Karnataka High Court
The Commissioner vs Ningappa S/O Mallappa Walikar Alias … on 21 July, 2025
Author: R.Devdas
Bench: R.Devdas
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WA No.100129 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
WRIT APPEAL NO.100107 OF 2025 (GM-SLUM)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.100129 OF 2025 (GM-SLUM)
IN WRIT APPEAL NO.100107/2025
BETWEEN
1. THE COMMISSIONER,
KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
NO.55, ABHAYA COMPLEX, 3RD FLOOR,
RISALDAR STREET, SHESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
2. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
IN-CHARGE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
Digitally signed by KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
CHANDRASHEKAR
LAXMAN KATTIMANI 1ST SUB DIVISION (TOL NAKA),
Location: HIGH JANNAT NAGAR, DHARWAD - 04.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA ...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SHRIPRASAD J. JOSHI, ADVOCATE AND
SRI. RAVIRAJ C.PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND
HANUMANTHAPPA
S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS:
1. CHANNABASAVVA W/O. HANAMANTHAPPA
TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
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AGE. 75 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
2. YALLAMMA @ YALLAVVA
W/O. MARUTI BAIRAPPANAVAR,
AGE. 50 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
3. KASTURI @ KASTUREVVA
W/O. HANUMANTHAPPA MANNAGI,
AGE. 48 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
4. FAKKIRAMMA @ LAXMI
W/O. MANJU @ MANJUNATH HEBSUR,
AGE. 46 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
5. ANNAPURNA W/O. NINGAPPA
TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 44 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
6. KUMAR S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 32 YEARS, OCC. STUDENT,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
7. RAVI S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 28 YEARS, OCC. STUDENT,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
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DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
8. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY/UNDER SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING SECRETARIAT,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
VIKAS SOUDHA, II FLOOR, BENGALURU - 560 001.
9. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
BOARDS AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
10. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, BOARDS AND
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
11. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DHARWAD, DIST. DHARWAD - 580 001.
12. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
SUB-DIVISION, DHARWAD,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 001.
13. HUBBALLI-DHARWAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (HDMC),
REPRESENTED BY ITS MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER,
LAMINGTON ROAD, HUBBALLI - 580 020.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, ADDL. GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR R10, R11
AND R12)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. NO.104671/2023 VIDE ORDER DATED
27.09.2024 AND ETC.
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IN WRIT APPEAL NO.100129/2025
BETWEEN
THE COMMISSIONER,
1. KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
NO.55, ABHAYA COMPLEX, 3RD FLOOR,
RISALDAR STREET, SHESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
2. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
1ST SUB DIVISION (TOL NAKA),
JANNAT NAGAR, DHARWAD - 04.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SHRIPRASAD J. JOSHI, ADVOCATE AND
SRI. RAVIRAJ C. PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. NINGAPPA S/O. MALLAPPA WALIKAR @ TALAWAR,
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. AYODHYA NAGAR, OLD HUBLI,
TQ. HUBBALLI, DIST. DHARWAD - 580 024.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY-2,
DEPT. OF HOUSING, M.S. BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-01.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DHARWAD - 01.
RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R2 AND R3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. NO.101473/2023 C/W W.P. NO.104671/2023
VIDE ORDER DATED 27.09.2024 AND ETC.,.
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THESE WRIT APPEALS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 09.06.2025, COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT',
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND)
These writ appeals are filed by respondent No.1
under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961,
being aggrieved by the common judgment dated
27.09.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.101473/2023 and
Writ Petition No.104671/2023. Writ Appeal
No.100129/2025 arises out of the order passed in Writ
Petition No.101473/2023, whereas Writ Appeal
No.100107/2025 pertains to the order passed in Writ
Petition No.104671/2023.
2. These appeals are preferred by the
Commissioner, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’). Learned counsels
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for the parties have advanced common arguments, and
reliance is placed on common documents. Accordingly,
both the appeals are heard together and are being
disposed of by this common judgment.
