Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 15.7.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 23 July, 2025
2025:HHC:23791
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1644 of 2025
.
Reserved on: 15.7.2025
Date of Decision: 23.07.2025.
Arjun Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
Coram
r to ...Respondent
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Vikrant Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No. 77 of 2025, dated 22.6.2025,
registered at Police Station Amb, District Una, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 318(4) read
with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a Pradhan of
the Diara Gram Panchayat and was previously elected as Vice
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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President of Dilwan Cooperative Agriculture Service Society Ltd.,
Una. An inquiry was conducted under Section 69(1) of the H.P.
.
Cooperative Society Act, 1968, by the District Audit Officer
(Co-operative Societies). Certain discrepancies and shortcomings
were noticed in the cash book of the Societies. The cash book was
exclusively maintained and operated by the Secretary of the
Society, who was responsible for daily accounting and financial
administration. The report does not attribute any role to the
petitioner. The petitioner had put his signatures on a resolution
passed by the Managing Committee for enhancing the Society’s
Cash Credit Limit from ₹1,80,00,000/- to ₹2.00 crores, which
was a collective decision of the Committee. Certain loans were
disbursed to the members and the beneficiaries in the ordinary
course of business. A loan of ₹ 17.00 lacs was sanctioned to the
petitioner, and the amount of ₹19,81,623/- was disbursed to the
business concern of the petitioner. The disbursal was made with
supporting documentation. The majority of the amount has been
returned to society. The amount advanced to Guru Nanak Filling
Station was fully repaid on 19.2.2021. The fact that the loan was
disbursed to the petitioner’s son or the petitioner cannot infer
any misappropriation. The disciplinary proceedings were
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initiated against Smt. Rimpi Devi, the Secretary of the Society. A
penalty of ₹25,43,537/- was imposed upon her by the Society.
.
The audit report does not record any finding of misappropriation,
embezzlement or diversion of funds. The acts committed by the
petitioner may amount to a procedural lapse, but do not
constitute embezzlement. The ingredients of cheating are not
satisfied. The petitioner has already tendered his resignation
from the post of Vice President on 5.9.2023. He is ready and
willing to join the investigation and abide by the terms and
conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that a complaint was received in the Police Station
regarding the misappropriation of ₹2,91,00,370.65 by Smt. Rimpi
Devi and the petitioner. The police registered the FIR and
conducted the investigation. The police seized the record and
found that an audit was conducted in which various discrepancies
were detected. The Cash Credit Limit was enhanced from ₹1.00
crore to ₹1,30,00,000/- on 29.3.2016, which was enhanced to
₹1,80,00,000/- and thereafter to ₹2.00 crores in 2016-2017.
These enhancements were signed by the petitioner and Urmila
Devi. Signatures of Urmila Devi did not match. Various
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proceedings were conducted, which were only signed by Urmila
Devi and the petitioner. The money was disbursed to certain
.
persons. The loan was disbursed to Ajay, Dinesh and Bhura
Kumar, who were not Members of the Society. ₹19,81,683/- was
transferred to Guru Nanak Patrol Filling Station. The maximum
amount was disbursed to the petitioner or his relatives after
enhancing the limit. ₹2,91,00,370.65 were misappropriated by
the petitioner and Rimpi Devi. The audit report recommended the
recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue. The petitioner
is to be interrogated regarding the misappropriated amount.
Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
4. I have heard Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel for
the petitioner, and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr. Vikrant Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely
implicated. The FIR was registered out of the political rivalry
between the petitioner and other persons. No case of cheating is
made out in the present case. The petitioner would join the
investigation as and when called upon to do so. Therefore, he
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prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in
.
Harish Singh Rawat v. State of H.P. 2025:HHC:20282 in support of
his submission.
6. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner
is involved in the embezzlement of a huge amount. The custodial
interrogation of the petitioner is necessary to unearth the extent
of embezzlement and the role of other persons. The resolution
regarding the enhancement of the Cash Credit Limit was signed
by the petitioner and Urmila. Signatures of Urmila are suspicious.
The amount was disbursed to the petitioner and his relatives after
enhancement. The custodial interrogation of the petitioner is
necessary to determine the involvement of other persons and
trace the money. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.
Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019)
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3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the power of pre-
arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It
.
was observed:
“69. Ordinarily, arrest is a part of the procedure of the
investigation to secure not only the presence of the
accused but also several other purposes. Power under
Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the
same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of pre-
arrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases. The
judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be
properly exercised after application of mind as to the
nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of theapplicant fleeing justice and other factors to decide
whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail.
Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes in the
sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court
must be circumspect while exercising such power for thegrant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be
granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only
when the court is convinced that exceptionalcircumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary
remedy.”
9. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that economic
offences are to be treated differently from other offences. It was
observed:
Economic offences
78. Power under Section 438 CrPC being an extraordinary
remedy, has to be exercised sparingly; more so, in cases of
economic offences. Economic offences stand as a different
class as they affect the economic fabric of society.
In Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain
[Directorate of Enforcement v. Ashok Kumar Jain, (1998) 2
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SCC 105: 1998 SCC (Cri) 510], it was held that in economic
offences, the accused is not entitled to anticipatory bail.
xxxxxx
.
80. Observing that an economic offence is committed with
deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless
of the consequence to the community, in State of
Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal [State of
Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal, (1987) 2 SCC 364: 1987
SCC (Cri) 364], it was held as under: (SCC p. 371, para 5)
“5. … The entire community is aggrieved if the
economic offenders who ruin the economy of the
State are not brought to book. A murder may be
committed in the heat of the moment, upon passions
being aroused. An economic offence is committed
with cool calculation and deliberate design with an
eye on personal profit, regardless of the
consequences to the community. A disregard for the
interest of the community can be manifested only at
the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the
community in the system to administer justice in an
even-handed manner without fear of criticism from
the quarters which view white-collar crimes with a
permissive eye, unmindful of the damage done to the
national economy and national interest.”
81. Observing that economic offences constitute a class
apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the
matter of bail, in Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI [Y.S. Jagan
Mohan Reddy v. CBI, (2013) 7 SCC 439: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri)
552], the Supreme Court held as under: (SCC p. 449, paras
34-35)
“34. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need
to be viewed with a different approach in the matter of
bail. The economic offences having deep-rooted
conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds need
to be viewed seriously and considered as grave offences
affecting the economy of the country as a whole and
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thereby posing a serious threat to the financial health of
the country.
35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind
.
the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character of the
accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with,
the larger interests of the public/State and other
similar considerations.” (emphasis supplied)
82. Referring to Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar
Bajoria [Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998)
1 SCC 52: 1998 SCC (Cri) 261], in Directorate of
Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora [Directorate of
Enforcement v. Bher Chand Tikaji Bora, (1999) 5 SCC 720:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1045], while hearing an appeal by the
Enforcement Directorate against the order [BherchandTikaji Bora v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No.
2140 of 1998, decided on 21-7-1998 (Bom)] of the Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court granting anticipatory bailto the respondent thereon, the Supreme Court set aside the
order of the Single Judge granting anticipatory bail.
10. This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay v.
State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held:
“25. We have already held that the power to grant
anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it
was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any
stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is
the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant
should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of
the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of
each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the
Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of
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2025:HHC:23791cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper
the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes
lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall
not be understood to have held that the Court shall not.
pass interim protection pending consideration of such
application as the Section is destined to safeguard the
freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, andwe say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit
cases.”
11. It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana,
(2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785 that the Courts should
balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation
while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was
observed:
“21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding
individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent
the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent
individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges inmaintaining a delicate balance between individual rights
and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walklies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual
rights and protecting public interest. While the right to
liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the courtmust also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact
on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation.
The court’s discretion in weighing these interests in the
facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to
ensure a just outcome.”
12. It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab,
(2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488 that pre-arrest bail can
be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the
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view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the
presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was
.
observed at page 501:
“21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a
serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied.
Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional cir-
cumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that
the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime orthe allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So
far as the case at hand is concerned, it cannot be said that
any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the
petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, andthere is no frivolity in the prosecution.
22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement
in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC
452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563], wherein this Court expressed thus:
(SCC p. 465, para 34)
“34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the na-
ture of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the
severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the
character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to
the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the wit-
nesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/
State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in
mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has
used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of
“the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of
bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case
against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not
expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in
original and supplied)
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23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the
sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The
presumption of innocence is one of the considerations
which the court should keep in mind while considering the
.
plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the
cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over
solicitous homage to the accused’s liberty can, sometimes,
defeat the cause of public justice.
13. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
14.
