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Telangana High Court
Bheemappa vs State Of Telangana on 8 July, 2025
1
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
+W.P.No.18251 OF 2024
% 08-07-2025
# Bheemappa S/o.Ramappa.
.... Petitioner
Vs.
$ State of Telangana and others.
.... Respondents
!Counsel for the petitioner : Mr.V.Ravichardan
Counsel for the respondents : Learned Government Pleader for Home
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 2006 (5) SCC 446
2. 1972 SLR SC 355
3. AIR 1963 SC 1723
4. 2002 (1) SLJ SC 1
5. (1997) 11 Supreme Court Cases 361
6. (2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 471
2
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
HYDERABAD
****
W.P.No.18251 OF 2024
Between:
Bheemappa S/o.Ramappa.
.... Petitioner
Vs.
State of Telangana and others. .... Respondents
ORDER PRONOUNCED ON: .07.2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? : Yes
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals? : Yes
3. Whether His Lordship wishes to
see the fair copy of the Judgment? : Yes
_______________________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
3
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO
W.P.No.18251 of 2024
ORDER
This writ petition is filed seeking the following relief :-
“….. to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the
action of the 2nd and 3rd respondent in imposing the major penalty
of “removal of service” against the petitioner and confirming the
same besides treating the period of suspension from 06.01.2011
to 14.01.2013 as “Not on Duty” vide impugned
D.O.No.1884/2023 (Rc.No.56/0R-I(IV)/Major/Rck/2017, dated
24.04.2023 and the connected order passed in Appeal by the 2nd
Respondent vide Proceedings No.340/T4/2023, dated
27.04.2024 though the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
case on the same set of facts and evidences vide C.C.No.
5188/2018, dated 22.02.2022, as being arbitrary, erroneous,
irrational, unjust, contrary to the dicta laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in catena of decisions and in violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India and consequently direct the
respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all
consequential benefits duly treating the period of suspension as
on duty for all purposes….”.
2. Brief facts of the case are as follows :-
(a) The petitioner, while working as an Armed Reserve Police
Constable, was placed under suspension vide proceedings dated
06.01.2011 issued by the 3rd respondent. Disciplinary proceedings
were initiated against him by the authorities as per Charge Memo
4dated 07.05.2011. Alleging that while he was working in
A.P.TRANSCO, he misappropriated an amount of Rs.5,47,676/- by
collecting from the accused consumers for power theft without
remitting the same to the Government account. The petitioner has
submitted a detailed written statement of defence dated 01.06.2011,
inter alia, stating that he has been falsely implicated without any
semblance of evidence. The incumbent requested that all further
proceedings be dropped. Having not been satisfied with the said
written statement of defence, the respondents have appointed an
Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry against the petitioner. After
conducting a detailed enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his
report stating that there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner has
misappropriated the alleged amount of Rs.5,47,676/-, but there is
evidence that the petitioner misappropriated an amount of
Rs.33,043/-.
(b) The petitioner submits that with regard to the very same
allegations as contained in the charge memo, initially, a case in
Cr.No.305 of 2010 was registered for the offences punishable under
Sections 420, 403, 409 and 477 (A) of IPC, and subsequently,
a charge sheet was also filed against the petitioner and the same was
taken on file as C.C.No.5188 of 2018 on the file of the XI Additional
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad, wherein the petitioner
was acquitted vide judgment dated 22.02.2022. However, without
5
considering the said enquiry report and without looking into the
reasons for acquittal of the said criminal case, the 3rd respondent
issued impugned proceedings dated 24.04.2023 imposing the major
penalty of removal from service, besides treating the period of
suspension from 06.01.2011 to 14.01.2013 as “Not on Duty”, holding
that the petitioner has misappropriated an amount of Rs.5,47,676/-.
Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the 2nd
respondent on 24.04.2023 and the same was rejected vide order
27.04.2024.
(c) Questioning the suspension order, the petitioner had filed
O.A.No.6369 of 2011 before the then A.P. Administrative Tribunal,
Hyderabad, and the Tribunal vide order dated 28.07.2011 directed the
respondents therein to review the order of suspension. When an oral
enquiry was ordered in respect of the very same allegations, the
petitioner filed O.A.No.7038 of 2011, and the departmental
proceedings were stayed vide order dated 08.09.2011. The said O.A.
was disposed of on 22.11.2013, granting liberty to the respondents to
proceed with the departmental proceedings after the conclusion of the
criminal case. The 2nd respondent, vide order dated 27.04.2024,
rejected the said appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed
the present writ petition.
