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Supreme Court of India
Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 23 July, 2025
Author: Dipankar Datta
Bench: Dipankar Datta, Surya Kant
2025 INSC 884
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7777/2023
VISHNU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN … APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
With
W.P. (C) No. 673/2023
VISHNU VARDHAN @ VISHNU PRADHAN … PETITIONER
VS.
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
With
MA No. 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022
With
CONMT. PET. (C) No. 23-24/2024 in W.P. (C) No. 673/2023
With
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ARJUN BISHT
Diary No(s). 6013/2024
Date: 2025.07.23
11:53:29 IST
Reason:
With
SMC (C) No. 3/2024
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
INDEX
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3
FACTS……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 6
IMPUGNED ORDER ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
BEFORE THIS COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO 3636-37 OF 2022 ……………………………………………………………………….. 22
CONTENTIONS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 24
ARGUMENTS BY VISHNU ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 24
ARGUMENTS BY REDDY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 25
ARGUMENTS BY NOIDA …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 28
REPLY BY VISHNU REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAINTAINABILITY …………………………………………………………………. 29
ISSUES ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 29
ANALYSIS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 30
I. HAS REDDY PLAYED FRAUD ON THE COURTS? ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 33
II. MAINTAINABILITY………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
A. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 47
B. MAINTAINABILITY OF CIVIL APPEAL/JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT …………………………………….. 56
INTRA-COURT APPEAL………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 56
MERGER …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 59
PROCEDURE, IF AN IMPEDIMENT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION ………………………………………………………………. 76
C. VISHNU PURSUING THE CIVIL APPEAL AS WELL AS THE REVIEW PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR
MODIFICATION/RECALL, SIMULTANEOUSLY ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 78
D. FORUM SHOPPING …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 81
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 82
2
INTRODUCTION
1. In Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court emphatically asserted “… stated simply, nothing … nothing … and
nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything.”
2. At the end of the last century, this Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.
Jagannath2 noticed the growing trend of abuse of the process of law by
dishonest litigants playing fraud on courts. Fraud was held to be an act of
deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair
advantage of another: a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. The
opening paragraph of such decision reads as follows:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice
Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition
of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a
nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree — by the first
court or by the highest court — has to be treated as a nullity by every court,
whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral
proceedings.
This Court then warned that:
5. The principle of “finality of litigation” cannot be pressed to the extent of such
an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest
litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties.
One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained
to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-
grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons
from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the
illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who’s case
is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily
thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
3. “Fraud unravels everything” was famously said by Lord Denning in Lazarus
Estates Ltd. v. Beasley3, emphasising that fraud can invalidate judgments,
1
(2017) 4 SCC 1
2
(1994) 1 SCC 1
3
(1956) 1 Q.B. 702
3
contracts and all transactions. The principle highlights the importance of
honesty and transparency in legal proceedings and transactions. However, it
is a cardinal principle of law that fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Order
VI Rule 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19084 may be referred to ordaining
that particulars, inter alia, of fraud have to be stated in the pleadings.
4. From the multiple decisions of this Court on ‘fraud’, what follows is that fraud
and justice cannot dwell together, the legislature never intends to guard fraud,
the question of limitation to exercise power does not arise, if fraud is proved,
and even finality of litigation cannot be pressed into service to absurd limits
when a fraud is unravelled.
5. The issue of fraud unravelling everything is pertinent here due to the nature
of dispute we are tasked to adjudicate; hence, its reference at the beginning
of our judgment.
6. The primary parties involved in these proceedings are the appellant-writ
petitioner-applicant, Vishnu Vardhan5, and the respondent no.7, Reddy
Veeranna6. Vishnu has alleged that fraud has been played by Reddy on courts
to reap benefits behind Vishnu’s back. The tangled facts involved in these
proceedings, the complex web of activities of the primary parties and their
associates and the relief claimed in the civil appeal as well as the writ petition
by Vishnu would have to be examined in great depth to ascertain whether
fraud, as alleged by him, is established; and, if so, how it has affected the flow
of judicial proceedings and the manner in which the same has to be dealt with.
4
CPC
5
Vishnu
6
Reddy
4
In the process, other petitions/applications that are on record would also
require due consideration.
7. In the civil appeal, by special leave, Vishnu has assailed the judgment and
order7 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad8 dated 28th October, 2021,
whereby the High Court allowed a writ petition9 filed by Reddy.
8. Concurrently with the civil appeal, Vishnu has presented a writ petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution. He has prayed for diverse relief therein, which
we propose to notice a little later.
9. The present lis concerns rival claims in respect of ownership of a land10
situated in Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, which was acquired by the
New Okhla Industrial Development Authority11 in 2005 and now forms a part
of Sector 18, NOIDA. The land was jointly purchased in 1997 by Reddy, one
T. Sudhakar12 and Vishnu13. Relying on their joint ownership, the trio initiated
various legal proceedings seeking multiple relief from time to time, before and
after the acquisition of the land by NOIDA. Vishnu alleges that Reddy made
several attempts to assert his exclusive ownership in proceedings where
Vishnu and Sudhakar were not joined as parties. He further alleges that in one
such proceeding, Reddy succeeded and the High Court, by the impugned
order, declared him the sole owner. Aggrieved by the conduct of Reddy (which,
7
impugned order
8
High Court
9
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2272/2019
10
referred to as land, subject land or property, interchangeably, hereafter
11
NOIDA
12
Sudhakar
13
the trio, wherever referred to collectively
5
according to Vishnu, is fraudulent) and the impugned order, Vishnu has sought
relief from this Court by presenting the civil appeal.
10. While the relief claimed in the civil appeal is for setting aside of the impugned
order, what is prayed in the writ petition is (i) a declaration that Reddy is not
the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) an order setting aside NOIDA’s decision
(reflected in its letter dated 17th January, 2023) to sanction full compensation
for acquisition of the land to Reddy, (iii) a declaration that the trio, as co-
owners of the land, be jointly awarded compensation for acquisition thereof
and (iv) ordering an inquiry to unearth the fraud and to initiate appropriate
legal proceedings against the persons responsible.
11. Inter alia, there is a petition for review (defective) and an application for recall,
both at the instance of Vishnu. While the former seeks review of the judgment
and order dated 5th May, 2022 of this Court in C.A. No. 3636/2022, the latter
seeks recall of an order dated 30th January, 2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil
Appeal 3636/2022.
FACTS
12. Since it is essential to delve deep into the facts for a proper determination of
the claims raised by Vishnu against Reddy and the officials of NOIDA, for the
sake of clarity and convenience, the full factual details are set out in the table
below.
17th April, 1976 Vide Notification No. 4157 dated 17th April, 1976 issued
under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area
Development Act, 1976, NOIDA was constituted by
6
declaring large tracts of land comprising of several
villages in Gautam Budh Nagar District, including lands
in the village of Chhalera Banger.
1985-1986 Between 1985 and 1986, NOIDA acquired a certain
portion of land from one Banwari and Bansha Singh and
compensation was received by them.
24th April, 1997 The trio jointly purchased a land measuring 5-13-10
Bighas at Khasra No. 422 and 427M of Village Challera
Banger, Gautam Budh Nagar, for a sum of Rs. 1 crore
from Bansa and Banwari Singh. Only 2-18-10 Bighas of
land14 which was un-acquired by NOIDA is the subject
of the present proceeding. The names of the trio were
entered in the revenue records and the record of rights.
1998 The trio instituted a suit15 seeking a permanent
First Suit injunction against NOIDA from disturbing their
possession and title in the subject land.
16th February, 2000 The trial court by its decree restrained NOIDA from
interfering with the possession of the unacquired land
admeasuring 2-18-10 bighas.
26th June, 2000 Vide an agreement to sell, Sudhakar purportedly
relinquished his share in the subject land to Reddy for
Rs. 10 lakh.
14
subject land
15
Civil Suit No. 416/1998
7
2001 Aggrieved, NOIDA carried an appeal16 from the trial
court’s decree dated 16th February, 2000 before the First
Appellate Court.
30th March, 2001 The First Appellate Court dismissed the civil appeal filed
by NOIDA and this decision not being challenged,
attained finality.
30th May, 2001 Sudhakar instituted a civil suit17 against Reddy, seeking
Second Suit a declaration of his 1/3rd share in the subject land.
31st May, 2001 Reddy filed his written statement in the said suit. On the
same day, a compromise agreement was signed by and
between Sudhakar and Reddy, conceding that Reddy
was the absolute owner of the land.
12th September, The trial court, declaring that the compromise
2002 agreement was not bona fide, refused to act upon it.
5th December, 2002 The civil suit instituted by Sudhakar was dismissed for
default by the trial court.
2003-2004 NOIDA introduced a scheme for development of a
commercial hub at Sector 18, NOIDA.
11th November, 2003 Sudhakar requested the Deputy CEO to convert the
subject land for use from agricultural to commercial,
which was denied on 13th January, 2004.
16
Civil Appeal No. 61/2000
17
Civil Suit No. 283/2001
8
27th March, 2004 An office order set the rates for commercial land at Rs.
1,10,000 per sq. metre and for residential land at Rs.
4000 per sq. metre.
2003 – 2005 NOIDA allegedly made several attempts to dispossess
the trio from the subject land.
12th April, 2004 NOIDA issued an acceptance letter to DLF Universal for
allotment of the commercial hub.
2005 The trio filed Execution Petition No. 2/2005 for execution
of the decree of the trial court dated 16th February,
2000, restraining NOIDA from dispossessing them from
the land.
3rd February, 2005 Vishnu purportedly executed an Agreement for Sale for
Agreement for Sale his share of the land with Reddy for a sum of Rs. 25
lakh.
3rd February, 2005 Vishnu executed a General Power of Attorney (PoA) in
PoA favour of one Venkataramana.
25th February, 2005 NOIDA and DLF Universal entered into a lease deed for
Plot No. M-3, Sector 18, NOIDA for a total premium of
Rs. 173 crore for an area admeasuring 54,320.18 sq.
metre.
2nd August, 2005 Execution Petition No. 2/2005 was rejected.
4th August, 2005 The trio, through their power of attorney holders, except
for Reddy who was himself present, agreed to sell land
9
measuring 5-13-10 Bighas in favour of M/s Prabhat
Home Pvt. Ltd. for 50% of the undivided share of the
entire land, for a consideration of Rs. 13.15 crore.
2nd September, 2005 A Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act,
Land Acquisition 189418 in respect of the subject land was issued.
3rd October, 2005 The trio had filed another execution application bearing
Execution Application No. 6/2005. This application was
rejected on 3rd October, 2005.
November/December WP(C) 66797/2005 was filed before the High Court by
2005 the trio, challenging the orders dated 2nd August, 2005
and 3rd October, 2005 whereby Execution Petition No.
2/2005 and Execution Application No. 6/2005,
respectively, were rejected.
22nd November, 2005 A notification under Section 6 of the 1894 Act in respect
of the subject land was issued.
21st December, 2005 The General Power of Attorney dated 3rd February, 2005
PoA – Cancellation was purportedly cancelled by Vishnu.
December 2005 Vishnu filed WP(C) No. 75152/2005, challenging the
land acquisition proceedings initiated by NOIDA
authorities.
18
1894 Act
10
28th April, 2006 WP(C) 66797/2005 filed by the trio was allowed, and the
matter was remanded to the executing court to decide
whether the land in question stood acquired by NOIDA.
31st May, 2006 Reddy filed a civil suit19 against Vishnu, praying for a
Third Suit declaration that he was the sole owner of the land.
7th June, 2006 Vishnu executed a registered agreement for sale,
agreeing to sell his 1/3rd share of the subject land to one
Ranbir Singh Narag for Rs. 3 crore.
4th October, 2006 Vishnu, through his Power of Attorney holder
(Venkataramana), filed a written statement in Civil Suit
No. 370/2006, admitting Reddy’s claims.
4th October, 2006 A Joint Compromise Application was filed by Reddy and
the PoA holder of Vishnu.
Note: Vishnu argues that Venkataramana had no
authority to file the written statement or a compromise
application, as the PoA had already been cancelled on
21st December, 2005.
17th November, 2006 Civil Suit No. 370/2006, i.e., the third suit, was decreed
as per the compromise.
18th December, 2006 Execution Petitions, which had been remanded, were
rejected by the executing court on 1 st August, 2008
because the lands were already acquired by NOIDA.
19
Civil Suit No. 370/2006
11
Challenging the rejections, the trio filed WP(C)
70088/2006 on 18th December, 2006. At paragraph 3
(three) of this WP, the trio pleaded that they are the co-
owners of the property.
10th December, 2009 While WP(C) No. 75152/2005, filed by Reddy,
challenging the land acquisition proceedings was
pending, Sudhakar and Vishnu filed impleadment
application claiming themselves to be the co-owners of
the property. The said application was allowed.
10th December, 2009 WP(C) No. 75152/2005 for compensation was allowed
by the High Court in light of the decision of the
Uttaranchal High Court in Bhoopendra Singh & Ors.
v. Awas Vikas Parishad20.
Note: This Court has upheld the decision of the
Uttaranchal High Court in Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
v. Bhoopendra Singh21.
2010 NOIDA challenged the order of the High Court dated 10th
December, 2009 in SLP (C) No. 20196-97/2010.
1st September, 2010 Reddy had Vishnu’s name deleted from the land records
qua the subject land using the compromise decree dated
17th November, 2006. In this regard, Khatauni Entry of
20
2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision 295
21
(2022) 14 SCC 277
12
Fasli Year 1407-1412 dated 26th September, 2010
shows Reddy as the sole owner.
10th January, 2011 Notice was issued by this Court in the SLP filed by
NOIDA, and operation of the impugned judgment dated
10th December, 2009 in WP(C) No. 75152/2005 was
stayed. On leave being granted, this SLP was numbered
as Civil Appeal No. 731/2013.
30th January, 2011 An award for compensation of the subject land was
made. This award has not been placed on record.
4th January, 2013 Vishnu was served by paper publication but did not enter
appearance before this Court.