Brief facts:
3. The brief facts of the case are, the petitioners in
Writ Petition No.101473/2023 claim to be the absolute
owners of the land bearing R.S. No.37/2B of Nekar Nagar,
Ayodhya Village, Hubballi. The appellants herein issued a
notification under Section 3 of the Karnataka Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Slum Act‘), notifying an extent of land
measuring 1 acre 26 guntas and 08 annas as Slum Area.
It is the grievance of the petitioners/respondents herein
that they were not heard prior to the issuance of the said
notification.
4. The petitioners in Writ Petition No.104671/2023
claim to be the owners of land bearing Survey No.37/3A of
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Nekar Nagar, Ayodhya Village, measuring 6 acres 18
guntas and 15 annas. The Board is stated to have
developed an area measuring 26 acres 2 guntas and 14
annas, which includes the lands in question. After the
development, possession certificates have been issued in
favour of the beneficiaries, who have thereafter put up
construction on the said land.
5. It is the common grievance of the petitioners
that, pursuant to the issuance of the notification under
Section 3 of the Slum Act, possession of the entire land
was taken over by the Board, which thereafter undertook
development and effected allotment in favour of
beneficiaries. It is alleged that the Board failed to pay any
compensation for the utilization of the said land. The
petitioners submitted representations to the respondent-
Board seeking compensation during the years 2015-16. As
no action was taken by the Board, the petitioners
approached this Court in Writ Petition No.103081/2016,
seeking a writ of mandamus. The said writ petition was
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entertained and a direction was issued to consider the
representation. However, as the directions issued therein
were not complied with, the petitioners initiated contempt
proceedings in C.C.C. No.100054/2018, during the course
of which the Board made a statement that appropriate
steps would be taken for acquisition of the land and
payment of compensation. When the matter stood thus,
the Board issued a preliminary notification under Section
17 of the Slum Act.
6. Respondent No.2-State issued a notification
under Section 17 of the Slum Act for acquisition of the
lands in question. Pursuant thereto, the Board submitted a
proposal to Respondent No.2 quantifying the
compensation payable to the landowners. As per the
minutes of the meeting, at Annexure-H, it was recorded
that the Department of Finance declined to grant financial
approval and accordingly directed that the land be de-
notified. The refusal of financial approval was on the
ground that the proposal entailed a financial liability of
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₹253.11 crores, which was neither concurred with the
Finance Department nor made in compliance with the
provisions of the Transaction of Business Rules, 1977 (for
short, ‘the Rules, 1977’). Acting upon the recommendation
and advice of the Finance Department, the order of de-
notification dated 11.04.2022, as at Annexure-K, came to
be issued.
7. The petitioners challenged the de-notification
before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge
held that the de-notification of the land, after issuance of
possession certificates and with reference to the
Government Notification dated 18.10.2004, had created
legal rights in favour of the beneficiaries. It was further
held that unilateral de-notification, without disturbing the
possession and third-party rights created through such
possession certificates, was illegal. Accordingly, the
notification dated 11.04.2022, the report of the Assistant
Commissioner dated 23.03.2022, and the report of the
Deputy Commissioner dated 25.03.2022 were quashed. A
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writ of mandamus was also issued directing the
respondents to quantify and pay compensation in terms of
Section 20 of the Slum Act.
Submissions:
8. Sri Shriprasad J. Joshi, learned counsel, along
with Sri Raviraj C. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-Board, submits that the petitioners-respondents
have divested themselves of their right, title, and interest
in the land by executing sale agreements along with
General Power of Attorney in favour of certain individuals.
These individuals, on the strength of the said sale
agreements and powers of attorney, are stated to be in
possession of the land much prior to the issuance of the
notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act. It is therefore
contended that the petitioners have no subsisting legal
right to seek compensation in respect of the said lands.
9. It is further submitted that the sale agreements
and powers of attorney were executed after the formation
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of the residential layout. Pursuant to the notification of the
land in question, the Board has only issued ‘Parichaya
Patras’ to the individuals, who are slum dwellers alleged to
have been inducted by the petitioners themselves. It is
contended that the land was notified under Section 3 of
the Slum Act solely on account of its occupation by such
slum dwellers. The appellants-Board further contends that
there has been no acquisition of the land in question so as
to attract any obligation for payment of compensation.
