Uttarakhand High Court
With vs Parmanand Yadav on 22 July, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:6440-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Special Appeal No.1061 of 2017
With
Delay Condonation Application (CLMA/16548/2017)
22 July, 2025
State of Uttarakhand and Others --Appellants
Versus
Parmanand Yadav --Respondent
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Presence:-
Mr. Susheel Kumar Vashishtha, learned Standing Counsel for the
State/appellants.
Mr. Mohd. Shaify, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Aditya Kumar Arya,
learned counsel for the respondent.
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Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Subhash Upadhyay, J.
(Per: Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
JUDGMENT
There is delay of 200 days in filing this
special appeal.
2. Objection to the delay condonation
application has not been filed by the respondent. For
the reasons indicated in the affidavit filed in support of
the delay condonation application, the same is allowed
and the delay in filing this special appeal is condoned.
3. State has filed this intra-court appeal
challenging judgment dated 01.05.2017 rendered by
learned Single Judge in WPSS No.774 of 2017. By the
said order, writ petition filed by respondent challenging
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termination order dated 02.06.2016 was allowed and
authorities of education department were directed to
reinstate respondent (writ-petitioner) with all
consequential benefits, within six weeks.
4. The judgment passed by learned Single
Judge impugned in this appeal is reproduced below:-
“Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
submits that the present lis is squarely covered by
the judgment rendered by this Court in WPSS No.618
of 2016 and analogous matters on 28.03.2017.
Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of in
terms of the judgment cited hereinabove. The
impugned termination order is quashed and set
aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the
petitioner with all consequential benefits within a
period of six weeks from today.
However, liberty is reserved to the respondents
to proceed with the matter in accordance with law.”
5. Learned State Counsel submits that writ
petition filed by respondent was decided in terms of
judgment dated 28.03.2017 rendered in WPSS No.618
of 2016. He submits that by a common judgment dated
28.03.2017, as many as eight writ petitions filed by
teachers, whose service was terminated on the ground
that they secured appointment based on forged
educational certificates, were decided in which leading
case was WPSS No.1152 of 2016; out of these eight
writ petitions, WPSS No.618 of 2016 was also decided
by the common judgment dated 28.03.2017. He further
submits that the judgment as rendered in WPSS
No.1152 of 2016, was set aside by Division Bench of
this Court vide judgment dated 13.02.2019 rendered in
SPA No.384 of 2017 and SPA No.385 of 2017.
Operative portion of the judgment rendered by Division
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Bench in SPA No.384 of 2017 and SPA No.385 of 2017
is extracted below:-
“12. We consider it appropriate, in such
circumstances, to set-aside the order under appeal,
and to restore the writ petitions to file. The learned
Single Judge shall examine whether failure, to
furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent
employee, has caused them prejudice, and whether
it would result in the finding recorded by the
Disciplinary Authority, and the punishment imposed
on the delinquent employee, being set-aside.”
6. Learned State Counsel thus submits that
since Division Bench of this Court has set aside the
judgment rendered in WPSS No.618 of 2016, therefore,
impugned order dated 01.05.2017, which relies on the
aforesaid judgment, also deserves to be set aside. He
further submits that respondent was not qualified for
appointment as Assistant Teacher (Government
Primary School) as he was not having Basic Teachers
Course (in short “BTC”) Certificate and he secured
appointment based on forged BTC Certificate. He
submits that the allegation that respondent was not
BTC qualified was confirmed when his certificate was
sent for verification to Deputy Registrar, Examination
Regulatory Authority, U.P.
7. Learned State Counsel relied upon judgment
rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of R.
Vishwanath Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Others,
reported in (2004) 2 SCC 105 and also placed reliance
on judgment rendered by this Court in WPSS No.254 of
2023 for contending that since respondent had secured
appointment as Teacher by playing fraud, therefore, he
is not entitled to protection under Article 311 of the
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Constitution of India. Relevant extracts of paragraph
nos.12 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below:
“12….
“Where an appointment in a service has
been acquired by practising fraud or deceit,
such an appointment is no appointment in law,
in service and in such a situation Article 311 of
the Constitution is not attracted at all.”
8. Learned State Counsel has also referred to
another judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court
in State of Bihar and Others Vs. Kirti Narayan
Prasad reported in (2019) 13 SCC 250. Paragraph
nos.14 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
“16. In the instant cases, the writ petitioners
have filed the petitions before the High Court with a
specific prayer to regularise their service and to set
aside the order of termination of their services. They
have also challenged the report submitted by the
State Committee. The real controversy is whether
the writ petitioners were legally and validly
appointed. The finding of the State Committee is that
many writ petitioners had secured appointment by
producing fake or forged appointment letter or had
been inducted in government service surreptitiously
by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer
concerned by issuing a posting order. The writ
petitioners are the beneficiaries of illegal orders
made by the Civil Surgeoncum-Chief Medical Officer.
