i) The petitioners are the owners of the respective plots by way of
purchase from the erstwhile owners, which is morefully described in
tabular statement contained in paragraph no.3 of the writ petition.
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(ii) The plots of land mentioned in paragraph no.3 of the writ
petition measuring more or less 5.03 acres were initially acquired for
the purpose of construction of project work SPUR 4 at Khiderpur (14
to 15 Kilometres) in district of Malda, by the State Government and a
net compensation of Rs.6,53,715/- has been awarded under the old
(iii) While the aforesaid compensation was pending disposal and the
amount not being credited to the bank accounts of the respective land
owners and the compensation amount was withheld despite passing
of the award, during the interregnum period the erstwhile land
owners as vendors transferred their plots to the vendees namely the
petitioners herein comprising 5.03 acres by way of separate deeds of
conveyance.
(iv) From the aforesaid deeds of conveyance executed by the
erstwhile owners, it is evident that the petitioners herein were alive of
the fact that the plots of land in question were acquired land in which
compensation has already been awarded which have been clearly
indicated in respective deeds of conveyance.
(v) The petitioners made several representations from time to time
for release of payment of the compensation amount on priority basis
to the respective petitioners out of the aforesaid compensation
amount. As the land has already been acquired and award passed
and the land has vested with the State, hence the question of
mutating the respective names in the record of rights cannot arise.
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(vi) It has come to the knowledge of the petitioners that the Deputy
Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Department of Land and
Land Reforms, Refugee, Relief and Rehabilitation, L.A Branch directed
the Collector, Malda to look into the prayer for land acquisition
compensation in respect of the acquired plots and take necessary
action. However, even after coming into force of Act of 2013 on 1st
January 2014, the State Government has failed and neglected to
disburse the awarded amount to the petitioners despite repeated
requests.
(vii) As per provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 since the
compensation amount has not been paid till date, the same has to be
made in terms of Act of 2013 and not otherwise.
(viii) In light of the aforesaid, the petitioners prayed for disbursement
of the statutory compensation for acquisition of land in question as
per provisions of Act of 2013.
3. Mr. Debojyoti Basu, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners
submitted that the land in question was acquired by the State Government
for the project of construction of embankment. The plots of land in
question were acquired in respect of which compensation has already been
awarded but no compensation paid/disbursed. The erstwhile vendors of
the petitioners, who were the owners of the land in question, have not been
paid any compensation amount. The petitioners are the subsequent
purchasers of the land in question and are therefore entitled to
compensation in terms of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 as no
compensation has been paid either to them or to their vendors. There is
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utter violation of the Doctrine of Eminent Domain at the instance of the
State Government in not making payment of the compensation in respect
of the acquired land. To buttress his contention, he relied on the decision
of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in U.P Jal Nigam, Lucknow Through
its Chairman and Ors versus Kalra Properties (P) Ltd, Lucknow and
Ors1.
4. On the contrary, Mr. Susovan Sengupta, learned advocate
representing State-respondents at the outset submitted that in the present
writ petition no challenge has been made to the notification published
under Section 4(1a) of West Bengal (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948
(hereinafter referred to as Act-II of 1948) or the acquisition proceedings. The
acquired land has absolutely vested with the State in terms of Section 4(2)
of the Act-II of 1948. Once the land is vested unless expressly taken away,
the vesting remains and such land cannot be conveyed or divested. The
petitioners being subsequent purchasers are only entitled to compensation
which their vendors are entitled to. To buttress his contention, he relied on
the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in V. Chandrasekaran
and Another versus Administrative Officer and Others2. There is
inordinate unexplained delay of 29 years in filing the writ petition
pertaining to an award passed in the year 1990. Moreover, Section 24 of
the Act of 2013 does not apply to the case of the petitioners since the
acquisition proceedings has been initiated under Act-II of 1948. Referring
to the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court passed in State
1 (1996) 3 SCC 124
2 (2012) 12 SCC 133
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of West Bengal & Ors versus Niladri Chatterjee & Ors3 and State of
West Bengal & Ors versus Sri Saktipada Saha Chowdhury & Ors4 he
submitted that Section 24 of the Act of 2013 applies to proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as
Act of 1894) and since in no stretch of imagination, the present
proceedings can be said to have been initiated under the Act of 1894,
therefore the aforesaid provisions cannot enure to the benefit of the
petitioners. Relying on the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in
Indore Development Authoirty versus Monoharlal & Ors5 he submitted
that a deemed lapse of land acquisition proceeding under Section 24(2)
would take place where there is inaction of the authorities for five years or
more prior to commencement of the said Act, neither possession of the
land has been taken nor compensation has been paid. The words ‘or’ used
in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 between possession and compensation
should be read as ‘and’ which means both the aforesaid conditions are to
be fulfilled for deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In the present
case, the possession of the land in question have been taken and the
compensation has been declared and the amount has been deposited with
the office of the Collector. Therefore, none of the conditions enshrined in
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is satisfied in the facts of the case.