9.1 It is further submitted that the Board issued
notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act dated
16.11.2018. Pursuant to the said notification, an enquiry
was conducted by the Assistant Commissioner and the
Deputy Commissioner, which revealed that the slum
dwellers in possession had been inducted by the
petitioners themselves through General Power of Attorney
and sale agreements, much prior to the issuance of the
notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act. Taking into
account this factual position, the impugned notification de-
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notifying the land came to be issued. However, the learned
Single Judge, without duly considering the aforesaid
aspects, proceeded to hold that the petitioners are entitled
to compensation.
10. Per contra, Sri Praveen K. Uppar, learned
counsel appearing for the original writ
petitioners/respondent No.1, submits that the alleged
transfer of property through General Power of Attorney
and agreement to sell has not divested the petitioners of
their right, title and interest in the land. It is contended
that such transactions do not confer absolute ownership
rights upon the agreement holders. The petitioners
retained the right to exercise further legal remedies in
respect of the lands in question. Even assuming the
existence of agreements to sell and GPAs, it is submitted
that, by virtue of the notification issued under Section 3 of
the Slum Act and the issuance of possession certificates by
the Board, third-party rights have been created which are
prejudicial to the interests of the petitioners.
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11. It is argued that once the Board has issued
possession certificates, it has thereby perfected title in
favour of the allottees, to the detriment of the petitioners’
rights. It is further submitted that a large extent of land
was developed by the Board subsequent to the notification
under Section 3 of the Slum Act, and possession
certificates were accordingly issued. The lands in question,
belonging to the petitioners, form part of this developed
area. It is lastly submitted that the Slum Act contains no
provision for de-notifying lands once they have been
notified.
11.1 It is submitted that the de-notification was a
consequence of the Finance Department’s refusal to grant
financial approval, citing concerns over the financial
burden. The correspondence placed on record by the
Board clearly establishes that possession certificates were
issued without following the due process of acquisition or
payment of compensation. The act of de-notification,
without cancelling the possession certificates already
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issued by the Board, demonstrates an attempt to deprive
the petitioners of compensation otherwise payable for the
unauthorized utilization of their land. It is further
submitted that the learned Single Judge, having rightly
considered these aspects, correctly held the de-notification
to be illegal and accordingly directed payment of
compensation.
Issues:
12. Having considered the submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise
for consideration before this Court:
(i) Whether the provisions of the Slum Act
empower de-notification of the land?
(ii) Whether the de-notification is justified in
the facts and circumstances of the present
case?
The Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1973 – An overview:
13. Before adverting to the aforesaid points, it is
apposite to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
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underlying the enactment. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons, as published in the Karnataka Gazette
(Extraordinary) dated 28.02.1973, reads as under:
“The Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1958 (Karnataka Act 8 of 1959) which
was enacted for the improvement and clearance of slum
areas in the State was struck down by the High Court
and the appeal preferred by the State Government
against the decision is pending before the Supreme
Court.
Though local bodies have been effecting
improvements to slums and have also cleared a few of
them, the progress made so far has been very meagre
and it is found that without adequate powers it has not
been possible effectively to check the increase in the
growth of slums and also clear the slums which are unfit
for human habitation. A number of schemes for the
improvement and clearance of slums are to be quickly
implemented with financial assistance given by the
Government of India. It has therefore become necessary
to enact a law immediately to provide for the
improvement and clearance of slums in the State.”
14. The preamble to the Slum Act reads as under:
An Act to provide for the improvement and
clearance of slums in the State of [Karnataka].
