Supreme Court – Daily Orders
United Bank Of India (Now Punjab … vs Swapan Kumar Mullick on 22 July, 2025
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta
2025 INSC 881 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 13592 OF 2020]
UNITED BANK OF INDIA …APPELLANT
(NOW PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK)
VERSUS
SWAPAN KUMAR MULLICK & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 30919 OF 2024]
SWAPAN KUMAR MULLICK …APPELLANT
VERSUS
UNITED BANK OF INDIA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
(NOW PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK)
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA J.
THE APPEALS
1. Leave granted. These appeals, arise out of a common judgment and
order dated 17th June, 20201 of a Division Bench of the High Court at
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
rashmi dhyani pant Calcutta2. The operative part of the impugned order reads thus:
Date: 2025.07.22
17:14:33 IST
Reason:
1
impugned order
2
High Court1
A) The judgment and order under appeal dated 1st April, 2016 is set aside.
B) The Board of Directors of the United Bank of India shall consider
amendment of Regulation 22 of the United Bank of India (Employees’)
Pension Regulations, 1995 according to the circular of the Indian Banks
Association dated 30th June, 2015 with or without retrospective effect
within 3 months of physical communication of this order.
C) The appellant bank by constituting an authority shall determine by 21st
October, 2020 upon giving an opportunity to Mullick to place facts and
adduce evidence before it whether he could be treated as having
voluntarily retired from service, strictly following the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Shashikala case reported in (2014) 16 SCC 260
read with UCO Bank & Ors. Vs. Sanwar Mal reported in (2004) 4
SCC 412 and Senior Divisional Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Shree Lal Meena reported in
(2019) 4 SCC 479, BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. Vs. Sh. Ghanshyam
Chand Sharma & Anr. reported in AIR 2020 SC 76 and the
observation made in this judgment and order.
D) Depending on such determination the option form/application submitted
by Mullick dated 23rd August, 2010 in the terms of the circular dated
16th August, 2010 for availing of the pension scheme shall be processed
by the bank by 20th November, 2020. The appeal (FMA 4412 of 2016)
is disposed of by this judgment and order.
(bold in original)
2. The appellant – United Bank of India (now Punjab National Bank)3 – is
aggrieved by the directions contained in (B) to (D) supra; hence, it has
preferred the lead appeal.
3. Upon service of notice, the 1st respondent – Shri Swapan Kumar
Mullick4 – has preferred the connected appeal.
FACTS
4. The uncontroverted facts giving rise to the present appeals are as
under:
4.1. Mullick joined the services of the Bank as a typist on 23rd
November, 1970. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of
3
Bank
4
Mullick2
machine operator in the year 1978, and later to the post of headcashier.
4.2. After rendering 36 years of service with the Bank, Mullick
tendered his resignation on 21st August, 2006, citing mental
depression. The Bank accepted Mullick’s resignation on 19th
October, 2006, and relieved him from its service.
4.3. On 27th April, 2010, a bipartite settlement was signed between
the Indian Banks Association5 and various unions of workmen.
Based on this bipartite settlement, the Bank issued a circular
(No.SP/OPTION/2/OM-0293/10-11) dated 16th August, 20106
extending ‘another option for pension’ for the employees who had
not opted for the pension scheme under the United Bank of India
(Employees’) Pension Regulations, 19957.
4.4. The circular assumes primacy since it defined retired employees
who would be entitled to pensionary benefits. It is this circular
upon which Mullick based his claim for pension. Clause 2 of the
circular defines retired employees and reads thus:
2. Retired employees means those who were in service of the Bank
on or after 29th September, 1995 and ceased to be in service of
the Bank on account of retirement on Superannuation, Voluntary
retirement or on account of VRS under special scheme prior to 27th
April, 2010.
4.5. Clause 3 of the circular lays down the eligibility and terms and
conditions, and reads thus:
3. Eligibility and terms and conditions:
5
IBA
6
circular
7
1995 Regulations3
A) This ‘another option for pension’ will be available to those
hitherto non optee retired employees.
i) Retired from the Bank’s service on superannuation or on
Voluntary retirement on or after 29th September, 1995.
ii) Retired from the Bank’s service on account of VRS under
special scheme on or after 29th September, 1995 after rendering
a minimum of 15 years service.
iii) Died while in service of the Bank on or after 29th September,
1995 (families of the deceased employees may opt for getting
family pension).
All of the above retired employees/families of the deceased
employees who want to opt for pension now will have to pay 156%
of what they received on retirement/death on account of the
Bank’s contribution to SPF and interest accrued thereon being
his/her share of 30% initial funding gap.
4.6. Mullick, on 23rd August, 2010, sought to exercise the option under
the circular and filled the form. On 5th October, 2010, the General
Manager (Staff Pension) of the Bank returned the application
stating that employees who had left the service by opting for
voluntary retirement/compulsory retirement/resignation are not
eligible to opt for pension.
4.7. On 24th September, 2012, through his advocate, Mullick made a
representation to the Bank requesting for reconsideration of his
case to opt for pension.
4.8. Having received no response, Mullick filed a writ petition before
the High Court inter alia praying for a writ of mandamus against
the Bank and its officers [respondents 2 to 4 in the connected
appeal] to extend the benefit of pension to him.
4.9. Before the writ court, Mullick advanced two-fold submissions:
first, he submitted that the “resignation letter” submitted by an
4
employee who has qualified the criteria enabling him topensionary benefits is liable to be treated as “retirement from
service”, thereby enabling him to get the said benefit. In support
of the same, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in
Bank of Baroda v. S.K. Kool (dead) Through Legal
Representatives8 and Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of
India9; and secondly, he relied upon Regulation 14 of the 1995
Regulations and asserted that he was entitled to pension as he
had put in qualifying length of service in terms thereof. For facility
of reference, Regulation 14 is reproduced below:
14. Qualifying Service – Subject to the other conditions contained
in these regulations, an employee who has rendered a minimum
of ten years of service in the Bank on the date of his retirement or
the date on which he is deemed to have retired shall qualify for
pension.