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3. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that
though the Enquiry Officer submitted his report stating that the
petitioner has misappropriated an amount of Rs.33,043/- only instead
of Rs.5,47,676/- as alleged and though the petitioner is acquitted of
the criminal case vide judgment dated 22.02.2002 in C.C.No.5188 of
2018, the 3rd respondent erroneously imposed the major punishment
of removal from service. Aggrieved thereby, although the petitioner
preferred an appeal stating that he was acquitted of the criminal case
on merit, the appellate authority erroneously rejected the appeal
without considering the contentions raised by the petitioner.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits
that a careful reading of the contents of the judgment dated
22.02.2022 in C.C.No.5188 of 2019 would make it clear that the
competent criminal Court has recorded a categorical finding at
Paragraph No.5(xi) and 5(xiv) that the amounts were deposited. There
is no cogent evidence to prove that the petitioner had collected the
amounts.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits
that though the allegation in the criminal case is that the petitioner
has misappropriated amounts by falsifying accounts and thereby
committed criminal breach of trust and cheating, the sum and
substance of the disciplinary proceedings is that the petitioner has
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misappropriated amounts by falsifying the records as per the findings
of the Inquiring Authority. The material placed before the competent
Court and the Inquiring Authority is the same. The 2nd respondent
had rejected the appeal without even addressing any of the
contentions raised by the petitioner, merely holding that acquittal in a
criminal case would not enure to the petitioner’s benefit, as the
standard of proof required in departmental proceedings is one of a
preponderance of probabilities.
6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil
Appeal No.7935 of 2023, dated 04.12.2023, which was rendered
placing reliance on the judgment in G.M.TANK Vs. STATE OF
GUJARAT AND OTHERS 1 and other judgments.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits
that the principle enunciated in the above decision is applicable to the
facts of the present case and, therefore, sought to extend the benefit of
the said judgments to the case on hand and accordingly set aside the
impugned orders passed by respondent Nos.2 and 3.
8. The respondents filed a counter affidavit stating that the
disciplinary authority, after carefully reviewing the entire PR file, the
findings of the inquiring authority, and other relevant records, has
1
2006 (5) SCC 446
8
awarded the punishment of removal from service, as in a criminal case
the burden of proof is essential. In contrast, departmental enquiry is
based on the preponderance of probabilities. The charge of
misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 5,47,676/-, which is to be
deposited in the Government account, has been proved against the
petitioner, and the petitioner’s explanation was not convincing.
Though the criminal case registered in this regard had ended in
acquittal, oral enquiry against the petitioner was very much proved
and having fully agreeing with the findings of the Inquiring authority
has awarded the punishment of “Removal from Service”, duly treating
his suspension period from 06.01.2011 to 15.01.2013 as “Not on
Duty”. Aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority, the
petitioner herein had preferred an appeal petition before the appellate
authority, i.e., the Director General of Police, Telangana, Hyderabad,
requesting reinstatement into service, which was rejected vide
Proceedings No.340/T4/2023, dated 27.04.2024.
9. It is further stated that earlier, the petitioner worked on a
deputation basis in Vigilance & APTS PS, Ranga Reddy, South Circle,
from 15.04.2003 to 03.10.2009 and repatriated to AR Cyberabad
Police on 03.10.2009. The petitioner was entrusted with the duty of
collecting compounding amounts and assessment amounts from the
accused consumers in Ranga Reddy District. The said amounts were
collected from consumers from 15.04.2003 to 03.10.2009, and
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subsequently, the petitioner was repatriated to his parent unit on
03.10.2009. After his repatriation, in his place, PC 4754 Sri
S.Edukondalu and PC 1701 Sri S.Venkateshwara Rao were deputed to
collect the amounts in the same area. During their visit, the
consumers/accused in Cr.Nos.5346/2007 and 2609/2007 stated that
they had paid the compounding amounts and assessment amounts to
the petitioner in the year 2007 itself, and in support of their
contention, they had produced the receipts issued by the petitioner.
10. It is further stated that during the investigation, on verification
of records, it was found that misappropriation had taken place. While
the petitioner was working at V & APTS P.S. R.R.South Circle, Budha
Bhavan, based on the complaint, a case in Cr.No.305 of 2010 was
registered against the petitioner for the offences punishable under
Sections 420, 403, 409 and 477(A) IPC and basing on the report
submitted by the Joint Managing Director, Vigilance & Security, AP
TRANSCO Vidyut Soudha, Hyderabad, vide
Lr.No.JMD(V&S)/P.O(VIDE)/VC-2/822/2010-2, dt.03.01.2011, the
petitioner was placed under suspension vide proceedings in
D.O.No.38/2011, dt.06.01.2011 under Rule 20 of TSCS (CC&A) Rules,
1991 and the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the
petitioner.