They were given notice to establish the genuineness
of their appointment and to show-cause. None of
them could establish the genuineness or legality of
their appointment before the State Committee. The
State Committee on appreciation of the materials on
record has opined that their appointment was illegal4
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and void ab initio. We do not find any ground to
disagree with the finding of the State Committee. In
the circumstances, the question of regularisation of
their services by invoking para 53 of the judgment in
Umadevi (3) [State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3),
(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] does not
arise. Since the appointment of the petitioners is ab
initio void, they cannot be said to be the civil
servants of the State. Therefore, holding disciplinary
proceedings envisaged by Article 311 of the
Constitution or under any other disciplinary rules
shall not arise.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Meghmala & others Vs. G. Narasimha Reddy &
others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 383, while laying
down the consequences of fraud by a party, held as
under:
“28. It is settled proposition of law that where
an applicant gets an order/office by making
misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the
competent authority, such order cannot be sustained
in the eye of the law. “Fraud avoids all judicial acts,
ecclesiastical or temporal.” (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1994 SC
853] .) In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1
QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341
(CA)] the Court observed without equivocation that :
(QB p. 712) “No judgment of a court, no order of a
Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been
obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.”
29. In A.P. State Financial Corpn. v. GAR
ReRolling Mills [(1994) 2 SCC 647 : AIR 1994 SC
2151] and State of Maharashtra v. Prabhu [(1994) 2
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SCC 481 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 676 : (1994) 27 ATC
116] this Court observed that a writ court, while
exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as
to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts
are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith.
“Equity is always known to defend the law from
crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade
law.”
30. In Shrisht Dhawan v. Shaw Bros. [(1992) 1
SCC 534 : AIR 1992 SC 1555] it has been held as
under : (SCC p. 553, para 20)
“20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the
most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of
jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human
conduct.”
31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rajendra Singh [(2000) 3 SCC 581 : 2000 SCC (Cri)
726 : AIR 2000 SC 1165] this Court observed that
“Fraud and justice never dwell together” (fraus et jus
nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim
which has never lost its temper over all these
centuries.
32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various
cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to
bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played
fraud or made misrepresentation and in such
circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the
fraud. (See Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential
School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi [(1990) 3
SCC 655 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 520 : (1990) 14 ATC
766] , Union of India v. M. Bhaskaran [1995 Supp
(4) SCC 100 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 162 : (1996) 32 ATC
94] , Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal
Yadav [(2004) 6 SCC 325 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 785] ,
State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing
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Parmar [(2007) 1 SCC 80 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 5] ,
Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar
Refining Co. [(2007) 8 SCC 110 : AIR 2007 SC 2798]
and Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC
751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929] .)
33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and
fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most
solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an
act of deliberate deception with a design to secure
something, which is otherwise not due. The
expression “fraud” involves two elements, deceit and
injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating
intended to get an advantage. [Vide Vimla (Dr.) v.
Delhi Admn. [AIR 1963 SC 1572 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ
434] , Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd.
[(1996) 5 SCC 550] , State of A.P. v. T.
Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149 : AIR 2005 SC
3110] , K.D. Sharma v. SAIL [(2008) 12 SCC 481]
and Central Bank of India v. Madhulika Guruprasad
Dahir [(2008) 13 SCC 170 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S)
272] .]”
10. Similarly, in the case of Regional Manager,
Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad
Dahir & others, reported in (2008) 13 SCC 170,
Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the case,
where a person had obtained appointment on the basis
of a false caste certificate, and it was held that fraud
vitiates everything and, therefore, if a person has
continued to work on the post for over 20 years, even
then, having obtained appointment on the basis of false
and forged caste certificate, cannot claim any equity or
benefit on that basis. Paragraph nos.14, 15, 16, 17 &
18 of the said judgment are extracted below:
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“14. Similarly, the plea regarding
rendering of services for a long period has been
considered and rejected in a series of decisions
of this Court and we deem it unnecessary to
launch an exhaustive dissertation on principles
in this context. It would suffice to state that
except in a few decisions, where the
admission/appointment was not cancelled
because of peculiar factual matrix obtaining
therein, the consensus of judicial opinion is
that equity, sympathy or generosity has no
place where the original appointment rests on a
false caste certificate. A person who enters the
service by producing a false caste certificate
and obtains appointment to the post meant for
a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or OBC,
as the case may be, deprives a genuine
candidate falling in either of the said
categories, of appointment to that post, and
does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence
of this Court. He who comes to the Court with
a claim based on falsity and deception cannot
plead equity nor the Court would be justified to
exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour.