4.10. In contrast, the Bank asserted that Mullick was ineligible for the
claimed benefits in view of Regulation 22 of the 1995 Regulations
which disqualified an employee resigning from service to grant of
pension. Regulation 22 reads as follows:
22. Forfeiture of service – (1) Resignation or dismissal or removal
or termination of an employee from the service of the Bank shall
entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently shall
not qualify for pensionary benefits;
4.11. The Single Judge, upon considering the rival contentions,
formulated the following issue:
8
(2014) 2 SCC 715
9
(2014) 16 SCC 2605
Whether the petitioner’s claim for pension becomes barred simply
because he had submitted his “resignation” from service instead of
seeking “retirement”?
4.12. Several decisions were cited before the Single Judge who, after
analysing the same, held that Mullick’s case was squarely covered
by the decision in Shashikala Devi (supra). The Court noted that
Mullick had served the Bank for 36 years (which was far in excess
of the qualifying service of 10 years for grant of pension), had no
pending disciplinary proceedings, and had resigned due to mental
depression. In such state of mind, the use of the term ‘resignation’
by Mullick instead of ‘retirement’ should not deprive him of
pensionary benefits to which he was otherwise entitled.
4.13. Consequent upon such findings, the Single Judge of the High
Court, on 1st April, 2016, held that Mullick was entitled to opt for
pension. The writ petition was allowed with direction to the Bank
to extend the benefit of pension to Mullick and pay him his
admissible dues within 6 months of the order.
4.14. Against the judgment of the Single Judge, the Bank filed an intra-
court appeal10 before a Division Bench of the High Court.
IMPUGNED ORDER
5. The Division Bench also referred to Shashikala Devi (supra) and
summarised the legal principle propounded therein: if an employee
resigns shortly before superannuation, with an unblemished service
10
F.M.A. 4412 of 2016
6
record, and does not expressly waive the right to pension, a presumption
arises that the employee did not intend to forfeit pension. Furthermore,
such resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement if the
employee has rendered the qualifying years of service.
6. Thereafter, the Division Bench noted that if circumstances surrounding
Mullick’s case were covered by those referred to in Shashikala Devi
(supra), then he should be given the benefit thereunder. Acknowledging
the absence of any factual finding by the Single Judge on this aspect, as
no arguments in this regard were made, the Division Bench set aside
the order of the Single Judge and ordered for a decision on Mullick’s case
by an appropriate authority in view of the circular dated 30th June, 2015
of the IBA suggesting that the banks, who were parties to the bipartite
settlement dated 10th April, 2002/27th May, 2002, might consider
amendments to Regulation 22 of the Bank Employees (Pension)
Regulations, 1995 as far as workmen employees are concerned.
According to the Division Bench, the main thrust of the circular dated
30th June, 2015 was that the operation of Regulation 22 may not divest
the employees who had rendered qualifying service of past service and
their entitlement to pension. The resultant directions given by the
Division Bench, premised on such reasoning, have been noted above.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
7. After notice was issued in the lead appeal, interim applications for
intervention/impleadment were filed by several parties, which were
7
allowed. The connected appeal, which is in the nature of a cross-
appeal, was also filed by Mullick. Accordingly, we have heard the
submissions advanced on behalf of the Bank, Mullick and the
intervenors.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE BANK/APPELLANT IN THE LEAD APPEAL
8. The Division Bench has given a direction to ‘consider’ an amendment
to Regulation 22 of the 1995 Regulations. Though it might seem to be
innocuous, such a direction in effect is in the nature of a mandate, and
such a mandate is in the teeth of several decisions of this Court.
9. Mullick had resigned, and not retired, from service in 2006. He had not
opted for pension under the 1995 Regulations but opted for provident
fund. Further, all terminal benefits payable to Mullick were paid to him
soon after his resignation, in 2006 itself. Mullick, not having opted for
pension and not having retired from the Bank’s service cannot, as a
matter of any legal or statutory right, claim pensionary benefits under
the 1995 Regulations.
10. In its decision in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena11, this Court considered the
difference between ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’. Paragraph 26 of the
decision was referred for the proposition that when the legislature
extends the application of beneficial legislation to a certain class, its
application cannot be extended to classes which are not included.
11
(2019) 4 SCC 479
8
11. Further, the impugned order is also contrary to the law laid down in
M.R. Prabhakar v. Canara Bank12 and BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.
v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma13, which followed the dictum in Shree
Lal Meena (supra).
12. Next, the decision of this Court in S.K. Kool (supra) was erroneously
relied upon by the High Court, since the issue there did not concern
resignation of an employee, who is not a pension optee. The issue was
related to interplay of punishment of removal from service with
superannuation benefit, i.e., pension and/or provident fund and
gratuity, as would be due otherwise and without disqualification from
future employment. Thus, such decision is clearly distinguishable on
facts.
13. Further, in S.K. Kool (supra), this Court held that an employee, upon
whom the punishment of removal with superannuation benefit is
imposed, would also be entitled to pension. Hence, the letter/circular
of the IBA dated 30th June, 2015 – which made a suggestion to the
banks to amend regulation 22 in terms of the decision in S.K. Kool
(supra) – did not relate to a case where an employee has tendered
resignation and particularly when he is not a pension optee.
14. Even otherwise, Mullick did not challenge any of the provisions of the
regulations or the settlement. Significantly, a challenge to regulation
22 of the UCO Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995, which is
12
(2012) 9 SCC 671
13
(2020) 3 SCC 346
9
a pari materia provision followed by all nationalized banks, has been
rejected by this Court in UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal14.
