Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 30.06.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Another on 21 July, 2025
2025:HHC:23404
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 580 of 2025
Reserved on: 30.06.2025
.
Date of Decision: 21.07.2025
Surjeet Singh & another …Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & another …Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat
Advocate.
For the respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
No.1/State Additional Advocate General
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of F.I.R No. 5 of 2023 dated 09.02.2023, registered at
Women Police Station, Una, District Una, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and consequential
proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.
_________________________________
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police
.
asserting that she was married to Krishan Gopal on 19.07.2022.
She stayed in her matrimonial home at Lamlehra for some time
after her marriage. She, her husband and her parents-in-law
(present petitioners) shifted to Mohali after some time.
Informant’s husband started taunting her at the behest of the
petitioners, saying that she was provided nothing by her
parents at the time of her marriage. Her mother-in-law taunted
her by saying that she had given ₹2,50,000/- to her daughter in
marriage for the purchase of a car, but the informant’s parents
had not given her anything. She was asked to bring money from
her parents. Petitioners used to say that she came empty-
handed. Her father-in-law used to say that the informant was
not as per his status, and she looked like a toy. They restrained
her from going out of the house. When she went to her parental
home for tying Rakhi, her husband left for Australia on
04.09.2022. The informant started residing with the petitioners.
They harassed the informant and stopped paying expenses for
her needs. They also abused the informant’s mother and her
brother. They tried to kill the informant and snatch her mobile
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phone. She started shivering due to fear. Her mother-in-law
requested her not to reveal the incident to any person to save
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the family’s honour. She was taken to her parental home on
12.11.2022. She tried to contact the petitioners but failed to do
so. She went to Lamlehra, and the house was found locked. She
called her father-in-law, who stated that he did not know her.
He revealed that he was residing in Mumbai. She tried to contact
her husband, who picked up the calls after several attempts and
said that he would not talk to her and would divorce her via a
video call. Informant’s parents tried to contact the petitioners
and ask them to keep the informant with them; however, they
refused. They stated that they were issued a Visa and they were
leaving India. The informant, her family members, and
Pardhan Gram Panchayat Takoli went to the petitioners’ house
on 31.01.2022; however, the petitioners refused to open the
door. The matter was reported to the police. The police
registered the F.I.R., conducted the investigation, and filed a
charge sheet before the Court after the completion of the
investigation.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and
the filing of the charge-sheet, the petitioners have filed the
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present petition for quashing of the F.I.R. and consequential
proceedings. It was asserted that the petitioners are residing in
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their house alone. They are unable to do any work due to their
old age and were dragged into this litigation unnecessarily. The
petitioners, their son and informant, resided together at
Lamlehra for 15 days and thereafter shifted to Mohali. The
petitioners’ son went to Australia, where he was working before
his marriage.
The informant knew about the fact that her
husband was serving in Australia, and he would leave India. His
ticket was booked by the informant. The informant and her
husband used to talk to each other on the telephone. She was
kept nicely in her matrimonial home. She herself left for her
parental home. She did not return to the petitioners’ house. The
petitioners published an advertisement in two leading
newspapers stating that they had disinherited their son and
informant. They filed an application under Section 22 of the
Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens
Act,2007. The notice was issued to the informant, but she did
not file any response. She filed a false complaint against her
husband and the petitioners. No allegations of demand for
dowry were made in the application. The matter was found to be
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one of domestic violence and was sent to CDPO, Bangana,
District Una, H.P., for taking action as per law. The petitioners
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went abroad on 08.02.2023 as their son-in-law was suffering
from a serious ailment in his ear and required surgery. The
informant made a false complaint against the petitioners and
their son. Her statement was recorded, and she has materially
improved upon her version. The contents of the F.I.R. do not
disclose the commission of any offence. No specific allegations
were made in the F.I.R. No complaint was made till 12.11.2022.
The petitioners’ version was not verified by the police. The
evidence on record is inconsistent with the allegations in the
F.I.R. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse
of the process of the Court. The allegations in the F.I.R. do not
constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore,
it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and F.I.R., as
well as consequential proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.,
be quashed.
