Madhya Pradesh High Court
Raghunath Singh Raghuwanshi vs Meharwan Singh Raghuwanshi on 8 July, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:14730
1 SA-940-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 8 th OF JULY, 2025
SECOND APPEAL No. 940 of 2025
RAGHUNATH SINGH RAGHUWANSHI
Versus
MEHARWAN SINGH RAGHUWANSHI AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Mr. Rohit Bansal - Advocate for appellant.
Mr. S.S. Kushwaha - Govt. Advocate for respondent No. 2 / State.
JUDGMENT
This second appeal under Section 100 of CPC has been filed against
judgment and decree dated 25.03.2025, passed by II District Judge,
Ganjbasoda, District Vidisha, in RCA No. 28/2022, as well as judgment and
decree dated 17.06.2022, passed by I Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Ganjbasoda, in Civil Suit No. 175A/2015.
2. The facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction,
and declaration of sale deed dated 30.04.2012 as null and void in respect of
Survey No. 20, area 0.513 hectare, Survey No. 21, area 0.052 hectare, and
Survey No. 145, area 1.526 hectares, situated in Village – Mangrai, Tahsil –
Ganjbasoda, District Vidisha. It is the case of plaintiff that he is the owner
and in possession of property in dispute. He has never executed any sale
deed in favour of defendant No. 1 – Raghunath Singh (it appears that there is
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an error in the plaint because plaintiff is Raghunath Singh and defendant No.
1 is Meharwan Singh). It was further pleaded that neither plaintiff has taken
any consideration amount from defendant No. 1 nor has given any
possession. Even the sale deed was not signed by him. It is the case of
plaintiff that plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are related to each other. Daughter
of maternal uncle of plaintiff is married to defendant No. 1. Plaintiff was in
need of money for treatment of his father Diman Singh, therefore, he took a
loan of Rs.4,00,000/- from defendant No. 1. Plaintiff had returned an amount
of Rs.1,10,000/- in the presence of his son, and remaining amount of
Rs.2,90,000/- is still outstanding, and plaintiff is ready and willing to return
the same to defendant No. 1. It is the case of plaintiff that defendant No. 1,
instead of getting a mortgage deed executed, got a sale deed executed.
Plaintiff came to know about this document when defendant No. 1 started
proceedings for mutation. Accordingly, plaintiff submitted his objection
before the Tahsil Court on 19.06.2015. In the said proceeding, a photocopy
of sale deed in question was annexed, then it came to the notice of plaintiff
that a sale deed dated 30.04.2012 has been executed. It is submitted that
aforesaid sale deed is not in the knowledge of plaintiff, and therefore, it is
null and void as plaintiff has not executed any sale deed in favour of
defendant No. 1. Accordingly, a suit was filed for declaration that plaintiff is
the exclusive owner of Survey Nos. 20, 21, and 145, total area 2.091
hectares, situated in Village – Mangrai, Tahsil – Ganjbasoda, District –
Vidisha, as well as for declaration that sale deed dated 30.04.2012 is null and
void to the right of plaintiff. A permanent injunction was also sought to the
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effect that defendant No. 1 be restrained from interfering with the peaceful
possession of plaintiff.
3. Defendant No. 1 filed his written statement, and it was claimed that
possession of land in dispute was given by plaintiff to defendant No. 1 after
execution of sale deed. It was denied that consideration amount was not
received by plaintiff. Plaintiff had signed the sale deed after receiving
consideration amount of Rs.17,77,400/- from defendant No. 1. Plaintiff is not
in possession of property in dispute, therefore, there is no question of any
threat to dispossess him. In a special statement, it was stated by defendant
No. 1 that sale deed in respect of Khasra Nos. 20, 21, 145, total area 2.091
hectares, was executed by plaintiff on 30.04.2012 after taking consideration
amount of Rs.17,77,400/-. Sale deed was got executed in the office of Sub-
Registrar. Suit filed by plaintiff is barred by time. Plaintiff is not in
possession of property in dispute, and in absence of prayer for possession,
suit for declaration of title is not maintainable. Contention of plaintiff that
plaintiff had taken loan of Rs.4,00,000/- out of which he had returned an
amount of Rs.1,10,000/- was denied. It was pleaded that now the value of the
land in dispute has enhanced, therefore, the intention of plaintiff has become
dishonest.
4. The trial Court, after framing issues and recording evidence,
dismissed the suit. It was held that plaintiff is neither the owner nor in
possession of the disputed property, and plaintiff has failed to prove that sale
deed was not executed by him.
5. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by the trial Court,
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appellant preferred an appeal, which too has been dismissed by II District
Judge, Ganjbasoda, District Vidisha, in RCA No. 28/2022, by judgment and
decree dated 25.03.2025.