15. During the pendency of these appeals, a 12th bipartite settlement
dated 3rd March, 2024 has been signed between the management of
various banks represented through the IBA and various Workmen
Unions at the industry level. In terms of clause 37 thereof, employees
who resigned from service have been given an option to opt for
pension under the 1995 Regulations on the terms and conditions
mentioned therein; however, Mullick did not exercise an option in
terms thereof.
16. Resting on the aforesaid submissions, it has been prayed that the lead
appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned order and the
connected appeal dismissed.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF MULLICK/APPELLANT IN THE CONNECTED APPEAL
17. Regulation 22 of the 1995 Regulations is violative of Articles 14 to 16
of the Constitution of India. Although a challenge to the relevant
regulation was not made before the High Court, the same is now
sought to be challenged in the connected appeal.
18. Regulation 22 classifies employees together for the purpose of denial
of pension in violation of Article 14. The classification of employees
who have resigned with delinquent employees who have been
punished/terminated/removed would be improper. An employee who
has resigned would resemble an employee who has availed voluntary
14
(2004) 4 SCC 412
10
retirement under Regulation 29; and, thus, for the purpose of pension,
he must be classified with an employee who has availed voluntary
retirement, especially when the former has completed 20 years of
qualifying service.
19. The decision in Sanwar Mal (supra) is in ignorance of the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar15. Further, Shree Lal Meena (supra) only referred to Sanwar
Mal (supra) and did not consider Regulation 22 independently.
20. This Court’s decision in Shashikala Devi (supra), which differentiated
between resignation simplicitor and resignation on health grounds,
was not at all considered in Shree Lal Meena (supra).
21. The relevant paragraph from Shashikala Devi (supra), which was
cited, reads thus:
9. The High Court, as seen earlier, has taken the view that the letter
was one of resignation that resulted in the forfeiture of past service
under Regulation 22 of the Regulations. The High Court appears to
have been impressed by the use of the word ‘resignation’ in the
employee’s letter dated 8-10-2007. The use of the expression
‘resignation’, however, is not, in our opinion, conclusive. That is, in
our opinion, so even when this Court has always maintained a clear
distinction between ‘resignation’ and ‘voluntary retirement’. Whether
or not a given communication is a letter of resignation simpliciter or
can as well be treated to be a request for voluntary retirement will
always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
the provisions of the rules applicable.
22. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid submissions and referring to the
reasons assigned by the Single Judge to allow Mullick’s writ petition, it
15
(1952) 1 SCC 1
11
was prayed that the judgment of the Single Judge be restored upon
reversal of the impugned order.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENORS
23. The intervenors, while supporting the claim of Mullick, contended that
the benefit of pension must be extended to employees who have
resigned.
24. There is no provision for workmen to retire from banks before attaining
the age of superannuation. Most banks stipulate a minimum of 25 to
30 years in the Officers’ Service Regulations, 1979, to retire. Thus, the
officers were compelled to resign and not retire.
25. The Bipartite Settlement dated 29th October 1993 triggered the
pension scheme by notification of the 1995 Regulations. While the
settlement does not provide for forfeiture of service in case of
resignation, Regulation 22 provided for forfeiture of service even for
resignation. Regulation 22 cannot be used to take away the benefit of
pension when an employee is otherwise entitled to it.
26. There exists no difference between payment of bank’s contribution of
provident fund to those retired on superannuation/voluntary
retirement and resignation.
27. Reliance was placed on a letter dated 1st October, 2001 issued by the
IBA to show that voluntary retirement was not available to staff under
the bipartite settlement, prior to introduction of the pension scheme.
Even after the introduction of pension scheme, only those who had
opted for pension could retire voluntarily. Thus, the workmen and
12
officers were compelled to resign, instead of retire. Imposition of such
conditions are unconscionable and in the teeth of the decision of this
Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress16.
28. Denial of pension to a particular group of employees who resigned is
discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
of India. Any employee who has rendered the qualifying period of
service must be held entitled to opt for pension.
29. The bipartite settlement grants the benefit of pension to those
employees who sought voluntary retirement but does not consider the
employees who have resigned and, in that regard, it would be violative
of this Court’s decision in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India17.
30. The bipartite settlement scheme dated 8th March, 2024, enjoins
employees who resigned between 1st January, 1980 and 27th April,
2010. However, it does not stipulate minimum years of service.
Despite that, banks have refused pension to employees who have
served less than 20 years of service, as stipulated under regulation 29.
31. In terms of this Court’s decision in S.K. Kool (supra), the benefit of
pension was extended even to delinquent employees, whose services
were terminated on account of disciplinary action. It would be
discriminatory to allow pension benefits to employees who committed
fraud on the employer-bank but to disallow employees who resigned.
16
1991 Supp (1) SCC 600
17
(1983) 1 SCC 305
13
This would result in an anomalous situation and would be arbitrary and
violative of Articles 12, 14, 16 and 21.
32. Lastly, since the terms of employment of these employees are
contractual in nature, the conditions imposed which are contrary to the
provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 are unsustainable in law.
The settlement does not specifically disentitle those who resigned from
its application and thus the banks cannot disallow the benefit to such
employees who have resigned.
THE ISSUE
33. The issue that arises for determination is: whether an employee
resigning from service citing mental depression, after having served
his employer much in excess of the period stipulated to qualify for
being entitled to pension, forfeits his right to opt for pension in terms
of a specific provision in the Pension Regulations for all times to come,
or, in view of pension being a social welfare measure for employees in
the winter years of their life, adopting a beneficial approach is
permissible and/or called for?
ANALYSIS AND REASONS
34. Multiple authorities have been cited on either side to persuade us to
answer the question in their favour. A close look at each of the relevant
decisions has to be taken to ascertain whether the issue we are
concerned with is res integra.
14
35. In Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon18, the
employees of the Reserve Bank of India19 had tendered their
resignations in 1988 and were getting superannuation benefits under
the provident fund contributory provisions and gratuity schemes.