Further, once award has been passed on taking over possession of the
land under section 16 of the Act 1894, the land vests in State. Section 24
does not provide for divesting of land acquired and it applies to a pending
3 MAT 86 of 2016
4 MAT 1545 of 2018
5 (2020) 8 SCC 129
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proceedings on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 i.e 1st January
2014. The above provision does not revive time-barred claims or reopen
concluded proceedings or allow the landowners to question the legality of
the proceedings. In light of his aforesaid submissions, he prayed that the
petitioners being the subsequent purchasers are at best be entitled to
compensation amount already awarded in favour of their erstwhile
vendors.
5. In reply to the aforesaid contentions advanced on behalf of the State-
respondents, Mr. Basu, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners
submitted that the Act-II of 1948 is a temporary Act which was introduced
for a definite purpose and upon fulfilment of the purpose, it has been
repealed. The acquisition proceedings initiated under Act-II of 1948 merges
with Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and therefore should be considered as a
proceeding under Act of 1894. In support of his contention, he relied on
the decision of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court passed in Niladri
Chatterjee (supra) (MAT 86 of 2016). Hence, provisions of Section 24 of Act
of 2013, is very much applicable to the facts of the case. He seeks for
appropriate orders for disbursement of compensation under the provisions
of Act of 2013.
6. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties
following issues have fallen for consideration.
(i) Whether the land acquisition proceedings in the instant case is
deemed to have been lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the Act of 2013?
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(ii) Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation under the
Act of 2013 or the compensation already awarded in favour of their
erstwhile vendors?
Issue No. 1. Whether the land acquisition proceedings in the instant
case is deemed to have been lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the Act
of 2013?
7. In order to examine the aforesaid issue, it would be profitable to
reproduce the relevant provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013 as
hereunder:
” 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,– (a)
where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act
has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or (b) where an award
under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall
continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if
the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),where an award under the said section 11
has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of
this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken
or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall
be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so
chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: 21 Provided
that where an award has been made and compensation in respect
of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the
account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land
Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.”
7.1. There cannot be any quarrel that the proceedings for land acquisition
in respect of the land in question measuring more or less 5.03 acres has
been initiated under the provisions of Act-II of 1948 and not under Act of
1894. The language of Section 24(1) is “Notwithstanding anything
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contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ….”. Such provisions clearly manifest
that land acquisition process shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain
cases in respect of proceedings initiated under Act of 1894.
7.2. Now the question arises is whether in the instant case where the
proceedings for land acquisition undisputedly have been initiated under
the Act-II of 1948, Section 24 of Act of 2013 has got any manner of
bearing. In order to find an answer to the aforesaid query it would be
apposite to reproduce the observation of the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
court in two appeals as hereunder.
In Niladri Chatterjee (supra) following observation was made:
” If one looks carefully, one would notice that in the facts of the
instant case, the land was requisitioned under LA Case No.
126R/1976-77 and was handed over to the Requiring Body on
29.04.1978 for construction of Ajoy Right Ex-Zamindary
Embankment, Sagira to Kogram. Notification under section 4(1a) of
the Act of 1948 was subsequently published in the Calcutta
Gazette on 2nd July, 1993. Although an amount of Rs.20,76,183/-
was sought for from the Requiring Body, i.e., Executive Engineer,
Damodar Head Works Division, Durgapur-2, but the said authority
simply failed to place the fund. Subsequently, after expiry of the
Act of 1948, the Collector of Burdwan simply abdicated his
statutory duty to issue notice under section 9(3B) of the Act of
1894. This could be either due to sheer callousness or negligence
on the part of the Collector of Burdwan. Undoubtedly, it is only due
to the Collector’s failure to issue notice under section 9(3B) of the
Act of 1894, the land acquisition proceeding stood lapsed.