Whereas, the number of slums in certain areas in
the State of [Karnataka] is increasing and is a source of
danger to public health and sanitation of the said areas;
And, whereas, under the existing law it has not been
possible effectively to check the increase, to eliminate
congestion and to provide for basic needs such as
streets, water-supply and drainage and to clear the
slums which are unfit for human habitation;
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And, whereas, to obviate this difficulty it is expedient to
provide for the removal of un-hygienic and insanitary
conditions prevailing in the slums, for better
accommodation and improved living conditions for slum
dwellers, for the promotion of public health generally and
for the acquisition of land for the purpose of improving,
developing or redeveloping slum areas, clearance of
slums and rehabilitation of slum dwellers;
And, whereas, the Constitution of India enjoins, as a
Directive Principle of State Policy that the State should
improve public health;
15. This Court, in Bellam Thimmappa @ Guntige
Thimmappa and Another v. Karnataka Slum
Clearance Board and Others (AIR 1997 Kar 256), has
succinctly summarised the object, scope, and
implementation of the Act. The relevant extract reads as
under:
10. xxx The Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act,
has been enacted with a view to check increasing number
of slums coming up throughout the State thereby
endangering public health and sanitation and to eliminate
congestion. The Act is also aimed at providing basic needs
such as streets, water supply and drainage and to clear
Slums which are unfit for human inhabitation. Section
3 which empowers the Government to declare an area as
a slum does not in terms make any distinction between
‘Slums’ created with the permission of the owner of the
land on which they come up and those which are created
by acts of trespass by unauthorised occupants and
squatters. What is important is whether an area sought to
be declared as a ‘Slum’ satisfied the conditions prescribed
by Section 3. If the answer is in the affirmative, such an
area can be declared as a ‘Slums’ no matter the same is
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the result of an act of trespass or has come into existence
on account of the neglect or the licence of the owner. The
provisions of the Act also do not forbid the ‘Slum’ dwellers
from approaching the Government or the competent
authority to make a declaration in terms of Section 3 or
other provisions for that matter. Merely because the ‘Slum
Dwellers’ had in the instant case themselves invoked the
powers vested in the Government under Section 3 would
not therefore invalidate a declaration made under the said
provision. This is particularly so because any such
determination or declaration has to be made after
providing an opportunity of ‘being heard’ to the owners
concerned who have a right of appeal against the final
order that may be passed by the competent authority.
The validity of any such order has therefore to be tested
on its merits and not by a reference to the person at
whose instance the same is passed. I therefore have no
hesitation in rejecting the challenge mounted by the
petitioner on that score also.
Analysis:
16. The determination of point No.(i) is contingent
upon the outcome of point No.(ii). Accordingly, this Court
proceeds to consider point No.(ii) first.
Regarding point No.(ii):
17. Article 21 of the Constitution of India
guarantees the right to life, which serves as an
inexhaustible source of several other fundamental rights.
This Article has a wide and expansive application. The
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judiciary has interpreted the right to life to include the
right to live with human dignity. The bare necessities of
life such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, and a
congenial, non-congested environment suitable for human
habitation are inextricably intertwined with the right to
life.
18. It is the bounden duty of the State to provide
the aforesaid essential facilities. When the right to life is
examined in conjunction with the State’s fundamental
obligations, it becomes evident that the enactment of the
Act was intended not only to safeguard the right to life but
also to enable the State to discharge its fundamental duty
in that regard.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Chameli Singh
and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [(1996) 2 SCC
549], while analysing the scope of Article 21 of the
Constitution guaranteeing the Right to Life observed as
under:
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“8. In any organised society, right to live as a human
being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of
man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities
to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which
inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to
achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any
civilised society implies the right to food, water, decent
environment, education, medical care and shelter. These
are basic human rights known to any civilised society. All
civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or
under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised
without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human
being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and
limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow
physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to
shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe
and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings,
sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation
and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have
easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter,
therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one’s
head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable
them to live and develop as a human being. Right to
shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to
live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a
fundamental right. As is enjoined in the Directive
Principles, the State should be deemed to be under an
obligation to secure it for its citizens, of course subject to
its economic budgeting. In a democratic society as a
member of the organised civic community one should
have permanent shelter so as to physically, mentally and
intellectually equip oneself to improve his excellence as a
useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties and
to be a useful citizen and equal participant in democracy.
