Chattisgarh High Court
Indian Institute Of Management Raipur vs Dr. Parikshit Charan on 11 July, 2025
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
2025:CGHC:32345
Digitally
signed by
NAFR
RAHUL
RAHUL JHA
JHA Date:
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
2025.07.14
17:04:39
+0530
REVP No. 142 of 2025
1 - Indian Institute Of Management Raipur Through Chief Executive Officer,
Po Kuru, Tehsil Abhanpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1)
2 – Dr. Ram Kalani Director, IIM Raipur, Office Address At IIM Raipur, Tehsil
Abhnpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 4)
…Applicants
versus
1 – Dr. Parikshit Charan S/o Mool Singh Charan Aged About 49 Years R/o Flat
No. 5, Block 1, Faculty R/o IIM Raipur Campus, District Raipur Chhattisgarh
(Petitioner)
2 – Board Of Governor Through The Chairman Shri Puneet Dalmia Dalmia
Bharat Limited, R/o 11 And 12 Floor, Hansalaya Building, 15 Barakhamba
Road, New Delhi 110001 (Respondent No. 2)
3 – Department Of Personnel And Training Through The Secretary Government
Of India, Ministry Of Personnel, Public Grievance And Pensions, Room No.
222d, North Block, New Delhi (Respondent No. 3)
4 – Shri P.R. Devi Prasad Enquiry Officer C/o Director Indian Institute Of
Management, Atal Nagar, New Raipur (CG) (Respondent No. 5)
Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Applicant : Mr. Kishore Bhaduri, Senior Advocate along with
Dr. Shiv Kumar Shrivastava, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Sudeep Johri, Advocate
(Writ Petitioner)
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru
Order on Board
11/07/2025
1. By way of this Review Petition, the review petitioners seek review of the
order dated 24/04/2025 passed by this Court in WPS No. 2832/2024 &
WPS No. 218/2025.
2. It is noteworthy to mention here that against the order dated 24/04/2025
passed by this Court in WPS No. 2832/2024 & WPS No. 218/202, the
IIM filed WA No. 330/2025, which was dismissed by the Division Bench
of this Court as withdrawn by order dated 22/05/2025 reserving liberty
in favour of the IIM to take recourse to law before the Single Bench.
Thus, this Review Petition.
3. The main ground urged in the review petition is that Section 5 (d)
provides an exception of the Indian Institutes of Management Act, 2017
(henceforth ‘the Act, 2017’) and therefore, service conditions of the
petitioner shall not be governed under the Act, 2017, and as such, the HR
Policy shall still be effective on the service condition of the petitioner.
He would submit that while deciding the aforesaid writ petitions, due to
inadvertence, the said fact has not been brought before this Court.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
No.1/Writ Petitioner would submit that after the order under review
passed by this Court, within a period of four days, the Writ Petitioner has
been placed under suspension i.e. by order dated 28/04/2025. The said
suspension order was challenged by the Review Petitioner in WPS No.
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
3209/2025, which was allowed by this Court on 09/05/2025. Against the
said order, the Review Petitioner/IIM preferred Writ Appeal No.
342/2025, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court and
affirmed passed by this Court. Thus, no relief can be granted in favour of
the Review Petitioner.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings.
