Jharkhand High Court
Ramendra Kishor Agarwal S/O Braj Mohan … vs Smt. Rekha Jaiswal Wife Of Sri Om Prakash … on 21 July, 2025
2025:JHHC:19933
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Revision No. 37 of 2011
1. Ramendra Kishor Agarwal S/o Braj Mohan Lal Agrawal,
2. Prem Shankar Agarwal
3. Santosh Kumar Agarwal
resident of Mohalla- Bajrangi Chowk, Hazaribagh Town, P.O. and
P.S. Hazaribagh, District Hazaribagh.
... Petitioners/Defendant
Versus
Smt. Rekha Jaiswal wife of Sri Om Prakash Jaiswal, resident of
village-Boddom Bazar, Hazaribag, P.O. and P.S. Hazaribagh, District
Hazaribagh.
... Opp. Party/Plaintiff
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
For the Petitioners : Mr. K.K. Ambastha, Adv.
Md. Abdul Wahab, Adv.
For the Opp. Party : Mr. Bhaiya Vishwajeet Kumar, Adv.
Mr. Sachin Mahato, Adv.
Order No.25/Dated- 21.07.2025
1. Heard Mr. K.K. Ambastha, learned counsel for the petitioners
as well as Mr. Bhaiya Vishwajeet Kumar, learned counsel for the
opposite party.
2. The instant civil revision is directed against judgment and
decree dated 24.08.2011 (decree singed on 03.09.2011) passed by
the Court of Sub-Judge-V, Hazaribagh in Eviction Suit No.11 of
1998 whereby and whereunder, the suit filed under Section
11(1)(c) and (e) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction)
Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter referred as 'The Act of 1982') has
been decreed in favour of plaintiff and the defendant/petitioners
have been directed to vacate the suit premises within one month
from the date of order and to handover the vacant possession of
the same to the plaintiff, failing which, the plaintiff shall be
entitled to evict the defendant from the suit premises through the
process of the Court.
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3. Factual matrix giving rise to this revision is that plaintiff
purchased the suit property by registered sale deed No. 11835
dated 13/14.12.1994 from Sri Krishnan Jaiswal, Advocate,
Hazaribagh, thereby acquired absolute ownership, right, title,
interest and possession over the property. It is further alleged that
before purchase of the suit property including the premises, the
defendant was an existing tenant under the vendor of the plaintiff
on a monthly rent of Rs.28/- payable according to the English
calendar month and had paid rent until December 1994. The
plaintiff asserts that the defendant was duly informed and
acknowledged the change of ownership, thereby recognizing the
plaintiff as his landlady, but failed to pay rent from January 1995
onward, thus becoming a defaulter. The plaintiff further claims
bona fide personal necessity for the suit premises, stating the
property is century-old, built with mud walls and local tiles, lacks
basic amenities such as urinal and latrine and is in a dilapidated
and unsafe condition, requiring complete reconstruction, which is
not feasible without eviction. It is further alleged that the
defendant has a separate residential house and is not residing in
the said suit premises and initially sought time till 31.03.1995 to
vacate, which was granted, followed by another extension till
30.06.1995 on compassionate grounds. However, the defendant
neither vacated the premises nor paid the rent from January 1995.
Hence, the suit was filed under Sections 11(1)(c) and (e) of the
Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982.
4. The defendant appeared and filed his written statement and
the plea of defendant in his written statement is that the suit filed
by the plaintiff is false and was filed in conspiracy with Krishna
Jaiswal to illegally take over the suit property. Defendant stated
that the case should not proceed because an earlier case (Title Suit
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No. 113 of 1996) involving the same property and parties, is still
pending in the Munsif Court, Hazaribagh. The defendant
explained that Krishna Jaiswal was the original owner, had agreed
to sell the house to defendant's son, Ramendra Kumar Agrawal, in
the year 1993 and even took an advance payment, with a written
and notarized agreement. Despite repeated requests to finalize the
sale, Krishna Jaiswal failed to execute the sale deed. Instead, he
fraudulently executed a sale deed in favor of Rekha Jaiswal, his
own relative, without informing the defendant or his son. The
defendant pleaded that this sale deed is bogus, fraudulent and
without consideration, made solely to defeat his son's legal right
under the earlier agreement. The defendant also stated that he has
been living in the house for a long time, paying rent to Krishna
Jaiswal until 1995 and has maintained the property at his own
cost. Since then, when rent payments were refused, he began
depositing the rent in a bank. He has also denied any landlord-
tenant relationship with Rekha Jaiswal who has no legal right or
personal necessity for the house and has never occupied it. The
defendant has also denied requesting any grace period or
acknowledging her ownership and maintained that the suit has
been falsely filed to illegally grab the property.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners assailing the impugned
judgment and decree has vehemently argued that the suit of the
plaintiff itself was misconceived and there was no specific
pleading that the plaintiff requires the suit premises bonafidely
and reasonably for her own use and occupation. The citation, i.e.,
1991 B.B.C.J. page 544 relied upon by learned Trial Court, while
deciding the suit, was also not applicable in the eviction suit in
question in view of the fact that in the said ratio, it was the case
when in a pending eviction suit, the plaintiff has sold the property
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to another person, who has filed the suit again/afresh against the
tenant. The learned Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate
the oral as well as documentary evidence relied upon by the
parties and the issues involved in this case in right perspective.