However, whether ipso facto such a lapse translates into a claim
for compensation under the provision of the Act of 2013 can be
answered simply by visiting section 24 of the Act of 2013. It will be
noticed from a plain reading of the said section that there is a
phrase, “proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894“. In the facts of the instant case, it cannot be held – by any
stretch of imagination – that proceedings were ever “initiated” under
the said Act of 1894. As such, abdication of statutory duty on the
part of the Collector of Burdwan to issue notice under section 9(3B)
of the Act of 1894 – either due to sheer callousness or negligence on
92024:CHC-AS:2494
his/her part – cannot ipso facto translate into a claim for
compensation under the Act of 2013. We do not know what
prevented the writ petitioners from approaching the writ Court any
time between initiation of L.A. Case No. 126R/1976-77 and the
year 2014, for the purpose of seeking appropriate relief(s). Merely
by making two representations – one on 20th December, 2011 and
the other on 30th July, 2014 – they have sought for a issuance of a
writ in the nature of mandamus for getting compensation under the
Act of 2013 upon filing a writ petition only in the year 2014, by
which time the said Act of 2013 has already come into force. We
find that in the facts of the instant case, the writ petitioners were
sleeping over their valuable right to get compensation for decades.
As such, they simply cannot approach the writ Court one fine
morning when the Act of 2013 has come into force in order to seek
compensation under the said Act of 2013, upon invoking section 24
of the said Act of 2013, when proceedings were never “initiated”
under the Act of 1894.”
In Sri Saktipada Saha Chowdhury (supra) the Court observed as follows.
” We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The order of the
learned Single Judge cannot be sustained since the acquisition of
the land in question was initiated under the Act-II of 1948 and not
under Act-I of the land acquisition act, 1894. Hence, Section 24 or
Section 26 of the 2013 Act cannot enure to the benefit of the writ
petitioners. This means, the writ petitioners will not be entitled to
the benefit of determination of compensation in terms of the
provisions of the 2013 Act. The order of the learned Single Judge,
therefore, is set aside…….”
Bearing in mind, the above observations of the Hon’ble Division Bench of
this Court, Section 24 of Act of 2013 cannot enure to the benefit of the writ
petitioners and does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the case
since the acquisition of the land in question was initiated under the Act-II
of 1948 and not under Act-I of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
7.3. It has been strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioners that since
after declaration of the award, the compensation has not been paid to the
beneficiaries/petitioners upon lapse of a considerable period of more five
years, the proceedings initiated for land acquisition in respect of the land
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in question is deemed to have been lapsed. Although it has already been
observed in the foregoing paragraph that Section 24 of Act of 2013 has got
no manner of application in the facts of the instant case yet since
consequence of none payment of compensation is raised it needs to be
dealt with. Before delving into the aforesaid aspect raised on behalf of the
petitioners it would be profitable to refer to the observation of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court made in Indore Development Authority (supra) with regard
to the rule of construction and the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of the
Act of 2013 as hereunder.
” 195. The proviso thus, is not foreign to compensation to be paid
under section 24(2). It provides what is dealt with in Section 24(2)
and takes to its logical conclusion, and provides for higher
compensation, where there is and can be no lapsing of acquisition
proceedings. The rule of construction- as is clear from the preceding
case law discussed, is that the proviso should be limited in its
operation to the subject-matter in a clause. A proviso is ordinarily a
proviso and has to be harmoniously construed with the provisions.
In our opinion, the proviso is capable of being harmoniously
construed with Section 24(2) and not with section 24(1)(b), once we
interpret the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2).
196. In keeping with the ratio in the aforesaid decisions, this court
is of the considered view that the proviso cannot nullify the
provision of Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object
of the enactment, but it can further by providing higher
compensation, thus dealing with matters in Section 24 (2).