4. I have heard Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat, learned counsel
for the petitioners and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
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5. Mr. Sandeep Gahlawat, learned counsel for the
petitioners, submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. do not
.
constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The
petitioners made a false complaint. The continuation of the
proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and
the F.I.R., as well as consequential proceedings arising out of the
said F.I.R., be quashed.
6. to
Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the matter is
pending before the learned Trial Court and this Court should not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR. The police
conducted the investigation and found sufficient material for
filing the charge sheet. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of.
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarized some of the principles under
which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed
in the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise ofthe extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustrationwherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines orrigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if theyare taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code, except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
.
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
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any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
.
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processesor to secure the ends of justice.
These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the
broad and profound nature of this authority, the HighCourt must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for
invoking such powers are embeddedwithin Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or
where intervention is essential to uphold theends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:25:54 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:23404criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil
in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus.
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
10. It was held in Raghunath Sharma v. State of Haryana,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1148, that the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction is the exception and not the rule. It was observed:
7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr. P.C. has
engaged this Court on numerous occasions [Ref: State of
Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699; SunderBabu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 14 SCC 244; Vineet
Kumar v. State of U.P. (2017) 13 SCC 369; Ahmad Ali
Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 13 SCC 435.] The
observations made in State of Karnataka v. M.
Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89 by a Bench of three Hon’bleJudges encapsulate the purpose of this power most aptly
in the following terms:
“6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in
a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule.
The section does not confer any new powers on the
High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the
Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It
envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise
secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor
desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would
govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No
legislative enactment dealing with procedure can
provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts,
therefore, have inherent powers apart from express
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provisions of law which are necessary for the proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them
by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in
the section which merely recognises and preserves
.
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of
any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do
the right and to undo a wrong in the course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res
ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person
anything it gives him that without which it cannot
exist). While exercising powers under the section, the
court does not function as a court of appeal or
revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section,
though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully
and with caution and only when such exercise is
justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to
do real and substantial justice for the administration
of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court
exists for the advancement of justice, and if any
attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has the power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court
to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent the promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
amounts to abuse of the process of the court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve
the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact.
When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the complainant has alleged and whether any offence
is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.”
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11. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L.
.
Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High
Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an
abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to theconclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue
would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be
quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose, which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case,
the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the verynature of the material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of
justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends ofmere law, though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. Thecompelling necessity for making these observations is
that without a proper realisation of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherentpowers of the High Court to do justice, between the State
and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the
width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”
12. The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
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33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the
remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-
established and recognised doctrine both by the English
courts and courts in India. There are some established
.
principles of law which bar the trial when there appears
to be an abuse of the process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2
All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.
***
The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction)
to prevent abuses of its process and to control its
procedure must in a criminal court include a power to
safeguard an accused person from oppression or
prejudice.”
In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same
case observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495
: (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the
word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and
wrong with the prosecution that the court should not
allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other
respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42 : (1993) 3 WLR 90 :
(1993) 3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse
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2025:HHC:23404justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the
following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a
fair trial; or.
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of
the process because it offends the court’s sense of
justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused inthe circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr
App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process
of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a
technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability thedefendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the
part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R
94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main
strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) caseswhere the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludesthat it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to
determine on the individual facts of each case.
13. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15
SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while
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exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was
observed at page 498:
.
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes
a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care andcircumspection, try to read in between the lines. The
Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not
restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empoweredto take into account the overall circumstances leading to
the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take,
for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have beenregistered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as
alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated onthe types of materials the High Court can assess to quash
an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction betweenconsideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material
that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIRcan be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda
Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCC
p. 527, paras 5-7)
“5. … Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the
court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an
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2025:HHC:23404which would result in injustice and prevent the
promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powers
court would be justified in quashing any proceeding if
it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to.
abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the
court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has
alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this
Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want
of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or
may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a
reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be
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sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The
judicial process, no doubt, should not be an
instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The
court should be circumspect and judicious in
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exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts
and circumstances into consideration before issuing
the process, lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to
harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the
section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about
its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied)
14. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face
criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal
misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It
was observed:
“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet
papers indicates that the allegations levelled by the First
Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping,specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also
pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time
of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even
the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the
other members of the Appellants’ family. Thus, we are of
the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was
nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also
the domestic violence case.
