Rajasthan High Court – Jodhpur
Madan Mohan And Anr vs State And Anr on 11 July, 2025
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:29853]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 733/2012
1. Madan Mohan Sharma S/o Shri Hariya Ram, by caste
Brahmin, R/o- Village Bamanpura, Tehsil Hindaun City, Distt.
Karauli, presently Product Executive, Shri Ram Transport Finance
Company Ltd. Anadra Chauraha, Sirohi.
2. Jitendra Kumar Jenam S/o Shri Satish Chandra Jenam, by
caste Hindu, R/o- Village Ganjkhadli, Distt. Alvar, presently
Senior Product Executive Shri Ram Transport Finance Company
Ltd., Anadara Chauraha, Sirohi.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Mahaveer Singh S/o Shri Jorawar Singh, by caste Rao, R/o-
Shastri Nagar, Chhawni, Sheoganj, Distt. Sirohi.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Chakrawarti Singh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. D.S. Udawat
Mr. Karan Singh Rathore
Mr. Ashwin Kumar Nogija
Mr. Shrawan Singh Rathore
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
Reportable
ORDER RESERVED ON ::: 08/07/2025
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON ::: 11/07/2025
BY THE COURT:-
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1. By way of filing this instant petition under Section 397 read
with Section 401 Cr.P.C., the petitioners have challenged the
order dated 27.07.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge,
Sirohi, in Sessions Case No. 6/2012, arising out of FIR No.
148/2011 registered at Police Station Sheoganj, District
Sirohi, whereby the learned trial court proceeded to frame
charges against the petitioners for the offences punishable
under Sections 306, 406, and 120-B of the Indian Penal
Code.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the complainant, Mahaveer
Singh, lodged an FIR through an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. against the petitioners at Police Station
Sheoganj, District Sirohi, alleging that his brother, Jitendra
Singh, who was engaged in the business of operating trucks
financed through Shriram Finance, Anadra Chouraha, Sirohi,
committed suicide on 11.08.2011 after allegedly consuming
a poisonous substance. A suicide note was discovered
beneath his bed on 10.08.2011, wherein it was stated that
the deceased was demanding ₹3,70,000/- from accused
Pintukumar, which remained unpaid. It was further alleged
that Pintukumar, in conspiracy with his partner Hameed
Khan, misappropriated the proceeds from Truck No. GJ-1-AY-
8305 and issued repeated threats, driving the deceased to
mental distress. The deceased had reportedly sold the said
vehicle to Bharat Kumar Bhand, after which threats
continued from Pintukumar and Hameed Khan, prompting
the act of suicide. The suicide note further implicated
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accused Jitendra Sharma @ Jainam and Madan Mohan
Sharma, both employees of Shriram Finance, Anadra
Chouraha, Sirohi, alleging that they dishonestly misused
₹40,000/- given by the deceased for repayment of the truck
loan and instead misappropriated the amount for personal
use. On a second occasion, ₹40,000/- was again given to
them, out of which only a receipt for ₹39,500/- was issued,
and ₹500/- was allegedly pocketed. They also misled the
deceased by stating that if a truck owner dies, the loan is
waived and a No Objection Certificate is issued without dues
–a claim found to be untrue after his death.
On the basis of these allegations, a criminal case was
registered and investigation commenced. The suicide note
was seized, witness statements were recorded, and relevant
documents including agreements and papers from Shriram
Finance were collected. Upon completion of investigation, a
charge sheet under Sections 306, 406, and 120-B IPC was
filed against the accused, which was later committed to the
Sessions Court. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order
dated 27.07.2012, whereby the learned Sessions Judge,
Sirohi, proceeded to frame charges against the petitioners
for the offences punishable under Sections 306, 406, and
120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the petitioners have
approached this Court by way of the present revision
petition, assailing the said order as being contrary to law and
facts on record.
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3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
4. Upon a careful consideration of the material available on
record, including the contents of the suicide note and the
nature of allegations levelled in the complaint, this Court is
of the prima facie view that the essential ingredients
required to constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC
appear to be lacking. It is well settled that the act of suicide,
though deeply tragic, cannot ipso facto invite criminal
liability upon others unless there exists a proximate, direct,
and active instigation or abetment to commit such an act.
