Rajasthan High Court – Jaipur
Arun Fatehpuria Son Of Late Shri Shankar … vs Tarachand Tholia Huf on 25 July, 2025
Author: Anoop Kumar Dhand
Bench: Anoop Kumar Dhand
[2025:RJ-JP:26949]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10566/2025
1. Arun Fatehpuria Son of Late Shri Shankar Lal Fatehpuria,
Aged About 63 Years, Resident of Tholia House, Tholia
Circle, Mirza Ismile Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
2. Deepak Fatehpuria Son of Late Shri Shankar Lal
Fatehpuria, Aged About 60 Years, Resident of Tholia
House, Tholia Circle, Mirza Ismile Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioners
Versus
Tarachand Tholia HUF, Through Pranshant Tholia S/o Shri Sharad
Chandra Tholia, aged about 52 Years, Resident of Tholia House,
Tholia Circle, M.I. Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Shashwat Purohit
Mr.Ramesh Chandra Sharma
Mr.Jaivardhan Joshi
For Respondent(s) : Mr.Prateek Kasliwal
Ms.Varnali Purohit
Mr.Harsh Parashar
JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND
Order
Reserved on : : : 18/07/2025
Pronounced on : : : 25/07/2025
Reportable
For convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided in the
following parts:-
INDEX
(1) The Challenge :-…………………………………………………………….2
(2) Contention by the petitioners:-……………………………………….2
(3) Contention by the respondent:-………………………………………5
(4) Analysis, Discussions & Findings:-…………………………………..7
(5) Conclusion:-…………………………………………………………15(Downloaded on 26/07/2025 at 01:01:10 AM)
[2025:RJ-JP:26949] (2 of 15) [CW-10566/2025]The Challenge:-
1. A challenge has been led to the impugned judgment dated
31.05.2025 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal (hereinafter
referred to as “the Appellate Tribunal”) by which the appeal
preferred by the petitioners against the judgment dated
12.10.2022 passed by the Rent Tribunal No.2, Jaipur Metropolitan-
I (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) has been rejected.
2. By judgment dated 12.10.2022, the application submitted by
the respondent/landlord (hereinafter referred to as “the
respondent”) under Section 9 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act,
2001 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2001”), was partly
allowed by the Tribunal and eviction order has been passed
against the petitioners/tenants (hereinafter referred to as “the
petitioners”), directing them to vacate the premises within a
period of six months, from the date of the judgment and to pay
the revised rent along with arrears to the respondent.
Contentions by the rival sides:-
(A) By the petitioners:-
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
respondents submitted an application under Section 9 of the Act of
2001 against the petitioner, before the Tribunal seeking eviction of
the petitioners from the subject premises situated at Tholia House,
M.I. Road, Jaipur on the ground of sub-letting, personal bona fide
necessity and revision of rent in terms of Section 6 of the Act of
2001. Learned counsel submits that the respondent failed to
establish that the petitioners had sub-let the subject premises or
any part thereof, and transferred the possession of the same to
third person.
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4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the subject
premises was originally let out in the year 1954 to a partnership
firm named M/s.Vyapar Udhyog Pratishtan of which Shankar Lal
Fatehpuria was the proprietor. Learned counsel submits that the
aforesaid partnership firm is a registered firm having three
partners namely; Arun Fatehpuria, Deepak Fatehpuria and Ankit
Fatehpuria. Learned counsel submits that the respondent
submitted an application under Section 9 of the Act of 2001,
without impleading the aforesaid partnership firm and the third
partner Ankit Fatehpuria. Learned counsel submits that non-
impleadment of proper parties, rendered the application defective
due to non-joinder of parties and the same was not maintainable.
Yet, the Tribunal entertained the said application and passed the
order impugned against the petitioners. Learned counsel submits
that the entire rent of the subject premises has been regularly
paid from the bank account of the aforesaid partnership firm i.e.
M/s.Vyapar Udhyog Pratishtan for the last 70 years and the same
has been accepted by the respondent. Learned counsel submits
that in order to substantiate the above, the partnership deed was
placed on the record, but the same was overlooked and the order
impugned has been passed by the Tribunal.
5. In support of his contentions, counsel has placed reliance
upon the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court
and by this Court :-
reported in 2017 (3) SCC 194 decided on
02.02.2017.
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(2) Prabha Arora & Anr. Vs. Brij Mohini
Anand & Ors. reported in 2007 (10) SCC 83
decided on 31.10.2007.
(3) Bhojamal Vs. Devaram decided by this
Court in S.B. Civil First Appeal No.107/1993
on 11.05.2017.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the
application filed by the respondent under Section 9 of the Act of
2001 was carrying defect of non-joinder of necessary parties,
hence, the same was not maintainable and was liable to be
rejected by both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. However,
instead of rejecting the application on this ground alone, the
impugned orders have been passed against the petitioners.