Therefore, in effect, where award is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as
well as where award is made but compensation is not deposited in
respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for
acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable
in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013.
197. For the aforesaid reasons, considering the placement of the
proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2),
considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the
repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted
which is not permissible and particularly when we read the word
‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the
legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part
of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher
compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount
112024:CHC-AS:2494
not deposited as required. Higher compensation is contemplated by
the Act of 2013, which intention is fully carried forward by the
placement and interpretation.”
In view of the observation of Hon’ble Supreme Court as above, if one reads
the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013 the irresistible
conclusion which one can arrive is that in case of land acquisition
proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), the
said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed where an award under
the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but (i) the physical possession of the land has
not been taken nor (ii) the compensation has been paid.
The State-respondents in its report stated that the land in question
measuring 5.03 acres was requisitioned under the provisions of Act-II of
1948 on 30 May 1990 for the purpose of construction of 4 numbers of
Solid Spur at Khidirpur under Mahananda Embankment Scheme (Fulahar)
in the district of Malda in LA case no.7/1990-1991 involving mouza-
Doulatnagar, J.L no.161 under Police Station-Harishchandrapur.
Thereafter, the possession of the land in question was handed over the
Requiring Body i.e. Executive Engineer, Mahananda Embankment
Division, Malda on 2nd June 1990. The petitioners contend that the land in
question has already been acquired and award has also been passed and
the land in question has also vested with the State. The aforesaid
contention of the State-respondents of taking over possession made in its
report has not been denied and disputed by the petitioners by filing any
exception to the report. Therefore, it is an admitted position that the
possession of land in question was taken over. The compensation amount
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of Rs.6,02,784/- was awarded and approved by the Collector, Malda on
22nd January, 2011, but the same has not been paid to the petitioners. It
is informed by learned advocate for the State that the amount has been
deposited with the Collector. Be that as it may, the non-payment of
compensation cannot lead to deemed lapse of proceedings and it becomes
inconsequential since twin conditions are to be satisfied. Thus, in the
above circumstances proceedings does not lead to deemed lapse under of
Act of 1894.
Issue No.2: Whether the petitioners are entitled to compensation
under the Act of 2013 or the compensation already awarded in
favour of their erstwhile vendor?
8. It is the contention of the petitioners that during the interregnum
period, after declaration of award and pending payment of compensation,
the erstwhile land owners as vendors transferred their plots to the vendees
namely the petitioners herein comprising 5.03 acres by way of separate
deeds of conveyance. The petitioners have also contended that from the
deeds of conveyance executed by the erstwhile owners, it would be evident
the petitioners herein were alive of the fact that the plots of land in
question were acquired land in which compensation has already been
awarded. The aforesaid fact has not been denied and/or disputed by the
State-respondents. It is also not in dispute that the land in question vested
with the State. Thus, facts reveal that the present petitioners are the
subsequent purchasers of the land in question which vested with the
State. Referring to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in U.P Jalnigam,
Lucknow (supra) it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that
subsequent purchasers are entitled to claim compensation. On the
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contrary, learned advocate representing the State-respondents relying on
V. Chandrasekaran (supra) argued that the subsequent purchasers are
only entitled to the extent of compensation to which their vendors are
entitled and cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings.
In V. Chandrasekaran (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme considering its decision
in U.P Jalnigam, Lucknow (supra) as well as other decisions of Hon’ble
Supreme court observed as follows.
“15. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person
who purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued
under Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court time
and again. In Lila Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, this
Court held that, any one who deals with the land subsequent to a
Section 4 notification being issued, does so, at his own peril. In
Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 540, this
Court held that a Section 4 notification gives a notice to the public
at large that the land in respect to which it has been issued, is
needed for a public purpose, and it further points out that there will
be “an impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired
thereunder.” The alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the
beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to
receive compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was
placed on an earlier judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Shri
Shiv Kumar Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.
16. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd.,
AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of land after
publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is
void against the State and at the most, the purchaser may be a
person- interested in compensation, since he steps into the shoes of
the erstwhile owner and may therefore, merely claim
compensation. (See also: Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana
& Ors., (1996) 11 SCC698).
17. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2677;
Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC
335; Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177,
this Court categorically held that, a person who purchases land
after the publication of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is
not entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that his
title is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of
vendor’s title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a
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Section 4 notification is void and the purchaser cannot challenge
the acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 10 SCC 689).
18. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized
to the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the
issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings
on any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed
executed in his favour does not confer upon him, any title and at
the most he can claim compensation on the basis of his vendor’s
title.”
Thus, is now settled principle of law that a person who purchases land
subsequent to the issuance of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is
not competent to challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on
any ground whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in his
favour does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim
compensation on the basis of his vendor’s title. As per the State-
respondents possession of land in question has been taken over on
requisition under the Act and the notice under Section 4 (1A) of Act-II of
1948 was published and upon repeal of Act-II of 1948 with effect from 31st
March 1997, the proceedings were concluded in terms of Section 9(3B) of
West Bengal Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1997. The aforesaid
aspect has not been denied and disputed by the writ petitioners. Section
9(3B) of the Act of 1997 is reproduced hereunder for the sake of
convenience of discussion:
“(3B) The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect on all
such persons known or believed to be interested in any land, or to
be entitled to act for persons so interested, the possession whereof
has already been taken on requisition under section 3 of the said
Act, and notice for acquisition of such land has also been published
under sub-section (la) of section 4 of the said Act, and, in every
such case, the provisions of section 4, section 5, section 5A, section
152024:CHC-AS:2494
6, section 7, section 8, and section 16 of this Act shall be deemed to
have been complied with:
Provided that the date of publication of notice under subsection (la)
of section 4 of the said Act shall be the date of reference for the
purpose of determining the value of such land under this Act:
Provided further that in every such case, the Collector shall make
an award under section 11 in respect of such land only for the
purpose of payment of due compensation to the persons interested
in such land where such land has, upon the Collector taking
possession thereof, already vested absolutely in the Government,
free from all encumbrances.”
The aforesaid provisions clearly manifest that where the possession of the
land has already been taken on requisition and notice for acquisition of
such land has also been published under sub-section (la) of Section 4 of
the said Act, and, in every such case, the provisions of Section 4, Section
5, Section 5A, Section 6, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16 of the Act
shall be deemed to have been complied with. Therefore, keeping in mind
the above provisions of law and in the facts of the present case, the land-
in-question already vested absolutely with the State. Needless to mention
that the petitioners in the writ petition have also admitted of such vesting
of the land in question.
Bearing in mind the above proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in V. Chandrasekaran (supra), the petitioners being the subsequent
purchasers after such vesting of land in the State at the most can claim
compensation on the basis of their vendor’s title, for the reason that the
sale deed executed in their favour by erstwhile vendors does not confer
upon them any title to the land in question. The alienation thereafter does
not bind the State or the beneficiary under the acquisition. The purchasers
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are entitled only to receive compensation, since they step into the shoes of
their erstwhile owner.
From the letter under Memo No.106/CA dated 1st February, 2011 of the
Collector, Malda at page 45 of the writ petition, it is found that the
Collector, Malda has accorded sanction of estimate amounting
Rs.6,02,784/-. Be that as it may, in Form 4A, it is found that an estimate
amounting to Rs.6,53,715/- has been calculated which includes additional
compensation @12% per annum from date of possession (i.e. 02.06.1990)
upto prior date of notice under Section 4(1a) i.e. 06.01.1997 and additional
compensation @12% per annum from the date of notice under Section
4(1a) i.e. 07.01.1997 upto probable date of award on 06.01.2014.
9. Accordingly, in light of the above discussion, the writ petition being
no. WPA 21490 of 2019 is disposed of directing the Competent Authority
under the State to disburse the compensation amount of Rs.6,53,715/-
together with interest @ 8% per annum to be calculated from 07.01.2014
till the date of payment, in favour of the petitioners to the extent of their
share in the land in question, subject to scrutiny and verification, within a
period of two months from the date of communication of this order.
10. Learned advocate for the petitioner is directed to communicate this
order to the Competent Authority under the State.
11. There shall be no order as to costs.
12. All connected applications stand disposed of.
13. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.
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14. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if
applied, be supplied to the petitioners on completion of all necessary legal
formalities.
(Bivas Pattanayak, J.)
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