4. Challenging judgments and decrees passed by Courts below, it is
submitted by counsel for appellant that Courts below have committed a
material illegality by holding that suit is barred by limitation. Even the
finding recorded by Courts below, in regard to possession against the
plaintiff, is contrary to the evidence available on record, and accordingly,
proposed following substantial questions of law:-
“(i) Whether, the learned courts below have erred in dismissing the suit of
plaintiff merely on basis of conjectures and surmises ?
(ii) Whether, learned courts below have gravely erred in dismissing the
suit as time barred without considering the relevant evidence available on
record ?
(iii) Whether, learned trial court has erred in giving finding of possession
against plaintiff contrary to the evidence available on record ?
(iv) Whether, learned trial court has erred in relying upon the evidence of
near relatives of defendant no.1 ?
(v) Whether, learned trial court has erred in giving finding of sale contrary
to the evidence with respect to loan transaction ?
(vi) Whether, the judgment and decree passed by learned courts below and
findings recorded therein being based on non consideration of evidence
and pleadings and being based on wrong assumptions and contrary to
order 41 rule 31 and 20 rule 5 CPC, are sustainable ? ”
5. Heard counsel for appellant.
6. It is the case of appellant that he had not executed a sale deed, Exh.
D-1, but he had executed a mortgage deed. Both the Courts below have given
concurrent findings of fact that appellant had executed a sale deed in favour
of defendant No. 1. Similarly, both the Courts below have given concurrent
findings of fact with regard to possession, and it has been held that appellant
is not in possession of land in dispute.
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7. According to Raghunath Singh, PW-1, sale deed, Exh. D-1, was not
executed in the office of Sub-Registrar, but it was executed in the Court
premises, whereas Defendant No. 1 – Meharban Singh, DW-1, and Raju
Raghuwanshi, DW – 2, have specifically stated that sale deed, Exh. D-1, was
executed in the office of Sub-Registrar, Basoda.
8. Sections 32 and 34 of Registration Act give a presumption to the
effect that the Sub-Registrar, who was discharging the official duties, must
have verified that the document has been executed by the concerning parties.
Thus, sale deed, Exh. D-1, could not have been executed unless and until
plaintiff and defendant No. 1 were present in the office of Sub-Registrar,
Basoda. It is not the case of plaintiff that sale deed, Exh. D-1, was executed
by producing some other person by impersonating the plaintiff.
9. So far as non-payment of consideration amount is concerned, trial
Court has held that Rajkumar Raghuwanshi, PW-2, and Rajkumar Yadav,
PW-3, have not stated anything about this fact in their examination-in-chief.
10. Raghunath Singh, PW-1, has admitted his signatures on sale deed,
Exh. D-1. He has also admitted his photograph, which is affixed on the sale
deed, Exh. D-1. Sale deed was executed by the Sub-Registrar in discharge of
his official duties. No evidence of sterling quality has been produced by
plaintiff to dislodge the presumption as provided under Sections 32 and 34 of
Registration Act.
11. Both the Courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that
plaintiff is not in possession of the property in dispute. Thus, even otherwise,
the suit is also barred under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act as
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consequential relief of possession was not sought. It is well-established
principle of law that even if the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the
Courts below are erroneous, still it cannot be interfered with by this Court in
exercise of power under Section 100 of CPC.
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali
reported in (2010) 12 SCC 740 has held as under:-
“13. A second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous
findings of facts based on appreciation of the relevant evidence.
The High Court should not entertain a second appeal unless it
raises a substantial question of law. It is the obligation on the court
of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not to
frustrate it by ignoring the same.
14. In Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Kumar & Bros. [(1998) 6 SCC
748 : AIR 1998 SC 2730], this Court held that existence of the
substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code and entering into the
question as to whether the need of the landlord was bona fide or
not, was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court as the issue can
be decided only by appreciating the evidence on record.
15. There may be a question, which may be a “question of fact”,
“question of law”, “mixed question of fact and law” and
“substantial question of law”. Question means anything inquired;
an issue to be decided. The “question of fact” is whether a
particular factual situation exists or not. A question of fact, in
the realm of jurisprudence, has been explained as under:
“A question of fact is one capable of being answered by way
of demonstration–a question of opinion is one that cannot be
so answered. The answer to it is a matter of speculation
which cannot be proved by any available evidence to be right
or wrong.”
(Vide Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 69, cited in
Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao v. Balasaheb Vikhe Patil
[(1994) 1 SCC 682], at SCC p. 705, para 34.)