The findings recorded on issue of partial eviction is also
misconceived and beyond the evidence available on record.
Therefore, impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside,
allowing this civil revision.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon
the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Shehla
Burney and Ors. vs. Syed Ali Mossa Raza (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors.,
reported in 2011 (3) Supreme 401, wherein dealing with provisions
of Order VII Rules 5 and 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was
held that in a case where prayer is not made against a particular
defendant, no relief possibly can be granted against him.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite
party/plaintiff has vehemently opposed the aforesaid contentions
raised on behalf of petitioners and submitted that the plaintiff has
filed the suit under the provision of Section 11(1)(c) and (e) of the
Act of 1982.
Section 11(1) of the Act of 1982 reads as under :-
"11. Eviction of tenants.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law
to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), and to
those of Section 18, where a tenant is in possession of any
building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except
in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more
of the following grounds:-
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(a) for breach of the conditions of the tenancy, or for
sub-letting the building or any portion thereof without the
consent of the landlord, or if he is an employee of the
landlord occupying the building as an employee, on his
ceasing to be in such employment;
(b) where the condition of the building has materially
deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or negligence or
default of the tenant or of any person residing with the
tenant or for whose behaviour the tenant is responsible;
(c) where the building is reasonably and in good faith
required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the
occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is
held by the landlord:
Provided that where the Court thinks that the
reasonable requirement of such occupation may be
substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part
only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue
occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such
occupation, the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and
fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of
the tenant, which portion shall henceforth constitute the
building within the meaning of clause (b) of Section 2 and
the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed
under section 5;
Explanation I. - In this clause the word "landlord" shall
not include an agent referred to in clause (f) of Section 2.
Explanation II. - Where there are two or more premises let
out by the landlord, it will be for the landlord to choose
which one would be preferable to him and the tenant or
tenants shall not be allowed to question such preference.
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(d) where the amount of two months rent, lawfully
payable by the tenant and due from him is in arrears by not
having been paid within the time fixed by contract or in the
absence of such contract, by the last day of the month next
following that for which the rent is payable or by not having
been validly remitted or deposited in accordance with
section 16;
(e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified
period, on the expiry of the period of the tenancy; and
(f) the landlord requires the premises in order to carry
out any building work at the instance of the Government or
the Municipality or Municipal Corporation or the Notified
Area Committee or the Regional Development Authority or
any other Authority within whose jurisdiction the building
lies and such building work cannot be properly and fully
carried out without the premises being vacated."
8. Learned counsel for the opposite party / plaintiff has
further submitted that it is well settled law that a tenant takes a
premises from the landlord to conduct his business or for the
purpose of residence, it is always choice of landlord to choose
premises for his business or residence. However, subject to
condition that there is bonafide need and requirement for personal
necessity. The law is well settled by catena of judgments that "the
reasonable requirement of the landlord postulate that there must
be an element of need as opposed to mere desire and wish. The
distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in
mind, but not so as to meet even the genuine need as nothing but
a desire." The Hon'ble Apex Court has quoted the aforesaid view
in the case of Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. vs. Uttam Chand &
Anr., (2004) 8 SCC 490.
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9. Learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has further
submitted that it is also settled proposition of law that necessity
need not be proved as a dire necessity. There is no substance in
the contention of the petitioner that as per mandatory provision
and Order VII Rule 7 of the C.P.C, specific relief was not sought
for rather in order to know the pith and substance of the case and
the relief sought for the contents of entire plaint has to be taken
into account. The petitioner (defendant) has never objected or
asserted before the learned Trial Court that he has been surprised
through the contents of plaint where relief is ambiguous.