Subsequently, the RBI Pension Regulations, 1990 were framed. The
employees, who had tendered resignation in 1988, claimed that they
were entitled to pension under these new Pension Regulations and
moved the concerned high court for relief whereupon it was held that
RBI was legally bound to grant pension to such employees. RBI then
challenged the decision of the high court and this Court held that as
the employees had tendered resignation, which was different from
voluntary retirement, they were not entitled to pension under the
Pension Regulations.
36. While allowing the appeal of RBI, a coordinate Bench in Cecil Dennis
Solomon (supra) proceeded to make the following pertinent
observations:
10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”,
“voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation”
convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation
involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service.
Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of
the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered
at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be
sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service.
Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally
retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not
denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated,
while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is
a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and
becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the
18
(2004) 9 SCC 461
19
RBI
15
general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary.
…
37. In Sanwar Mal (supra), Sanwar Mal – who was initially appointed in
UCO Bank on 29th December, 1959 and was thereafter promoted to Class
III post in 1980 – resigned from the service of UCO Bank after giving
one month’s notice on 25th February, 1988. Thereafter, the UCO Bank
(Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995 were framed and Sanwar Mal
opted for the pension scheme under such regulations. UCO Bank
declined to accept his option to admit him into the pension scheme.
Sanwar Mal filed a suit for a declaration that he was entitled to pension
under the Pension Regulations and for a mandatory injunction directing
UCO Bank to make payment of arrears of pension along with interest.
The suit was decreed and the decree was affirmed in first appeal and,
thereafter, by the relevant high court in second appeal. UCO Bank
carried an appeal to this Court, which was allowed and the judgment of
the high court set aside. This Court differentiated the expressions
“resignation” from “voluntary retirement” by ruling as follows:
9. … The words “resignation” and “retirement” carry different
meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point
of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case
of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation
or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying
service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that
there is severance of employment (sic is the same) but in service
jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under
the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and “retirement” have
been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings.
The Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a
self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary
support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself.
The Scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their
provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who
16
resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete
cessation of master-and-servant relationship whereas voluntary
retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of
retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of
resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas
retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules
framed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the
length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the
employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits.
Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting
resignation vis-à-vis voluntary retirement and acceptance thereof.
Since the Pension Regulations disqualify an employee, who has
resigned, from claiming pension, the respondent cannot claim
membership of the fund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides for
disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for
those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we
do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the
respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping
out such class of employees. The view we have taken is supported
by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v.
Cecil Dennis Solomon. Before concluding we may state that
Regulation 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only
disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from
becoming a member of the fund. Such employees have received their
retiral benefits earlier. The Pension Scheme, as stated above, only
provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is no question of
penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The Pension
Scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They
are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition
which is more in the nature of an eligibility criterion, the Scheme
disentitles such category of employees as are out of it.
38. The difference between ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’, though
discussed by this Court in Cecil Dennis Solomon (supra) and
Sanwar Mal (supra) in extenso, we find such distinction not to have
been applied by another coordinate Bench in Sheelkumar Jain v.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd.20. Sheelkumar was an employee of
an insurance company governed by a pension scheme which provided
forfeiture of the entire service of an employee should he resign from
20
(2011) 12 SCC 197
17
his employment. Sheelkumar submitted a letter of resignation which
resulted in denial of his service benefits under such scheme. The Bench
was, thus, called upon to decide the issue whether the termination of
the services of the appellant in 1991 amounted to resignation or
voluntary retirement. It was held that since the employee had
completed the qualifying service and was entitled to seek voluntary
retirement under the scheme, he could not be said to have resigned
so as to lose his pension. Referring to the decisions in Cecil Dennis
Solomon (supra) and Sanwar Mal (supra), the Bench ruled that the
Courts there had not been called upon to decide whether the
termination of services of the employee was by way of resignation or
voluntary retirement. For the reasons assigned, the Bench proceeded
to hold that:
25. Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme states that the resignation
of an employee from the service of the corporation or a company
shall entail forfeiture of his entire past service and consequently he
shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does not define the term
“resignation”. Under sub-para (1) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension
Scheme, an employee, who has completed 20 years of qualifying
service, may by giving notice of not less than 90 days in writing to
the appointing authority retire from service and under sub-para (2)
of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, the notice of voluntary
retirement shall require acceptance by the appointing authority.
Since “voluntary retirement” unlike “resignation” does not entail
forfeiture of past services and instead qualifies for pension, an
employee to whom Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme applies
cannot be said to have “resigned” from service.
39. Close on the heels of the aforesaid decision came the decision in M.R.
Prabhakar (supra). A further coordinate Bench was seized of appeals
concerned with the legality of the claim for pension in lieu of
contributory provident fund of some officers of Canara Bank who had
18
resigned and stood relieved from their respective posts prior to 3rd
June, 1993, i.e., prior to signing of the statutory settlement dated 29th
October, 1993 under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the joint note
of even date, followed by the Canara Bank (Employees’) Pension
Regulations, 1995, which were notified in the Gazette of India on 29 th
September, 1995. Although the employees succeeded before the
single judge, the division bench of the relevant high court held
otherwise resulting in the appeals. While repelling the submission that
Sanwar Mal (supra) requires reconsideration and that Sheelkumar
Jain (supra) ought to be followed, the Bench observed as follows:
18. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants have placed
heavy reliance on Sheelkumar Jain and submitted that in the light of
that judgment, the decision rendered in Sanwar Mal requires
reconsideration. We find it difficult to accept the contention raised by
the learned counsel appearing for the appellants.