4th November, 2015 Civil Appeal No. 731/2013 filed by NOIDA was dismissed
by this Court.
2015-17 Reddy made representations to NOIDA and the District
Magistrate seeking compensation in terms of the
judgment dated 4th November, 2015 passed by this
Court.
8th January, 2018 The District Magistrate rejected Reddy’s representation.
22nd October, 2018 Reddy initiated action for contempt by filing Contempt
Petition No. 1841-42/2018 in Civil Appeal No. 731/2013
and alleged wilful and deliberate non-compliance with
the order dated 4th November, 2015. The petition was
13
withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedies
before the High Court.
17th January, 2019 Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court, Reddy filed
WP(C) 2272/2019 before the High Court praying for:
1. quashing of the order dated 8th January, 2018.
2. quashing of the award dated 31st January, 2011.
3. a declaration that the land acquisition proceedings
have lapsed and to direct NOIDA to either initiate
fresh land acquisition proceedings or pass a fresh
award or hand over possession to Reddy.
7th August, 2020 Vishnu instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 before the trial
Fourth Suit court claiming that the compromise decree dated 17th
November, 2006, was null and void.
11th October, 2021 Served with summons, Reddy filed his written statement
in Civil Suit No. 471/2020. However, it has not been
placed on record.
28th October, 2021 The High Court allowed WP(C) 2272/2019 filed by Reddy
and accepted the plea that he was the sole owner of the
Impugned order property. The compensation was enhanced from
in C.A. No.
7777/2023 Rs.181.87 per sq. yard (or Rs.152.04 per sq. metre) to
Rs.1,10,000 per sq. metre, with a deduction for
development charges at 50%, i.e., Rs. 55,000 per sq.
metre, along with a 30% solatium and interest @ 15%.
14
30th October, 2021 Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, Reddy
challenged the same in SLP (C) No. 19035/2021 which,
on leave being granted, was numbered as Civil Appeal
No. 3636/2022.
8th March, 2022 NOIDA filed a counter in Civil Appeal No. 3636/2022.
24th March, 2022 Aggrieved by enhancement of compensation by the
order dated 28th October, 2021 of the High Court,
NOIDA too challenged the same in SLP (C) No.
5500/2022. Upon leave being granted, the SLP was
numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3637/2022.
5th May, 2022 This Court vide a common judgment and order,
dismissed the civil appeal filed by NOIDA (C.A. No.
Challenge to the
impugned order 3637/2022) and partly allowed the civil appeal filed by
was dismissed by
this Court Reddy (C.A. No. 3636/2022), setting aside deduction of
the development charges ordered by the High Court.
10th August, 2022 Review Petition (C) Nos. 874-875/2022 filed by NOIDA
were dismissed by this Court.
15th September, Due to the financial implications arising out of the order 2022 dated 5th May, 2022, the then CEO, NOIDA issued a
letter to the Deputy Secretary, Govt. of Uttar Pradesh
seeking guidance from for filing a curative petition.
19th September, Vishnu filed IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No. 3636/2022
2022 seeking modification of the order dated 5th May, 2022.
15
30th September, Pursuant to letter dated 15th September, 2022, the
2022 matter was examined by the Law Department and letter
dated 30th September, 2022 was issued to NOIDA
requesting that instead of filing a curative petition, an
attempt be made to negotiate the compensation amount
with Reddy.
7th October, 2022 A meeting/negotiation took place between NOIDA and
Reddy, where they agreed to have the compensation
payable reduced from Rs.359 crore to Rs.295 crore,
which was paid to Reddy on 28th December, 2022.
30th January, 2023 IA No. 155895/2022 in C.A. No. 3636/2022 was
disposed of by a Bench of two-Judges [of which one of
us (Surya Kant, J.) was a member], granting Vishnu
liberty to agitate his claim regarding co-ownership
before the Reference Court.
3rd July, 2023 Vishnu approached this Court with the civil appeal and
the writ petition, which are under consideration.
3rd July, 2023 Vishnu filed MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in Civil
Appeal 3636/2022 seeking recall of order dated 30th
January, 2023.
13th August, 2023 Vishnu filed a defective Review Petition Diary no.
33040/2023 praying for review of the judgment dated
MA Diary No. 5th May, 2022. As the defects were not cured within
6013/2024
16
(tagged with the time, registration thereof was declined22 by the
present set of
matters) Registrar (J-A) vide order dated 4th January, 2024.
Vishnu filed an appeal23 against the Registrar’s order,
registered as MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition
Diary No. 33040/ 2023. On 24th October, 2024, the
Chamber Judge ordered that the said appeal be tagged
with Civil Appeal 7777/2023 and the other connected
matters.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
14th August, 2023 Notice on the special leave petition, writ petition,
miscellaneous application as well as on the application
seeking condonation of delay was issued by a bench of
this Court (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ.).
Notice and stay by
this Court Reddy was directed to keep the compensation amount
received by him in an FDR and to file affidavits with
details of such FDR along with an undertaking not to
encash the FDR without prior permission of this Court.
21st November, 2023 After noting his pleading that the compensation amount
had been invested in immovable properties, Reddy was
Reference to a directed to furnish details of the immovable
larger bench
properties/lands and investments in the business within
three weeks. The two-Judge Bench (cor. Surya Kant and
22
under Order VIII Rule 6(3) and 6(4) of Supreme Court Rules, 2013
23
under Order VIII Rule 6 (5) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
17
Dipankar Datta, JJ.) condoned the delay in filing the SLP,
granted leave to appeal, issued Rule Nisi in the writ
petition and considering the issues likely to be raised in
the civil appeal directed that these matters be placed
before a larger Bench after obtaining necessary orders
from the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.
10th January, 2024 Vishnu filed Contempt Petition No. 23-24/2024 in WP
(C) 673/2023 for violation of the orders dated 14th
August, 2023 and 21st November, 2023.
8th May, 2024 This Court disposed of the IAs filed by Reddy seeking
recall/modification of orders dated 21st November, 2024
and 14th August, 2023 by directing him to file details of
the investments made by him (out of the compensation
amount) in a sealed cover, duly signed by him, along
with an affidavit/undertaking inter alia stating : (i) that
he shall not create any third-party rights in respect of
the said properties; (ii) that the compensation amount
has been invested only in the assets to be disclosed by
him in the sealed cover; (iii) that the said assets have
been disclosed in his Income Tax Returns; and (iv) that
there are no third-party interests or encumbrances on
the said assets, and if any exist, the same shall be
disclosed.
18
August 2024 Suo Moto Contempt Petition (C) No. 3 of 2024 was
SMC (C) No. registered against NOIDA for not having filed the
3/2024
(tagged with the counter affidavit within the time prescribed as per order
present set of
matters) dated 8th May, 2024.
September 2024 The civil appeal, the writ petition and the connected
matters were heard on several dates.
3rd October, 2024 This Bench, during the final hearing, opened the sealed
cover and, upon perusal of its contents, noted that
instead of making full disclosures, Reddy had submitted
a vague and misleading certificate from Pradeep Reddy
& Co., Chartered Accountants, omitting essential details
regarding the parties involved, the nature and manner
of the investments, the terms securing such
investments, and the particulars of the properties and
loans. Accordingly, the affidavit submitted by Reddy was
rejected and he was granted one final opportunity to
deposit a sum of Rs. 300 crore with the Registry. Reddy
was further restrained from entering into any agreement
to sell and/or creating any third-party rights in respect
of immovable assets owned by him, his family and the
companies created by him or his family members. He
was also directed to furnish details of all the movable/
19
immovable assets owned by him, his family and the said
companies.
4th November, 2024 Pursuant to the order dated 3rd October, 2024, Reddy
filed IAs praying for deposit of title deeds of immovable
properties instead of cash deposit.
22nd January, 2025 This Bench allowed Reddy to furnish securities through
his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine. Upon conclusion
of hearing, judgment was reserved.
IMPUGNED ORDER
13. The impugned order, as noted above, was passed on 28th October, 2021 partly
allowing Reddy’s writ petition.
14. Reddy, in paragraph 7 of his writ petition, asserted that as on the relevant
dates, he owned the subject land privately in light of the decree in Civil Suit
No. 416 of 1998 and that the respondents therein had no ‘right, title and
interest’ over the subject land.
15. A reply affidavit was filed by the State of U.P. and its officers; but as is usual
with official respondents, they did not go beyond averring that contents of
paragraph 7 of the writ petition are not admitted and that the entire land
acquisition proceedings, for planned development of NOIDA, were in
observance of the 1894 Act.
16. Before the High Court, the parties (namely Reddy as writ petitioner, the State
of Uttar Pradesh and seven others as respondents) advanced several
arguments and placed various documents on record. Preliminary objections on
20
the maintainability of the writ petition including, inter alia, suppression of facts
as well as the locus of Reddy to claim compensation for the subject land
without there being a decree in his favour were raised by the respondents
therein.
17. Regarding the preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition:
a. the High Court rejected the same on the ground that Reddy had become the
sole owner of the subject land. This observation was premised on the order of
the trial court dated 17th June, 2010 under Section 34 of the “Land Revenue
Act, 1996” and Reddy’s name was, accordingly, entered in the Khatauni.
b. On the same premise, the allegation that Reddy had suppressed the order
dated 12th September, 2002 whereby the trial court denied to act on the
compromise decree was overruled by the High Court in view of the finding of
the trial court dated 17th June, 2010.
c. The objection of the respondents in the writ petition to the maintainability of
the writ petition asserting that a remedy is available under Section 18 of the
1894 Act was overruled by the High Court holding that the writ petition was
filed in view of the liberty given by this Court to approach the High Court vide
order dated 22nd October, 2018.
18. Regarding the quantum of compensation:
a. The High Court repelled the submission of Reddy that compensation was not
determined as per the direction of the High Court and, therefore, the award is
to be treated as a nullity so as to apply Section 24 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
21
Resettlement Act, 201324 in view of the decision of this Court in IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Manoharlal (LAPSE-5 J.)25.
b. Qua the challenge to the award and the prayer for determination of
compensation in accordance with law, the High Court held that the award
dated 31st January 2011 had been made subject to the final outcome of the
appeal filed by NOIDA. Since that appeal was dismissed by this Court on 4 th
November 2015, the State ought to have passed a fresh award in compliance
with the High Court’s judgment dated 10th December 2009.
c. The High Court then proceeded to determine the compensation by referring to
the circle rate of Sector 18, NOIDA, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/- per sq. metre. The
High Court also determined that development charges can be to the extent of
maximum 50% (fifty percent) and, therefore, held that the State should have
taken Rs. 55,000/- per sq. metre as the market value of the land. It was,
therefore, ordered accordingly.
BEFORE THIS COURT IN CIVIL APPEAL NO 3636-37 OF 2022
19. When the impugned order was challenged before this Court in separate
appeals, vide Reddy Veerana v. State of U.P.26, the civil appeal filed by
NOIDA was dismissed and the civil appeal filed by Reddy was allowed in part.
Learned senior counsel representing Reddy before us asserted that this
decision has therefore upheld the impugned order. However, on a closer
perusal of the case records, it is clear that the adjudication stands on a much
24
2013 Act
25
(2020) 8 SCC 129
26
(2022) 14 SCC 252
22
narrower footing. This Court in paragraph 39 of its decision in Reddy Veerana
(supra) noted that it is merely deciding on the quantum of compensation and
not the title of Reddy on the scheduled piece of land. For ease of reference,
paragraph 39 is quoted below:
39. In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on the scheduled piece
of land has not been contested by the respondents and the adjudication is
confined only to the quantum of compensation, we deem it appropriate not to
interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect to the ownership…
20. In view of the decision rendered in Bhoopendra Singh (supra), this Court
held that NOIDA must determine the compensation by taking into
consideration the circle rate which has been determined as per the market
value, i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/- per square metre. Further, dealing with the issue
of deduction of the development charges, this Court held that the High Court
failed to consider the contextual circumstances in its decision. Therefore,
applying the ratio of previous decisions, this Court concluded that NOIDA’s
actions, i.e., the passing of the award after a delay of five years from the date
of taking possession, was a violation of Article 300-A of the Constitution,
leading to a constitutional tort. Thus, taking note of the aforesaid and in the
peculiar facts of the case, it was directed that in addition to the statutorily paid
interest, the additional amount of penal interest must be paid in place of
shifting the date for determination of the amount of compensation or to
determine the compensation as per the 2013 Act, as demanded by Reddy.
23
CONTENTIONS
ARGUMENTS BY VISHNU
21. The principal submission advanced by learned senior counsel for Vishnu is that
the impugned order, along with all other orders obtained by Reddy through
misrepresentation and suppression of material facts, ought to be treated as
void ab initio, relying on the settled legal proposition that “fraud unravels
everything”.
a. Our attention was drawn to various documents on record indicating that Reddy
has taken inconsistent and mutually contradictory positions regarding the
extent of his ownership over the property. While he jointly prosecuted various
litigation from 2001 till 2019 along with Vishnu and Sudhakar, he asserted
sole ownership in other proceedings.
b. The written statement filed by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu’s power of
attorney holder, admitting Reddy’s sole ownership of the property, was
without authority, as such power granted in Venkataramana’s favour had been
cancelled long before institution of Civil Suit No. 370/2006. It has also been
shown that Venkataramana is a partner of Reddy in the partnership firm that
offered securities before this Court.
c. Using this fraudulent decree dated 17th November 2006, Reddy managed to
have his name mutated in the revenue records.
d. Even after the decree, Reddy filed several pleadings claiming to be the joint
owner of the land.
e. The existence of the said decree was consistently suppressed by Reddy before
the courts.
24
22. As regards the quantum of compensation for the acquisition, it was submitted
on behalf of Vishnu that relegating the matter back to the Collector or the
Reference Court for computation after a lapse of two decades would be unjust.
It has been urged that the subject land should be treated as commercial in
nature, and compensation should be awarded accordingly.
23. On this basis, Vishnu has sought that the impugned order, insofar as it records
findings with respect to the ownership of the subject land, be set aside.