10
11. It is further stated that the petitioner was acquitted vide
judgment dated 22.02.2022 in C.C.No.5188 of 2018. The Inquiring
Authority has given a categorical finding that there is no
substantiating evidence to prove that the petitioner has
misappropriated an amount of Rs.5,47,676/- and also non-
availability of 204 receipts proves that the petitioner has
misappropriated the Government amount to the extent of Rs.33,043/-
by not remitting it to the Government Account, which is a fraudulent
act done by the petitioner. The petitioner has not provided any clarity
and has not submitted any evidence of having remitted Rs.5,47,676/-
to the Government in his defence to disprove the allegations made
against him. While corroborating the charges levelled against the
petitioner, sufficient evidence is available, which shows that the
petitioner produced fake permanent receipt numbers mentioning the
Challan numbers of other crimes and issued them to accused/(power
theft) consumers, mentioning different crime numbers. This is a
fraudulent act committed by the petitioner. From the evidence
available on record, it is revealed that the petitioner has
misappropriated an amount of Rs.33,043/- without remitting it to the
Government. Therefore, the 3rd respondent had rightly imposed the
major punishment of removal from service, in addition to treating the
period of suspension from 06.01.2011 to 14.01.2013 as not on duty.
Aggrieved by the order of the 3rd respondent, the petitioner preferred
11
an appeal before the 2nd respondent, who, in turn vide impugned order
dated 27.04.2024, rejected the appeal. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner has filed the present writ petition.
12. It is further stated that Rule 21 of the CC&A Rules, 1991, states
that the proceedings in a criminal case and the departmental
proceedings are distinct and different. The allegations levelled against
the petitioner are grave involving financial misappropriation.
13. It is further stated that acquittal in criminal case would not
enure to the benefit of the charged officer as the standard of proof
required in the departmental proceedings is one of preponderance of
probabilities. Is the burden of proof that the prosecution failed to
establish. However, after reviewing all the existing records and
documents, including, challans, FSL opinion/report, and the
substantial evidence submitted during the inquiry, the preponderance
of probability is evident. Hence, the 2nd respondent has issued
rejection order.
14. In support of his contentions, the learned Government Pleader
appearing for the respondents relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in UNION OF INDIA Vs. SARDAR BAHADUR 2 and stated
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has given clear rulings to the effect
that disciplinary proceedings is not a criminal trial and that the
2
1972 SLR SC 355
12
standard of proof required in a disciplinary inquiry is one of
preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
15. In State of AP Vs. S. Sreerama Rao 3, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that if the inquiry is held correctly, the departmental
authorities are the sole Judges of facts. Suppose there is some legal
evidence on which their findings can be based. In that case, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter that can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for
writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
16. In Union of India Vs. Harjeet Singh Sandhu 4, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that if two views are possible, the court shall not
interfere by substituting its own opinion for the satisfaction or opinion
of the authority, exercising the power under judicial review.
17. It is further stated that the power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure
that the conclusion that the authority reaches is necessarily correct in
the eye of the court. The disciplinary authority is the sole Judge of
facts. The Court/Tribunal, in exercising its power of review, does not
act as an appellate authority to re-evaluate the evidence and to arrive
at its independent findings based on the said evidence.
3
AIR 1963 SC 1723
4
2002 (1) SLJ SC 1
13
18. It is further stated that in the case of Ram Lal V. State of
Rajasthan & Ors(Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023), the appellant /
charged officer therein Post-acquittal has filed a writ petition seeking
reinstatement by quashing the dismissal order of the Appellate
Authority and subsequent refusal to review. The Single Judge
dismissed the writ petition, elucidating the differing standards of proof
between the criminal case and the departmental proceedings. The writ
appeal filed by the petitioner therein met with a similar fate,
reiterating the limited parameters for a judicial review against an order
in departmental proceedings. The bench also remarked that it was
also aware that the mere acquittal by a criminal court would not grant
the employee the right to claim any benefits, including reinstatement.
19. It is further stated that the material was placed before the
competent court. The inquiring authority is the same, it is the burden
of proof that prosecution has failed to establish in the criminal case.
