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Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/13 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 15 July, 2025
Page No.# 1/13
GAHC010223642024
2025:GAU-AS:9129
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/5575/2024
AL AMIN ZAKARIA
S/O- LATE HABIB ALI, VILLAGE- BARHAILAKANDI PART-III, P.O.-
BARHAILAKANDI, DISTRICT- HAILAKANDI, ASSAM, PIN- 781354
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM,
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (ELEMENTARY), DISPUR, GUWAHATI-06
2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION
ASSAM
KAHILIPARA
GUWAHATI
3:THE DISTRICT LEVEL SELECTION COMMITTEE
REPRESENTED BY THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER
KARIMGANJ
ASSAM
4:THE DISTRICT ELEMENTARY EDUCATION OFFICER
KARIMGANJ
DIST.- KARIMGANJ
ASSA
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. A B T HAQUE,
Advocate for the Respondent : GA, ASSAM, SC, ELEM. EDU
Page No.# 2/13
:::BEFORE:::
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR
Date of hearing: 15.07.2025
Date of Judgment & Order: 15.07.2025Judgment & order(Oral)
Heard Mr. A. B. T. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard
Mr. Arunav Phukan, learned standing counsel, Elementary Education
Department, and Ms. U. Sharma, learned Government Advocate, appearing
on behalf of their respective respondents.
2. The petitioner, herein, by way of instituting the present proceeding,
has assailed the rejection of his claim for appointment on compassionate
ground by the District Level Committee, Karimganj, in its meeting held on
12.08.2024. The petitioner has made a further prayer for a direction upon
the respondent authorities to place his application before the jurisdictional
District Level Committee for a fresh consideration of his case for
appointment on compassionate ground.
3. As projected in the writ petition, the father of the petitioner, Late
Habib Ali, while serving as an Assistant Teacher at Manikbond M.E. School,
died-in-harness, on 17-06-2004. At the time of death of the father of the
petitioner; the petitioner, herein, was aged around 7(seven) years.
Accordingly, the mother of the petitioner submitted an application for
appointment on compassionate ground. The application of the mother of
the petitioner was considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee
Page No.# 3/13
in its meeting held on 17-06-2013. However, the same could be rejected on
the ground of late submission. The said decision of the jurisdictional District
Level Committee was, however, not challenged by the mother of the
petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner, on attaining the age of majority,
submitted an application on 04-07-2016, before District Elementary
Education Officer (DEEO), Karimganj, for consideration of his case for
appointment on compassionate ground. The consideration of the case of
the petitioner having not been made by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee, the petitioner, herein, again, vide his application, dated 29-03-
2023, prayed before the District Elementary Education Officer (DEEO),
Karimganj, for consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate
ground.
4. The applications so submitted by the petitioner having not been
considered in the manner required, he approached the Court by way of
instituting a writ petition being WP(c)7003/2023. This Court, vide order,
dated 06-12-2023, disposed of the said writ petition by directing the
District Elementary Education Officer(DEEO), Karimganj, to place the
application of the petitioner, dated 04-07-2016, before the next available
District Level Committee, Karimganj, for consideration of his case for
appointment on compassionate ground. It was further provided that if the
application of the petitioner was earlier placed before the jurisdictional
District Level Committee, the outcome, thereof, be communicated to the
petitioner and in such event, there would be no requirement to place it
again before the jurisdictional District Level Committee. The application of
the petitioner was placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee
in its meeting held on 12-08-2024. The jurisdictional District Level
Committee, on consideration of the same and noticing that the application
Page No.# 4/13
submitted by the mother of the petitioner was rejected earlier by the
Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013, and such rejection not
having been challenged by the mother of the petitioner, herein; proceeded
to reject the claim of the petitioner.
5. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted the present proceeding
before this Court.
6. Mr. Haque, learned counsel for the petitioner, after reiterating the
facts noticed hereinabove, has submitted that the case of the petitioner
was not given its due consideration by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee and accordingly, a direction is called upon to be issued by this
Court to the respondent authorities to have the case of the petitioner,
herein, placed before the jurisdictional District Level Committee for
consideration of his claim for appointment on compassionate ground, on
merits.
7. Mr. Haque, learned counsel, has further submitted that the rejection
of the application of the mother of the petitioner for appointment on
compassionate ground, would be of no consequence, inasmuch as, the
same was so rejected on a technical ground. The learned counsel has
submitted that the petitioner, herein, having submitted the application for
consideration of his case for appointment on compassionate ground,
immediately, after attaining the age of majority; such application was
required to be given its due consideration by the respondent authorities.
Page No.# 5/13
8. In support of his submission, Mr. Haque, learned counsel for the
petitioner, has placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Govinda Janardan Gaikwad v. State of
Maharashtra & ors.[Civil Appeal No. 7489 of 2023, dated 06-11-2023].