ARGUMENTS BY REDDY
24. At the outset, maintainability of this civil appeal and the connected writ
petition has been challenged by Reddy on various grounds including the fact
that:
a. Vishnu has sought apportionment of the subject land prior to getting the
registered Power of Attorney dated 3rd February 2005, full settlement
agreement dated 3rd February 2005 and decree of the Trial Court dated 17th
November, 2006, nullified. Even though Vishnu instituted CS No. 471/2020
praying that the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006 be declared
null and void, he has not sought any monetary compensation in the aforesaid
suit and has, therefore, bypassed the Trial Court in approaching the Supreme
Court only to save the payment of the court fee which smacks of mala fide;
b. Vishnu has engaged in ‘forum shopping’ as he has been pursuing various types
of proceedings before this Court as well as instituted a civil suit before the
Trial Court;
c. This Court does not have the original jurisdiction to adjudicate complicated
questions of fact under Article 131 of the Constitution;
25
d. Relying on the decision in Nidhi Kaim (supra), it is submitted that this Court
does not have the jurisdiction to decide an “intra-court appeal”;
e. The order dated 21st November, 2023 of this Court referring the matter to a
three-Judge Bench is against the established principle of stare decisis as the
reference order included not just questions of law but complicated questions
of fact;
f. The writ petition filed by Vishnu is not maintainable as against the order of
this Court dated 5th May, 2022 – much less when there is no violation of any
Fundamental Right alleged in the said writ petition – since judicial orders of
the Supreme Court cannot be challenged in the writ jurisdiction before this
Court itself;
g. The order of the High Court has now merged with the final order of this Court
and, therefore, the civil appeal filed by Vishnu is not maintainable, and that
the doctrine of merger would apply;
h. This Court does not have the jurisdiction to conduct a review of a judgment
through a miscellaneous application, much less in a second miscellaneous
application, by placing reliance on Order XLVII, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court
Rules, 201327;
i. The listing of the review and chamber appeal is in clear violation of Order
XLVII, Rule 3 of the SC Rules, 2013; and
27
SC Rules, 201326
j. Vishnu is a chronic litigant coming with unclean hands as he has engaged insupressing material documents before this Court and has played fraud upon
this Court.
25. On merits, it has been argued before us that:
a. Reddy has perfected his title through the decree of the Trial Court dated 17th
November, 2006 in CS No. 370 of 2006. Moreover, Vishnu sold off his entire
property to a third party, Ranbir Singh, vide a registered agreement to sell
dated 7th June, 2006 while supressing the earlier sale made to Reddy;
b. The principle that fraud vitiates every proceeding is subservient to the principle
of interest rei publicae, ut sit finis litium. It was specifically contended that
Reddy has not played any fraud by not making Vishnu a party to the previous
litigation;
c. On the contrary, fraud has been played upon Reddy as Vishnu has not
disclosed material documents;
d. Vide decree dated 17th November, 2006, the interest in the subject land
passed from Vishnu to Reddy which to this day stands as a valid instrument;
e. The three deeds, namely, the full settlement sale agreement,
Affidavit/declaration and the Registered Power of Attorney must be read
together as part of the same transaction;
f. A registered document can only be cancelled/modified by another registered
document; in the instant case, the registered irrevocable Power of Attorney
dated 3rd February, 2005 could not have been cancelled without registering
the document of cancellation;
27
g. Moreover, no notice of cancellation was provided to Venkataramana and,
therefore, it is not a valid cancellation as per Section 208 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872 and Section 3 of the Power of Attorney Act, 1882;
h. Furthermore, a registered Power of Attorney cannot be revoked unilaterally;
i. Vishnu is estopped from re-agitating the issue on title as he has relinquished
his entire share of the property; and
j. Lastly, NOIDA has no right to re-agitate the dispute on merits collaterally.
ARGUMENTS BY NOIDA
26. NOIDA has argued before us that:
a. The doctrine of merger is not applicable when the order of the Court is vitiated
by fraud and that fraud is an exception to the rule of stare decisis;
b. This Court exercises plenary powers to prevent the abuse of process and to
meet the ends of justice under Article 129 of the Constitution;
c. The landowners must be relegated to the reference court under Section 18 of
the 1894 Act for determining compensation; and
d. The High Court and this Court committed a grave legal and factual error by
ignoring vital evidence in the form of exemplar sale deeds of the subject land
for determining the true and actual market value for assessment of quantum
of compensation.
27. In consequence thereof, NOIDA has prayed for recalling the orders of the High
Court dated 28th October, 2021 and of this Court dated 5th May, 2022 in
exercise of the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution and to revisit the
enhanced compensation of Rs.1,10,000/- per sq. metre or to direct the
landowners to approach the appropriate court under the 1894 Act.
28
REPLY BY VISHNU REGARDING OBJECTIONS TO MAINTAINABILITY
28. In response to the objections raised regarding the maintainability of the
present set of petitions, Vishnu submitted that:
a. Through the present proceedings, he is not seeking to appeal the judgment
dated 5th May 2022 and is, therefore, not invoking the appellate jurisdiction of
this Court but rather its inherent jurisdiction to prevent a gross miscarriage of
justice;
b. The provisions of the SC Rules—particularly Order LV Rule 6—preserve the
inherent powers of this Court to prevent the abuse of the court’s process;
c. Fraud constitutes an exception to the doctrine of merger;
d. The doctrine of merger is also inapplicable in the present case, as Vishnu was
not a party before the High Court; and
e. The writ petition is maintainable not only on the basis of infringement of the
right under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, 195028, but also because
Vishnu’s rights of access to justice and to a fair, equal, and transparent judicial
process are at stake.
ISSUES
29. On maintainability,
a. whether the impugned order having merged with this Court’s order dated 5th
May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), as claimed by Reddy, renders the
present appeal – which, so to say, lays a collateral challenge to an order of
this Court itself – not maintainable?
28
Constitution
29
b. whether the present writ petition is not maintainable, as it seeks to challenge
a judicial order which, by its very nature, can never be said to violate
Fundamental Rights?
c. whether Vishnu can pursue a civil appeal against the impugned order as well
as a petition for review of the decision of this Court in which the impugned
order has merged, as claimed, simultaneously?
d. Whether Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping?
30. Whether Reddy obtained the impugned order, as well as this Court’s order
dated 5th May 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra), by practising fraud and
deception upon the courts and, therefore, the same deserve to be set
aside/recalled?
31. Should the answer to the above issues be in favour of Vishnu and against
Reddy, what would be the appropriate order to be passed in these proceedings
having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances?
ANALYSIS
32. We begin with recording the realisation that undoubtedly, there seems to be
much more than what have met our eyes. However, like all courts, we are
bound to decide cases based on the evidence on record, judicially noticeable
facts, and the applicable law. Despite Reddy and Vishnu – and to certain extent
Sudhakar – having used the judicial process obviously to secure their personal
interests, we cannot be a bystander. If things have happened with a telling
effect on public interest, resulting in public funds from the public exchequer
being drained, the same has to be dealt with within the bounds of our
30
jurisdiction. In our pursuit for the truth and to uphold the rule of law, we must
adhere to established principles unless a valid reason warrants deviation.
33. Vishnu, as can be gathered from the narrative of events, has not left any stone
unturned to have the benefits accruing in favour of Reddy undone. The sheer
number of proceedings instituted by Vishnu bear testimony to his struggle to
set at naught all such orders that operate to his detriment. Apart from the civil
appeal against the impugned order and a writ petition under Article 32 seeking
enforcement of what, Vishnu calls infringement of his Fundamental Rights, he
has inter alia pursued the alternate channel of filing a petition (which is
defective) for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra), an application
for modification/recall of the order of this Court relegating him to the remedy
under the 1894 Act and a petition for contempt of this Court’s order. The
multiplicity of proceedings in this particular case raises a reasonable
apprehension that the legal process, including this Court’s, is being potentially
abused by Vishnu. While, in no uncertain terms has Reddy asserted that
Vishnu has indulged in abuse, we need to carefully assess whether it is Vishnu
or Reddy, or both, who is/are the real abuser(s).
34. While judicial consuetude ordinarily mandates that we begin with a threshold
examination of the issue of maintainability, the sui generis features of the
present case impel us to first address the core allegation levelled by Vishnu of
fraud having been committed by Reddy. We find that the question of
maintainability, in the present case, is a mixed question of fact and law which,
ideally, ought to be determined after adjudicating the question of alleged fraud
played by Reddy on the courts. We draw support for this approach from the
31
decision of this Court in Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta29 where,
dealing with Order XIV, CPC, it was observed as under:
13. Sub-rule (2) of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC lays down that where issues both of
law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of the opinion that the
case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only, it may try
that issue first if that issue relates to (a) the jurisdiction of the court, or (b) a
bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force. The provisions of
this Rule came up for consideration before this Court in Major S.S.
Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon [(1964) 4 SCR 409 : AIR 1964 SC 497] and it was
held as under: (SCR p. 421)
“Under Order 14 Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure where issues both of law
and of fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or
any part thereof may be disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try
those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the
settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been
determined. The jurisdiction to try issues of law apart from the issues of fact
may be exercised only where in the opinion of the court the whole suit may
be disposed of on the issues of law alone, but the Code confers no jurisdiction
upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary
issues. Normally all the issues in a suit should be tried by the court; not to
do so, especially when the decision on issues even of law depend upon the
decision of issues of fact, would result in a lopsided trial of the suit.”Though there has been a slight amendment in the language of Order 14 Rule 2
CPC by the amending Act, 1976 but the principle enunciated in the above quoted
decision still holds good and there can be no departure from the principle that
the Code confers no jurisdiction upon the court to try a suit on mixed issues of
law and fact as a preliminary issue and where the decision on issue of law
depends upon decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue.
(emphasis ours)
35. Recently in Sathyanath v. Sarojamani30, this Court after analysing
judgments rendered by various High Courts and also Ramesh (supra) made
the following observations:
21. The provisions of Order 14 Rule 2 are part of the procedural law, but the
fact remains that such procedural law had been enacted to ensure expeditious
disposal of the lis and in the event of setting aside of findings on preliminary
issue, the possibility of remand can be avoided, as was the language prior to
the unamended Order 14 Rule 2. If the issue is a mixed issue of law and fact,
or issue of law depends upon the decision of fact, such issue cannot be tried as
a preliminary issue. In other words, preliminary issues can be those where no
evidence is required and on the basis of reading of the plaint or the applicable29
(2006) 5 SCC 638
30
(2022) 7 SCC 64432
law, if the jurisdiction of the court or the bar to the suit is made out, the court
may decide such issues with the sole objective for the expeditious decision.
Thus, if the court lacks jurisdiction or there is a statutory bar, such issue is
required to be decided in the first instance so that the process of civil court is
not abused by the litigants, who may approach the civil court to delay the
proceedings on false pretext.
* * *
23. The different judgments of the High Court referred to above are in
consonance with the principles laid down by this Court in Ramesh B.
Desai [Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638] that not all
issues of law can be decided as preliminary issues. Only those issues of law can
be decided as preliminary issues which fell within the ambit of clause (a) relating
to the “jurisdiction of the Court” and (b) which deal with the “bar to the suit
created by any law for the time being in force”. The reason to substitute Rule 2
is to avoid piecemeal trial, protracted litigation and possibility of remand of the
case, where the appellate court differs with the decision of the trial court on the
preliminary issues upon which the trial court had decided.
(emphasis ours)
36. We shall therefore decide the issue of maintainability after examining the
allegation of fraud.
I. HAS REDDY PLAYED FRAUD ON THE COURTS?
37. Upon due consideration of the entire factual matrix, some notable facts stand
out which, we believe, are appropriate to highlight.
38. At the inception, the trio – Vishnu, Reddy and Sudhakar – stood as a united
front. They consistently projected themselves as co-owners of the property in
question in multiple judicial proceedings:
a. in 1998, claiming to be the owners of the property, the trio jointly instituted
a suit31 seeking a permanent injunction against NOIDA.
b. upon securing a decree, they together filed an execution application 32.
c. they jointly pursued a writ petition33 challenging rejection of their
execution application.
31
Civil Suit No. 416/1998
32
Execution Application No. 6/2005
33
WP (Civil) 66797/200533
d. even when Vishnu singly assailed the land acquisition proceedings in a writpetition34, Reddy and Sudhakar filed an impleadment application
reaffirming the narrative of joint ownership.
e. NOIDA, in its appeal35 before this Court, arrayed the trio as respondents
and not once did Reddy assert exclusive ownership during these
proceedings.
39. Contrary to the consistent earlier stance, Reddy, in a complete volte-face,
asserted his sole ownership of the property in not one but multiple judicial
proceedings:
a. in 2001, Sudhakar sued36 Reddy, seeking his 1/3rd share in the land. Curiously,
the written statement was filed the very next day, and even more curiously, a
compromise agreement was filed a day later. The Trial Court, sceptical of this
sudden turn of events, rejected the compromise finding its bona fides
questionable. Ultimately, the suit was dismissed for default as Sudhakar did
not pursue it further.
b. in 2006, Reddy sued37 Vishnu, claiming to be the sole owner. This suit took a
particularly curious turn when one Venkataramana, claiming to be Vishnu’s
Attorney, filed a written statement admitting the claim. However, records
reveal that the Power of Attorney had already been cancelled on 21 st
December, 2005, a full six months prior to the suit being instituted. Worse
still, pursuant to the documents having been filed in the Court by Reddy, it
34
WP (Civil) 75152/2005
35
Civil Appeal No. 731/2013
36
Civil Suit No. 283/2001
37
Civil Suit No. 370/200634
has surfaced that Venkataramana is also a partner of Reddy in the firmManyata-Pristine.
c. Finally, in January 2019, Reddy once again laid exclusive claim to the subject
land asserting himself as the sole owner in a writ petition38 before the High
Court, challenging the District Magistrate’s decision to deny him
compensation. Vide the impugned order, his claim was allowed by the High
Court.
40. In a judicial landscape that values consistency and candour, this case strikes
a discordant note. This trajectory of the contradictory claims made by Reddy
can hardly be ignored by this Court.