19. We may point out that in Sheelkumar Jain this Court was dealing
with an insurance scheme and not the pension scheme, which is
applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the scheme
and the Regulations are not in pari materia. In Sheelkumar Jain case,
while referring to Para 5, this Court came to the conclusion that the
same does not make distinction between “resignation” and “voluntary
retirement” and it only provides that an employee who wants to leave
or discontinue his service amounts to “resignation” or “voluntary
retirement”. Whereas, Regulation 20(2) of the Canara Bank
(Officers’) Service Regulations, 1979 applicable to banks, had
specifically referred to the words “resignation”, unlike Para 5 of the
Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that judgment,
this Court in para 30 held that the Court will have to construe the
statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination
of service of an employee was a termination by way of resignation or
a termination by way of voluntary retirement.
40. In Shashikala Devi (supra), heavily relied on by the Division Bench
in the impugned order, the short question that fell for consideration in
an appeal before yet another coordinate Bench was whether the letter
19
dated 8th October, 2007 sent by late Mauzi Ram, husband of
Shashikala, was in essence a letter seeking premature retirement on
medical grounds or a letter of resignation from the service of the
Central Bank of India21. The decisions in Cecil Dennis Solomon
(supra) and Sanwar Mal (supra) were duly considered. It was noted
that the orders under challenge in the appeal had taken the view that
the letter given by Mauzi Ram was one of resignation that resulted in
the forfeiture of past service under Regulation 22 of the relevant
regulations of the CBoI. The Bench then expressed its view of the
relevant high court being impressed by the use of the word
“resignation” in the employee’s letter dated 8th October, 2017. The use
of the expression “resignation”, however, was held not to be
conclusive. In the opinion of the Bench, it was not so even when this
Court had maintained a clear distinction between “resignation” and
“voluntary retirement”. Whether or not a given communication is a
letter of resignation simplicitor or can as well be treated to be a request
for voluntary retirement was held to be always dependent upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and the provisions of the rules
applicable. After considering several decisions including Sudhir
Chandra Sarkar v. TISCO22 and S. Appukuttan v. Thundiyil
Janaki Amma23, wherein law has been laid down to the effect that
pension is a right and payment of it does not depend on the discretion
21
CBoI
22
(1984) 3 SCC 369
23
(1988) 2 SCC 372
20
of the employer and also that while interpreting a statute the Court
ought to keep the legislative intent in mind and eschew an
interpretation which tends to restrict, narrow down or defeat its
beneficial provisions, it was held that:
18. It is, in our opinion, abundantly clear that the beneficial
provisions of a Pension Scheme or Pension Regulations have been
interpreted rather liberally so as to promote the object underlying the
same rather than denying benefits due to beneficiaries under such
provisions. In cases where an employee has the requisite years of
qualifying service for grant of pension, and where he could under the
service conditions applicable seek voluntary retirement, the benefit
of pension has been allowed by treating the purported resignation to
be a request for voluntary retirement. We see no compelling reasons
for not doing so even in the present case, which in our opinion is in
essence a case of the deceased employee seeking voluntary
retirement rather than resigning.
Ultimately, having appreciated the attendant circumstances in which
Mauzi Ram resigned as well as on consideration of the decision in
Sheelkumar Jain (supra), the Bench proceeded to rule that for a
waiver of a legally enforceable right earned by an employee, it is
necessary that the same is clear and unequivocal, conscious and with
full knowledge of the consequences and that no such intention could
be gathered from the facts and circumstances of such case. Relief was
thus granted to Shashikala by allowing the appeal and setting aside
the judgments under challenge.
41. Next, a somewhat similar issue came up for consideration in Asger
Ibrahim Amin v. LIC24 before a coordinate Bench. The question
which fell for consideration is: whether the appellant is entitled to claim
24
(2016) 13 SCC 797
21
pension even though he resigned from service of his own volition and,
if so, whether his claim on this count had become barred by limitation
or laches? After referring to Sheelkumar Jain (supra), the coordinate
Bench observed that the appellant had put in more than 20 years’
service and that he ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely
because he styled his termination of services as “resignation” or
because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. It
was also observed that the Court would be failing in its duty, if it were
to go by the letter and not by the laudatory spirit of statutory
provisions and the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 14 of
the Constitution of India.
42. Although what is expressed in Asger Ibrahim Amin (supra) could
provide succour to Mullick, we note that a subsequent coordinate
Bench had the occasion to disagree with the view expressed therein,
resulting in a reference vide order dated 26th November, 2015.
43. The conflicting conclusions drawn from similar facts and laws, evident
in earlier decisions of coordinate Benches comprising two-Judges,
came up for resolution before a larger Bench in Shree Lal Meena
(supra) premised on such reference. The divergence of judicial views
of this Court having necessitated examination of the issue by a larger
Bench, the law was declared in clear terms. Three sets of appeals were
before the larger Bench in which one set pertained to employees of
Andhra Bank and the rest pertained to employees of public sector
insurance companies. The common thread running through all sets of
22
appeals was that the concerned employees had tendered resignation
from service when, admittedly, the Pension Regulations had not been
introduced. After its introduction with retrospective effect, the said
employees had successfully ventilated their grievance before the
respective high courts. Pertinent observations from the said decision
read thus:
26. There are some observations on the principles of public sectors
being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial
legislations25. We may, however, note that as per what we have
opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle.
When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial
provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date
and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded
cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be
read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable
of another interpretation. We may also note that while framing such
schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a contributory
nature and their financial implications. Such financial implications are
both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would be
inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours
to extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by
the legislature.