In this regard, Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code defines
abetment as follows:
“A person abets the doing of a thing, who–
First.–Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly.–Engages with one or more other person or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that
thing; orThirdly.–Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of
that thing.
Explanation 1.–A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful
concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily
causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done,
is said to instigate the doing of that thing.”
A plain reading of the above provision makes it abundantly
clear that abetment must be directly connected to the doing
of a particular act, and in the context of Section 306 IPC,
“that act” must necessarily refer to the ultimate consequence
–namely, the commission of suicide by the deceased. The
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instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid must therefore
pertain specifically to that fatal act. It is not sufficient that
the accused may have caused mental distress or engaged in
general misconduct; unless such conduct is demonstrably
linked to inciting or facilitating the commission of suicide, the
legal threshold for abetment is not met. The abetment must
be aimed at the consequence itself, and not merely form part
of a background of strained relations or financial discord.
Thus, any alleged wrongful acts must be scrutinized through
the lens of whether they were designed to compel or drive
the deceased to the extreme act of self-destruction, and not
merely whether they amounted to civil or interpersonal
disputes. In the absence of such targeted mens rea and
causative nexus with the suicidal act, criminal liability under
Section 306 IPC cannot be attracted.
5. A plain reading of the suicide note does not reveal any
express or implied act of instigation by the accused-
petitioners that can be construed as a deliberate or active
provocation driving the deceased to end his life. The
deceased has stated that he was mentally disturbed for
several months following certain financial disputes, and that
he had been consistently demanding an amount of
₹3,70,000/- from accused Pintukumar, a portion of which he
had borrowed from third parties. The deceased further
mentioned that the said amount was not returned to him,
and that he was subjected to persistent reminders and
threats regarding the ownership and sale of the truck in
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question, allegedly involving Pintukumar, his partner Hameed
Khan, and Pintukumar’s mother.
6. However, mere financial disputes or repeated demands for
repayment–however pressing or insistent–cannot be
elevated to the level of criminal instigation within the
meaning of Section 107 IPC. The threats mentioned in the
note, at best, reflect mental pressure emanating from
commercial or civil discord; they do not demonstrate any
overt act aimed at compelling or provoking the deceased to
commit suicide. There is a categorical absence of any
reference in the suicide note to physical abuse, coercion,
blackmail, or conduct that can be termed as incitement to
end life. The deceased himself has stated, ” मैंने यह कदम अपनी खुद
की इच्छा से उठाया है ” (“I have taken this step of my own
volition”), which further negates any theory of inducement or
coercion.
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Amalendu Pal @
Jhantu vs State of West Bengal, [(2010) 1 SCC 707],
has authoritatively held that conviction under Section 306
IPC requires a positive act of instigation or intentional aid on
the part of the accused. Mere harassment, mental distress,
or financial pressure–absent a direct or active act leading
the deceased to commit suicide–does not meet the
threshold require for establishing abetment. The Court
categorically observed that:
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“Without a positive act on the part of the accused to
instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot
be sustained… It also requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no
option…”
In the present case, applying the aforesaid principle, the
allegations do not disclose such instigating or active conduct
which would bring the petitioners within the purview of
Section 306 IPC.
8. It is equally pertinent to note that no prior complaint, written
or oral, appears to have been lodged by the deceased or his
family members alleging physical mistreatment, threats of
violence, or any other form of sustained harassment that
could reasonably be inferred to have led him to take this
extreme step. In such circumstances, where the suicide was
a culmination of accumulated financial stress and mental
burden, the invocation of criminal culpability under Section
306 IPC–without the foundational requirement of mens rea
or clear instigatory conduct–is legally unsustainable.
9. This Court also takes judicial notice of the principle that not
every act of insistence, verbal altercation, or pressure for
repayment of money can amount to abetment of suicide. The
insistence made by the accused for return of money or the
continuation of financial obligations may, at most, give rise
to a civil cause of action, but cannot be viewed through the
lens of criminal abetment unless the prosecution can
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establish a clear nexus between such insistence and the
mental state of the deceased directly leading to the suicide.