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25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some
general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record
any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but
an abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to.
subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough
scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain
of truth in the allegations or whether they are made only
with the sole object of involving certain individuals in acriminal charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises
from a matrimonial dispute.” (Emphasis supplied)
16. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the
parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a
molehill, and every matrimonial conduct
r amounting to
nuisance does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: –
“32. Many times, the parents, including the close
relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a molehill.
Instead of salvaging the situation and making everypossible endeavour to save the marriage, their action,
either due to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred
towards the husband and his family members, brings
about the destruction of the marriage over trivial issues.
The first thing that comes to mind for the wife, her
parents and her relatives is the Police as if the Police isthe panacea of all evil. No sooner does the matter reach
the Police than even if there are fair chances ofreconciliation between the spouses, they would get
destroyed. The foundation of a sound marriage is
tolerance, adjustment and respecting one another.
Tolerance of each other’s faults, to a certain bearable
extent, has to be inherent in every marriage. Petty
quibbles and trifling differences are mundane matters
and should not be exaggerated and blown out of
proportion to destroy what is said to have been made in
heaven. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must
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keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the
parties, their character and social status. A very technical
and hyper-sensitive approach would prove to be.
disastrous for the very institution of marriage. In
matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers are the
children. The spouses fight with such venom in their
hearts that they do not think even for a second that if themarriage were to come to an end, then what would be the
effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious role
so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned. The
only reason why we are saying so is that instead ofhandling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of
criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but
hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-
treatment and harassment by the husband and his familymembers towards the wife. The degree of such ill-
treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Policemachinery should be resorted to as a measure of last
resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and
harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for
the purpose of holding the husband to ransom so that hecould be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her
parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife
complains of harassment or ill-treatment,Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically.
No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 ofthe IPC. Every matrimonial conduct which may cause
annoyance to the other may not amount to cruelty. Mere
trivial irritations and quarrels between spouses, whichhappen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount
to cruelty”
17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rajesh Chadha v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094 that the
provisions of Section 498A of IPC are being invoked without
mentioning any specific date, time or incident, which casts
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serious suspicion on the complainant’s version. It was
observed:-
.
13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are
distressed with the manner in, the offences under
Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act,
1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant-
wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married
sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in
matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append
every relative of the husband casts serious doubt on the
veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant-
wife or her family members, and vitiates the very
objective of a protective legislation. The observations
made by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana (2025) 3 SCC
735 appropriately encapsulate this essence as under:
“25. A mere reference to the names of family
members in a criminal case arising out of a
matrimonial dispute, without specific allegationsindicating their active involvement, should be
nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact,
borne out of judicial experience, that there is often
a tendency to implicate all the members of thehusband’s family when domestic disputes arise out
of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and
sweeping accusations, unsupported by concreteevidence or particularised allegations, cannot form
the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must
exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse oflegal provisions and the legal process and avoid
unnecessary harassment of innocent family
members. In the present case, Appellants Nos. 2 to
6, who are the members of the family of Appellant
No. 1, have been living in different cities and have
not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant
No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they
cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution, and
the same would be an abuse of the process of the::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:25:54 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:23404law in the absence of specific allegations made
against each of them.”
14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse
by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter
.
without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency
of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific
dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the
prosecution, and casts serious suspicion on the viability
of the version of the Complainant. We cannot ignore the
missing specifics in a criminal complaint, which is the
premise of invoking the criminal machinery of the State.
Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of
the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce
decree has attained finality; hence, any further
prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an
abuse of process of law.
18.
This position was reiterated in Ghanshyam Soni Vs.