44. Although the larger Bench in Shree Lal Meena (supra) did not
expressly overrule the decision in Asger Ibrahim Amin (supra), what
appears from a bare reading of the decision in BSES Yamuna Power
Ltd. v. Sh. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma26 rendered by another
coordinate Bench is this:
13. The view in Asger Ibrahim Amin was disapproved and the Court
held that the provisions providing for voluntary retirement would not
apply retrospectively by implication. In this view, where an employee
has resigned from service, there arises no question of whether he has
in fact “voluntarily retired” or “resigned”. The decision to resign is
materially distinct from a decision to seek voluntary retirement. The
decision to resign results in the legal consequences that flow from a25
Shashikala Devi (supra) and Asger Ibrahim Amin (supra)
26
(2020) 3 SCC 34623
resignation under the applicable provisions. These consequences are
distinct from the consequences flowing from voluntary retirement and
the two may not be substituted for each other based on the length of
an employee’s tenure.
45. Asger Ibrahim Rahim (supra) had followed the decision in
Sheelkumar Jain (supra). BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. v. Sh.
Ghanshyam Chand Sharma seems to be right in holding that Shree
Lal Meena (supra) disapproved Asger Ibrahim Rahim (supra). For
the same reasons, once could say that Sheelkumar Jain (supra) too
stands disapproved.
46. Although we would ordinarily be bound by what the larger Bench in
Shree Lal Meena (supra) has ruled, one noticeable factual
dissimilarity is that the employees there had resigned prior to
introduction of the Pension Regulations and that is why one finds, from
the following passage, one additional reason to deprive the employees
of pension. It reads:
19. What is most material is that the employee in this case had
resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an employee
resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of
the Pension Rules. In our view, attempting to apply the Pension Rules
to the respondent would be a self-defeating argument. As, suppose,
the Pension Rules were applicable and the employee like the
respondent was in service and sought to resign, the entire past
service would be forfeited, and consequently, he would not qualify for
pensionary benefits. To hold otherwise would imply that an employee
resigning during the currency of the Rules would be deprived of
pensionary benefits, while an employee who resigns when these
Rules were not even in existence, would be given the benefit of these
Rules.
(underlining ours)
47. Be that as it may, the consistent trend of the decisions from Sanwar
Mal (supra) to BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. (supra) with the exception
24
of Sheelkumar Jain (supra) and Shashikala Devi (supra), which
were decided considering the respective factual matrix, has been to
hold “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” as two distinct concepts
with varying consequences on severance of relationship and that
substitution of the two for each other based solely on the duration of
an employee’s service would run counter to the intendment of
statutory regulations and, therefore, is improper. We see no reason to
take a different view.
48. Having distilled the legal principle from the precedents, we now
consider it appropriate to examine how convincing the arguments
advanced on behalf of Mullick by his learned counsel are.
49. Omission of the several previous Benches to consider the ratio of the
decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) has been advanced by learned
counsel for Mullick to persuade us not to follow the precedents.
According to him, to group employees who resign together with
employees who are dismissed or removed or terminated from service,
in the light of the dicta in Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) is violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution.
50. In Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra), the vires of Section 5(1) of the West
Bengal Special Courts Act, 195027 and certain notifications issued
thereunder were under challenge on the ground that the same were
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The accused were convicted
by the Special Court constituted under the 1950 Act and sentenced.
27
1950 Act
25
Thereafter, the accused approached the High Court with a writ petition
claiming that the Special Court had no jurisdiction to try them. The
challenge succeeded before the High Court. In appeal, the Constitution
Bench by a clear majority upheld the judgment of the High Court. This
was perhaps the first decision by this Court where, for an enactment
under challenge to pass the test of ‘reasonable classification’, the twin
conditions of ‘the classification being based on an intelligible differentia
which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others’ and
‘that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to
be achieved by the Act’ were laid down [per Hon’ble S.R. Das, J. (as
the Chief Justice then was)]. The majority held that the unbridled
power conferred on the State by Section 5 to place any case before
the Special Court for trial wherein the procedure prescribed is less
advantageous to the accused was discriminatory and violative of
51. We have considered the ratio of Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) having
regard to the contention urged touching Article 14 and in the light of
the fervent appeal of Mullick — that the resignation he tendered,
arising out of mental depression was never intended to result in a
forfeiture of his right to opt for pension, should an option exercise be
made available in future, and that for all intents and purposes, such
resignation was nothing but an exercise to voluntarily retire from
service — with the care and attention the same deserve, but regret
26
our inability to comprehend as to how the ratio of such decision could
be of any help to Mullick.
52. Although the concepts of “resignation” and “retirement” have engaged
the consideration of this Court in multiple proceedings, some of which
have been referred to above, it is necessary at this stage (even at the
cost of repetition) to understand the expressions “resignation” and
“voluntary retirement”. A public servant, who is in permanent
employment, is entitled to continue in service till his retirement on
superannuation. However, any such employee may sever his
relationship with his employer prior to the date of superannuation by
any of the two modes, i.e., resignation and voluntary retirement.
Notwithstanding that both are modes bringing about an early
severance of employer-employee relationship, there exists clear
distinction between the two. Resignation, being a voluntary
relinquishment of employment, is an implied term of employer-
employee relationship. As noticed in the cited precedents, resignation
can be exercised anytime while the employee is in service. But unless
specified otherwise, say cases where resignation is unilateral28,
majorly, resignation is bilateral which, to be effective, requires
acceptance by the employer. Nowadays, it is not uncommon to find
clauses in offers of employment providing the conditions for a
resignation to take effect. In changing times, resignation tendered
soon after entry in service and before completion of the mandatory
28
provisions in Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution
27
period of service mentioned in the offer, does come with a price. On
the other hand, an employee may seek voluntary retirement if an
option is provided by the employer as a condition of service to such
employee to retire from service on fulfilment of the specified terms
and conditions. Any employee may, thus, offer to retire voluntarily
upon completion of the requisite period of service and upon fulfilling
other requirements. An offer to retire voluntarily, made by an
employee, is normally accepted by the employer unless, of course,
there is any debilitating factor. Further, if the employer introduces a
scheme for voluntary retirement and the pre-conditions are satisfied
upon receipt of any offer, the employee may be permitted to retire
voluntarily in accordance therewith. Importantly, when a provision for
voluntary retirement does exist, yet, an employee elects to resign,
such resignation (irrespective of the length of service) cannot be
treated as voluntary retirement unless, in a given case, the employee
also satisfies the conditions for voluntary retirement. What is
applicable in a case of voluntary retirement ex proprio vigore may not
apply to resignation in all cases. Also, if an employee does not wish to
continue in service, whatever be the reason therefor, and any
provision/scheme for voluntary retirement is non-existent, the only
mode open to him for severing the relationship, if he so desires, is
resignation; and once he does resign, he agrees to submit to the
consequences thereof as are applicable.