In contrast, after going through all existing records, documents viz.,
challans, FSL opinion/report and the substantial evidence, both oral
and documentary, adduced before the inquiring authority, it was
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner had
misappropriated an amount of Rs.33,043/-, which was collected from
the accused of power theft consumers towards compounding and
assessment amount and had not remitted to the Government account
and the petitioner has not produced any evidence in his defence to
14
prove that he has remitted the amounts of Rs.5,47,676/- into the
Govt. account and has not misappropriated the Governmentamounts.
In the absence of any evidence adduced by the petitioner, the
allegation of misappropriation of Government amount stands proved.
Therefore, the writ petition lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.
20. While reiterating the counter averments, the learned
Government Pleader appearing for the respondents submits that the
respondents have rightly passed the impugned orders and there are
no grounds to interfere with the same.
21. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner filed a reply
affidavit reiterating the same submissions as stated in the writ
affidavit.
22. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the
learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. Perused
the record.
23. Having considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel for the respective parties, the points for consideration are :-
1. Whether the petitionerhas misappropriated an
amount of Rs.5,47,676/-.
2. The allegation is made against the petitioner after
one and half year of his repatriation to his parent unit.
15
3. When the allegations in both the Departmental
proceedings and the criminal proceedings are one and
the same, and once the petitioner was acquitted in the
criminal case vide judgment in C.C.No.5188 of 2018,
dated 22.02.2022, the departmental proceedings cannot
be continued.
24. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the
order of this Court in W.P.No.7020 of 2023, dated 06.12.2024,
wherein this Court allowed the writ petition observing as follows :-
12) In similar circumstances, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal‘s case (2024 (SCC Online
SC 2594), has held as under:
“12. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are
identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the
same, then the PK, J wp_7020_2023 matter acquires a different dimension. If the court
in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full
consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to
prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances.
The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that
allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and
oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts.
Further, the Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh
at Hyderabad in Venkatapathi’s case (1999 (4) ALD 39 (DB), has held as under:
“4. Challenging the order of the learned single Judge, the RTC has filed this writ appeal.
We find no merit in the appeal inspite of the persuasion of the learned Counsel for the
appellant-RTC. We have already pointed out as to what charge was framed in the
disciplinary enquiry against the petitioner. It has to be noted that the charge was not for
the substantive act of having caused death of the wife. The charge was only that
petitioner was involved in a criminal case and the said involvement had resulted in
framing of a criminal case for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. The argument of the
learned Counsel for the appellant is that in course of the enquiry the petitioner had
himself stated that death of his wife was result of his delinquency. It is argued that in
view of this admission of the petitioner the disciplinary authority was justified in
accepting the same and Court cannot reappreciate the PK, J wp_7020_2023 evidence.
16
We fail to understand as to how the statement of petitioner was relevant in the instant
case. The charge was only for involvement in a criminal case resulting in instituting of a
criminal case against the petitioner. As soon as the criminal case itself was found to be
untenable in Court of law, the very basis of the charge was knocked out. The charge
should have been quashed as and when the criminal case ended in acquittal.
Involvement in a criminal case which was not tenable in Court of law can hardly amount
to any delinquency. It cannot be disputed that the disciplinary authority is entitled to
hold disciplinary enquiry on the same charge as is before a Criminal Court because the
scope of disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial is different. But, where the charge in the
disciplinary enquiry is necessarily dependent on the result of the criminal case if the
criminal case itself ends in favour of the delinquent, the charge in the disciplinary
enquiry will become unsustainable one. In the facts and circumstances of the case
having regard to the charge framed against the petitioner and having regard to the
result of the criminal case, we have no manner of doubt that the learned single Judge
was right in allowing the petitioner’s claim.”
14) Coming to the case on hand, the charge memo was issued to the petitioner on the
ground that he was involved in a criminal case, which was admittedly and ultimately
ended in acquittal vide judgment dated 21.03.2022 passed by the V Additional Sessions
Judge, II-FTC, Warangal at Jangaon, in Sessions Case No.24 of 2019. Further, the
witnesses cited in criminal case as well as in departmental proceedings vide charge
memo dated 19.07.2018 are one and the same. Therefore, having regard to the law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred judgments, this Court is of the
view that the impugned orders are not sustainable under law and are therefore liable to
be set aside.
25. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents
relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in GOVIND DAS Vs.
STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS 5 and PRAVIN KUMAR Vs. UNION
OF INDIA AND OTHERS 6.