State, NCT of Delhi, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1301, wherein it was
observed:-
10. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made
by the complainant are that in the year 1999, theAppellant inflicted mental and physical cruelty upon her
for bringing an insufficient dowry. The Complainantrefers to a few instances of such atrocities; however, the
allegations are generic and rather ambiguous. The
allegations against the family members, who have beenunfortunately roped in, are that they used to instigate the
Appellant husband to harass the Complainant wife, and
taunted the Complainant for not bringing enough dowry;
however, there is no specific incident of harassment or
any evidence to that effect. Similarly, the allegations
against the five out of six sisters that they used to insult
the Complainant and demanded dowry articles from her,
and upon failure, beat her up, but there is not even a
cursory mention of the incident. An allegation has also
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been made against a tailor named Bhagwat that he, being
a friend of the Appellant, instigated him against the
Complainant, and was allegedly instrumental in blowing
his greed. Such allegations are merely accusatory and
.
contentious in nature, and do not elaborate a concrete
picture of what may have transpired. For this reason
alone, and that the evidence on record is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations, the version of the
Complainant seems implausible and unreliable. The
following observation in K. Subba Rao v. State of
Telangana, Represented by Its Secretary, Department of
Home(2018) 14 SCC 452, fits perfectly into the present
scenario:
“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against
the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to
matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives
r of the husband should not be roped in on the basis ofomnibus allegations unless specific instances of their
involvement in the crime are made out.”
11. As regards the Appellant, the purportedly specific
allegations levelled against him are also obscure in
nature. Even if the allegations and the case of the
prosecution is taken at its face value, apart from the bald
allegations without any specifics of time, date or place,
there is no incriminating material found by the
prosecution or rather produced by the complainant to
substantiate the ingredients of “cruelty” under
section 498A IPC, as recently observed in the case
of Jaydedeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat
2024 INSC 960 and Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 2025 INSC 671. The Complainant has admittedly
failed to produce any medical records or injury reports,
x-ray reports, or any witnesses to substantiate her
allegations. We cannot ignore the fact that the
Complainant even withdrew her second Complaint dated.
06.12.1999, six days later, on 12.12.1999. There is also no
evidence to substantiate the purported demand for dowry
allegedly made by the Appellant or his family, and the
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investigative agencies in their own prudence have not
added sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 to
the chargesheet.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Janshruti v. Union
.
of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 909 that there are hundreds of
genuine cases as contrasted to a false case registered under
Section 498A, and the Courts should be conscious of the ground
reality while adjudicating the cases under Section 498-A of IPC.
It was observed:-
11. We are cognizant of the growing discourse
highlighting instances where the provision may have
been misused. However, it must be borne in mind that forevery such instance, there are likely hundreds of genuine
cases where Section 498A has served as a crucial
safeguard for victims of domestic cruelty. We are also
aware that certain unconscionable individuals,emboldened by the rising fervour to dismantle such
protective provisions, have gone so far as to publicly
share videos depicting the exchange of dowry –an actnot only unlawful but also indicative of the entrenched
nature of the very evil this provision seeks to combat.
12. We also remain acutely attuned to the ground
realities. As the Constitutional Court and the apex judicialbody of the country, we bear the solemn responsibility of
safeguarding justice for our entire population. The harsh
truth is that dowry continues to persist as a deeply
entrenched social evil, prevalent across vast sections of
the country. A significant majority of such cases go
unreported, with countless women compelled to endure
injustice in silence. This underscores the continuing need
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2025:HHC:23404vital instruments of protection and redressal for those
most vulnerable.
20. Thus, the Court has to strike a fine balance and it has
.
to see that the allegations made against the accused for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC
are not general, vague or omnibus to rope in the relatives of the
husband. At the same time, the Court should not scuttle a
genuine case filed under Section 498A of the IPC.
21. r to
A perusal of the F.I.R. shows that the informant had
made specific allegations against the petitioners. It was
asserted against her mother-in-law that she told the informant
that ₹2-5 Lakhs were provided in her daughter’s dowry, and the
informant had not brought anything with her. The allegations
against the father-in-law were that he used to tell the
informant’s husband that she was not upto her status, and she
looked like a toy. She further asserted that the petitioners did
not provide any maintenance to her. The petitioners abused her
mother and brother, and an attempt was made to kill her and
snatch her mobile phone. She was left in her parental home, and
she was not allowed to visit her matrimonial home. When she
went to her matrimonial home with her relatives and Pardhan,
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the petitioners did not open the door. These allegations clearly
show the continuous harassment, mental and physical cruelty
.
inflicted upon the informant.
22. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are
false. It is impermissible to look into the correctness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. It was laid down
in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that
the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR
cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations.
It was observed:-
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as tothe reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at their face value, must disclose the commissionof an offence and make out a case against the accused. At
the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their facevalue, do not disclose the commission of an offence or
make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:25:54 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:23404Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for.
Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed,
the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable.
We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping
in mind the position of this Court in Joseph SalvarajA. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], thisCourt while deciding the question of whether the
High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was
filed by the police during the pendency of the
r Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out evenprima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State ofGujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged tohave been committed by the appellant were
prima facie made out from the complainant’s
FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”
23. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed at page 397:
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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference.
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan
Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the
judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed further against the accused for which the
accused is required to be tried or not’.”
24. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi),
2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the power to quash a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly and not routinely.
It was observed: –
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly withcircumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used in a
routine manner according to its whims or caprice.”
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25. This position was reiterated in Vinod Bihari Lal v.
State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1216, wherein it was observed:
.
37. This Court, in a catena of decisions, has observed that
it is not for the courts to embark upon an enquiry into the
reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the
FIR at the stage of quashing of the proceedings. However,it is of paramount importance that the allegations made
against the accused, if taken at face value, must disclose
the commission of an offence, whether from the FIR, the
chargesheet, or other relevant materials. It is incumbentupon the courts to exercise their discretionary powers
where the materials on record indicate that the criminal
proceedings are being misused as instruments of
oppression or harassment.
26.
Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to
determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made
in it.
27. A heavy reliance was placed upon the documents
annexed to the petition to submit that these documents show
that the informant had improved upon her version, and her
version cannot be relied upon. All these documents are
photocopies, and their authenticity has not been established. It
was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondent State that it
is impermissible to rely upon the documents not forming part of
the charge-sheet, especially when the authenticity of these
documents is yet to be seen. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
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2025:HHC:23404
Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1:
1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed on the
.
face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same,
no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract
anything. It was observed:
“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed
only if, on the face of the complaint or the papersaccompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In
other words, the test is that taking the allegations and
the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting
anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Courtwill be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
28. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that
the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the
proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be
allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri
Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to
which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh
evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable.
The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually
introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of
Section 482, Cr. P.C.”
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29. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view
in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs.
.
G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and
held:
“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements
of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the
correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into thedocuments, which were not filed before the lower Court.
Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into
fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations, in
the light of the statement made on oath of thecomplainant that the ingredients of the offence or
offences are disclosed and there is no material to
show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be nojustification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Stationand an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
the informant would be of secondary importance. Itis the material collected during the investigation
and the evidence presented in Court which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of
mala fides against the informant are of no
consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for
quashing the proceedings”.
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30. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it
.
was observed at page 142:
“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in
the complaint, as they stand, without adding ordetracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the
ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High
Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for
that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judgeconducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected
during the course of the trial.”
31. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it
was held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the
trial, but the same are not material at the stage of
deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her beforethe High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see
no reason to place any reliance on these threedocuments.
32. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2
SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein
it was observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in
a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the::: Downloaded on – 21/07/2025 21:25:54 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:23404accused to have not been committed based on any of the
Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law
seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no
further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks.
to rely on materials which were not there before the
Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We
may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are
always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laiddown for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings
arising from a police report by the High Courts in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being
substantially different from the tests laid down forquashing a process issued under Section 204 read with
Section 200, the High Courts on recording duesatisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and thatproceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be
impermissible if the justice of a given case does notoverwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied).
33. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the
documents to determine that the informant/victim improved
upon her version and her testimony cannot be relied upon. This
is the matter for trial where the victim would be cross-
examined and her credibility would be weighed against the
other evidence.
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34. It is undisputed that the police have filed the charge-
sheet before the learned Trial Court. Hence, the learned Trial
.
Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023
SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed,
the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It
was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that
the investigation has been completed and the charge
sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegationslevelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence,
particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc.
of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the
appellants should prefer a discharge application before
the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of CriminalProcedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to
the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet
is ready to be filed before the competent court. In suchcircumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look
into the materials which the investigating officer mighthave collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any
such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall
look into the materials and take a call whether anydischarge case is made out or not.”
35. No other point was urged.
36. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the
same is dismissed.
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37. The present petition stands disposed of, and so are
the miscellaneous applications, if any.
.
38. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla )
21 July 2025
st
Judge
(ravinder)
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