6. For the sake of convenience, it would be appropriate to quote Section
5(d), 11 (1) & (2) (i), 35 (1)(2)(a) and 39 (1)(c) of the Act, 2017 for
ready reference, which reads thus:-
5. On and from the commencement of this Act,-
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
d) every person employed by every existing Institute
immediately before such commencement shall hold his
office or service in the corresponding Institute, with the
same tenure, at the same remuneration and upon the same
terms and conditions and with the same rights and
privileges as to pension, leave, gratuity, provident fund and
other matters as he would have held had this Act not been
enacted and shall continue to do so unless and until his
employment is terminated or until such tenure,
remuneration and terms and conditions are duly altered by
regulations:
Provided that if the alteration so made is not
acceptable to such employee, his employment may be
terminated by the Institute in accordance with the terms of
the contract with the employee, or, if no provision is made
therein in this behalf, on payment, to him by the Institute, of
a compensation equivalent to three months’ remuneration in
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REVP No. 142 of 2025case of permanent employee and one months’ remuneration
in the case of other employee:
Provided further that any reference, by whatever form
of words, to the Director, and other officers of an existing
Institute under any law for the time being in force, or in any
instrument or other document, shall be construed as a
reference to the Director, and other officers of the
corresponding Institutes;
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
11. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board of
every Institute shall be responsible for the general
superintendence, direction and control of the affairs of the
Institute and shall have the power to frame or amend or
modify or rescind the regulations governing the affairs of
the Institute to achieve the objects of the Institute specified
in section 6.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1),
the Board shall have the following powers, namely:-
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
(i) to create academic, administrative, technical and other
posts and to make appointments thereto:
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
35. (1) The Board may, by notification, make regulations not
inconsistent with this Act and the rules made thereunder to
carry out the provisions of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or
any of the following matters, namely:-
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
(a) tenure, remuneration and terms and conditions of
employees of existing Institute under clause (d) of section 5;
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
39.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act:-
xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx
(c) until the first regulations are made under this Act, the
rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force,
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall
continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
7. The order under review was passed by this Court on 24/04/2025 in WPS
Nos. 2832/2024 & 218/2025, wherein this Court held thus:-
“7. From the pleadings, it is apparent that the petitioner
is an Associate Professor in the IIM, Raipur. On account of
some complaints received against the petitioner, he has been
placed under suspension; charge-sheet has been issued; and
the Departmental Enquiry has been contemplated by the
Director of the IIM.
8. Section 11 of the Act, 2017 speaks about ‘Powers and
Function of the Board’, subject to the provisions of the Act,
the Board of every institute shall be responsible for the
general superintendence, directions and control of the
affairs of the institute and shall have the power to frame or
amend or modified or rescind the regulation governing the
affairs of the institute to achieve the objects of the Institute
specified in Section 6. Section 11 (2) (i) of the Act, 2017
provides that the Board shall have the power to create
academic, administrative, technical and other posts and to
make appointments thereto. From the said provisions, it is
crystal clear that the BOG is the appointing authority of the
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REVP No. 142 of 2025petitioner. Thus, the charge-sheet can only be issued upon
approval of the BOG, but the same has not been followed in
the case in hand. Even, the respondents failed to show that
the powers delegated by the BOG upon the Director. The
charge-sheet issued by the other authority than the specified
authority was wholly without jurisdiction and vitiated the
whole disciplinary proceedings.
9. Such procedure adopted by the Director would also
do violence to the protective provisions contained under
Article 311 (2) which ensures that no public servant is
dismissed, removed or suspended without following a fair
procedure in which he/she has been given a reasonable
opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge
sheet. Such a charge sheet can only be issued upon approval
by the appointing authority, in the case at hand, it is BOG,
not the Director. (See: Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath &
Others1.
10. It is well settled proposition of law that if the manner
of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the
act must be done in that manner or not at all. (See: Meera
Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Others2).
11. As far as the HR Policy is concerned, the same is
nothing but internal arrangement of the establishment. Even
otherwise, the policy/guidelines cannot supersede the
statutes i.e. the Act, 2017. Even the respondents failed to
show that the provisions of the Act, 2017 will not applicable
to the case of the petitioner.
12. Guidelines/policy per se do not partake to the
character of statute. Such guidelines/policy in absence of
the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. This is
because guidelines, by their very nature, do not fall into the
1 (2014) 1 SCC 351
2 (2008) 9 SCC 177
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REVP No. 142 of 2025category of legislation, direct, subordinate or ancillary.
They have only an advisory role to play and non-adherence
to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly
permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or
law situation warrants the same. Judicial control takes over
only where the deviation either involves arbitrariness or
discrimination or is so fundamental as to undermine a basic
public purpose which the guidelines and the statute under
which they are issued are intended to achieve. (See:
Poonam Verma & Others v. Delhi Development Authority3
13. Applying the well settled principles of law to the facts
of the present case and for the reasons mentioned
hereinabove, without expressing any opinion on the merits
of the case with regards to contents of the charge-sheet, the
impugned suspension order; the disciplinary proceedings
contemplated against the petitioner; and the charge-sheet
are hereby quashed.