15. An act of deliberate deception with a
design to secure something, which is otherwise
not due, tantamounts to fraud. Fraud is a
conduct either by letter or words, which
induces the other person or authority to take a
definite determinative stand as a response to
the conduct of the former either by words or
letter. (See R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of
Kerala [(2004) 2 SCC 105 : 2004 SCC (L&S)
350] , Bank of India [(2005) 7 SCC 690 : 2005
SCC (L&S) 1011] , BHEL [(2007) 5 SCC 336 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 152] , Derry v. Peek
[(1889) 14 AC 337 : (1886-90) All ER Rep 18
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(HL)] , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High
School and Intermediate Education [(2003) 8
SCC 311] and Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v. State
of Maharashtra [(2005) 7 SCC 605] .)
16. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi
[(2003) 8 SCC 319] this Court had observed
that fraud is anathema to all equitable
principles and any affair tainted with fraud
cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
application of any equitable doctrine.
17. Recently, in State of Maharashtra v.
Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar [(2007) 1
SCC 80 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 5] dealing with a
similar situation, this Court has observed thus:
(SCC p. 89, para 23)
“23. The makers of the Constitution
laid emphasis on equality amongst
citizens. The Constitution of India
provides for protective discrimination and
reservation so as to enable the
disadvantaged group to come on the
same platform as that of the forward
community. If and when a person takes
an undue advantage of the said
beneficent provision of the Constitution
by obtaining the benefits of reservation
and other benefits provided under the
Presidential Order although he is not
entitled thereto, he not only plays a fraud
on the society but in effect and substance
plays a fraud on the Constitution. When,
therefore, a certificate is granted to a
person who is not otherwise entitled
thereto, it is entirely incorrect to contend
that the State shall be helpless spectator
in the matter.”
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18. Having considered the matter in the
light of the aforestated legal position, in our
judgment, the decision of the High Court is
untenable. As noted supra, the employee
having accepted the finding of the Scrutiny
Committee, holding that the caste certificate
furnished by the employee was false, the very
foundation of her appointment vanished and
her appointment was rendered illegal. Her
conduct renders her unfit to be continued in
service and must necessarily entail termination
of her service. Under these circumstances,
there is absolutely no justification for her claim
in respect of the post merely on the ground
that she had worked on the post for over
twenty years. The post was meant for a
reserved candidate but she usurped the same
by misrepresentation and deception. In our
opinion, the fact that caste certificate was
referred to the Scrutiny Committee for
verification after ten years of her joining the
service and a long time was taken by the
Scrutiny Committee to verify the same is of no
consequence inasmuch as delay on both the
counts does not validate the caste certificate
and the consequent illegal appointment.”
11. Respondent was terminated on the ground
that he secured appointment on forged BTC Certificate.
BTC Certificate furnished by respondent at the time of
his appointment was sent for verification to the Deputy
Registrar, Examination Regulatory Authority, U.P. and
the Deputy Registrar informed the District Education
Officer (Elementary) Udham Singh Nagar that no such
certificate of training was issued by his office.
Thereafter, respondent was give notice asking him to
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show cause within ten days and thereafter the time
given to respondent for showing cause was extended
for another fifteen days, however, respondent did not
respond to the notice issued to him from time to time.
12. Thus respondent himself is to be blamed for
not responding to the show cause notice and the only
inference which can be drawn against him is that he
was not possessed of BTC qualification which is
essential qualification for appointment as Primary
School Teacher.
13. In view of the legal position as discussed
above, the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India would not be available to the respondent.
Thus, the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge
is interferable.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the
impugned judgment dated 01.05.2017. Thus, the
special appeal is allowed.
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
22.07.2025
SS
SUKHBANT
Digitally signed by SUKHBANT SINGH
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH
COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=71978f9c61bfde0ba69967c787b1764ea7bc7dd12
9a8a6380d49b1885e628615, postalCode=263001,
SINGH
st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=2D8B71B8D8E345F6B7F95B1DD4FB4BEBD2
B7D72C42261361AED33172F152148D, cn=SUKHBANT
SINGH
Date: 2025.07.24 10:22:35 +05’30’
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