The ultimate object of making a man equipped with a
right to dignity of person and equality of status is to
enable him to develop himself into a cultured being. Want
of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object
of the constitutional animation of right to equality,
economic justice, fundamental right to residence, dignity
of person and right to live itself. To bring the Dalits and
Tribes into the mainstream of national life, providing these
facilities and opportunities to them is the duty of the State
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as fundamental to their basic human and constitutional
rights.”
20. In view of the exposition of law laid down in the
aforesaid judgments, it is the fundamental duty of the
State to safeguard the right to life by ensuring the
provision of adequate living space, safe and decent
housing structures, clean and hygienic surroundings,
sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation,
and essential civic amenities such as roads and other
infrastructural facilities.
21. In the facts of the present case more fully
discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, it is evident that,
in furtherance of the object of the Act and the
constitutional mandate, a notification under Section 3 of
the Act was issued, declaring the area in question as a
slum. Since the slum came to exist on private land, and in
order to guarantee the right to life as enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution, a notification under Section
17 of the Act was issued for acquisition of the said land.
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However, the acquisition proceedings were subsequently
dropped on the ground of financial considerations. When it
is the bounden duty of the State to provide essential civic
amenities such as safe and adequate housing, sanitation,
electricity, water, and clean surroundings, financial
implications are inevitable and cannot be cited as a
justification to abdicate such responsibility. Once it is
demonstrated before the Court that the State has failed to
protect the right to life, the only consideration for the
Court is the enforcement and protection of that
fundamental right. It hardly needs reiteration that the
Constitutional Courts are the guardians of the fundamental
rights of the citizens. It is wholly impermissible for the
State to deny the enforcement of the right to life under
Article 21 on the pretext that its protection would entail a
financial burden on the State exchequer.
22. Once this Court concludes that there is a
violation of the right to life attributable to the inaction or
omission of the State, it is incumbent upon the State to
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take appropriate measures to protect and restore such
right, regardless of the financial implications. As noted in
the minutes of the meeting referred and extracted in this
judgment, the proposal for de-notification was based on
untenable grounds, such as the absence of prior approval
from the Finance Department before the issuance of the
acquisition notification and the anticipated burden on the
exchequer. This Court is unable to appreciate such
excuses, particularly when a violation of the right to life
under Article 21 has been established.
23. In the light of the judgments referred to above,
this Court is of the considered view that, even where a
slum exists on private land, irrespective of how or at
whose instance such slum came into existence, directions
may be issued for declaring the area as a slum and for
undertaking its development, keeping in view the broader
object and purpose of the Act. In such a situation, if the
land is privately owned, the Court is empowered to direct
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acquisition of the said land in furtherance of the objectives
of the Act.
24. A notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act
came to be issued, pursuant to which allotment letters and
possession certificates were granted to the families
residing on the said property. It is the contention of the
appellants that the Board merely issued Parichaya Patras
to the families who were already in occupation of the land
in question. The Board, however, contends that the said
families were inducted into possession by the petitioners
themselves by executing sale agreements and General
Power of Attorney (GPA) documents. The GPA was
executed in favour of the Hubballi Siteless Labourers
Association, pursuant to which the land was divided into
plots and allotted to siteless labourers, who were put in
possession and are stated to have perfected their title
through such sale agreements. It is the further contention
that, in view of the land having been divested by
execution of GPAs and sale agreements, the petitioners
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have lost their right to claim compensation. It is also
stated that the notification under Section 17 of the Slum
Act was issued without knowledge of the existence of the
said sale agreements and GPA. Only upon submission of
the report by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner did this aspect come to light. Thereafter, a
decision was taken to de-notify the land in question.
25. The above submissions may appear persuasive
at first blush. However, upon deeper scrutiny of the
records placed before this Court, the underlying reason for
the de-notification becomes apparent. In order to
demonstrate the arbitrary exercise of power by the Board,
it is necessary to set out the sequence of events in detail.