14. In the result, both the Writ Petitions are allowed.
However, liberty is reserved in favour of the respondent/IIM
to take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the
provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording
due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised.
8. After four days of the passing of the aforesaid order, by order dated
28/04/2025, the Writ petitioner was placed under suspension, which was
challenged by him in WPS No. 3209/2025, which was allowed by this
Court on 09/05/2025 holding thus:-
“6. On going through the pleadings and documents, it is
manifest that the respondents completely placed reliance
upon the HR Policy of the IIM whereas Section 39(1)(c) of
the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the first3 2007 (13) SCC 154
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REVP No. 142 of 2025regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye-laws
of each Institute as in force, immediately before the
commencement of this Act shall continue to apply to the
Institute in so far as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
7. Bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as per Section 11(2)
(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing authority of
the petitioner and the disciplinary action including passing
of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the
BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the respondent is
inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the
provision regarding the appointing authority is concerned,
the Act, 2017 will prevail as per Section 39(1)(c). Despite
the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities have not
followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true
perspective. By applying the provisions of the Act, 2017, the
earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner were allowed
and granted liberty to the IIM to take appropriate steps
against the petitioner as per the provisions contained in the
Act, 2017 and after affording due opportunity of hearing to
the petitioner, if so advised. Despite granting the said
liberty, again without following the provisions of the Act,
2017 on the strength of the HR Policy the impugned
suspension order has been passed by the respondent No.2.
8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the petition is
allowed and the order dated 28-4-2025 (Annexure-P/1) is
hereby quashed. However, liberty is reserved in favour of
the IIM to proceed against the petitioner as per the
provisions of the Act, 2017, if so advised.”
9. The Review Petitioner/IIM challenged the order dated 09/05/2025
passed in WPS No. 3209/2025 before the Division Bench of this Court
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
in WA No. 342/2025. The said appeal was dismissed by the Division
Bench by order dated 27/05/2025 and affirmed order of this Court. The
Division Bench held thus:-
“8. From perusal of the impugned order, it transpires that
learned Single Judge held that on going through the
pleadings and documents, it is manifest that the respondents
completely placed reliance upon the HR Policy of the IIM
whereas Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically
provides that until the first regulations are made under this
Act, the rules, and bye-laws of each Institute as in force,
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall
continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Learned Single
Judge further held that bare perusal, it is quite vivid that as
per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the
appointing authority of the petitioner and the disciplinary
action including passing of suspension order can only be
issued upon approval of the BoG, but the HR policy relied
upon by the respondent is inconsistent with the Act, 2017.
Thus, as far as the provision regarding the appointing
authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per
Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand,
the authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act,
2017 in its true perspective. By applying the provisions of
the Act, 2017, the earlier writ petitions filed by the
petitioner were allowed and granted liberty to the IIM to
take appropriate steps against the petitioner as per the
provisions contained in the Act, 2017 and after affording
due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, if so advised.
Despite granting the said liberty, again without following
the provisions of the Act, 2017 on the strength of the HR
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REVP No. 142 of 2025Policy the impugned suspension order has been passed by
the respondent No.2 and allowed the writ petition filed by
respondent No.1 herein and quashed the order dated
28/04/2025. However, liberty was reserved in favour fo the
IIM to proceed against the petitioner (respondent No.1
herein) as per the provisions of the Act, 2027, if so advised.
Even otherwise, writ appeal filed against the order dated
24/04/2025 was withdrawn by the appellants with liberty to
take recourse to law before learned Single Judge and
thereafter no review was filed.
9. Considering the submissions advanced by learned
counsel appearing for the parties, perusing the order dated
24/04/2025 passed by learned Single Bench of this Court in
WPS Nos.2832 of 2024 and 218 of 2025, further perusing
the order dated 22/05/2025 passed in writ appeal and also
considering the findings recorded by learned Single Judge
while allowing the writ petition filed by respondent No.1
herein, we are of the considered opinion that learned Single
Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or
jurisdictional error in the impugned order warranting
interference by this Court.