41. The impugned order was passed on a writ petition presented by Reddy,
wherein he challenged the District Magistrate’s refusal to grant compensation
for the acquired land and simultaneously sought a declaration of his exclusive
ownership. The High Court accepted his claim albeit based on material which
was scant, information that was incomplete and knowledge appearing to be
fragmentary.
42. Considering Reddy’s consistent stance in earlier proceedings that the property
was jointly owned with Vishnu and Sudhakar, his failure to implead them in
the writ petition is appalling, if not more. This, in our view, was a calculated
attempt by Reddy to wrongfully appropriate the entire property keeping the
other two – Vishnu and Sudhakar – in the dark.
38
WP (Civil) 2272/2019
35
43. Although the provisions of the CPC do not apply to writ proceedings ex proprio
vigore, the principles flowing therefrom, as far as practicable, can be made
applicable. Order I Rule 9, CPC, as originally enacted, ordained that a suit shall
not be defeated by reason of misjoinder or non-joinder of parties; however,
after its amendment in 1976 introducing the proviso, the implication is that
non-joinder of a party could, in a given case, prove fatal for the right to relief
claimed by the plaintiff, more so when a necessary party is not impleaded,
and defeat the suit. Although Order I Rule 10 does empower a court to implead
at any stage of the proceedings a party who should have been joined as a
defendant, either upon or without the application of either party, a decree
passed by the court in the absence of a necessary or proper party to the suit
and affecting his interest could be avoided by such party; however, if the
decree is such that it acknowledges and declares the right of the decree-holder
to the subject matter of the suit and entitles him to its benefits, such a decree
has to be carried either in appeal or review by the affected non-party to divest
the decree-holder of whatever the decree entitles him to.
44. Insofar as writ proceedings are concerned, it is no longer res integra that any
order made on a writ petition affecting the interest of a party who has not
been arrayed as a respondent could be invalidated on the ground of breach of
natural justice.
45. We may profitably refer to the decision in Poonam v. State of U.P.39.
Although the decision was rendered in connection with a selection process for
39
(2016) 2 SCC 779
36
allotment of a fair price shop, this Court after analysing various previous
decisions emphasised:
21. We have referred to the aforesaid passages as they state the basic principle
behind the doctrine of natural justice, that is, no order should be passed behind
the back of a person who is to be adversely affected by the order. The principle
behind the proviso to Order 1 Rule 9 that the Code of Civil Procedure enjoins it
and the said principle is also applicable to the writs. An unsuccessful candidate
challenging the selection as far as the service jurisprudence is concerned is
bound to make the selected candidates parties.
46. A reference may further be made to the decision in Ajay Ishwar Ghute and
Ors. v. Meher K. Patel and Ors.40 wherein a Bench of two-Judges [of which
one of us (Ujjal Bhuyan, J.) was a member] in an appeal against an order
made under Article 226 of the Constitution, held thus:
21. In the facts of the case, the senior district-level officials of the State had
stated on oath that the construction of the compound wall, in respect of which
relief was sought in the Writ Petition, would affect the rights of several third
parties. However, the Court completely ignored the same. Even in clause 6(iii)
of the “Minutes of Order”, there was enough indication that the compound wall,
if not appropriately constructed, would affect the rights of owners of the other
lands. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to have called upon the 1st and
2nd respondents to implead the persons who were likely to be affected. The 1st
and 2nd respondents could not have pleaded ignorance about the names of the
concerned parties as they have referred to the owners of the other lands in the
“Minutes of Order”. However, the Division Bench of the High Court has failed to
make even an elementary enquiry whether third parties will be affected by the
construction of the compound wall under police protection. Hence, the order
dated 16th March 2022 passed in the Writ Petition in terms of the “Minutes of
Order” is entirely illegal and must be set aside. The Writ Petition will have to be
remanded to the High Court to decide the same in accordance with the law.
47. More generally, there are umpteen number of decisions of this Court wherein
the rights of a third party have been protected in civil litigation. This principle
was specifically noted in respect of claims arising out of land acquisition in the
40
2024 SCC OnLine SC 681
37
case of Neyvely Lignite Corpn. Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land
Acquisition) Neyvely41 as follows:
12. It is true that Section 50(2) of the Act gives to the local authority or the
company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under
Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the
Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and
adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.
However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is
that the limited right of adduction of evidence for the purpose of determining
the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the
proceedings or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We
cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of
Section 50 of the Act within a narrow compass. The right given under sub-
section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in
derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from
the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural
justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court
starting from Himalayan Tiles case [(1980) 3 SCC 223 : (1980) 3 SCR 235] is
that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society
registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person
interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and
is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be
heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is
entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of
the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court
and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court
under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled
to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. When
the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion
or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart
from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable
to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and
salutary rights. Moreover in the language of Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, in the absence
of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no
complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation
to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not
a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The denial of
the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure
offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes
involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not
generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims
for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and
ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in
the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals
after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States
41
(1995) 1 SCC 221
38
(sic Stakes)involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist
upon proper explanation of every day’s delay. In this attitudinal situation it
would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the
delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the
threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On
other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would
participate in the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce
necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the
court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering
the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation.
14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the
State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it
not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation,
who would be the affected person? Is it not interested to see that the appellate
court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as
per law? For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs
1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs 10,000. Who
is to bear the burden? Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to
condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award? Many an instance can
be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit
the land is acquired is served with the notice and brought on record at the stage
of enquiry by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal
under Section 54, it/they would be interested to defend the award under Section
11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc.
against the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party affected
by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right
to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under
Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective
we are of the considered view that the appellant-Company is an interested
person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Act and is also a proper party,
if not a necessary party under Order 1 Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had
committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person
interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside.
48. However, it is clarified that we do not seek to make any opprobrious remarks
against the High Court as it was incumbent upon Reddy to implead Vishnu and
Sudhakar as respondents in his writ petition and the High Court could not have
been expected to know the long-standing disputes or the fact that Reddy had
procured change in the revenue records on the basis of the compromise decree
whereupon further proceedings between Vishnu and Reddy in the shape of a
suit were pending unless the same was brought to its notice.
39
49. In any event, having regard to the events preceding presentation of the writ
petition by Reddy, out of which the present proceedings have arisen, we have
no hesitation to hold that Reddy tailored a situation to suit his convenience by
not impleading Vishnu as a party with the sole intention of obtaining an order
in respect of not only the quantum of compensation payable for acquisition of
the subject land but also a declaration as to his entitlement thereto – all,
behind Vishnu’s back. An attempt by Reddy to steal a march over Vishnu is
clearly discernible which, without reference to anything more, does border on
fraud.
50. Moving ahead, it is equally well settled that suppression of even a single
material fact can be fatal before writ courts. In this context, one may usefully
refer to the decision of this Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v.
State of Bihar42 where the law has succinctly been stated as follows:
13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies
such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the
need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by
deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that
had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the
case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court,
whatever view the court may have taken …
(emphasis ours)
51. In the present case, Reddy’s failure before the High Court to disclose the
earlier series of litigation – where he consistently asserted joint ownership with
Vishnu and Sudhakar – being a fact having a bearing on the merits of the case,
is alone sufficient to vitiate the impugned order.
42
(2004) 7 SCC 166
40
52. However, the concealment runs deeper. It stems from the suit43 that Vishnu
had instituted on 7th August, 2020, referred to hereafter.
53. During the pendency of the writ petition (in which the impugned order was
passed), Vishnu instituted the suit praying to declare the compromise decree
dated 17th November, 2006 as null and void on the ground that the written
statement (admitting Reddy’s sole ownership over the property) filed by
Venkataramana on his behalf was without any authority as the Power of
Attorney in his favour already stood cancelled. Reddy filed his written
statement in that suit on 11th October 2021 – which is 17 (seventeen) days
before the High Court disposed of the writ petition. Despite being a party to
the suit, Reddy chose not to inform the writ court of pendency of the suit.
Notably, the decree dated 16th February, 2000 in the suit44 instituted by the
trio and the change in the land records based on the compromise decree dated
17th November, 2006 in the suit45 instituted by Reddy were relied on by Reddy
to have a ruling in his favour. As per the records available from the website of
the High Court, it is noted that judgment was reserved on 6th October, 2021.
Therefore, between 7th August, 2020 (date of institution of the fourth suit) and
28th October, 2021 (date of the impugned order), ample opportunity was
available for Reddy to disclose the factum of a suit having been instituted by
Vishnu. This deliberate suppression, of a material fact, further highlights the
fraudulent intent behind Reddy’s claim.
43
Civil Suit No. 471/2020
44
Civil Suit No. 416/1998
45
Civil Suit No. 370/2006
41
54. As discerned above, suppression of material facts before the High Court by
Reddy is writ large; however, his fraudulent conduct is not confined to that
forum alone.
55. It has not been shown to us by Reddy that during the course of the proceedings
before this Court leading to the decision in Reddy Veeranna (supra), this
Court was informed of institution of the suit by Vishnu. In fact, this Bench
discovered the pendency of such suit solely through examination of the related
documents and proceedings.
56. Another instance – though ultimately unsuccessful – that underscores Reddy’s
fraudulent conduct is the suit46 instituted on 30th May, 2001, i.e., the first suit.
In this suit, which was filed just two days before the summer vacation of the
court, Sudhakar sought a declaration of his 1/3rd ownership in the land.
Curiously, despite acknowledging in paragraph 3 of the plaint that the property
was jointly owned by three individuals, Vishnu, the third co-owner, was not
made a party to the suit. What followed reveals the dubious conduct of Reddy.
The very next day, Reddy filed his written statement, outright denying
Sudhakar’s claims and asserting exclusive ownership. He contended that he
alone paid the full sale consideration, and that Sudhakar’s name was included
in the sale deed merely due to his status as a practicing advocate, whose help
was needed in official dealings.
57. Interestingly, on the very same day, Reddy and Sudhakar filed a compromise
agreement in which Sudhakar unconditionally admitted Reddy’s sole
46
Civil Suit No. 283/2001
42
ownership. However, the trial court, rightly suspicious of the extraordinary
speed at which the pleadings and the compromise agreement were filed,
questioned the bona fides of the agreement and refused to act upon it.
Subsequently, neither party pursued the matter, and the suit was dismissed
for default on 5th December 2002.
58. It is almost unprecedented for a written statement and a compromise to be
filed the day after a suit is instituted. Even more astonishing is Sudhakar’s
complete and unopposed surrender of his claim without any explanation, and
notably, without impleading the third co-owner, Vishnu. The moment the trial
court declined to endorse the compromise, both of them lost interest in the
case and the suit was ultimately dismissed for default. This sequence: rapid
pleadings, exclusion of a necessary party, and abandonment of the suit clearly
reflects a collusive effort by Reddy to manufacture support for his claim of sole
ownership (emphasis ours). While Reddy’s conduct before the High Court
reveals fraud, this episode confirms that his deceptive practices date back over
two decades.
59. Another instance of somewhat shady dealings stem from the fact of filing of a
written statement before the trial court by Venkataramana, acting as Vishnu’s
Attorney, whereas it is Vishnu’s claim that the Power of Attorney was cancelled
by the time the written statement was filed. Having regard to the ultimate
order proposed to be passed, we do not wish to make any factual
determination as to whether the Power of Attorney stood cancelled or not as
on the relevant date or even if cancelled, whether the due procedure was
followed; however, suffice it to note that Venkataramana, in course of the
43
proceedings before this Court, has been discovered to be a partner with Reddy
in their firm Manyata – Pristine and it is this firm which offered securities
before this Court as recorded in the order dated 21st January, 2025.
60. Be that as it may, obtaining of the impugned order by Reddy in his favour by
playing fraud on the High Court is conspicuous by its presence. Thus, we find
Vishnu’s core argument to be creditworthy and compelling for us to hold that
judicial orders procured by Reddy by subverting the judicial process through
fraud and concealment of material facts cannot be permitted to stand.
61. In decisions abound, the Courts have consistently nullified orders obtained
through fraudulent means. Key excerpts from some of these decisions read
thus:
a. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh47, this Court
reiterated that fraud unravels everything:
3. “Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant)
is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.
Lord Denning observed in a language without equivocation that “no judgment
of a court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained
by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything” (Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley
[(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 (CA)] ).
b. In Shrisht Dhawan (Smt) v. Shaw Bros.48, it was held:
20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any
civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.
Michael Levi likens a fraudster to Milton’s sorcerer, Comus, who exulted in his
ability to, ‘wing me into the easy-hearted man and trap him into snares’. It has
been defined as an act of trickery or deceit. In Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary fraud in equity has been defined as an act or omission
to act or concealment by which one person obtains an advantage against
conscience over another or which equity or public policy forbids as being
prejudicial to another. In Black’s Legal Dictionary, fraud is defined as an
intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in reliance
upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or surrender a legal
47
(2000) 3 SCC 581
48
(1992) 1 SCC 534
44
right; a false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or by conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed, which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury……..
c. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.49, this Court held:
21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is
obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before
three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:
“Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.”
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order
obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non
est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order—by the first court
or by the final court—has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or
inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ
or even in collateral proceedings.
23. ***
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith’s Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p. 644,
explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment
would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable
from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court
was “mistaken”, it might be shown that it was “misled”. There is an essential
distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction
is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that
it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one
which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was
imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said : fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus
nemini patrocinari debent).
d. The judgment by Denning, L.J. in Lazarus Estates Ltd. (supra), which has
since been quoted with approval by this Court in a catena of decisions including
Nidhi Kaim (supra), asserted intolerance for fraud in legal proceedings in the
following words:
No court … will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by
fraud. […] Fraud unravels everything. The court is careful not to find fraud
unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates
judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever….
49
(2007) 4 SCC 221
45
62. We are also mindful of the legal principle that if a fact could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence, its non-disclosure does not
constitute suppressio veri or suggestio falsi. Profitable reference may be made
to the decision in Shri Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University50 where this
Court observed that “where a person on whom fraud is committed is in a
position to discover the truth by due diligence, fraud is not proved”. It would
neither be a case of suggestio falsi nor suppressio veri.
