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Jharkhand High Court
Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd. … vs Radha Mohan Singh on 22 July, 2025
Author: Rajesh Kumar
Bench: Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:20054-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.120 of 2021
------
Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd. Corporate Office Engineering
Building, Dhurwa, Ranchi through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, through its authorized officer A.K. Shrivastava, Aged about-
54 Years, Son of Late R.K. Lal, Resident of Gas Godam Road, P.O.
Namkum, P.S. Namkum, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand and presently
working and posted as Senior Manager (Gen.) JUVNL
…. …. Respondent No.1/Appellant
Versus
1. Radha Mohan Singh, Son of Late Sheo Pujan Singh, Retired
Accountant, Electric Supply Sub-Division No.1, Adityapur,
Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran Nigam Limited, Adityapur, District-
Saraikela-Kharsawan, Jharkhand, permanent resident of village &
P.O. Chaura, P.S. Narahi, District-Ballia (Uttar Pradesh), PIN
277502. …. …. Petitioner/Respondent
2. The General Manager, Jamshedpur Area Board, Jharkhand Bijli
Vitaran Nigam Ltd. Bistupur, P.O. P.S.-Bistupur, Jamshedpur, East
Singhbhum
3. The Superintending Engineer, Jamshedpur Electricity Supply
Circle, Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd., Vikas Bhawan, P.O.
P.S.-Saraikela Kharsawan, Saraikela Kharsawan
4. The Electrical Executive Engineer, Electric Supply Division,
Adityapur, P.O. P.S. Aditypur, Saraikela Kharsawan
5. The Deputy General Manager (F&A), Jharkhand Bijli Vitaran
Nigam Ltd. Corporate Office, Engineering Building, PO-Dhurwa,
PS-Jagannathpur, Dhurwa, Ranchi.
…. …. Respondent/Proforma Respondents
CORAM : HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
——
For the Appellant : Mr. Mukesh Kr. Sinha, Advocate
For Pvt. Respondent : Mr. Arvind Kumar Singh, Advocate
Mr. Vijay Bahadur Singh, Advocate
——
11/Dated: 22.07.2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.
1. The instant intra-court appeal under Clause-10 of Letters
Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 20.01.2020
passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.164
of 2019, whereby and whereunder, while disposing of the writ
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petition, direction has been given to the respondents to make
payment of three months’ salary and hold the petitioner entitled for
panel as well as statutory interest if there is delayed payment of
G.P.F. on the part of the respondents.
I.A.No.9408 of 2024
2. The instant appeal is barred by inordinate delay of 815 days,
therefore, an application for condoning the aforesaid delay has been
filed being I.A.No.9408 of 2024.
3. This Court, after taking into consideration the fact that the
instant intra-court appeal has been filed after inordinate delay of 815
days, deems it fit and proper, to first consider the delay condonation
application before going into the legality and propriety of the
impugned order on merit.
4. The ground for condonation of delay has been taken, as per
the pleading made in the instant interlocutory application that after
getting the impugned order dated 20.01.2020, it has been decided to
challenge the same and accordingly, the file was transmitted to the
Law Department. The Law Department thereafter making necessary
paper works, forwarded the entire set of writ petition and affidavits
along with order impugned to the Senior Standing Counsel. The
concerned counsel of the Nigam prepared the memo of appeal and
forwarded the same to the Law Department.
5. After receiving the file from the concerned Department, memo
of appeal was affidavited and filed on 19.03.2021. Hence the
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aforesaid exercise consumed time and the appeal could not be filed
within the period of limitation, which according to the appellants is
not intentional rather on account of procedural delay.
6. Mr. Mukesh Kr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-JBVNL, therefore, has prayed to condone the delay and
has submitted that the reasons assigned in the instant interlocutory
application are sufficient to condone the delay.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties on delay
condonation application and before considering the same, this Court,
deems it fit and proper to refer certain legal proposition, as has been
propounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the approach
of the Court in condoning the inordinate delay.
8. There is no dispute about the fact that generally the lis is not to
be rejected on the technical ground of limitation but certainly if the
filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, then the duty of the
Court is to consider the application to condone the delay before
entering into the merit of the lis.
9. It requires to refer herein that the Law of limitation is enshrined
in the legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the
general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation
are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is
that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed
period of time, as has been held in the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Brijesh Kumar & Ors. Vrs. State of Haryana
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& Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 351.
10. The Privy Council in General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corpn. Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, (1939-40)
67 IA 416, relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law
Lecturers, 1932, wherein, it has been said that:
“A Law of limitation and prescription may appear
to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular
case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is
to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a
particular party as the Judge cannot, on
equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by
the law, postpone its operation, or introduce
exceptions not recognized by law.”
11. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556,
the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of delay of
565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or
satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given,
held at paragraph-6 as under:
“6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes and
the courts have no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds.”