The status report shows that the petitioner was Vice
President of the Society. The Cash Credit Limit of the Society was
enhanced from ₹1.00 crore to ₹2.00 crores during his tenure, with
his signatures and the signatures of Urmila Devi. The status
report also shows that the signatures of Urmila Devi were
suspicious. Money was thereafter disbursed to the petitioner and
his relatives. These allegations clearly show that the petitioner
had taken advantage of his position to enhance the Cash Credit
Limit and thereafter to utilise the money of the Society for his
benefit. The petitioner, being a Vice President of the Society, was
supposed to protect its interests; however, he failed to do so and
utilised the money for his benefit. This is prima facie an abuse of
the authority vested in the petitioner. While dealing with a similar
issue of an abuse of public service by a public servant, the Hon’ble
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Supreme Court had held in Devinder Kumar Bansal (supra) that
pre-arrest bail should not be granted in such cases. It was
.
observed:-
“24. If liberty is to be denied to an accused to ensure a
corruption-free society, then the courts should not hesitate to
deny such liberty. Where overwhelming considerations in the
nature aforesaid require denial of anticipatory bail, it has to be
denied. It is altogether a different thing to say that once theinvestigation is over and a charge-sheet is filed, the court may
consider granting regular bail to a public servant accused of
indulging in corruption.
25. Avarice is a common frailty of mankind, and Robert Walpole’s
famous pronouncement that all men have their price,
notwithstanding the unsavoury cynicism that it suggests, is not
very far from the truth. As far back as more than two centuries
ago, it was Burke who cautioned: “Among a people generally
corrupt, liberty cannot last long.” In more recent years, RomainRolland lamented that France fell because there was corruption
without indignation. Corruption has, in it, very dangerous
potentialities. Corruption, a word of wide connotation, has, inrespect of almost all the spheres of our day-to-day life, all over
the world, the limited meaning of allowing decisions and actionsto be influenced not by the rights or wrongs of a case but by the
prospects of monetary gains or other selfish considerations.
26. If even a fraction of what was the vox populi said about the
magnitude of corruption to be true, then it would not be far
removed from the truth that it is the rampant corruption
indulged in with impunity by highly placed persons that has led
to economic unrest in this country. If one is asked to name one
sole factor that effectively arrested the progress of our society to
prosperity, undeniably, it is corruption. If the society in a
developing country faces a menace greater than even the one
from the hired assassins to its law and order, then that is from
the corrupt elements at the higher echelons of the Government
and of the political parties.
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27. In Manoj Narula v. Union of India [Manoj Narula v. Union of
India, (2014) 9 SCC 1], this Court held that corruption erodes the
fundamental tenets of the rule of law and quoted with approval
its judgment in Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of.
Maharashtra [Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal v. State of
Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 642 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737 : (2013) 2
SCC (L&S) 187] and held as under : (Manoj Narula case [ManojNarula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1], SCC pp. 25-26, para 16)
“16. … ’26. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction
that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption
mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, acceleratesundeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory
of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country,
corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of
governance.’ (Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal case [NiranjanHemchandra Sashittal v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC
642: (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 737: (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 187], SCC pp.
654-55, para 26)” (emphasis supplied)
28. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh [Subramanian
Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC 64: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri)1041: (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666] this Court held as under: (SCC p.
100, para 68)
“68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses a gravedanger to the concept of constitutional governance, but it also
threatens the very foundation of Indian democracy and theRule of Law. The magnitude of corruption in our public life is
incompatible with the concept of a socialist, secular democraticrepublic. It cannot be disputed that where corruption begins,
all rights end. Corruption devalues human rights, chokes
development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, and
fraternity, which are the core values in our preambular vision.
Therefore, the duty of the court is that any anti-corruption law
has to be interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to
strengthen the fight against corruption.” (emphasis supplied)
29. In K.C. Sareen v. CBI [K.C. Sareen v. CBI, (2001) 6 SCC 584: 2001
SCC (Cri) 1186], this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 589, para 12)
“12. Corruption by public servants has now reached a
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2025:HHC:23791grappling with even the institutions created for the protection
of the republic. Unless those tentacles are intercepted and
impeded from gripping the normal and orderly functioning of
the public offices, through strong legislative, executive, as well.
as judicial exercises, the corrupt public servants could even
paralyse the functioning of such institutions and thereby
hinder the democratic polity.” (emphasis supplied)
30. While approving the judgment of Subramanian
Swamy v. CBI [Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 :
(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 : (2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36], rendered by another
Constitution Bench in Manoj Narula case [Manoj Narula v. Unionof India, (2014) 9 SCC 1], a Constitution Bench of this Court,
dealing with rampant corruption, observed as under : (SCC pp.
26-27, paras 17-18)
“17. Recently, in Subramanian Swamy v. CBI [Subramanian
Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 42 :
(2014) 3 SCC (L&S) 36], the Constitution Bench, speaking
through R.M. Lodha, C.J., while declaring Section 6-A of the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, which was
inserted by Act 45 of 2003, as unconstitutional, has opinedthat : (SCC pp. 725-26, para 59)
’59. It seems to us that the classification which is made in
Section 6-A on the basis of status in the government service isnot permissible under Article 14, as it defeats the purpose of
finding prima facie truth in the allegations of graft, whichamount to an offence under the PC Act, 1988. Can there be
sound differentiation between corrupt public servants based ontheir status? Surely not, because irrespective of their status or
position, corrupt public servants are corrupters of public power.