63. However, the circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that the fact
of Vishnu being a co-owner of the property could not have been discovered by
either the High Court or this Court unless the same were placed before such
courts. Reddy having conducted himself throughout in a fraudulent manner
and with intent to deceive not only Vishnu but also the High Court could not
be expected to lay bare all previous transactions and proceedings. As is usual
with statutory authorities, not much was also expected of NOIDA. Corruption
of a large scale in payment of compensation has not gone unnoticed by this
Court for which a suo motu contempt action has been initiated. Since
proceedings are pending, we wish to leave it at that. However, what is
important for the present purpose is the overarching element of fraud in which
Reddy indulged with impunity.
64. In light of the above discussion, we feel no hesitation to hold that given the
deception involved, the impugned order and the decision of this Court dated
50
(1976) 1 SCC 311
46
5th May, 2022 in Reddy Veerana (supra) procured by Reddy are tainted by
fraud and, thus, lack legal sanctity and validity.
II. MAINTAINABILITY
65. We now propose to deal with the arguments raised by learned senior counsel
for Reddy relatable to maintainability of this writ petition and civil appeal as
well as the other applications filed by Vishnu. We propose to deal with them
in detail considering the labyrinthine and peculiar facts presented before us.
A. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE WRIT PETITION
66. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has vociferously contended that the writ
petition under Article 32 presented by Vishnu is not maintainable on the twin
grounds that (i) the writ petition makes no mention of violation of any
Fundamental Right and (ii) no writ petition can lie against a judicial order.
67. Writ jurisdiction in India, as is well known, emanates from two articles of the
Constitution – Articles 32 and 226. The latter pertains to writ jurisdiction
exercisable by the various High Courts in the country while the former confers
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs/orders/directions for
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed by the Constitution. Since
the High Courts are empowered under the Constitution to enforce legal rights,
apart from Fundamental Rights, the power conferred under Article 226 is
considered to be more expansive compared to the power under Article 32.
68. It is axiomatic that merely because a litigant barely pleads in his writ petition
before this Court that any of his Fundamental Rights has been breached would
not entitle him to maintain a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. What
is additionally necessary for him to plead is the nature of breach of
47
Fundamental Right, actual or apprehended, and the (likely) consequence
thereof.
69. The importance of pleadings in a writ petition under Article 32 was highlighted
by this Court in Amina Marwa Sabreen v. State of Kerala51 as follows:
14. Reverting to the preliminary objections raised by the respondent State, as
already mentioned above, there is no reference to the G.O. in the entire writ
petition. This document is not even part of the writ petition. Therefore, there
are no foundational facts and/or pleadings in the writ petition challenging this
G.O. as unconstitutional. More importantly, there is no prayer in the writ petition
seeking quashing of this G.O. Even when the learned counsel for the State had
pointed out fundamental infirmity in the writ petition, no attempt was made by
the petitioners to amend the writ petition so as to incorporate challenge to the
said G.O. as well. In the absence of any pleadings and the prayer seeking
quashing of the said G.O., it is not permissible for the petitioners to seek a relief
by making oral submissions in this behalf.
(emphasis ours)
70. For a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution to be entertained, the
petitioner has to run a case establishing prima facie violation or imminent
threat of violation of any Fundamental Right. In this context, some relevant
judicial pronouncements are discussed below.
a. In D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab52, this Court held:
44. We have already found that none of the provisions of the Act offend any
fundamental rights of the petitioners. But it is contended on behalf of the
petitioners that in a petition under Article 32 once it is alleged and a prima facie
case is made out that the fundamental rights of a citizen are threatened or
violated this Court is not only bound to entertain it for determining to what
extent the allegation is valid but is also bound to go into the question, if raised,
that the law under which it is alleged that his fundamental right is infringed is
invalid on the ground of want of legislative competence. There are two facets
to this submission. Firstly, whether ultimately any fundamental right in fact is
threatened or violated, so long as a prima facie case of such a threat or violation
is made out a petition under Article 32 must be entertained. Secondly, once it
is entertained irrespective of whether it is found ultimately that in fact no
fundamental rights of the petitioners are invaded the vires of the legislation or
the competence of the legislature to enact the impugned legislation must be
gone into and determined. While the first proposition is valid, the second is not.
51
(2018) 14 SCC 193
52
(1971) 2 SCC 269
48
46. It is apparent therefore that the validity or the invalidity of the impugned
law, on the ground of legislative competence should purport to infringe the
fundamental rights of the petitioner as a necessary condition of its being
adjudicated. But if in fact the law does not, even on the assumption that it is
valid, infringe any fundamental rights, this Court will not decide that question
in a petition under Article 32. The reason for it is obvious, namely, that no
petition under Article 32, will be entertained if fundamental rights are not
affected and if the impugned law does not affect the fundamental rights it would
be contrary to this principle to determine whether that law, in fact, has
legislative competence or not.
(emphasis ours)
b. In Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE53, a coordinate Bench of this Court had the
occasion to rule that:
11. […] But, we may point out here that a mere failure to apply a rule which
ought to have been applied may not, by itself, justify an invocation of the
powers of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. In order to succeed in
a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioner has to disclose how
his fundamental right has been infringed by a particular rule or decision or its
application. The impact of the Rule or decision upon the facts of each petitioner
case has to be clearly brought out.
12. In the cases before us, the fundamental rights alleged to be violated could
only be the general ones embraced by Article 16(1) of the Constitution which
reads:
“There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State.”
Where a petitioner alleges that he has been denied equality of opportunity for
service, during the course of his employment as a government servant, it is
incumbent upon him to disclose not only the Rule said to be infringed but also
how this opportunity was unjustifiably denied on each particular occasion. The
equality of opportunity in a matter relating to employment implies equal
treatment to persons similarly situated or in the same category as the
petitioner. It postulates equality of conditions under which a number of persons
belonging to the same category compete for the same opportunities and a just
and impartial application of uniform and legally valid standards in deciding upon
competing claims. It does not exclude justifiable discrimination.
(emphasis ours)
c. In Ramdas Athawale (5) v. Union of India54, it was observed by this Court
that:
46. It is equally well settled that Article 32 of the Constitution guarantees the
right to a constitutional remedy and relates only to the enforcement of the right
conferred by Part III of the Constitution and unless a question of enforcement53
(1975) 4 SCC 714
54
(2010) 4 SCC 149
of a fundamental right arises, Article 32 does not apply. It is well settled that
no petition under Article 32 is maintainable, unless it is shown that the petitioner
has some fundamental right. In Northern Corpn. v. Union of India [Northern
Corpn. v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 239] this Court has made a pertinent
observation that when a person complains and claims that there is a violation
of law, it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the
enforcement of which alone Article 32 is attracted.
(emphasis ours)
d. In Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana55, this Court referring to the
decisions in D.A.V. College (supra) and Ramdas Athawale (supra) observed
as follows:
11. But the above decisions do not wholly support the stand of the respondents.
This Court in D.A.V. College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC
269] has held that there are two aspects. The first is whether ultimately any
fundamental right in fact is threatened or violated. So long as a prima facie case
of such a threat or violation is made out, a petition under Article 32 must be
entertained. Second, once it is entertained, irrespective of whether it is found
ultimately that in fact no fundamental rights of the petitioners are invaded, the
vires of the legislation or the competence of the legislature to enact the
impugned legislation must be gone into and determined. [The Constitution
Bench in D.A.V. College [D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, (1971) 2 SCC 269],
further held that while the first proposition is valid, the second is not. Thus, the
entertainment of the writ petition does not mean that this Court has to examine
the impugned legislation or legislative competence if the same is not found to
be infringing fundamental rights.
71. Furthermore, the right to seek an effective legal remedy for an infringed right
is part of the right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. One
may make a profitable reference to the decisions in Anita Kushwaha v.
Pushap Sadan56 and Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India57 for the same.
72. Since the 1970s, interpretation of the Constitution, particularly Fundamental
Rights, has undergone a significant transformation. Through dynamic and
evolving interpretations, various aspects of equality, life and freedom have
been recognised and expanded to reflect the changing needs of society.
55
(2023) 11 SCC 693
56
(2016) 8 SCC 509
57
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1334
50
73. We are, at this stage, reminded of what this Court held in Express
Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India58 while negating a challenge to the
interpretation placed on Article 14 in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.59,
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India60 and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v.
International Airport Authority of India Ltd.61 that all governmental
actions, which are not supportable by law, would be per se violative of Article
14 of the Constitution. Excerpts from paragraph 70 read as follows:
70. […] it is urged that the content of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution would
not include the right which is guaranteed by other clauses of Article 19.
According to the learned counsel, it must therefore logically follow that what
facilitated the exercise of a fundamental right did not for that reason become a
part of the fundamental right itself. He read out different passages from the
judgments of Bhagwati. J. in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority
of India Ltd. and endeavoured to show, to use his own language, that “in spite
of some literal flourish in the language here and there, they did not and could
not depart from the ambit of Article 14 which deals with the principle of equality
embodied in the Article”. He was particularly critical of the dictum of Bhagwati,
J. in International Airport Authority case5 that “arbitrariness was the antithesis
of Article 14” and commented that this would mean that all governmental
actions which are not supportable by law were per se violative of Article 14. I
am afraid, it is rather late in the day to question the correctness of the landmark
decision in Maneka Gandhi case and the innovative construction placed by
Bhagwati, J. on Article 14 in the three cases of Royappa, Maneka Gandhi and
International Airport Authority which have evolved new dimensions in judicial
process.
74. As we read the above passage acknowledging the declaration of law that
arbitrariness in State action is an antithesis of Article 14, we are also reminded
of decisions of high authority of this Court that a violation of a principle of
natural justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14 [see Union of India
58
(1986) 1 SCC 133
59
(1974) 4 SCC 3
60
(1978) 1 SCC 248
61
(1979) 3 SCC 489
51
v. Tulsiram Patel62] and that natural justice is an antithesis of arbitrariness
[see Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanho University63].
75. Article 14’s guarantee against arbitrariness is fundamental to all State actions.
Since equality and natural justice are antithesis of arbitrariness, nowadays it
has become customary to style a petition as one filed under Article 32 and
vaguely allege either arbitrariness or violation of the traditional principles of
natural justice [the rules that none should be condemned unheard and no one
should be a judge of his own cause] as well as a third principle developed in
India, which also includes the right to be afforded a fair hearing and a reasoned
order should the outcome of the proceedings be adverse to the person
proceeded against. Question is, should the Supreme Court entertain writ
petitions under Article 32 without clear and specific pleadings as to how the
right of equality or any other Fundamental Right has been infringed and what
is the impact thereof on the suitor without clear, specific, and definite
pleadings? The answer must be an emphatic ‘NO’. If the principles deducible
from the authorities referred to above are of any guidance and help, a loosely
drafted writ petition under Article 32 ought not to be entertained in the
absence of the requisite pleadings. Even where violation of a statutory right is
sought to be camouflaged as violation of a Fundamental Right, or where a
statutory right is found to have been predominantly violated with only an
incidental infringement of a Fundamental Right, this Court may, in the
judicious exercise of its discretion, refuse to entertain the writ petition while
62
(1985) 3 SCC 398
63
(1998) 8 SCC 194
52
safeguarding the liberty of the suitor to pursue his writ remedy before the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
76. Having said that, we now proceed to decide the contentions raised by Reddy.
77. The first contention is that the writ petition does not disclose violation of any
Fundamental Right. In this regard, reference may be made to the first
paragraph of the writ petition which reads:
This Writ Petition under Article 32 seeks to enforce Petitioner’s fundamental
Rights under Article 14, 19(1)(g) & Article 21 together with 300-A of the
Constitution of India. This Writ Petition is necessitated on account of an
extraordinary and brazen fraud upon this Hon’ble Court…This appears to be a general statement regarding the particular Fundamental
Rights which, according to Vishnu, stand breached. It is of no help to him.
Furthermore, a perusal of paragraph 6(h) of the writ petition reveals
averments to the effect that the rights of Vishnu under Articles 19(1)(g) and
21 have been severely impaired insofar as it relates to access to appropriate
legal remedies, as the remedy available under Section 30 of the 1894 Act is
only illusory in nature, considering that the question of title has already been
declared in favour of Reddy.
78. A plain reading of the writ petition together with the prayer clauses, noted in
paragraph 6 (supra), makes it evident that none of Vishnu’s Fundamental
Rights were invaded to enable him maintain a writ petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution. To recapitulate, Vishnu prayed in his writ petition that (i)
Reddy be declared as not the sole owner of the subject land, (ii) NOIDA’s
decision (reflected in its letter dated 17th January, 2023) to sanction full
compensation for acquisition of the land to Reddy be set aside, (iii) the trio be
declared as co-owners of the land and jointly awarded compensation for
53
acquisition thereof and (iv) an inquiry be ordered to unearth the fraud and to
initiate appropriate legal proceedings against the persons responsible. The
case set up in the writ petition by Vishnu does not, in our opinion, constitute
breach of any of his Fundamental Rights; although, it cannot be gainsaid that
his property rights are definitely in jeopardy leading to violation of Article 300A
of the Constitution for which a petition under Article 226 could have been
entertained regard being had to the law laid down by a five-Judge Constitution
Bench of this Court in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab64. However, Vishnu
sought to project that the writ petition had to be filed due to concerns that
even if a sound case on merits were presented, other courts would feel
hesitant to entertain the grievance given this Court’s decision in Reddy
Veerana (supra). It was as if apart from the remedy of a writ petition before
this Court, no other remedy was available to Vishnu.
79. That is, however, not the case before us. Vishnu has sought to avail the
appellate remedy against the impugned order as well as a review of the
decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) which, if undisturbed by us, would
incidentally seal his fate. In any event, if Vishnu were to succeed in the civil
appeal and the petition for review considered bearing in mind the decision on
this civil appeal, the resulting relief would likely address his grievance arising
from the fraud, of which he has claimed to be a victim.