Therefore, aforesaid plea of the petitioner is not tenable at all. The
suit of the opposite party has been decreed in the year 2011
although eviction suit was filed in the year 1998 but up till now,
he has not tasted the fruit of the decree due to stay order passed in
this revision. There is no merit in this revision, which is fit to be
dismissed.
10. Learned counsel for the opposite party/plaintiff has also
placed reliance upon the following reported judgments:
(i) Mrs. Veena Rani & Ors. vs. Mrs. Ishrati Amanullah &
Anr., reported in 1984 SCC On Line Patna 176 and AIR
1985 Patna 207;
(ii) M/s Bihar Alloy Steels Limited Vs. Hari Shankar
Worah (Properties) Ltd. & Anr., reported in 1987 PLJR
868.
11. I have gone through the impugned judgment and decree in
the light of contentions raised on behalf of both the parties.
12. It appears that Eviction Suit No.11 of 1998 was filed by the
plaintiff (opposite party herein), stating inter alia the plaintiff has
bought the suit property in December 1994 which was owned and
possessed by Sri Krishnan Jaiswal and became the legal owner.
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The defendant was already living there as a tenant, paying rent of
Rs.28/- per month. After the sale, the defendant was told to pay
rent to the new owner (the plaintiff), which he agreed to, but he
stopped paying rent from January 1995. The plaintiff needs the
house for her personal use. The building is very old and in
dilapidated condition to live in. She wants to rebuild it, which is
not possible while the tenant is still living there. The defendant
owns another house in the same town but does not live there. The
defendant asked for more time to move out and was given
extensions until June 1995 but still he did not vacate or pay rent.
Thereafter, eviction suit was filed by plaintiff.
13. It further appears that the plea of defendant as per written
statement is that the plaintiff has no bonafide requirement of the
suit premises as she has house and there is sufficient place in her
house where she lives with her husband and family and she never
required the suit house and never demanded eviction of the
defendant. The defendant has also denied of any knowledge of
sale of the suit premises to the plaintiff. The defendant was never
inducted as tenant by the plaintiff rather he was inducted as
tenant by her vendor Sri Krishnan Jaiswal. He has also denied any
payment of rent to the plaintiff at any point of time. However, it is
admitted that he always paid rent earlier hand to hand but since
1979, the rent was sent through money order to Krishnan Jaiswal
who always accepted it but since January 1995, he refused to grant
any receipt, hence, the rent was being remitted through money
orders, which was refused by the Krishnan Jaiswal with ulterior
motive. Since, there is alternative accommodation available to the
plaintiff, therefore, there is no need of eviction of the defendant
from suit premises. The defendant never defaulted in payment of
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rent rather he and his son repair and renovate the suit premises
and constructed urinal and latrine at his own cost.
14. It further appears that learned Trial Court, on the basis of
pleadings of the parties, has settled following issues for
adjudication :-
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether there is cause of action for the suit?
(iii) Whether there are relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties?
(iv) Whether plaintiff has required the suit house bona-
fidely for her personal use and occupation?
(v) Whether tenancy was for fixed term and defendant is
liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the
expiry of the fixed period?
(vi) As to whether the need of plaintiff will be satisfied by
partial eviction of the defendant from the suit
premises?
(vii) As to what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to?
15. The learned Trial Court after considering the pleadings of
the parties as well as oral and documentary evidence adduced in
this case and the law applicable in the factual position decided all
the issues. To consider that whether learned Trial Court has
rightly decided the case, three points is necessary to consider; (i)
Whether there was relationship of landlord and tenant? (ii)
Whether there was bonafide need or personal necessity of
plaintiff? (iii) Whether need of plaintiff will be satisfied by partial
eviction?
16. The petitioner has pointed out illegality or impropriety in
the impugned order as regards relationship of landlady and
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tenant between the parties. On the issue whether there is
relationship of landlord and tenant, it is found that the
petitioners/defendant has taken plea that he was inducted by the
vendor (Sri Krishnan Jaiswal) of the plaintiff over the suit
premises and never attorned as tenant of the plaintiff and never
paid rent to her. But it is found by learned Trial Court on the basis
of evidences that vendor of plaintiff (Krishnan Jaiswal) and
husband of plaintiff informed the defendant about the sale of suit
premises and defendant attorn the plaintiff as landlady and
promised to pay rent to her but defendant never paid rent to the
plaintiff. Thus, it is clear that defendant has knowledged about the
landlady. On the issue of attornment, in the case of Gopi vs.