26. It is to be seen that in the instant case, the allegation against
the petitioner is that he has misappropriated an amount of
Rs.5,47,676/-, but the Department failed to prove in their enquiry.
The enquiry report itself stated that there is no evidence to prove that
the petitioner has misappropriated an amount of Rs.5,47,676/-,
5
(1997) 11 Supreme Court Cases 361
6
(2020) 9 Supreme Court Cases 471
17
However, there is evidence that the petitioner has misappropriated an
amount of Rs.33,043/-. So, the report itself is not in a position to
prove the actual misappropriation of amount by the petitioner.
Therefore, imposing the major punishment of removal from service is
untenable.
27. The contention of the petitioner is that after one and half year
from the date of relieving from the place where he was deputed, the
allegations were made against the petitioner. If the petitioner has
really misappropriated the amount as alleged by the respondents, they
ought to have proved the same. But, in the instant case, the
respondents failed to prove that the petitioner has misappropriated an
amount of Rs.5,47,676/-. Therefore, the allegations made against the
petitioner after one and half year cannot be proved in toto. Even
during that one and half year period, some other employees were also
entrusted with the same duty that the petitioner had rendered.
28. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the
decisions of this Court in RAMLAL‘s case (supra) and
VENKATAPATHI’s case (Supra), wherein it was observed that the
witnesses cited in the criminal proceedings as well as in the
disciplinary proceedings are one and the same. However, in the
present case, a perusal of the criminal proceedings and the
departmental proceedings goes to show that the issue is one and the
18
same, except one or two witnesses are different. Therefore, the said
cases do not apply to the case on hand.
29. In support of his contentions, the learned Government Pleader
relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Govind‘s case
(supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as follows :-
2. The only ground which has been urged by the learned counsel for the
appellant in support of this appeal is that since the appellant has been
acquitted in the criminal case, the order for termination of his services
should have been set aside. The learned counsel has placed before us a
copy of the judgment of the criminal court whereby the appellant was
acquitted. We have gone through the said judgment. We find that the
acquittal of the appellant is based on the view that the charges are not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Since the standard of proof required to
prove a charge of misconduct in departmental proceedings is not the same
as that required to prove a criminal charge, the acquittal of the appellant in
the criminal case, in these circumstances, could not, in our opinion, be
made the basis for setting aside the order for termination of the services of
the appellant passed in the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of
evidence adduced in the departmental inquiry conducted in the charges
levelled against the appellant. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal
and the same is accordingly dismissed.”
30. In the above case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that sincethe
standard of proof required to prove a charge of misconduct in
departmental proceedings is not the same as that needed to confirm a
criminal charge, the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal case
could not be made the basis for setting aside the order of termination
of the services of the appellant passed in the departmental
proceedings based on evidence adduced in the departmental inquiry
19
conducted in the charges levelled against the appellant. In the
present case, during the departmental enquiry, the respondents failed
to prove that the petitioner had misappropriated an amount of
Rs.5,47,676/-. However, there is evidence that the petitioner
misappropriated an amount of Rs.33,043/-. Therefore, the aforesaid
case is not fully applicable to the case on hand.
31. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents also
relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in PRAVIN
KUMAR‘s case (supra) and stated that the power of judicial review is
distinct from appellate power exercised by departmental appellate
authority. In the said judgment, with regard to the effect of criminal
enquiry on disciplinary proceedings, it was held as follows :-
33. The incident of 28-2-1999 raised serious questions of criminality
under the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, as well as of
violation of Service Regulations and administrative misconduct. Thus, in
addition to appointment of enquiry officer, the authorities also registered a
criminal complaint with the CBI. After investigation, the CBI though did not
find adequate material to launch criminal prosecution against the
appellant but through its self-speaking report dated 7-3-2000, the CBI
recommended major disciplinary action against the appellant and a few
others.
34. It is beyond debate that criminal proceedings are distinct from civil
proceedings. It is both possible and common in disciplinary matters to
establish charges against a delinquent official by preponderance of
probabilities and consequently terminate his services. But the same set of
evidence may not be sufficient to take away his liberty under our criminal
law jurisprudence. Such distinction between standards of proof amongst
20civil and criminal litigation is deliberate, given the differences in stakes,
the power imbalance between the parties and the social costs of an
erroneous decision. Thus, in a disciplinary enquiry, strict rules of evidence
and procedure of a criminal trial are inapplicable, like say, statements
made before enquiry officers can be relied upon in certain instances.