10. It is now trite to state that the mere act of raising a
demand for repayment of a borrowed amount–howsoever
frequent or insistent–does not ipso facto amount to
abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Abetment, as
contemplated under the statutory scheme, necessitates a
deliberate, proximate, and culpable conduct on the part of
the accused, which either instigates, facilitates, or compels
the commission of suicide. A creditor asserting his legal right
to recover dues from a debtor cannot be per se branded as
an abettor of suicide, unless it is demonstrably established
that such demand was accompanied by acts of unlawful
coercion, humiliation, or harassment of such an aggravated
nature that it stripped the victim of all viable alternatives
except to resort to self-destruction.
11. In the context of a debtor-creditor relationship–
whether involving an individual lender or a financial
institution–the obligation to repay is inherently recognized,
and correspondingly, the right to demand repayment is
legally protected. The assertion of this right, in the absence
of any accompanying illegality, abuse, or threatening
conduct, cannot be construed as abetment. Even if the
pressure exerted is perceived by the debtor to be
burdensome or emotionally unsettling, such perception–
without objective evidence of unlawful or unreasonable
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duress–does not elevate the conduct to the threshold of
criminal culpability. The law does not expect individuals,
howsoever distressed, to surrender to despair. Even
assuming the existence of overbearing or excessive
pressure, the aggrieved party always has recourse to lawful
remedies–civil or criminal–to vindicate his rights. Resorting
to suicide cannot, in such cases, be attributed to the alleged
actions of the creditor unless the conduct in question was so
oppressive and cruel that it completely eclipsed the mental
volition of the victim. In the present case, there is an
absence of any such extreme or exceptional circumstance.
The deceased’s action, though tragic, appears to be the
result of internalized financial anxiety rather than any
criminal inducement or provocation attributable to the
petitioners.
12. This Court is not unmindful of the legal position that
the present proceedings arise at the stage of framing of
charge and not upon conclusion of trial or conviction. It is
well-settled that at this juncture, a meticulous appreciation
or dissection of the evidentiary record is not warranted, and
the Court must proceed primarily on a prima facie view of
the material available. However, it is equally imperative to
ensure that the process of law is not weaponized in a
manner that causes undue harassment to individuals who
are made to undergo a full-fledged criminal trial in the
absence of foundational facts or core ingredients constituting
the alleged offence. In the present case, the solitary piece of
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material forming the fulcrum of the prosecution’s case is the
suicide note, the evidentiary worth of which shall ultimately
be tested at the stage of trial. Yet, the content of the said
note–when perused in its entirety–even at a preliminary
stage, does not rise above the threshold of mere grievance
or mental distress emanating from financial transactions.
Once it is judicially discerned that the substratum of the
suicide note lacks the requisite incitement or instigation as
defined under Section 107 IPC, it becomes manifest that
compelling the petitioners to undergo the rigours of a
protracted criminal trial would not only be unwarranted but
would also amount to inflicting avoidable prejudice, verging
on infringement of their fundamental and civil liberties. In
such situations, courts are duty-bound to prevent the abuse
of judicial process and to secure the ends of justice by
intervening at the stage of charge, particularly when it is
evident that the allegations do not, even if taken at face
value, disclose the essential elements of the offence alleged.
13. As regards the charge framed under Section 406 IPC, it
is to be noted that the offence of criminal breach of trust is
defined under the said provision as follows:
“Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any
dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property
in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such
trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied,
which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully
suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’.”
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A plain reading of the above statutory provision reveals that
two essential elements must be satisfied to attract the
rigours of Section 406 IPC: (i) entrustment of property or
dominion over property, and (ii) dishonest misappropriation,
conversion, or use of such property in violation of trust. In
the present case, however, there is not even a whisper in the
material on record suggesting any entrustment of specific
property to the petitioners, much less any dishonest
misappropriation thereof. The grievance of the complainant
appears to revolve around the non-refund or alleged
misapplication of funds advanced in the course of financial
transactions relating to a truck. Such monetary dealings,
evidently arising out of civil-commercial arrangements,
cannot–in the absence of clear fiduciary entrustment and
culpable intent–be stretched to fit the contours of criminal
breach of trust.