The contentions urged by the Board are found to be
untenable for the following reasons:
a. The sale agreements and the General Power of
Attorney (GPA), at best, created only an interest in
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the property and did not divest the petitioners of
their absolute rights therein.
b. The execution of sale agreements and GPA cannot be
construed as a lawful transfer of right, title and
interest in the property in accordance with law.
c. The petitioners retained the right to enforce their title
or any other lawful claims against the occupants of
the land.
d. The contention that the Board merely issued
Parichaya Patras is far from the truth. The material
on record, particularly as seen from Annexure-Y,
clearly establishes that possession certificates were
issued by the Board in exercise of its powers under
the Slum Act, subject to certain conditions. Notably,
the possession certificates make no reference to the
alleged sale agreements or GPA.
e. The issuance of possession certificates has conferred
absolute rights in favour of the beneficiaries, and the
property has thereby vested in them.
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f. Consequently, any enforceable rights that the
petitioners may have had stand extinguished by
virtue of the said possession certificates.
g. The possession certificates imposes condition as;
“µÀgÀvÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ
1. ¤ªÉñÀ£À/ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß 15 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À PÁ® ¥ÀgÀ¨Ás gÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¨ÁgÀzÀÄ.
2. F ¤ªÉñÀ£À/ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸Áé¢üãÀzÁgÀgÄÀ ¸ÀéAvÀ Rað£À°è
¸ÀĹÜwAiÀÄ°èlÄÖPÉƼÀîvÀPÌÀ zÄÀ Ý.
3. ªÀÄAqÀ½AiÀÄ PÁAiÉÄÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ½UÉ M¼À¥nÀ ÖzÉ.”
26. The list of beneficiaries under the slum
development scheme in the larger extent of 26 acres, 2
guntas, and 14 annas is detailed in Annexure-B.
Annexure-B contains particulars of the beneficiaries along
with the respective plot numbers, boundaries, and
measurements. Notably, the measurements reflected in
the sale agreements do not correspond with those
mentioned in the possession certificates. The Board has
made no effort to reconcile its contention that Parichaya
Patras were issued to the persons found in possession of
the sites by the petitioners. If such contention were to be
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accepted, the measurement and boundaries of the sites
ought to have matched, which is clearly not the case
herein. Furthermore, if the Board had issued only
Parichaya Patras, there would be no plausible justification
for imposing a condition of non-alienation for a period of
15 years.
27. A notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act
was issued in the year 1992. The petitioners subsequently
submitted a representation to the Board seeking
compensation for the notified land. Upon receiving no
response, the petitioners approached this Court by filing
Writ Petition No.103081/2016, wherein a direction was
issued to the Board to consider the said representation.
Alleging disobedience and non-compliance with the order
passed in the writ petition, the petitioners filed a contempt
petition in CCC No.100054/2018. Pursuant thereto,
respondent No.2 issued an endorsement stating that
acquisition proceedings would be initiated and
compensation would be paid. The endorsement dated
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01.08.2018, in fact, records that sites had been allotted
without initiating acquisition proceedings, and that steps
would be taken to acquire the land and disburse
compensation.
28. In compliance with the undertaking given in the
contempt proceedings, a notification under Section 17 of
the Slum Act was issued on 16.11.2018 for acquisition of
the lands in question. In its communication dated
07.01.2021 addressed to the Secretary, Housing
Department, the Board even computed the approximate
amount of compensation payable. It appears that the
proposal was placed before the Finance Department for
financial concurrence. However, the Finance Department
declined to accord concurrence, citing that the notification
issued under Section 17 of the Slum Act was in violation of
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Rules,
1977. Consequently, a decision was taken to de-notify the
land, and the impugned de-notification was issued on
11.04.2022.
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28.1 The relevant minute of the meeting is extracted
below:
“59) ªÉÄîÌAqÀ »A§gÀºÀzÀ£éÀAiÀÄ DyðPÀ E¯ÁSÉ ¸ÀASÉå:DE 631
ªÉZÀÑ-9/2021, ¢£ÁAPÀ:12.01.2022 gÀ°è PɼÀPÀAqÀAvÉ »A§gÀºÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß
¤ÃqÀ¯ÁVzÉ.