9. Per contra, Mr. Phukan, learned standing counsel, Elementary
Education Department, and Ms. Sharma, learned Government Advocate,
have submitted that the delay occasioning in the matter, has rendered the
application submitted by the petitioner, herein, to be a stale one, and the
same would not mandate a consideration by the respondent authorities. It
was further submitted that the policy in place, mandates consideration of
the application of any one member of the family of the deceased employee
and the application submitted by the mother of the petitioner having
already been considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and
the same having been rejected, further application from the same family
would not be mandated to be submitted. It was also submitted that the
rejection of the application of the mother of the petitioner, herein, was
never assailed at any point of time and the same has, therefore, attained
its finality. Accordingly, it was submitted that the claim made by the
petitioner, herein, for consideration of his case for appointment on
compassionate ground, would not mandate an acceptance by this Court.
10. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also
perused the materials available on record.
11. The facts, noticed hereinabove, is not in dispute. The mother of the
petitioner, herein, had submitted an application for consideration of her
Page No.# 6/13
case for appointment on compassionate ground after the death of the
father of the petitioner. The said application was duly considered by the
jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013,
however, the same came to be rejected. The rejection of the application
submitted by the mother of the petitioner by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee was not challenged by the mother of the petitioner and/or by
any other family member of the deceased Government employee. However,
the petitioner, herein, on attaining the age of majority, had, for the first
time, submitted an application for appointment on compassionate ground
on 04-07-2016. The said application of the petitioner, herein, in pursuance
of the directions passed by this Court in WP(c)7003/2023; came to be
rejected by the jurisdictional District Level Committee in its meeting held
on 12-08-2024, on noticing the rejection of the application submitted by
the mother of the petitioner in the matter by the Committee in its meeting
held on 12-06-2013.
12. It is to be noted at this stage that the appointment on compassionate
ground is for the purpose of mitigating the hardship faced by the family of
a deceased employee on account of the premature death of the bread-
earner of the family. The mother of the petitioner, herein, having applied
for appointment on compassionate ground and her case having been duly
considered by the jurisdictional District Level Committee and the same
having been rejected and such a rejection not being challenged by her,
further application for appointment on compassionate ground from the
same family; would not be mandated. The rejection of the application
submitted by the mother of the petitioner by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee in its meeting held on 17-06-2013 not being challenged either
by the mother of the petitioner, and/or, by the petitioner, herein, the same
Page No.# 7/13
has, therefore, attained its finality.
13. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the subsequent
application submitted by the petitioner, herein, after rejection of the
application submitted by the mother of the petitioner in terms of the policy
in place; would not mandate a consideration. Having drawn the said
conclusion, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction upon the respondent
authorities for placing his case before the jurisdictional District Level
Committee for a fresh consideration for appointment on compassionate
ground, is now being considered.
14. As noticed hereinabove; the father of the petitioner had died-in-
harness on 17-02-2004. The claim of the petitioner for appointment on
compassionate ground, in view of the long delay occasioning in the matter
since the date of death of the father of the petitioner has been rendered
stale and accordingly, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction upon the
respondent authorities for a fresh consideration of the application
submitted by the petitioner, herein, in the matter, would not mandate
acceptance by this Court.
15. The petitioner, in the present proceeding, having also prayed for a
direction upon the respondent authorities for consideration of his case for
appointment on compassionate ground; it is to be noted that such a
consideration would now be required to be so directed to be made after
around 21 years having elapsed since the date of the death of the
government servant involved.
Page No.# 8/13
16. It is a settled position of law that public service appointment should
be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of an application and on
merits. The appointment on compassionate ground cannot be a source of
recruitment. It is merely an exception to the requirement of law keeping in
view the fact of the death of the employee while in service, leaving his
family without any means of livelihood. In such cases, the object is to
enable the family to get over the sudden financial crises. Such
appointments on compassionate ground, therefore, have to be made in
accordance with the Rules, Regulations, or, administrative instructions
taking into consideration, the financial condition of the family of the
deceased. The favourable treatment to the dependent of the deceased
employee must have a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved
thereby i.e. relief against destitution. At the same time, however, it should
not be forgotten that as against the destitute family of the deceased
employee, there are millions and millions of other families which are
equally, if not more, destitute. The exception to the Rule made in favour of
the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the service
rendered by him and the legitimate expectation, and the change in the
status and affairs of the family endangered by the erstwhile employment,
which are suddenly upturned. The claims for of appointment on
compassionate ground would mandate that there be no delay in effecting
such appointment, the object being to mitigate the hardships faced by the
family due to the death of the bread earner.