Ballabh Vyas, (2022) 19 SCC 204, it is held in para No.32:-
32. In the light of the finding on the issue whether the
respondents in RC No. 262 of 2008 were mala fide denying
the title of the petitioner therein over the petition scheduled
property, Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act would
assume relevance in regard to the right of the petitioner in
RC No. 262 of 2008 to seek eviction of the respondents
therein, from the petition scheduled property. Admittedly,
the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants viz. late Shri
Balraj, was the tenant in respect of the petition scheduled
property under its original owner Smt Phool Kumari. A bare
perusal of Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act would
reveal that if a landlord transfers the property leased out or
any part of it, the transferee, in the absence of any contract to
the contrary, shall possess all the rights of the landlord.
Hence, the impact of Ext. P-3, in the absence of any contract
to the contrary, is that the respondent herein has stepped
into the shoes of Smt Phool Kumari. In terms of Section 109
of the Transfer of Property Act it is clear that attornment by
the lessee is not necessary for the transfer of the property
leased out to him. Thus, the inevitable consequence of
transfer of a leased-out property by the landlord in
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accordance with law to a third party, in the absence of a
contract to the contrary, is that the third party concerned
would not only become its owner having title but also would
step into the shoes of the vendor as the landlord in relation to
the lease holder at the relevant point of time. In such
circumstances, the findings of the courts below that there
exists jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the
respondent and the appellants can only be held as the correct
and lawful conclusion in the light of the evidence on record
based on the legal position.
17. It is clear by well-established law that attornment is not
necessary condition creating landlord and tenant relationship and
transferee is entitled to sue on the personal necessity even in
absence of attornment by tenant.
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Md. Ayub & Anr. vs.
Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155 has discussed the concept of
bonafide requirement of plaintiff with comparative hardship
between the landlord and tenant. It has been held that landlord’s
requirement need not be a dire necessity.
The above principle of law was also propounded by the
Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Mrs. Veena Rani (supra),
relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner at para 11 of the
said judgment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that when
the tenant did not make genuine effort to find out any alternative
accommodation, even during the pendency, the tenant cannot
claim hardship in future.
19. Partial Eviction: The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Badrinarayan Chunilal Bhutada vs. Govindram Ramgopal
Mundada, (2003) 2 SCC 320 held as under:-
“It is expected of the parties to raise necessary pleadings so
as to enable the parties to adduce evidence and bring on
record such relevant material as to enable the court forming
an opinion on the issue as to comparative hardship andPage | 11
2025:JHHC:19933consistently with such finding whether partial eviction could
meet the ends to justice. Even if no issue has been framed,
the court may discharge its duty by taking into
consideration such material as available on record.”
The same principle has been propounded by the Hon’ble
Patna High Court/Ranchi Bench in the case of M/s Bihar Alloy
Steels Limited (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the
petitioner at para No.14 of the said judgment.
20. In the instant case, the mere plea of petitioner/defendant
that there is only one room in the suit premises and rests are in
dilapidated condition, which is sufficient for use and occupation
of the plaintiff, for which, defendant has not adduced any
evidence, which has not been accepted by the learned Trial Court
in view of reasonable and bonafide requirement of the plaintiff
and on the principle that the tenant cannot dictate the landlady
regarding use and occupation of her own premises in the manner
desired by the tenant. As such, the petitioner/defendant himself
in essence has not pleaded or proved any partial eviction to be
sufficient.
21. In view of the aforesaid discussions and reasons, I find that
learned counsel for the petitioner has miserably failed to point out
any infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree suffering
from non-consideration of material evidence or any error in
arriving at right findings by the concerned Trial Court. Learned
Trial Court appears to have considered all those above points as
pointed out by the present petitioner in right perspective on the
basis of materials evidence available on record. Therefore, the
impugned judgment and decree does not require any interference
by way of this revision. I do not find any merits in this revision,
which stands dismissed.
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22. Interim order, if any, passed in this case, stands vacated.
23. Pending I.As., if any, also stand dismissed.
24. Let a copy of this judgment along with Trial Court record be
sent back to the concerned Trial Court for information and
needful.
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated: 21/07/2025
Sachin / AFR
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