“The proposal has been examined.
Administrative Department is directed to:-
1)The de-notify forthwith, all the cases
for which preliminary or final notification has
been issued under Section 17 of Karnataka
Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act 1973.
2)To submit detailed report on why
financial liability Rs.253.11 crores was
created without taking Finance Department
concurrence, in violation of Transaction of
Business Rules, 1977.”
29. The deviation from the acquisition process is
stated to be on account of the execution of sale
agreements and General Power of Attorney (GPA)
documents by the petitioners. Noticeably, the proceedings
commenced with representations and a writ petition
seeking a writ of mandamus in the year 2016. Until the
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Finance Department declined to accord financial
concurrence, the Board never raised the issue of sale
agreements or GPA. It is only after the refusal of financial
concurrence that the question of sale agreements was
brought forth. The belated reference to the sale
agreements and GPA in the impugned order raises serious
doubts as to its genuineness. The veracity of this ground
can be tested by examining the correspondence
exchanged between the Board and the Government prior
to the refusal of financial concurrence.
30. It is both interesting and relevant to refer to the
communication addressed by the Board to the Secretary,
Housing Department, dated 12.04.2022. In this
communication, after adverting to the reports submitted
by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy
Commissioner, reference is made to the issuance of the
notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act. It is
recorded therein that, due to the inaction of the
landowners, migrant labourers came to occupy the lands
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in question and began residing there. Since the persons
residing on the said land were unauthorized occupants
belonging to marginalized sections of society, and in order
to provide them with basic civic amenities such as drinking
water, sanitation, hygiene and reasonable accommodation,
a notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act was issued.
The communication further states that, once a notification
under Section 17 of the Slum Act is issued, there is no
enabling provision under the Act to de-notify the same. It
is also recorded that, in the event of de-notification, the
Board would lose its rights over the land developed by it,
and consequently, the slum dwellers would be rendered
unauthorized occupants, liable to be evicted.
31. A combined reading of the aforesaid
communication and the resolution passed pursuant to the
decision of the Finance Department makes it explicitly
clear that the Slum Act contains no provision for de-
notification of land once a notification under Section 17
has been issued. Furthermore, the decision to de-notify
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the land from acquisition appears to have been taken
solely to avoid the financial burden of compensation, while
simultaneously continuing the third-party interests already
created through the issuance of possession certificates.
32. The Board undertook two distinct actions:
firstly, the issuance of the notification in respect of the
land, and secondly, the issuance of possession certificates.
While the effect of the notification can be nullified by de-
notification, the third-party interests created through the
possession certificates continue to subsist. The de-
notification, in isolation, does not ipso facto annul the
rights conferred through the possession certificates. As a
consequence, the Board has failed entirely to cancel the
possession certificates or to restore the status of
possession to what it was prior to their issuance. This
omission renders the de-notification process incomplete
and ineffective in law.
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33. The manner in which the de-notification has
been effected is contrary to the object and spirit of welfare
legislation, and is violative of Article 300A of the
Constitution of India. The petitioners claim to possess
right, title and interest in the property in question. It is a
well-settled principle that no person can be deprived of
their property save by authority of law. Without acquisition
in accordance with law and without payment of
compensation, the State or its instrumentalities cannot
divest or extinguish the rights vested in the petitioners.
34. Even if it is assumed that the petitioners had
transferred certain rights in the land through the execution
of sale agreements, such transfer did not result in
complete divestment of their ownership, as the sale
agreements do not constitute a transfer of title in the
manner recognized by law. The petitioners continued to
retain certain rights from the bundle of ownership rights,
which could have been enforced, but for the issuance of
possession certificates. However, with the creation of title
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in favour of the slum dwellers through the possession
certificates issued by the Board, whatever residual rights
the petitioners may have had stood effectively
extinguished, thereby rendering them incapable of
enforcement.