28
53. Conceptually, therefore, “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” are
different. Employees resigning from service and employees retiring
from service voluntarily constitute two different classes. Treating the
two classes differently may not offend Article 14; and there is no
justification to hold so, on facts and in the circumstances. However,
creating a class within several accused, who are similarly placed,
without reason is not permissible and that is precisely why Section 5
of the 1950 Act was rightly found in Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra) to be
violative of Article 14. Thus, the two situations – the one before us and
the other before the Constitution Bench – do not attract any
comparison.
54. Insofar as Regulation 22 of the 1995 Regulations is concerned, it deals
with forfeiture of service. Clubbing of resignation with dismissal,
removal and termination of service leading to forfeiture of past service
and consequent disentitlement to pensionary benefits per se do not
offend Article 14. We may observe that such regulation is a signal to
the employees warning them of the consequences should there be
severance of relationship by any of the modes, referred to therein.
While a resignation, when asked for by an employee, may be accepted
upon exercise of discretion by the employer, the other modes are
referable to punitive measures. It is as a matter of policy that forfeiture
of past service and disentitlement to pension have been provided.
29
55. Whether the policy is wise or prudent is not a matter for the courts to
be concerned with. We may profitably quote Prof. Wade29:
“The doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be
reconciled with the no less important doctrine that the court must not
usurp the discretion of the public authority which Parliament
appointed to take the decision.Within the bounds of legal
reasonableness is the area in which the deciding authority has
genuinely free discretion. If it passes those bounds, it acts ultra vires.
The court must therefore resist the temptation to draw the bounds
too tightly, merely according to its own opinion. It must strive to
apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority
the full range of choices which the legislature is presumed to have
intended. Decisions which are extravagant or capricious cannot be
legitimate. But if the decision is within the confines of
reasonableness, it is no part of the court’s function to look further
into its merits. ‘With the question whether a particular policy is wise
or foolish the court is not concerned; it can only interfere if to pursue
it is beyond the powers of the authority’…”
56. It is settled law that judicial review courts should refrain from
assessing the merits of policies formulated by legislative or regulatory
authorities which are codified in statutes/regulations. Such codified
policy may be wise or flawed, the policy may be effective in achieving
the objectives or could warrant a revision by way of an improvement.
However, any shortcomings in the policy do not render the regulation
ultra vires. Courts cannot invalidate a regulation merely because in its
opinion the policy is unwise or ineffective. The scrutiny has normally
to be restricted to the process of policy making. As long as the policy
is not beyond the scope of the regulation-making power or does not
transgress the bounds of the parent enactment or is in violation of any
29
Administrative Law, H.W.R. Wade, 6th Edition, pg.407
30
of the limitations imposed by the Constitution, there is little or no scope
for interference by the Courts.
57. None of these vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present case.
58. In any event, we do not find Regulation 22 to be so manifestly
arbitrary, so as to call for interference. Regulation 22 could have been
held to violate Article 14 if Mullick, upon resigning from service, were
denied dues on account of provident fund. Since by 2006, when he
resigned, Mullick had not shown any inclination to opt for pension
instead of provident fund, Regulation 22 did not affect him at all. To
have an entitlement to pension, futuristically speaking, Mullick was
required to adhere to the 1995 Regulations, which he did not.
59. Be that as it may, we have noticed that in Sanwar Mal (supra) an
argument premised on Article 14 came to be rejected. We share the
view expressed therein and, thus, find no merit in the contention urged
on behalf of Mullick relying on Anwar Ali Sarkar (supra).
60. We record having considered the contention urged touching validity of
Regulation 22 even though no formal challenge by Mullick to such
regulation was laid before the High Court.
61. Next, it has been contended on behalf of Mullick that Shree Lal Meena
(supra) did not have the occasion to consider Shashikala Devi
(supra). This contention is plainly misconceived. There appears to be
numerous references to Shashikala Devi (supra) in the order of
reference dated 26th November, 2015 and the larger Bench too
31
referred to it in paragraph 26, extracted above. The contention being
equally unmeritorious deserves outright rejection.
62. Before moving ahead, we feel it expedient to refer to S. K. Kool
(supra). The factual matrix of such case is singularly singular.
Following disciplinary proceedings, S.K. Kool was removed from
service of the appellant bank with superannuation benefits as would
be due otherwise and without disqualification from future employment.
The relevant bipartite settlement was read in a manner as if it were to
prevail over statutory regulations. In any event, we hold that whatever
has been laid down there by the coordinate Bench turns on the facts
of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in a case where the
order of punishment of removal imposed on the delinquent does not
entitle him to any financial benefit.
63. The contention of the intervenors, which are in similar line as urged on
behalf of Mullick, do not survive for the reasons assigned above; and,
therefore, we see no reason to entertain their grievance. In any event,
the bipartite settlement dated 8th March, 2024 has taken substantial
care of the grievances of employees who resigned and, hence, nothing
further is called for in the circumstances.