12. While considering the similar issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12
SCC 649, wherein, it has been held as under:
“21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach
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reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.9. (ix) the conduct, behavior and attitude
of a party relating to its inaction or negligence
are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental
principle is that the courts are required to
weigh the scale of balance of justice in
respect of both parties and the said principle
cannot be given a total go-by in the name of
liberal approach.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive
delay as a non-serious matter and, hence,
lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a
nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of
course, within legal parameters.”
13. It is settled position of Law that when a litigant does not act
with bona fide motive and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part, the period of limitation for filing the appeal expires,
such lack of bona fide motive and gross inaction and negligence are
the vital factors which should be taken into consideration while
considering the question of condonation of delay. Reference in this
regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Division Bench
of Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat through Secretary & Anr.
Vrs. Kanubhai Kantilal Rana, 2013 SCC Online Guj. 4202,
wherein, at pargraph-17, it has been held that “Law having
prescribed a fixed period of limitation of 30 days for preferring the
appeal, the Government cannot ignore the provisions of the period of
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limitation as it was never the intention of the legislature that there
should be a different period of limitation when the Government is the
appellant.”
14. In the case of Post Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media
India Limited & Anr., [(2012) 3 SCC 563], it has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs-27 to 29 as under:
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable explanation,
we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted
to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions.
The claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and6
2025:JHHC:20054-DBinstrumentalities that unless they have reasonable
and acceptable explanation for the delay and there
was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the
usual explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable degree of
procedural red tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for the government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and should
not be swirled for the benefit of a few.”
15. Likewise, the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
& Anr. Vrs. Chaitram Maywade, [(2020) 10 SCC 667], after
referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Post
Master General & Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Limited & Anr.,
(supra) has held at paragraphs 1 to 5 as hereunder:
“1.The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to
do the same thing again and again and the
conduct seems to be incorrigible. The special
leave petition has been filed after a delay of 588
days. We had an occasion to deal with such
inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the
State of Madhya Pradesh in State of
M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal,
(2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of our order dated
15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in
that case and we see no purpose in repeating
the same reasoning again except to record
what are stated to be the facts on which the
delay is sought to be condoned. On 5-1-2019, it
is stated that the Government Advocate was7
2025:JHHC:20054-DBapproached in respect of the judgment
delivered on 13-11-2018 [Chaitram
Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine
HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted
filing of the SLP against the impugned order on
26-5-2020. Thus, the Law Department took
almost about 17 months’ time to decide whether
the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater
certificate of incompetence would there be for
the Legal Department.
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to
look into the aspect of revamping the Legal
Department as it appears that the Department
is unable to file appeals within any reasonable
period of time much less within limitation. These
kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the
aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view
of the judgment in Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living
Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2
SCC (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 580 :
(2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that
these kinds of the cases are only “certificate
cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from
the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue.
The object is to save the skin of officers who
may be in default. We have also recorded the
irony of the situation where no action is taken
against the officers who sit on these files and
do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been
worded, the wastage of judicial time involved,
we impose costs on the petitioner State of Rs
35,000 to be deposited with the Mediation and
Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be
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deposited within four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the
delay in filing and sitting on the files and
certificate of recovery of the said amount be
also filed in this Court within the said period of
time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General
to caution that for any successive matters of
this kind the costs will keep on going up.”
16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs.
Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely
because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given
case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At
paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
even after sufficient cause has been shown a
party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in
question as a matter of right. The proof of a
sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the
exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in
the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not
proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be
dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause
is shown then the court has to enquire whether in
its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the
consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this
stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power
after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be
limited only to such facts as the court may regard
as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why
the party was sitting idle during all the time9
2025:JHHC:20054-DBavailable to it. In this connection we may point out
that considerations of bona fides or due diligence
are always material and relevant when the court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14
of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such
applications the court is called upon to consider
the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5
and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and
relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to
the same extent and in the same manner be
invoked in dealing with applications which fall to
be decided only under Section 5 without reference
to Section 14. In the present case there is no
difficulty in holding that the discretion should be
exercised in favour of the appellant because apart
from the general criticism made against the
appellant’s lack of diligence during the period of
limitation no other fact had been adduced against
it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the
appellant’s application for condonation of delay
only on the ground that it was appellant’s duty to
file the appeal as soon as possible within the
period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a
valid ground.
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient
cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as
to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period
of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side and as
such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the litigant
and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
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18. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’
has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or
“enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer
the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which
provides a platitude, which when the act done
suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the
facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly
examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that
the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable
the court concerned to exercise discretion for the
reason that whenever the court exercises discretion,
it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant
must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine
whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra
Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath
Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.11
2025:JHHC:20054-DBNarayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953]
, Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2
SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24
: AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC
993] this Court explained the difference between a
“good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed
that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and
vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that
of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that
substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not
sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible.
(Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR
2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it
has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the
period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve
what it considers a distress resulting from its
operation.” The statutory provision may cause
hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed
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lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a
decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a
statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the
community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to
quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It
seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not
been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of
time become stale. According to Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may
have been acquired in equity and justice by long
enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party’s
own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC
510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC
705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448
: (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of
Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830
: AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially
engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
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legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down
by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the
court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain
the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which
means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or
for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court
could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on
time condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature.”
19. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case
or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted deliberately” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each
case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises
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discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation
of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide
or was merely a device to cover the ulterior purpose as has been
held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs.
Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs.
A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
20. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation
to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the
party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket
formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @
Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC
195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-
“12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression
“sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of
the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other
similar provision should receive a liberal construction
so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is
imputable to a party. In a particular case whether15
2025:JHHC:20054-DBexplanation furnished would constitute “sufficient
cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each
case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for
accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the
delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear
that the courts should not proceed with the tendency
of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the
petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of
disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished
should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so
when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides
can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other
hand, while considering the matter the courts should
not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps
within the time prescribed a valuable right has
accrued to the other party which should not be lightly
defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like
manner. However, by taking a pedantic and
hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation
furnished should not be rejected when stakes are
high and/or arguable points of facts and law are
involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis
terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating
valuable right of such a party to have the decision on
merit. While considering the matter, courts have to
strike a balance between resultant effect of the order
it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”
21. This Court, after considering the aforesaid proposition and the
explanation furnished in the delay condonation application to
condone the inordinate delay of 815 days, is proceeding to examine
as to whether the explanation furnished can be said to be sufficient
explanation for condoning the delay.
22. It is evident from the judgments referred hereinabove, wherein,
expression ‘sufficient cause’ has been dealt with, which means that
the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a
want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of
a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
deliberately” or “remained inactive”.
23. It is evident from the explanation furnished in the delay
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condonation application that after getting the impugned order dated
20.01.2020, it has been decided to challenge the same and
accordingly, the file was transmitted to the Law Department. The Law
Department thereafter making necessary paper works, forwarded the
entire set of writ petition and affidavits along with order impugned to
the Senior Standing Counsel. The concerned counsel of the Nigam
prepared the memo of appeal and forwarded the same to the Law
Department. After receiving the file from the concerned Department,
memo of appeal was affidavited and filed on 19.03.2021. Hence the
aforesaid exercise consumed time and the appeal could not be filed
within the period of limitation.
24. This Court, after going through the delay condonation
application has found that the explanation which has been furnished
in the delay condonation application is only the movement of file from
one department to another or from one table to another and further,
the impugned order was passed on 20.01.2020 but the appeal has
been filed on 19.03.2021 which is fairly after lapse of about more
than 1 year that too without any explanation as to why the JBVNL
has filed appeal after lapse of more than 1 year, which is
approximately one year and two months.
25. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the reason
assigned for condoning the 815 days delay in filing the appeal,
cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay.
26. The coordinate Bench of this Court has passed an order in
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L.P.A. No.86 of 2021 on 05.01.2022 rejecting the delay condonation
application since the appeal was filed after delay of about 687 days
without any sufficient cause to condone the delay.
27. The reference of another case is required to be made herein of
an order passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court in L.P.A.
No.835 of 2019, wherein, the issue of condoning the delay of 568
days was under consideration.
28. The coordinate Bench of this Court has not found the reason
furnished by the State appellants therein to be sufficient cause on
the ground of movement of file from one table to another by putting
reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex as
referred hereinabove.
29. The State appellant has travelled to the Hon’ble Apex Court by
filing the SLP being SLP No.7755 of 2022 and has challenged the
order passed in L.P.A. No.835 of 2019 but the said SLP No.7755 of
2022 has been dismissed, as would appear from the order dated
13.05.2022.
30. The Hon’ble Apex Court has dismissed one Special Leave to
Appeal (C) Nos.8378-8379/2023 on 28th April, 2023 filed by the State
of Jharkhand which was filed against the order passed by this Court
in L.P.A. No.99 of 2021, wherein the coordinate Bench of this Court
dismissed the said appeal on the basis of delay of 534 days in filing
of the appeal.
31. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court has also dismissed S.L.P.(C)
18
2025:JHHC:20054-DB
Diary No.(S) No.3188 of 2024 on 02.02.2024 filed by the State of
Jharkhand against the order dated 14.08.2023 passed by this Court
in L.P.A. No.401 of 2022, wherein, the delay of 259 days was not
condoned.
32. This Court, applying the principle laid down by the Hon’ble
Apex Court as also considering the fact that the delay of 815 days
has not sufficiently been explained and as such, the instant
interlocutory application deserves to be dismissed.
33. Accordingly, the delay condonation application being I.A.
No.9408 of 2024 is hereby, dismissed.
34. In consequence thereof, the instant Letters Patent Appeal
being L.P.A. No.120 of 2021 also stands dismissed.
35. Pending Interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands
disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
19
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