10. Accordingly, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is
liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s).”
10. Now reverting to the grounds raised by the Review Petitioner that the
provisions of Section 5 (d) of the Act, 2017 provides an exception and
therefore, shall not be governed under the Act, 2017, and as such, the HR
Policy shall still be effective on the service condition of the Writ
Petitioner. The ground taken by the Review Petitioner has been
considered by this Court while deciding WPS No. 3209/2025 and it was
observed by order dated 09/05/2025 that though there is an exception
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
under Section 5 (d) of the Act, 2017, Section 39(1)(c) provides that until
the first regulation are made under this Act, the Rules and bye-laws of
each institute are enforced, immediately before the commencement of
this Act, shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Hence, as the provisions
regarding power of the BoG regarding the status of the appointing
Authority was not inconsistent with the Act, 2017, that’s why the
provisions of Section 11(2) would be applicable.
11. On going through the provisions of the Act, 2017, it is evident that
Section 39(1)(c) of the Act, 2017 categorically provides that until the
first regulations are made under this Act, the rules, and bye- laws of each
Institute as in force, immediately before the commencement of this Act
shall continue to apply to the Institute in so far as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
12. As per Section 11(2)(i) of the Act, 2017 the BoG is the appointing
authority of the writ petitioner and the disciplinary action including
passing of suspension order can only be issued upon approval of the
BoG, but the HR policy relied upon by the review Petitioner is
inconsistent with the Act, 2017. Thus, as far as the provision regarding
the appointing authority is concerned, the Act, 2017 will prevail as per
Section 39(1)(c). Despite the said fact, in the case at hand, the authorities
have not followed the provisions of the Act, 2017 in its true perspective.
13. Though in the order under review, the aforesaid issue has not been dealt
with by this Court owing to the fact that the same has not been brought
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
before this Court by either of the parties, the same has been duly
deliberated in the subsequent Writ Petition i.e. WPS No. 3209/2025 and
held that the Authorities have not followed the provisions of the Act,
2017 and hence, while allowing the said Writ petitions, this Court
granted liberty to the IIM to proceed against the Writ Petitioner as per
the Act, 2017, if so advised. Even, the Appellate Court has also affirmed
the said finding of this Court in WA No. 342/2025. However, without
availing the remedy as has been granted earlier by this Court, the IIM
filed the present Review Petition.
14. The Scope of the review jurisdiction is narrow confined to errors
apparent on the face of the record or if a relevant provision of law had
been overlooked. In other words, it is only a patent error which is
amenable to review and not an error which may have to be discovered by
a process of reasoning and what may be called a virtual re-hearing of the
matter. In the garb of a Review Petition, this Court cannot sit in
judgment over its own order. Therefore I am not satisfied that the
Review application is maintainable, if the petitioner is aggrieved, the
remedy is different.
15. It is well settled that scope of review jurisdiction is extremely limited
and only an error apparent on face of record can be corrected in the said
jurisdiction and re-appraisal/re-appreciation cannot be done in exercise
of said jurisdiction as that would amount to exercise of appellate
jurisdiction which is impermissible in law as has been held in catena of
judgments by the Hon’ble Apex Court, such as Devaraju Pillai v.
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REVP No. 142 of 2025
Sellayya Pillai, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 61, Meera Bhanja (Smt) v.
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt), reported in (1995) 1 SCC 170,
Avijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. and others, reported in (1996)
10 SCC 174, Lily Thomas etc. v. Union of India and others, reported
in AIR 2000 SC 1650, Akhilesh Yavad v. Vishwanath Chaturvedi and
others, reported in (2013) 2 SCC 1 and Sasi (D) through LRS. v.
Aravindakshan Nair and others, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 692).
16. The ground raised by the review petitioner in this review petition cannot
be permitted to be raised in review petition. Even otherwise, there is no
error apparent on the face of record in the order under review warranting
invocation of review jurisdiction.
17. As an upshot, the review petition is dismissed.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Rahul/Gowri
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