The corrupt public servants, whether high or low, are birds of
the same feather and must be confronted with the process of
investigation and inquiry equally. Based on the position or
status in service, no distinction can be made between public
servants against whom there are allegations amounting to an
offence under the PC Act, 1988.’
And thereafter, the larger Bench further said: (SCC p. 726,
para 60)
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’60. Corruption is an enemy of the nation, and
tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing
such persons is a necessary mandate of the PC Act,
1988. It is difficult to justify the classification which
.
has been made in Section 6-A because the goal of law
in the PC Act, 1988 is to meet corruption cases with a
very strong hand, and all public servants are warned
through such a legislative measure that corrupt
public servants have to face very serious
consequences.’
And again: (SCC pp. 730-31, paras 71-72)
’71. The Office of Public Power cannot be the
workshop of personal gain. The probity in public life
is of great importance. How can two public servants
against whom there are allegations of corruption of
graft, or bribe-taking, or criminal misconduct under
the PC Act, 1988 can be made to be treated differently
because one happens to be a junior officer and the
other, a senior decision-maker
72. Corruption is an enemy of the nation, and
tracking down a corrupt public servant, however
high he may be, and punishing such a person is a
necessary mandate under the PC Act, 1988. The
status or position of a public servant does not qualify
such a public servant for exemption from equal
treatment. The decision-making power does not
segregate corrupt officers into two classes as they
are common criminals and have to be tracked down
by the same process of inquiry and investigation.’
18. From the aforesaid authorities, it is clear as noonday
that corruption has the potentiality to destroy many a
progressive aspect, and it has acted as the formidable
enemy of the nation.” (emphasis supplied).
15. In the present case, there is a huge embezzlement of
₹2,91,00,370.65. This money was invested by the members of the
Society to protect their future, which has been compromised by
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the acts of the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held
entitled to pre-arrest bail.
.
16. It was submitted that the custodial interrogation of
the petitioner is necessary. This submission has some force. The
money was prima facie embezzled over a long period of time. It is
necessary to trace the money trail to properly investigate the
matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
Versus Anil Sharma (1997) 7 SCC 187, that where custodial
interrogation is required, pre-arrest bail should not be granted. It
was observed: –
“6. We find force in the submission of the CBI that
custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation
oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced
with a favourable order under Section 438 of the Code. In acase like this, effective interrogation of a suspected person
is of tremendous advantage in disinterring many useful
information and also materials which would have been
concealed. Success in such interrogation would elude if thesuspected person knows that he is well protected and
insulated by a pre-arrest bail order during the time he is
interrogated. Very often, interrogation in such a condition
would reduce to a mere ritual. The argument that the
custodial interrogation is fraught with the danger of the
person being subjected to third-degree methods need not
be countenanced, for such an argument can be advanced by
all accused in all criminal cases. The Court has to presume
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2025:HHC:23791task of disinterring offences would not conduct themselves
as offender”.
17. A similar view was taken by the Delhi High Court in
.
Mukesh Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1032,
wherein it was observed:
“13. One of the significant factors in determining this
question would be the need for custodial interrogation.
Without a doubt, custodial interrogation is more effective toquestion a suspect. The cocoon of protection afforded by a
bail order insulates the suspect, and he could thwart
interrogation, reducing it to futile rituals. But it must be
also kept in mind that while interrogation of a suspect isone of the basic and effective methods of crime solving, the
liberty of an individual also needs to be balanced out.”
18. It was held in P Chidambaram (supra) that the grant of
pre-arrest bail may hamper the investigations. It was observed:
“83. Grant of anticipatory bail at the stage of investigation
may frustrate the investigating agency in interrogating the
accused and in collecting useful information, and also thematerials which might have been concealed. Success in such
interrogation would elude if the accused knows that he is
protected by the order of the court. Grant of anticipatorybail, particularly in economic offences, would definitely
hamper the effective investigation. Having regard to the
materials said to have been collected by the respondent
Enforcement Directorate and considering the stage of the
investigation, we are of the view that it is not a fit case to
grant anticipatory bail.”
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19. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be released on bail at
this stage.
.
20. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the
same is dismissed.
21. The observations made here-in-before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
r to
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
23rd July, 2025
(Chander)
::: Downloaded on – 23/07/2025 21:22:31 :::CIS
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