80. In our view, there is no prima facie infringement of Vishnu’s Fundamental
Rights including, inter alia, the right to have access to an effective legal
64
AIR 1963 SC 1909
54
remedy, since all the available options for relief are being sought to be
explored by him. Accordingly, we uphold the first argument advanced by
Reddy that the writ petition did not disclose violation of any of the
Fundamental Rights and, hence, is not maintainable.
81. Having regard to the aforesaid finding, we are not required to deal with the
second ground; however, for completeness of decision, we are ad idem with
the contention that a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order. In this
context, reference may be made to the nine-Judge Constitution Bench decision
of this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra65 where
it was pertinently observed as follows:
18. On these facts, the question which arises for our decision is whether a
judicial order passed by the High Court prohibiting the publication in
newspapers of evidence given by a witness pending the hearing of the suit, is
amenable to be corrected by a writ of certiorari issued by this Court under Article
32(2). This question has two broad facets; does the impugned order violate the
fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(a), (d) and (g); and if
it does, is it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32(2)?
Thus, in the present proceedings, we will limit our discussion and decision to
the points which have a material bearing on the broad problem posed by the
petitions before us.
* * *
37. The next question which calls for our decision is : does the impugned order
contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)? In
dealing with this question, it is essential to bear in mind the object with which
the impugned order has been passed. As we have already indicated, the
impugned order has been passed, because the learned Judge was satisfied that
the interests of justice required that Mr Goda should not be exposed to the risk
of excessive publicity of the evidence that he would give in court. This order
was passed by the learned Judge after hearing arguments from both the parties
to the suit. Thus, there is no doubt that the learned Judge was satisfied that in
order to be able to do justice between the parties before him, it was essential
to grant Mr Goda’s request for prohibiting the publication of his testimony in the
newspapers from day to day. The question is : can it be said that an order which
has been passed directly and solely for the purpose of assisting the discovery
of truth and for doing justice between the parties, infringes the fundamental
rights of the petitioners under Article 19(1)?
65
AIR 1967 SC 1
55
38. The argument that the impugned order affects the fundamental rights of
the petitioners under Article 19(1), is based on a complete misconception about
the true nature and character of judicial process and of judicial decisions. When
a Judge deals with matters brought before him for his adjudication, he first
decides questions of fact on which the parties are at issue, and then applies the
relevant law to the said facts. Whether the findings of fact recorded by the Judge
are right or wrong, and whether the conclusion of law drawn by him suffers
from any infirmity, can be considered and decided if the party aggrieved by the
decision of the Judge takes the matter up before the appellate court. But it is
singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision pronounced by a
Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him
for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of the citizens under Article
19(1). What the judicial decision purports to do is to decide the controversy
between the parties brought before the court and nothing more. If this basic
and essential aspect of the judicial process is borne in mind, it would be plain
that the judicial verdict pronounced by court in or in relation to a matter brought
before it for its decision cannot be said to affect the fundamental rights of
citizens under Article 19(1).
(emphasis ours)
82. Interestingly, a perusal of the prayer clauses of the writ petition presented by
Vishnu does not show that a challenge has been laid to any judicial order. He
has prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari, to quash and set aside the
decision of NOIDA dated 17th January, 2023 and a writ of declaration to declare
Reddy to not have an exclusive right to claim compensation. There being
evidently no challenge to any judicial order, this ground of challenge is liable
to be rejected.
B. MAINTAINABILITY OF CIVIL APPEAL/JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
83. A variety of objections regarding the jurisdiction of this Court in determining
the questions arising for decision have been raised.
INTRA-COURT APPEAL
84. Firstly, we wish to clarify that we do not possess and are not exercising any
“intra-court appeal” jurisdiction, as contended by learned senior counsel
representing Reddy. The Constitution does not confer any such jurisdiction on
us and we are conscious of the legal position. However, having so clarified, it
56
is important to note that the principle of “fraud unravels everything” is not
confined only to examining judgments rendered by the courts below but could
include the unravelling of judgments of this Court as well, if at all the justice
of the case before us so demands. In the former moiety of this judgment, we
have discussed that Reddy has with impunity indulged in playing fraud on the
courts and, therefore, his challenge to the jurisdiction of this Court must fail.
85. In Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab66, this Court held that:
17. It is a settled legal proposition that where a person gets an order/office by
making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent authority, such
order cannot be sustained in the eye of the law as fraud unravels everything.
“Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new
subtleties invented to evade law.” It is trite that “fraud and justice never dwell
together” (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant). Fraud is an act of deliberate
deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. Fraud
and deception are synonymous. “Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles
and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine.” An act of fraud on court is always viewed
seriously. [Vide Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy [(2010) 8 SCC 383, para
34.]
18. However, the question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a party
to treat the judgment and order as null and void without getting it set aside
from the competent court. The issue is no more res integra and stands settled
by a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even if
void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. [Vide State of
Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth [(1996) 1 SCC 435]
and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries (P) Ltd. [(1997) 3
SCC 443].
86. Moreover, as noted hereinabove, the decision in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra)
delineated that every Court, either superior or inferior – first or final – has
jurisdiction in cases where a judgment of the court has been obtained by fraud
to treat it as nullity.
87. Acceptance of the contention of Reddy would lead to a situation akin to a
juridical cul-de-sac, where no option is available to Vishnu to assert his legal
66
(2011) 12 SCC 588
57
rights. Adopting a hands-off approach weighed down by the fact of existence
of a judicial order of this Court of competent jurisdiction and thereby keeping
it untouched (despite proof of such judicial order having been procured by
fraud), would be a travesty of justice. Much of what has been said by this
Court on the aspect of fraud vitiating even the most solemn of proceedings, in
that case, would seem to be dead letter. On the contrary, ends of justice
demand that such order(s), as might have been procured based on established
fraud, must not be retained on the record of Courts of Record.
88. Another challenge to the maintainability of the civil appeal is on the ground
that the reference of the case, by this Court using its “intra-court appeal”
jurisdiction to the present bench of three judges violate the established
principle of stare decisis as it refers not only a question of law but also
questions of fact. While the High Court and any subsequent Bench of this Court
would no doubt continue to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of the dicta in
A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra), in reality, for the purposes of judicial propriety
and abundant caution, this Court in a coordinate configuration deemed it
inappropriate to examine whether the decision of this Court in Reddy
Veerana (supra), in which it is contended that the impugned order has
merged into, ought to be examined in greater depth for ascertaining whether
it was obtained by fraud. Therefore, the only plausible option open to the
Bench of coordinate strength was to refer the matter to a larger bench to
decide whether fraud has been played on this Court and this is precisely what
has been done in the present case by the order dated 21st November, 2023.
The said order was open-ended in the sense that who should constitute the
58
larger bench was not specified. It was left open for the master of the roster to
decide on constitution of the larger bench; and it could have included the
available member(s) of the two-Judge Bench, which decided Reddy Veerana
(supra). However, this Bench having been constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief
Justice and Reddy having participated in the proceedings before us without
raising any demur regarding coram, we see the contention as one raised in
desperation. Even otherwise, to put it straight, we do not wish to spill much
ink regarding this misconceived contention since by way of this judgment, we
have kept our focus limited to the point of “fraud” and have exercised caution
and circumspection in not making any determination regarding the merits
pertaining to the dispute at hand. We, therefore, see no merit in the contention
urged on behalf of Reddy that placement of the civil appeal and the writ
petition before us is in violation of any law.
89. Lastly, ex abundanti cautela, as pointed out above, this Court in Reddy
Veerana (supra) made no determination on the title of Reddy and only made
the decision with respect to the compensation on the basis of the circle rate.
Therefore, this larger bench is not strictly sitting in “appeal” on any point of
law/fact but is concerned only with whether this Court’s judgment was
procured through fraud.
MERGER
90. Learned senior counsel for Reddy has also assiduously argued that the present
civil appeal is not maintainable, as it effectively challenges an order of the
Supreme Court, into which the impugned order has merged. It is contended
that no appeal lies before the Supreme Court against its own order.
59
91. Since arguments in extenso were advanced on the aspect of non-
applicability/applicability of the doctrine of merger, we need to notice what it
means, how this Court has applied it or declined to apply it to the cases before
it, and finally how relevant it is to the present exercise.
92. As per Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Edition), ‘merger’ means “the act or an
instance of combining or uniting; Civil Procedure. the effect of a judgment for
the plaintiff, which absorbs any claim that was the subject of the lawsuit into
the judgment, so that the plaintiff’s rights are confined to enforcing the
judgment”.
93. A brief overview of English law on the doctrine of merger by judgment reveals
that when an action prevails, the cause of action, along with all attendant
rights emanating from it, merge into the judgment and thereby stand
extinguished.
94. To trace the origin of the doctrine of merger in English law, we must journey
back to the nineteenth century. Almost two centuries ago, the Court of
Exchequer Chamber, in the case of King v. Hoare67, articulated the following
principles:
If there be a breach of contract, or wrong done, or any other cause of action
by one against another, and judgment be recovered in a court of record, the
judgment is a bar to the original cause of action, because it is thereby
reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained, so far as it can be
at that stage; and it would be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant
to another suit for the purpose of obtaining the same result. Hence the legal
maxim, ‘transit in rem judicatam’—the cause of action is changed into matter
of record, which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in
the higher.
67
(1844) 13 Meeson and Welsby 494
60
95. Similarly, in Kendall v. Hamilton68, the House of Lords, endorsing the
decision in Hoare (supra), stated thus:
The doctrine of merger is quite intelligible. Where a security of one kind or
nature has been superseded by another of a higher kind or nature, it is
reasonable to insist that the party seeking redress should rest only upon the
latter. So when what was once a mere right of action has become a judgment
of a court of record, the judgment is a bar to the original cause of action.
96. In Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v. Zodiac Seats UK Ltd69, the Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom, summarised the doctrine of merger as follows:
17. […] [Merger] treats a cause of action as extinguished once judgment has
been given upon it, and the claimant’s sole right as being a right upon the
judgment. Although this produces the same effect as the second principle, it is
in reality a substantive rule about the legal effect of an English judgment, which
is regarded as ‘of a higher nature’ and therefore as superseding the underlying
cause of action: see King v Hoare […].
97. Perhaps one of the earliest Indian decisions exploring the doctrine of merger
is that of the High Court of Bombay in Commissioner of Income-Tax v.
Tejaji Farasram Kharawalla70 wherein a Division Bench held thus:
It is a well-established principle of law that when an appeal is provided from a
decision of a Tribunal and the appeal Court after hearing the appeal passes an
order, the order of the original Court ceases to exist and is merged in the order
of the appeal Court and although the appeal Court may merely confirm the order
of the trial Court, the order that stands and is operative is not the order of the
trial Court but the order of the appeal Court.
98. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai
Manubhai71, laid down that the English doctrine of merger, while it might have
68
(1879) 4 App. Cas. 504
69
[2013] UKSC 46
70
(1953) SCC OnLine Bom 28
71
(1953) 2 SCC 489
61
influenced certain judicial pronouncements in our country, it essentially has no
relevance to a Hindu widow’s estate.
99. In State of Madras v. Madurai Mills Co. Ltd.72, another three-Judge Bench
observed that the application of the doctrine of merger depends on the nature
of the appellate or revisional order in each case and the scope of the statutory
provisions conferring the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. It was observed
thus:
5. […] But the doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of rigid and universal
application and it cannot be said that wherever there are two orders, one by the
inferior Tribunal and the other by a superior Tribunal, passed in an appeal on
revision, there is a fusion of merger of two orders irrespective of the subject-
matter of the appellate or revisional order and scope of the appeal or revision
contemplated by the particular statute.
100. The question arising for decision before a Constitution Bench of five-Judges of
this Court in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co.
Ltd. and others73 was whether the order of the original authority merged in
the order of the Appellate Authority even where the Appellate Authority merely
dismissed the appeal without any modification of the order of the original
authority. Answering the question posed before it, the Bench observed thus:
4. [..] It is obvious that when an appeal is made, the Appellate Authority can do
one of three things, namely, (i) it may reverse the order under appeal, (ii) it
may modify that order, and (iii) it may merely dismiss the appeal and thus
confirm the order without any modification. It is not disputed that in the first
two cases where the order of the original authority is either reversed or modified
it is the order of the Appellate Authority which is the operative order and if the
High Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ to the Appellate Authority it cannot
issue a writ to the original authority. The question therefore is whether there is
any difference between these two cases and the third case where the Appellate
Authority dismisses the appeal and thus confirms the order of the original72
(1967) 1 SCR 732
73
(1963) 2 SCR 56362
authority. It seems to us that on principle it is difficult to draw a distinction
between the first two kinds of orders passed by the Appellate Authority and the
third kind of order passed by it. In all these three cases after the Appellate
Authority has disposed of the appeal, the operative order is the order of the
Appellate Authority whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or
confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious
as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification.
(emphasis ours)
101. At the turn of this century, the decision in Kunhayammed v. State of
Kerala74 was rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. Since this
decision stands out as a guiding light wherein this Court summarized the law
on the doctrine of merger and appears to be the sheet anchor of the claim of
Reddy, it would be apt to examine the decision closely.
102. The question that arose for decision in Kunhayammed (supra) was whether
upon dismissal of a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India carried from an order of the High Court, a review petition would still
be maintainable before such Court. The decision begins with the following
words:
1. A question of frequent recurrence and of some significance involving
the legal implications and the impact of an order rejecting a petition
seeking grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India has arisen for decision in this appeal.
The coordinate Bench had the occasion to examine the doctrine of merger in
great depth. Briefly, what was held is this. If special leave were not granted
(either by an unreasoned or a reasoned order) and the petition dismissed, the
order under challenge would not merge in the order of dismissal. However, if
upon grant of leave the Court dismissed an appeal in exercise of its appellate
74
(2000) 6 SCC 359
63
jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the order is unreasoned, the doctrine would
apply resulting in merger of the order under challenge in the order dismissing
the appeal. In paragraph 7 the Court noted that the doctrine of merger is
neither a doctrine of constitutional law nor a doctrine statutorily recognized
and that it is a common law doctrine founded on principles of propriety in the
hierarchy of the justice delivery system. Paragraph 12 of the decision has aptly
captured the logic underlying the doctrine of merger. It was observed thus:
12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more
than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a
given point of time. When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal
or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior
forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be
effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the
superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether the decree
or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the
decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final,
binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order
passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is
not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by
the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which
could have been laid shall have to be kept in view.”