14. Merely because certain receipts were allegedly not
issued in full, or that a part of the amount was not utilized
strictly for the purpose for which it was advanced, cannot–
without a demonstrable breach of legal duty, dishonest
conversion, or diversion of entrusted property–justify the
invocation of criminal law. There is no allegation that the
petitioners were ever entrusted with property in a fiduciary
capacity or that they were bound by any legal directive
regarding its use, which they wilfully violated. At best, the
dispute reflects a civil liability, not a criminal breach. The
appropriate remedy for such claims of financial impropriety
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would lie in instituting a civil suit for recovery or damages,
and not in the invocation of the penal provisions of Section
406 IPC, which are meant to address clear cases of criminal
misappropriation arising from a position of trust.
15. As regards the charge framed under Section 120-B IPC,
which pertains to criminal conspiracy, the same also appears
to be legally unsustainable in the absence of foundational
facts substantiating the core ingredients of the alleged
substantive offences. In order to invoke the provisions of
Section 120-B IPC, the prosecution must, at the very
threshold, demonstrate a prima facie case that there existed
an unlawful agreement between two or more persons to
commit an illegal act or to accomplish a legal act by illegal
means. However, in the present case, no cogent material has
been placed on record to suggest the existence of a prior
meeting of minds or any overt act committed in furtherance
of such conspiracy.
16. It is well settled that conspiracy cannot exist in the
abstract. When the alleged acts constituting the substantive
offences under Sections 306 and 406 IPC are themselves
found to be lacking in essential ingredients, it becomes
legally incongruent to sustain a charge of conspiracy to
commit such offences. If the commission of the principal
offence itself does not prima facie emerge from the facts, the
question of conspiracy to commit that offence becomes
wholly academic and unsustainable in law. The mere fact
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that multiple persons are named in a suicide note or that
their conduct gave rise to a sense of grievance does not, in
the absence of clear and independent material, satisfy the
rigorous requirement of a conspiratorial design or unlawful
agreement. Section 120-B cannot be pressed into service as
a substitute for deficient substantive charges, and must
necessarily be supported by evidence of concerted action
aimed at a common illegal objective. In the present case, the
record is completely bereft of any such material linking the
petitioners in a conspiratorial framework; hence, the
invocation of Section 120-B IPC stands vitiated in law and in
logic.
17. In cases where the foundational ingredients of the
charged offences are conspicuously absent even on a prima
facie appraisal, or where the ultimate fate of the trial is
clearly foreseeable based on the existing material, it
becomes incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
revisional jurisdiction with judicial foresight and intervention.
The Court must not remain a passive onlooker in the face of
manifest injustice or procedural abuse. Rather, where the
continuation of proceedings would amount to a futile
exercise, causing undue hardship and prejudice to the
accused, the Court is duty-bound to accord due weight to a
plea for discharge and effectuate a just, fair, and expeditious
resolution. The majesty of criminal law lies not merely in its
rigorous application, but in its judicious restraint against
unwarranted prosecution. In such circumstances, early
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judicial intervention becomes essential to uphold the sanctity
of legal process and protect individuals from being subjected
to the rigours of a trial devoid of legal foundation.
18. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned order dated
27.07.2012, to the extent it directs the framing of charges
under Sections 306, 406, and 120-B IPC against the
petitioners, suffers from legal infirmity and appears to be
based on an erroneous appreciation of the material placed on
record. The continuation of criminal proceedings in the
absence of foundational ingredients constituting the alleged
offences would amount to abuse of the process of law and
cause grave prejudice to the petitioners.
19. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed. The
order dated 27.07.2012 passed by the learned Sessions
Judge ,Sirohi in Sessions Case No.6/2011, is hereby quashed
and set aside.
20. The petitioners are discharged of the charges. They
shall be let free, if not required in any other case.
21. The record be sent back forthwith.
(FARJAND ALI),J
7-Mamta/-
.
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