16. In RBI v. Ramakrishna Govind Morey [(1976) 1 SCC 803 :
AIR 1976 SC 830] this Court held that whether the trial court
should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently, is not a
question of law or a substantial question of law and, therefore, the
second appeal cannot be entertained by the High Court on this
ground.
17. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262]
this Court held that the question whether the lower court’s finding
is perverse may come within the ambit of substantial question of
law. However, there must be a clear finding in the judgment of the
High Court as to perversity in order to show compliance with the
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provisions of Section 100 CPC. Thus, this Court rejected the
proposition that scrutiny of evidence is totally prohibited in the
second appeal.
18. In Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand [(1998) 6 SCC 683 : AIR
1998 SC 3063] , this Court held that question of reappreciation of
evidence and framing the substantial question as to whether the
findings relating to the factual matrix by the court below could
vitiate due to irrelevant consideration and not under law, being
question of fact cannot be framed.
19. In Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa
[(2000) 6 SCC 120] this Court held that it is not permissible for
the High Court to decide the second appeal by reappreciating the
evidence as if it was deciding the first appeal unless it comes to the
conclusion that the findings recorded by the court below were
perverse.
20. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala [(2002) 3 SCC 634 : AIR 2002 SC
1428] this Court held that it is permissible to interfere even on
question of fact but it has to be done only in exceptional
circumstances. The Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 637-38,
para 6)
“6. … While scrutiny of evidence does not stand out to be
totally prohibited in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction in
the second appeal and that would in our view be too broad a
proposition and too rigid an interpretation of law not worthy
of acceptance but that does not also clothe the superior courts
within jurisdiction to intervene and interfere in any and every
matter–it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme
perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso
stands permissible–it is a rarity rather than a regularity and
thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no
prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had
in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper
circumspection.”
21. In P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan [(2007) 5 SCC 669]
this Court reiterated the principle that interference in the second
appeal is permissible only when the findings are based on
misreading of evidence or are so perverse that no person of
ordinary prudence could take the said view. More so, the Court
must be conscious that intervention is permissible provided the
case involves a substantial question of law which is altogether
different from the question of law. Interpretation of a document
which goes to the root of title of a party may give rise to a
substantial question of law.
22. In Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti
Garvali [(2007) 11 SCC 668 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 964] this
Court considered the scope of appeal under Section 30 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 and held as under : (SCC pp.
679-80, paras 39-40 & 42)
“39. Section 30 of the said Act postulates an appeal directly
to the High Court if a substantial question of law is involved
in the appeal.
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40. A jurisdictional question will involve a substantial
question of law. A finding of fact arrived at without there
being any evidence would also give rise to a substantial
question of law. …
***
42. A question of law would arise when the same is not
dependent upon examination of evidence, which may not
require any fresh investigation of fact. A question of law
would, however, arise when the finding is perverse in the
sense that no legal evidence was brought on record or
jurisdictional facts were not brought on record.”
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy [(2008) 4 SCC 594] .
23. In Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan [(2007) 4 SCC 465] this
Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 and Rule 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, held that the bona fide
personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not
be normally interfered with.
24. There is no prohibition to entertain a second appeal even on
question of fact provided the Court is satisfied that the findings of
the courts below were vitiated by non-consideration of relevant
evidence or by showing erroneous approach to the matter.
[Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 647 : AIR
1992 SC 1604] , Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan [(1996) 5 SCC
353] , Satya Gupta v. Brijesh Kumar [(1998) 6 SCC 423] ,
Ragavendra Kumar v. Prem Machinery & Co. [(2000) 1 SCC 679
: AIR 2000 SC 534] and Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd.
[(2000) 4 SCC 285] ]25 [Ed. : Para 25 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./68/2010 dated 9-7-2010.] . Thus, the
law on the subject emerges to the effect that second appeal under
Section 100 CPC is maintainable basically on a substantial
question of law and not on facts. However, if the High Court
comes to the conclusion that the findings of fact recorded by the
courts below are perverse being based on no evidence or based on
irrelevant material, the appeal can be entertained and it is
permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. The
landlord is the best judge of his need, however, it should be real,
genuine and the need may not be a pretext to evict the tenant only
for increasing the rent.”
13. No perversity could be pointed out by counsel for appellant.
Accordingly, no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal.
14. Ex consequentia, judgment and decree dated 25.03.2025, passed by
II District Judge, Ganjbasoda, District Vidisha, in RCA No. 28/2022, as well
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as judgment and decree dated 17.06.2022, passed by I Civil Judge, Junior
Division, Ganjbasoda, in Civil Suit No. 175A/2015, are hereby affirmed.
15. Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
AKS
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Signed by: ALOK KUMAR
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