(emphasis ours)The Bench then proceeded to sum up its conclusions thus:
42. ‘To merge’ means to sink or disappear in something else; to become
absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is
defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby
the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or
swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus
Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-68.)
* * *
44. To sum up, our conclusions are:
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a
court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such
superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before
it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the
superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is
capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
64
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible
into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special
leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave
to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an
appeal.
(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited
application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the
superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or
capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger.
The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or
affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the
Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the
judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate
jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing
of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore
be applied to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order
or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger.
An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place
of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not
inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives
reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications.
Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law
by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution.
Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order
are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the
parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being
the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the
order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order
of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order
of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent
proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of
Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract
the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely
affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to
appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as
provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 CPC.
(emphasis ours)
65
103. A subsequent three-Judge Bench in Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri
Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal75
succinctly summarized what was held in Kunhayammed (supra) in the
following words:
20. The Court thereafter analysed number of cases where orders of different
nature were passed and dealt with these judgments by classifying them in the
following categories:
(i) Dismissal at the stage of special leave petition—without reasons—no res
judicata, no merger.
(ii) Dismissal of the special leave petition by speaking or reasoned order—no
merger, but rule of discipline and Article 141 attracted.
(iii) Leave granted—dismissal without reasons—merger results.
104. It is discernible from the aforesaid decisions that although the doctrine of
merger has its roots in common law principles, it has firmly been integrated
within the contours of Indian jurisprudence.
105. Having discussed the law on the doctrine of merger, we must acknowledge
that with rules come with exceptions. The doctrine of merger does not apply
universally or without limit. There are certain decisions of this Court which, in
the exceptional situations before it, declined to apply the doctrine of merger.
It would be appropriate to notice the same now.
106. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Vijai
International Udyog76 emphasized that the doctrine of merger finds no
application where the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” is applicable. It
was observed thus:
75
(2019) 4 SCC 376
76
(1984) 4 SCC 54366
4. On the facts of the case, we do not accept the view of the High Court that
the doctrine of merger applied. Both the assessee and the Commissioner had a
statutory right of appeal to the Tribunal against the decision of the Assistant
Commissioner and in exercise of that right two separate appeals had been filed.
On account of the mistake of the Tribunal in not clubbing the two appeals the
statutory right of appeal of one party could not be negatived. It is a well-settled
proposition of law that no party should suffer on account of the mistake of the
Court or the Tribunal. That apart in a situation like this, the doctrine of merger
has no application and the High Court was in error in throwing out the
Commissioner’s appeal by applying the doctrine of merger.
107. Yet again, the two-Judge Bench in A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra) laid down
fraud as an exception to the doctrine of merger while observing thus:
38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case
is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is
passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts
including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not
dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally
by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which
Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also
gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore,
merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to
any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall
or reconsider the order.
39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is
established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or
playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in
consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to
stand.
(emphasis ours)
108. In MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar77, a two-Judge Bench held that the doctrine
of merger does not apply when the higher court has not adjudicated the issues
on merits, and the controversy between the parties has not been looked into.
77
(2010) 11 SCC 374
67
In applying this doctrine to the specifics of the case, the Court had the occasion
to observe:
39. The issue of merger has no bearing in the facts and circumstances of the
present petitions, since, the issue that was decided by the High Court in the
earlier batch of writ petitions and the issue that was raised and considered in
the subsequent public interest litigation is entirely different. Secondly, in our
view, the principles of res judicata are also not attracted since the issue raised
and considered in the subsequent public interest litigation had not been raised
and considered in the earlier round of litigation.
109. The decision rendered by another Bench of two Judges of this Court in
Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi v. Pearl Drinks Ltd.78 is also worth
consideration because it deals with a situation different from those considered
by this Court in the aforementioned decisions. It was held thus:
21. The Tribunal obviously failed to notice this distinction and proceeded to
apply the doctrine of merger rather mechanically. It failed to take into
consideration a situation where an order may be partly in favour and partly
against a party in which event the part that goes in favour of the party can be
separately assailed by them in appeal filed before the appellate court or
authority but dismissal on merits or otherwise of any such appeal against a part
only of the order will not foreclose the right of the party who is aggrieved by the
other part of this order. If the doctrine of merger were to be applied in a pedantic
or wooden manner it would lead to anomalous results inasmuch as a party who
has lost in part can by getting his appeal dismissed claim that the opposite party
who may be aggrieved by another part of the very same order cannot assail its
correctness no matter the appeal earlier disposed of by the court or authority
had not examined the correctness of that part of the order.
110. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that when an appeal is limited to a
specific part of the judgment and order of the first-instance court, the merger
occurs only to that extent, leaving the rest intact and available for future
consideration. The extent of merger is determined by the subject matter of the
78
(2010) 11 SCC 153
68
appeal. The merger can only operate on issues which were the subject-matter
of the appellate court’s judgment and order and cannot have any application
to issues which are not being taken on appeal by either party or which had not
been touched upon by the appellate court.
111. What happens in situations where an appeal is limited to a specific portion of
the judgment of the first-instance court or where the issues decided by the
court therein remain unaddressed in the appellate court’s judgment: can it still
be asserted that the entire original judgment of the first-instance court ceases
to exist upon merging with the appellate court’s judgment?
112. In S. Shanmugavel Nadar v. State of T.N.79, a Bench of two Judges laid
down that it is only the operative part of an original judgment that merges in
the judgment of the appellate forum and not the whole of the judgment. The
relevant paragraph of the decision is extracted hereunder:
10. Firstly, the doctrine of merger. Though loosely an expression merger of
judgment, order or decision of a court or forum into the judgment, order or
decision of a superior forum is often employed, as a general rule the judgment
or order having been dealt with by a superior forum and having resulted in
confirmation, reversal or modification, what merges is the operative part i.e.
the mandate or decree issued by the court which may have been expressed in
a positive or negative form. For example, take a case where the subordinate
forum passes an order and the same, having been dealt with by a superior
forum, is confirmed for reasons different from the one assigned by the
subordinate forum, what would merge in the order of the superior forum is the
operative part of the order and not the reasoning of the subordinate forum;
otherwise there would be an apparent contradiction. However, in certain cases,
the reasons for decision can also be said to have merged in the order of the
superior court if the superior court has, while formulating its own judgment or
order, either adopted or reiterated the reasoning, or recorded an express
approval of the reasoning, incorporated in the judgment or order of the
subordinate forum.
79
(2002) 8 SCC 361
69
113. It is clear that what gets merged is the operative part of the original judgment
and order, not its entirety, unless the appellate court adopts, reiterates the
reasoning, or expressly approves the reasoning contained in the first-instance
court’s judgment and order. Put differently, a ‘declaration of law’ by the
appellate court regarding the issues before the first-instance court is
necessary, which can only be inferred from a detailed, analytical order rather
than a mere dismissal seeking closure of the case without clear discussion or
analysis. Therefore, it becomes imperative to discern whether the appellate
court’s judgment and order indeed ‘declares’ the law on the issues presented
before the first-instance court.
114. At the cost of repetition, we may note that placing heavy reliance on
Kunhayammed (supra) learned senior counsel for Reddy argued that the
impugned order of the High Court having merged with the decision in Reddy
Veerana (supra), the former ceases to exist, and it is the latter which subsists,
remains operative, and is capable of enforcement in the eye of the law.
115. Reverting to Kunhayammed (supra), we bear in mind what the coordinate
Bench expressed in paragraphs 12 and 44(iii) extracted supra. While
wholeheartedly concurring with the law laid down in Kunhayammed (supra),
we also notice that Kunhayammed (supra), on its own terms, has recognized
that the doctrine of merger has limited application; hence, the same decision
does carve out an exception requiring every matter coming before the courts,
where the point of merger is raised, to be decided on case-to-case basis.
70
116. There can be no doubt that a review petition before the court which passed
the decree/order would be barred by reason of application of the doctrine of
merger if despite dismissal of a civil appeal by this Court, be it by a reasoned
or an unreasoned order, the appellant chooses to approach the court (whose
decree/order was impugned) once again with a review petition. Notably, the
issue that has engaged our attention in this appeal did not arise for decision in
Kunhayammed (supra).
117. We preface our discussion on the next point by reiterating that a party to the
proceedings affected by a judgment/order may appeal as of right within the
prescribed period of limitation, if such a right is created by a statute. However,
insofar as a stranger, i.e., a non-party to the proceedings is concerned, if an
appeal from the judgment/order is allowed, he too can appeal provided a
leave/permission is granted by the appellate court. Law is well-settled that
much is not required to obtain leave/permission. If a stranger, dissatisfied with
a judgment/order, can make out even a prima facie case that he, being bound
by such judgment/order, is aggrieved by it or prejudicially affected by it, there
could arise little reason for declining leave/permission. We may usefully refer
to the decisions in Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd.80
and State of Punjab v. Amar Singh81 in this behalf. Precisely for this reason,
the two-Judge Bench (cor. Surya Kant and Dipankar Datta, JJ.) granted
permission to Vishnu to appeal against the impugned order.
80
(1970) 3 SCC 573
81
(1974) 2 SCC 70
71
118. Without reading and understanding the ratio laid down in Kunhayammed
(supra) in light of the issue that was decided by it and blindly placing reliance
on such ratio, as if it were a one-size-fits-all situations, could produce a result
which may not be what the interest of justice of a given case would demand.
A couple of situations can be conceived of where the principle of merger, as
enunciated and in the manner understood as well as applied, could bring about
undesirable and pernicious results.
119. One of the situations, akin to the present case, could be where the judgment
and order of a high court upon a challenge being laid before this Court is upheld
in the course of disposal of a civil appeal by way of its dismissal. As a result of
merger of the operative directions contained in the order of the high court in
the appellate order of this Court, it is such appellate order which would partake
the character of the only operative order. Now, if the order of the high court
prejudicially affects a third party or even has the effect of binding such party
but such party was deliberately not included in the array of respondents and,
in fact, it is proved that he was unaware of the proceedings before the high
court or this Court, the remedy of such affected party to appeal against the
order of the high court with the permission of this Court as and when he derives
knowledge of the same would not be available if the contention sought to be
raised on behalf of Reddy, based on the merger doctrine, is accepted. The
affected party would, thus, be disabled from applying for a review before the
High Court per Kunhayammed (supra), its order having merged in this
Court’s order. No doubt, remedy by way of review followed by a curative
petition is made available before this Court by the SC Rules, 2013 but the
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same are not as wide as the remedy of appeal. Even in cases of such remedies,
the party approaching this Court cannot urge, as a matter of right, that he be
heard before an order is passed. The contention that Reddy has urged based
on the merger doctrine, if accepted, might lead to highly unjust and inequitable
consequences which, in cases, could be irreversible.
120. Let us consider another situation. This Court by enactments made by the
Parliament exercises appellate jurisdiction over orders passed by several
Tribunals. Suppose, one respondent in an original proceeding before a Tribunal
considers itself aggrieved by an order passed by it and carries it in an appeal
before this Court, which is dismissed by a Bench of two Judges in exercise of
appellate jurisdiction vide a reasoned order without notice to the respondents
on the first day it is listed. However, while such appeal was pending before this
Court, another respondent in the original proceeding before the Tribunal is also
desirous of carrying the same order in appeal but, for sufficient cause, is unable
to appeal readily. By the time such respondent upon completion of all
formalities presents its appeal and the same comes up for consideration before
a Bench of this Court, whatever be the strength of the Bench, the respondent
in the appeal being the successful applicant before the Tribunal and before this
Court too brings to its notice that the appeal presented first in point of time
has been listed and dismissed by a Bench of two Judges of this Court. Should
the appellant (in the appeal, which was filed later) be told off at the gates on
the sole ground that the order under appeal has ceased to be the operative
order, having merged with the appellate order of this Court? If the situation
unfolds to be such where the Bench of greater strength is inclined to admit the
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appeal disagreeing with the view of the Bench of two Judges, can it be said
that the said Bench would be disabled from exercising their appellate
jurisdiction since, per the doctrine of merger, the order under appeal does not
exist? The answers to the aforesaid questions, in our considered opinion,
cannot but be in the negative. A right of hearing that accompanies every
proceeding decided publicly, unless such hearing is barred, cannot be cast
aside for no better reason than that of a merger having occurred.
121. There is one other exception to the doctrine of merger. Nowadays, it is not a
rarity to find that petitions involving similar, though not identical, issues are
clubbed together and disposed of by a common judgment and order. If such a
judgment and order is unsuccessfully challenged before a superior court by
one of the petitioners to the proceedings, and such a challenge fails, the
doctrine of merger may not apply when another set of petitioners challenges
the same (common) judgement and order; if the second set of petitioners are
able to demonstrate that the case run by them is not identical (though bearing
resemblance) with the proceedings already decided, it would still be open for
the superior court to entertain the challenge and rule in a manner different
from the earlier proceedings.
122. Thus, the application of the doctrine of merger, in every case, should be
accompanied by an awareness of its limitations and should not be wielded to
close avenues for addressing genuine concerns. Prioritizing justice and fairness
should supersede an absolute insistence on finality. While the latter is
commendable, the former is superior. These doctrines, even though are
grounded in sound and justifiable public policy arguments, yet, do not limit the
74
powers of the courts in cases where larger public interest is at stake. They
have been adapted to accommodate exceptions and qualifications, leaving
room for acknowledging special circumstances, particularly in matters of public
significance.