35. For the reasons stated hereinabove, it is
evident that the decision to de-notify the land is legally
impermissible. The mere existence of a financial burden
cannot constitute a valid ground for such de-notification.
Any such decision would directly defeat the object and
purpose of the Act and would amount to a breach of the
fundamental obligation of the State to safeguard the right
to life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of
India.
36. Further, this Court is inclined to direct the
appellant-Slum Board to conclude the acquisition
proceedings initiated pursuant to the issuance of the
notification under Section 17 of the Act and to complete
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the development of the slum by providing the civic
amenities referred to in this judgment. While issuing such
directions, it is equally imperative to safeguard the rights
of the landowner in terms of Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India. It is a well-settled position of law
that no person’s property can be occupied or utilised
without the payment of just compensation. In this view of
the matter, the private respondent is entitled to
compensation for the utilisation of his land.
37. If the Board was genuinely not in need of the
lands in question, it ought to have restored possession to
the petitioners in the manner in which it existed prior to
the issuance of the notification and the subsequent
possession certificates.
38. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the de-
notification of the land under the impugned order dated
11.04.2022 is held to be illegal, arbitrary and
unsustainable in law.
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Regarding point No.(i):
39. The correspondence of the Board with the
Secretary, Housing Department, dated 12.04.2022, and
produced at Annexure-J, clearly acknowledges that there
is no provision under the Slum Act for de-notification. The
Board has sought to invoke Section 21 of the Karnataka
General Clauses Act, 1899 to justify the de-notification.
However, a comparative reading of the scheme of
acquisition under the Slum Act with other enactments that
provide for acquisition makes it evident that, wherever the
legislature intended to permit de-notification, a specific
enabling provision has been incorporated into the statute.
In the absence of any such enabling provision under the
Slum Act, the concession made by the Board that de-
notification is not contemplated under the Act requires no
further elaboration.
40. The learned Single Judge, after considering all
the aforementioned factual aspects, has rightly held that
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the notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act was
issued proposing to acquire the lands in question, and in
view of the submissions made, the contempt proceedings
were accordingly dropped. Thereafter, a preliminary
notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act came to be
issued. Upon a combined reading of Sections 17 and 18 of
the Slum Act, it was held that the land vests absolutely in
the Government, free from all encumbrances, from the
date of issuance of the notification under Section 17. The
learned Single Judge further held that the possession
certificates issued by the Board pursuant to the
Government notification created rights in favour of the
beneficiaries. It is further held that once the land vests
with the Government under Section 17(1) of the Slum Act,
the same cannot be de-notified by invoking Section 21 of
the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899. In support of
this proposition, the learned Single Judge placed reliance
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
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Lt. Governor of H.P. vs. Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2
SCC 149].
41. The learned Single Judge also held that mere
execution of a sale agreement and General Power of
Attorney does not convey title unless a registered sale
deed is executed in accordance with law. In this regard,
reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd.
vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC
656]. It was further held that the possession certificates
expressly declare that the occupants are in possession
pursuant to the Government notification dated
18.10.2024. Once such possession is reconfirmed and
rights are created, de-notification cannot be effected
without first addressing the legal consequences of the
rights so created under the possession certificates.
42. For the aforesaid reasons and upon careful
consideration of the findings recorded by the learned
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Single Judge in quashing the impugned de-notification and
directing payment of compensation, this Court is of the
considered view that the de-notification is illegal and
unjustifiable. The findings recorded by the learned Single
Judge do not suffer from any infirmity warranting
interference by this Court.
43. Accordingly, appeals are dismissed.
44. The learned Single Judge, while issuing a
direction to the authorities to quantify and pay
compensation under Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum
Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, has not
prescribed any specific time frame for compliance. This
Court deems it appropriate to direct the concerned
authorities to complete the process of quantification and
payment of compensation within three months from the
date of receipt of copy of this order. It is needless to
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observe the respondent-land owners shall be entitled to
interest on the compensation in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(R.DEVDAS)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(K V ARAVIND)
JUDGE
DDU
CT: UMD
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3
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