64. Adverting to the factual matrix, in the case at hand, Mullick while in
service had the opportunity to opt for pension in terms of the 1995
Regulations. He, however, opted for provident fund. At the time of
severance of relationship with the Bank upon acceptance of
resignation, he received his own contribution of Rs.2,21,554.00 and
32
the Bank’s contribution of Rs.5,91,987.00 towards provident fund
dues. Having served the Bank for over 35 years and in service for more
than a decade after introduction of the 1995 Regulations, he is
presumed to have been aware of the same together with the
consequences of tendering resignation instead of seeking voluntary
retirement by giving a 3 months’ notice on the date he tendered
resignation. Presumption can also be legitimately drawn that Mullick
was satisfied with whatever he received on account of provident fund
dues while demitting office. True it is, Mullick was suffering from
mental depression but that did not prevent him from being coherent
while writing the resignation letter. It has not been the case of Mullick
that he signed without being aware of its contents. Mullick seems to
have had a change of mind only when options were again called for
from employees who had superannuated/retired, pursuant to the
bipartite settlement dated 27th April, 2010 followed by the circular
dated 16th August, 2010. While it is equally true that the relevant Bank
official could have appropriately advised Mullick not to resign but to
seek voluntary retirement, which could have enabled him to reap the
benefits of the aforesaid settlement dated 27th April, 2010 and the
consequent circular dated 16th August, 2010 issued by the IBA, at the
same time such official cannot also be blamed for not visualizing a
future event. We conclude this chapter by holding that the terms of
the bipartite settlement are binding on all the employees of the public
sector banks, which were parties thereto, and such terms cannot be
33
read in a manner to extend its coverage dehors the statutory
regulations. The issue formulated by us, thus, stands answered in
favour of the Bank and against the appellant.
65. For all the reasons aforesaid, Mullick must be held to have resigned
from service and not retired voluntarily so as to enable him secure the
benefit of a further opportunity to opt for pension in terms of the
circular dated 16th August, 2010. Relief that the Single Judge granted
to Mullick based on consideration of the decisions in S.K. Kool (supra)
and Shashikala Devi (supra) was correctly set at naught by the
Division Bench vide direction in (A) extracted at the beginning of this
judgment, which we hereby affirm.
66. However, the lead appeal tasks us to consider the validity of the other
directions of the Division Bench as in (B), (C) and (D), extracted supra,
which are impugned before us. Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra
Pradesh30, V.K. Sood v. Department of Civil Aviation31 and State
of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini32 are some decisions of this
Court which have a material bearing in this connection.
67. It is elementary but requires to be restated that the power under
Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised by a high court to
direct the legislature/executive to enact a law (primary or subordinate)
or frame a regulation/bye-law. These are executive functions which
are required to be performed based on policy decisions taken at the
30
(1990) 2 SCC 707
31
1993 Supp (3) SCC 9
32
(2017) 11 SCC 42
34
appropriate level. The jurisdiction of a high court is limited to the
extent of pointing out why a law, in the given circumstances, is
necessary for regulating the affairs of the public/society and/or to
remedy a particular mischief that is noticed in course of proceedings;
but in such a case too, it is only a nudge in the form of a request that
could be made to the executive to consider the desirability of
enacting/framing such a law or to amend an existing law.
68. Bearing in mind the above well-settled principle of law, it is now time
to examine the directions [(B) to (D)] given by the Division Bench of
the High Court. Although the Division Bench required the Board of
Directors of the Bank to ‘consider’ an amendment to Regulation 22 of
the 1995 Regulations in view of the circular of the IBA dated 30th June,
2015, learned counsel for the Bank is right in his submission that
viewed in the light of stipulation of a timeline and the other directions
for determining whether resignation tendered by Mullick could be
treated as voluntary retirement and to process his claim for pension
upon such determination, user of the word ‘consider’ is really a
mandate on the Bank to amend Regulation 22 of the 1995 Regulations.
No such mandate could have been issued and we hold that the Division
Bench overstepped its bounds by directing the Board of Directors of
the Bank to consider amending Regulation 22 even when the vires of
such a regulation was not under challenge in Mullick’s writ petition.
35
CONCLUSION
69. The connected appeal of Mullick, thus, stands dismissed.
70. While direction (A) is affirmed, the directions given by the Division
Bench [(B) to (D)] being the operative part of the impugned order
stand set aside. The lead appeal is partly allowed and shall stand
disposed of with directions as follows.
RELIEF
71. We appreciate Mullick’s candour in not continuing in service despite his
mentally depressed state of mind. Being the head cashier and dealing
with public money, of which the Bank was the custodian, Mullick by
tendering resignation averted a crisis situation which could have
ensued had he, because of mental depression, mishandled cash and
failed to perform his duty as before. Since Mullick had served the Bank
without blemish for more than 35 years and is now a septuagenarian,
we consider it appropriate to extend some relief to him in exercise of
our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of the India to assist
him survive in the winter years of his life with a fair measure of dignity.
72. The Bank has referred to clause 37 of the bipartite settlement dated
8th March, 2024. Though Mullick may not have exercised option in
terms thereof, we grant him a fortnight’s time more to opt for pension
as a very special case. Opting for pension would mean that Mullick
would abide by all the terms and conditions of such settlement. If
Mullick returns the sum received by him on account of provident fund
36
together with the applicable rate of interest within the time stipulated
by the Bank, he will be entitled to pension at such rate and on such
terms as are provided in the settlement.
73. However, in the unlikely event of Mullick not being eligible in terms of
the settlement to receive pension or he being unable to refund the sum
received by him on account of provident fund together with the
applicable rate of interest, as the case may be, he may instead request
for financial relief within a fortnight. If such a request is received, the
Bank shall, as a model employer, proceed to pay to Mullick relief in a
sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees five lakh) only within two months from
date of its receipt. This particular grant of financial relief is, however,
not to be treated as a precedent.
74. We, therefore, dispose of the lead appeal on the aforesaid terms.
75. The applications filed by the intervenors stand dismissed.
76. Other connected applications, if any, stand closed.
……………………………J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
……………………………J.
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 22, 2025.
37
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