123. On a conspectus of the authorities, we are inclined to the view that the doctrine
of merger may not have any application in all cases of cognate civil appeals
being carried from the same order (obviously at the instance of a party
different from the appellant who approached this Court first in point of time),
if it is convincingly demonstrated that (i) his right of appeal should not be
foreclosed because of the very rare or special circumstance(s) that is/are
projected before the court; or (ii) his appeal raises an issue of seminal public
importance, which was not available to be raised by the appellant who
approached this Court in its appellate jurisdiction in the earlier round of
litigation, and also that such issue in the greater public interest requires a
resolution by this Court; or (iii) since an act of court ought to prejudice none,
refusal to interfere by this Court would invariably result in offending the
principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit; or (iv) the earlier appellate
decision is vitiated because of fraud having been practiced on this Court by a
party in whose favour the ruling had been made, as in this case; or (v) that
public interest would be put to extreme jeopardy by reason of irretrievable
consequences ensuing, if interference which is otherwise found to be
warranted in law were declined solely based on the doctrine of merger.
124. Having noted that fraud is an exception to the doctrine of merger and
considering that the impugned order of the High Court and the decision of this
75
Court in Reddy Veerana (supra) have been found by us to be vitiated by
fraud, the argument by learned senior counsel for Reddy as regards the non-
maintainability of the present proceedings based on the merger doctrine is of
no significance.
PROCEDURE, IF AN IMPEDIMENT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION
125. Procedural law is a sentinel of non-arbitrariness; it not only provides a
safeguard against the individual vagaries of a judge but also establishes a
structured framework for litigants to approach the legal system for redressal
of their issues. However, procedural law cannot foresee all situations that may
arise. Procedure must facilitate justice, not detract from it. In special cases,
the letter of procedural law must yield to the ends of justice. Courts are, of
course, duty-bound to apply procedural law in its entirety, save where such
application would result in manifest absurdity.
126. The contention advanced by learned senior counsel for Reddy is that the
procedure undertaken by the Registry and the Division Bench of this Court
violates the SC Rules, 2013. We are in complete disagreement with such a
proposition since the provisions of the SC Rules, 2013, highlighted by learned
senior counsel for Reddy, are applicable in the course of normal action. Once
fraud, on the face of the record, is proved, the procedural law laid down by
the SC Rules, 2013 must support the actualisation of justice, not the continued
perpetuation of wrongs. We quite agree with the contention of learned senior
counsel for Vishnu that Order LV, Rule 6 of the SC Rules, 2013 specifically
recognises the inherent powers of this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction to
secure justice. When the Court has been the victim of fraud, it’s hands cannot
76
be tied down by procedural laws in a manner to defeat the interests and rights
of other parties.
127. In the case of State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari82, this Court with reference
to Rule 3 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. 5,
Chap. 1-A held:
8. …This omission or default is only a breach which can be characterised as an
irregularity to be corrected by condonation on application by the party fulfilling
the condition within a time allowed by the court. We must always remember
that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but
an aid to justice. It has been wisely observed that procedural prescriptions are
the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the
administration of justice. Where the non-compliance, tho’ procedural, will
thwart fair hearing or prejudice doing of justice to parties, the rule is mandatory.
But, grammar apart, if the breach can be corrected without injury to a just
disposal of the case, we should not enthrone a regulatory requirement into a
dominant desideratum. After all, courts are to do justice, not to wreck this end
product on technicalities. Viewed in this perspective, even what is regarded as
mandatory traditionally may, perhaps, have to be moderated into wholesome
directions to be complied with in time or in extended time… .
128. In M.V. “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez83, this Court in a case regarding
Rule 4 of Chapter XXII of the Calcutta High Court Rules, 1914, as applicable
to the Original Side, held that:
18. Rules of procedure are not by themselves an end but the means to achieve
the ends of justice. Rules of procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and
are not hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction of a rule of
procedure which promotes justice and prevents its miscarriage by enabling the
court to do justice in myriad situations, all of which cannot be envisaged, acting
within the limits of the permissible construction, must be preferred to that which
is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. The reason is obvious. Procedure is
meant to subserve and not rule the cause of justice. Where the outcome and
fairness of the procedure adopted is not doubted and the essentials of the
prescribed procedure have been followed, there is no reason to discard the
result simply because certain details which have not prejudicially affected the
result have been inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In our view, this
appears to be the pragmatic approach which needs to be adopted while
construing a purely procedural provision. Otherwise, rules of procedure will
become the mistress instead of remaining the handmaid of justice, contrary to
the role attributed to it in our legal system.
82
(1976) 1 SCC 719
83
(1989) 4 SCC 671
77
129. We have no hesitation to hold that a similar interpretation can be applied to
the SC Rules, 2013.
130. The contention of Reddy under consideration can also be dealt with by applying
the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit. No act of Court should harm a
party being the foremost principle in the mind of any Court, it would be a
travesty of justice if such court, feeling bound by the shackles of technicalities,
were to decline interference to set things right despite arriving at a definitive
conclusion of being tricked by fraud; and, it is a fallacy to urge such a
contention before the Supreme Court, which has vast and pervasive powers
to remedy any wrong that might have occasioned to a litigant owing to sharp
and fraudulent practices of another litigant, more particularly in a case of
proven fraud.
131. This contention of Reddy, therefore, must fail owing to our satisfaction of the
impugned order and the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) having been
vitiated by fraud.
C. VISHNU PURSUING THE CIVIL APPEAL AS WELL AS THE REVIEW PETITION AND
APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION/RECALL, SIMULTANEOUSLY
132. That Vishnu has spared no effort to explore every option has been noticed by
us above.
133. An appeal against a decree or order, passed or made by an inferior court,
before a superior court and a review of the same decree/order before the court
which passed/made it cannot simultaneously be pursued by the same party.
The logic behind it is that there cannot be a parallel challenge to the same
decree or order by the same party before two different fora – that is, in the
78
courts of appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction. On the very terms of
Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC, such a course of action is not
permissible.
134. However, there is an absence of a two-pronged assail in two different
proceedings by Vishnu to the same decree or order: whereas the civil appeal
is directed against the impugned order, a petition has subsequently been filed
by Vishnu for review of the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) [which had
the occasion to modify the impugned order]. Therefore, neither Section 114
nor Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC would create a legal bar for entertaining the two
proceedings [appeal and review] that have been initiated by Vishnu.
135. Nevertheless, it does seem to us to be a well thought out endeavour on the
part of Vishnu to file the petition for review even after he had carried the
impugned order in an independent appeal before this Court. Uncertainty was
looming large and Vishnu, not content to rest on his oars by simply appealing
to the conscience of this Court, also sought a review to remedy the wrong
caused to him by Reddy. If indeed the appeal against the impugned order were
to fail on the ground that the same had merged in the decision in Reddy
Veerana (supra), as argued by Reddy, or even if the same appeal were to
succeed and the impugned order set aside, Vishnu would have very little to
salvage since the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) would still hold the field.
Filing of the review by Vishnu, thus, appears to have been intended to ensure
that he is either not non-suited or that even after achieving success in appeal,
he is not left in the lurch. However, we are of the considered opinion that even
if Vishnu had not applied for a review – as a logical corollary of the aforesaid
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discussions – the decision in Reddy Veerana (supra) too having been
obtained by Reddy by playing fraud, has to be erased from the records being
a nullity.
136. Turning to the order under appeal declining registration of the petition for
review, which has been directed to be tagged with these proceedings and also
requires simultaneous disposal, we find that the petition was marked as
defective. The grounds based whereon the Registrar declined registration have
been perused.
137. The occasion has now arisen for considering the grounds urged in support of
the appeal against the Registrar’s order. Apart from an objection that
appropriate quantum of court fees has not been deposited, which Vishnu has
disputed, the Registrar noted certain technical defects concerning array of
parties and the like. The same are certainly curable defects. We, therefore,
find it necessary to allow the appeal by requiring the Registry to notify the
additional quantum of court fees payable by Vishnu, which has not been
notified to him, as well as grant liberty to Vishnu to cure the other technical
defects within a fortnight from this date. It is only upon curing of such defects
that the petition for review shall be treated to be in order.
138. As already discussed above, due to fraud having been played by Reddy, the
doctrine of merger does not apply and, thus, the impugned order is open to
interference notwithstanding the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana
(supra). For reasons already discussed, the civil appeal has to be allowed and
the impugned order set aside.
80
139. As a logical corollary of the impugned order being set aside, it would follow
that the decision of this Court in Reddy Veerana (supra), upholding the same,
which too was obtained by playing fraud, will also be a nullity, and thus stand
recalled in exercise of our inherent powers.
140. Furthermore, based on the aforesaid discussion, we are also inclined to allow
the application (MA 1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022) for
recall of the order dated 30th January, 2023 whereby this Court directed Vishnu
to approach the court under Section 30 of the 1894 Act for appropriate relief.
D. FORUM SHOPPING
141. The contention that Vishnu has engaged in forum shopping is premised on the
fact that he instituted Civil Suit No. 471/2020 on 7th August, 2020 before the
trial court claiming that the compromise decree dated 17th November, 2006
was null and void and, therefore, it is contended that the present proceedings
are instituted to bypass the jurisdiction of the trial court.
142. This contention has been urged to be rejected. When the High Court has
already ruled in a proceeding that directly affects Vishnu’s right and when such
decision, on appeal, is replaced by the decision of the higher court in Reddy
Veerana (supra), Vishnu invariably was left with no other option but to
approach this Court by way of these proceedings. After the decision in Reddy
Veerana (supra), it is obvious that no court, far less the trial court, would
venture to make any order having the effect of upsetting what this Court had
directed rendering Vishnu’s endeavour to approach any other court useless
before first attempting to have the order operating against him in Reddy
Veerana (supra) vacated/recalled.
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143. Pertinently, we wish to point out that considering the long-standing set of
disputes between the trio, it would have been appropriate if the High Court
were urged to implead those third parties whose rights could specifically be
affected. However, the High Court proceeded unaware of the fact that there
was one other party (read Vishnu) who was claiming joint ownership and had
even instituted a suit to have the decree obtained by Reddy declared void.
Now, in view of the order that we propose to pass, we hope and trust that all
the necessary parties would be brought on record and extended the
opportunity to place their respective versions to facilitate an appropriate
decision to be rendered to terminate the present lis by a just and proper
redetermination of the compensation payable to the rightful claimant(s).
CONCLUSION
144. In the wake of the unbecoming conduct of the trio, we do not feel bound by
the nature of relief claimed by Vishnu. We, therefore, consider it appropriate
to order/direct as under:
i. the impugned order of the High Court dated 28th October, 2021 passed in
WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors.]
stands set aside, since fraud has vitiated the entire proceedings;
ii. as a corollary to the above, the judgment and order dated 5th May, 2022
in Reddy Veerana (supra) (which too was obtained by playing fraud) is
declared to be a nullity and stands recalled in exercise of our inherent
powers;
82
iii. the order dated 30th January, 2023 passed by this Court in MA 255/2023
in C.A. No. 3636/2022 is recalled, also in exercise of our inherent powers;
iv. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 [Reddy Veeranna v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors.] is
remanded in its entirety to the High Court;
v. as a consequence of (iv) supra, WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will stand revived
and restored on the file of the High Court with direction to implead Vishnu
Vardhan and T. Sudhakar as additional respondents;
vi. WP (Civil) 2272/2019 will be decided afresh by the High Court in
accordance with law, upon hearing all interested parties;
vii. should any disputed question of fact arise for decision disabling it to decide
the same based on affidavit evidence, the High Court may in its discretion
permit the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence regarding the
claim for compensation as well as re-determination and apportionment
thereof amongst the rightful claimants, as if it were exercising powers
under Section 54 of the 1894 Act.
viii. till such time a decision is given by the High Court, the interim order dated
21st January 2025, whereby we allowed Reddy to furnish securities through
his partnership firm Manyata-Pristine instead of cash deposit, shall
continue meaning thereby that the securities furnished by him in the form
of title deeds of immovable properties shall remain deposited with this
Court and shall be subject to and abide by further orders of the High Court;
ix. however, the interim order dated 3rd October, 2024 restraining Reddy from
entering into any agreement to sell and/or to create third party rights in
respect of the immovable assets owned by him (except those for which
83
security has been furnished), his family and the companies created by himor his family members shall remain in abeyance subject to his cooperating
with the High Court for early disposal of the writ petition;
x. in the event of non-cooperation from the side of Reddy, the High Court
may pass such restraining order as it may deem fit and proper.
xi. having regard to the magnitude of fraud which we have detected in course
of consideration of these proceedings, we find it just and proper to request
the Chief Justice of the High Court to preside over the Division Bench for
finally deciding the writ petition as early as possible, and subject to the
convenience of the Bench, preferably by the year end;
xii. all questions on merits, other than those decided vide this judgment,
including re-determination of fair and just compensation for the acquired
land and apportionment thereof, are kept open for being urged before the
High Court;
xiii. having regard to the track record of the trio, the possibility of a compromise
cannot be totally ruled out and if they file terms of settlement, we hope
and trust that the High Court will carefully examine such terms to ensure
that public interest is not hindered in its acceptance; and
xiv. pending suits/proceedings, if any before any judicial fora / administrative
authority, shall be taken to its logical conclusion in accordance with law.
145. The civil appeal (CA 7777 of 2023), the appeal against the order of the
Registrar (MA Diary No. 6013/2024 in Review Petition Diary No. 33040/ 2023),
and the application for recall of the order dated 30th January, 2023 (MA
1737/2023 in MA 255/2023 in C.A. No. 3636/2022) are allowed and shall
84
stand disposed of on the above terms together with all other connected
applications. The writ petition [WP (C) 673 of 2023] is, however, dismissed.
146. As indicated in paragraph 137, Vishnu shall be at liberty to cure the defects
upon due communication of the additional court fees to be put in by him for
making the petition for review in order. Thereafter, the petition for review (Dy.
No. 33040/2023) shall be registered, appropriately numbered, and shown to
have been disposed of by this order. Should Vishnu fail to cure the defects,
the petition shall stand dismissed as infructuous.
147. SMC (C) No. 3/2024 will be heard separately.
148. In view of the remand ordered by us, we observe that the parties shall bear
their own costs.
………………………………J
(SURYA KANT)
………………………………J
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
………………………………J
(UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 23, 2025.
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