35. Thus, the appellant’s contention that he should be exonerated in the
present proceedings as no criminal charge-sheet was filed by the CBI after
enquiry, is liable to be discarded. The employer always retains the right to
conduct an independent disciplinary proceeding, irrespective of the
outcome of a criminal proceeding. Furthermore, the CBI report dated 7-3-
2000 does recommend major disciplinary action against the appellant. The
said report also buttresses the respondent’s case.
In the said judgment, with regard to punishment and
plea of leniency, it was held as follows :-
36. In our considered opinion, the appellant’s contention that the
punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the allegation of
corruption, is without merit. It is a settled legal proposition that the
disciplinary authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for a
proved delinquency, subject of course to principles of proportionality and
fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article 14 itself, which
prohibits State authorities from treating varying degrees of misdeeds with
the same broad stroke. Determination of such proportionality is a function
of not only the action or intention of the delinquent, but must also factor
the financial effect and societal implication of such misconduct. But unlike
in criminal cases, in matters of disciplinary proceedings courts only
interfere on grounds of proportionality when they find that the punishment
awarded is inordinate to a high degree, or if the conscience of the court
itself is shocked. Thus, whereas imposition of major penalty (like
dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank) would be discriminatory and
impermissible for trivial misdeeds; but for grave offences there is a need to
send a clear message of deterrence to the society. Charges such as
corruption, misappropriation and gross indiscipline are prime examples of
the latter category, and ought to be dealt with strictly.
21
37. Applying these guidelines to the facts of the case in hand, it is clear
that the punishment of dismissal from service is far from disproportionate
to the charges of corruption, fabrication and intimidation which have
unanimously been proven against the appellant. Taking any other view
would be an anathema to service jurisprudence. If we were to hold that
systematic corruption and its blatant cover-up are inadequate to attract
dismissal from service, then the purpose behind having such major
penalties, which are explicitly provided for under Article 311 of the
Constitution, would be obliterated.
38. Still further, the appellant’s actions would most probably have caused
huge consequential losses to BPCL and lowered the reputation of the CISF
amongst members of the public. Given the paramilitary nature of the
appellant’s force, a sense of integrity, commitment, discipline, and
camaraderie is paramount. This expectation is only heightened in the case
of the appellant given how he was specifically tasked with weeding out
corruption and conducting surprise raids. Once shattered through acts of
intimidation, forgery, and corruption; only the severest penalty ought to be
imposed.
32. From the above judgment, it is evident that the power of judicial
review is distinct from appellate power being exercised by the
departmental authorities. It is a settled legal proposition that the
disciplinary authority has wide discretion in imposing punishment for
a proven delinquency, subject, of course, to the principles of
proportionality and fair play. Such requirements emanate from Article
14 itself, which prohibits State authorities from treating varying
degrees of misdeeds with the same broad stroke. Determination of
such proportionality is a function of not only the action or intention of
the delinquent but must also factor the financial effect and societal
implication of such misconduct. However, in the case on hand,
22
although the allegation against the petitioner is that he
misappropriated an amount of Rs.5,47,676/-, the same could not be
elicited, and there is evidence that an amount of Rs.33,043/- only was
misappropriated.
33. In the case of disciplinary proceedings without conducting a
proper enquiry and without bringing proper evidence to that effect,
authorities cannot impose major punishment. In the present case, the
petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case and in the departmental
proceedings, the allegations made by the Department could not be
proved. It is stated in the enquiry report that there is no evidence to
prove that the petitioner has misappropriated an amount of
Rs.5,47,676/- and in the said circumstances, imposition of
punishment of removal from service is highly objectionable and
disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Moreover, while imposing
the major punishment of removal from service, treating the
suspension period as ‘not on duty’ is acceptable because the petitioner
has not worked for the said period and the principle of ‘no work and
no pay’ would apply.
34. Insofar as the punishment of removal from service is concerned,
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is
of the considered view that the punishment of removal from service is
disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Therefore, this Court feels
23
it just and proper to modify the punishment of removal from service to
that of compulsory retirement.
35. Accordingly, the order dated 24.04.2023 passed by the 3rd
respondent, as confirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated
20.06.2024, is hereby set aside. The punishment of removal from
service imposed on the petitioner is modified to that of compulsory
retirement. Insofar as treating the suspension period from 06.01.2011
to 14.01.2013 as ‘not on duty’ holds good.
36. The writ petition is accordingly is disposed of. No order as to
costs.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________________
NAMAVARAPU RAJESHWAR RAO, J
Date : 08.07.2025
L.R.Copy to be marked
(B/o)
Prv
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