17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent decision rendered in the case of
State of W.B. v. Debabrata Tiwari & ors. [reported in (2023) SCC Online SC
219], on the issue involved in the present proceeding, has drawn the
following conclusions:
Page No.# 9/13
“32. On consideration of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles
emerge:
i. That a provision for compassionate appointment makes a departure from the
general provisions providing for appointment to a post by following a particular
procedure of recruitment. Since such a provision enables appointment being made
without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general
provisions and must be resorted to only in order to achieve the stated objectives, i.e.,
to enable the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial crisis.
ii. Appointment on compassionate grounds is not a source of recruitment. The reason
for making such a benevolent scheme by the State or the public sector undertaking is
to see that the dependants of the deceased are not deprived of the means of
livelihood. It only enables the family of the deceased to get over the sudden financial
crisis.
iii. Compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any
time in future. Compassionate employment cannot be claimed or offered after a lapse
of time and after the crisis is over.
iv. That compassionate appointment should be provided immediately to redeem the
family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years.
v. In determining as to whether the family is in financial crisis, all relevant aspects
must be borne in mind including the income of the family, its liabilities, the terminal
benefits if any, received by the family, the age, dependency and marital status of its
members, together with the income from any other source.
33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to
enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the
death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means
of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact
that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position
to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of
the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having
regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment
to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account
of death of a bread-winner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need
to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning compassionate appointment
because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate would be
frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the
deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment
would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant
circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a
case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for
consideration.
34. As noted above, the sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compassionate
Page No.# 10/13appointment is that the family of the deceased employee would be unable to make two
ends meet without one of the dependants of the deceased employee being employed on
compassionate grounds. The financial condition of the family of the deceased, at the
time of the death of the deceased, is the primary consideration that ought to guide
the authorities’ decision in the matter.
35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding
whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a
delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of
prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate
appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is
diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased,
may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government
employee. In such circumstances, Courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided
by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was
able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some
other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this
Court in Hakim Singh would amount to treating a claim for compassionate
appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession
which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a
vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by
the dependents of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a
claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a
considerable period of time since the death of the government employee.
36. Laches or undue delay, the blame-worthy conduct of a person in approaching a
Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for
grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay
Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, (1874) 3 P.C. 221 as under:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy,
either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are
most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances,
always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of
the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a
balance of Justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it
relates to the remedy.”
37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party
by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High
Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for
consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M. R.
Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450. In the said case, it
was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High
Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Page No.# 11/13
38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 this Court restated the
principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words:
“9…. the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is
inordinate delay on the part of the Petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, In its train new injustices, and if
writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. Itwas pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained
delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or
not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for
filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition
should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997)
6 SCC 538; NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278.
40. Further, simply because the Respondents-Writ Petitioners submitted their
applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that
they diligently perused the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard,
it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv
Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, wherein the following observations were
made:
“19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court
or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim
or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead
cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.”
18. In view of the discussions made hereinabove and applying the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of the
Debabrata Tiwari(supra) to the facts of the present case, this Court is of
the considered view that the claim of the petitioner for consideration of his
case for appointment on compassionate ground, would not mandate
acceptance on the ground that the application submitted by the mother of
the petitioner was rejected in the year 2013 and the same not being
Page No.# 12/13
challenged, has attained its finality and a subsequent application from the
members of the same family; would not mandate a consideration by the
respondent authorities. Further, the delay occasioning in the matter since
the date of death of the father of the petitioner, occasioning on 17-06-
2004, having rendered the claim of the petitioner, herein, for appointment
on compassionate ground, to be a stale one; no direction is called upon to
be issued by this Court to the respondent authorities for consideration of
the case of the petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate
ground. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate
appointment in respect of the petitioner, herein, has been lost. Entertaining
the claim at this point of time would be of no avail, because, admittedly,
the petitioner has been able to eke out a living even though he was not
favoured with an appointment on compassionate ground. Accordingly, this
Court is of the considered view that it is not a fit case to direct the claim of
the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground be considered or
entertained by the respondent authorities.
19. At this stage, the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered
in the case of Govinda Janardan Gaikwad(supra) relied upon by the
learned counsel for the petitioner would require to be so considered.
20. On perusal of the said decision, it is seen that the mother of the
appellant, therein, had also applied for appointment on compassionate
ground. However, her case was not considered by the authorities and
accordingly, the appellant, therein, on attaining age of majority, had
applied for substitution of his name in place of the name of his mother.
However, in the instant case, the application submitted by the mother of
Page No.# 13/13
the petitioner was duly considered by the jurisdictional District Level
Committee and the same was rejected. The rejection, however, was not
assailed by the mother of the petitioner, and/or, by the petitioner, herein,
or, any of his family members and the same has already attained its
finality. Accordingly, the said decision, in the considered view of this court;
would not advance the case of the petitioner, herein.
21. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the issue involved in
the present proceeding being a stale issue, it would not be permissible for
this Court to issue any direction requiring consideration of the case of the
petitioner, herein, for appointment on compassionate ground in pursuance
to death of his father, in harness, occasioning in the year 2004.
22. In the above view of the matter; this writ petition is held to be devoid
of any merit and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. However, there
shall be no order as to costs.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
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