Therefore, interference of this Court is warranted.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that an
application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code (for
short, “CPC“) was submitted by the petitioners before the
Appellate Tribunal seeking amendment in the reply to the
application originally submitted by them before the Tribunal, but
the said application came to be rejected. Learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the sole reason for passing the impugned
order against the petitioners is the personal bona fide need, as
claimed by the respondent. Learned counsel contends that in fact,
the respondent is in possession of three premises, namely, the
subject premises of the petitioners and two other premises
operating in the name and style of Amarpali Jewellers and
Anupam Trading. Learned counsel submits that during pendency of
the eviction proceedings, the lease in favour of Amarpali Jewellers
was renewed and another shop which is located behind the
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subject premises was let out to Secure Ventures LLP. Hence, under
these circumstances, counsel submits that the claim of personal
bona fide requirement of the respondent is not genuine and the
sole intention of the respondent is to get the petitioners evicted
from the subject premises, rather than to fulfill any bona fide
need.
8. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon
the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and by
this Court :-
(1) Kempaiah Vs. Lingaiah & Ors. reported
in 2001 (8) SCC 718 decided on 31.10.2001.
(2) Dhan Raj Vs. LR’s of Nemichand reported in
2010 Supreme (Raj) 1838 decided on
30.09.2010 &
(3) Bhagirath Vs. Ram Prasad reported in
1987 Supreme (Raj.) 212 decided on
10.09.1986.
9. Learned counsel submits that, under these circumstances,
the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as by the Appellate
Tribunal suffer from legal infirmity and the same are not
sustainable in the eyes of law and are liable to be quashed and
set-aside.
(B) By the respondent:-
10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners and
submits that it is an admitted position in the reply filed by the
petitioners before the Tribunal that the subject premises was
initially taken on rent by Late Shankar Lal Fatehpuria in the year
1954 and subsequently, said Shankar Lal Fatehpuria started using
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the subject premises in the name and style of M/s.Vyapar Udhyog
Pratishtan. Learned counsel submits that the subject premises was
never let out to any partnership firm or M/s.Vyapar Udhyog
Pratishtan, rather the same was let out to an individual namely
Shankar Lal Fatehpuria. Learned counsel submits that this fact has
also been admitted by the petitioners’ witnesses, while appearing
in the witness box for recording of their statements. Learned
counsel submits that the respondent is in bona fide need of the
subject premises as he is a jeweler by profession and running his
business from another location in the city, which is inadequate for
his growing business requirements and the subject premises is
better suited for his business operations. Therefore, the eviction
application was filed by him against the petitioners, on the ground
of personal bona fide necessity and other grounds. Learned
counsel submits that the personal bona fide need/requirement of
the respondent has been duly established by him not only on the
record of the Tribunal but also the Appellate Tribunal, which
recorded concurrent finding against the petitioners. Learned
counsel submits that the landlord is the best judge of his
requirements.
11. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon
the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Kahahaiya Lal Arya Vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors. (SLP (C)
No.21965/2022).
12. Learned counsel further submits that the objection regarding
non-joinder of the third partner Ankit Fatehpuria and the
partnership firm Vyapar Udhyog Pratishtan, was raised by the
petitioners before the Tribunal by way of filing an application
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under Order 14 Rule 5 CPC. However, the said application was
rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 09.03.2022, against
which the petitioners submitted S.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.5394/2022 before this Court, which was also rejected by this
Court granting liberty to raise all the available objections before
the Tribunal. Learned counsel submits that the order dated
09.03.2022, passed by the Tribunal, has attained finality. Learned
counsel submits that even an application was also submitted by
the petitioners before the Appellate Tribunal under Order 6 Rule
17 CPC for taking on record the lease deed executed in favour of
Secured Ventures LLP. However, the same was rejected by the
Appellate Tribunal vide impugned order dated 31.05.2025. Hence,
interference of this Court is not warranted and the writ petition is
liable to be rejected.
Analysis, Discussions & Findings:-
13. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and
perused the material available on record.
14. Basically, the petitioners have raised two fold arguments:
firstly, the rent of the subject premises was regularly paid from
the bank account of the partnership firm i.e. M/s Vyapar Udhyog
Pratisthan; and secondly, there existed no personal bona fide
necessity of the respondent to seek eviction of the petitioners
from the subject premises because the respondent is already in
possession of the other premises, which have been let out by him
to other tenants.
15. This Court shall deal with the first submission of the
petitioner. The respondent has submitted an application under
Section 9 of the Act of 2001 against the petitioners seeking their
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[2025:RJ-JP:26949] (8 of 15) [CW-10566/2025]eviction from the subject premises on the grounds of sub-letting
and personal bona fide necessity. The issue of sub-letting has
been decided against the respondent, while the issue of personal
bona fide need/requirement has been decided in his favour by the
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal.
16. Perusal of the application under Section 9 of the Act of 2001
reveals that the subject premises was let out in the year 1954 to
Shankar Lal Fatehpuria, father of the petitioner, who started his
business of agriculture equipments, spare parts and pump, etc. in
the name and style of M/s.Vyapar Udhyog Prathisthan and the
rent was paid by him through cheques drawn from the bank
account of the above firm.
In the reply to the aforesaid application, the petitioners
accepted and did not deny this fact. This fact has been also
admitted by the petitioner No.2-Deepak Fatehpuria in his cross-
examination.
17. The petitioners have submitted a copy of the partnership
deed on the record, which indicates that the partnership firm M/s
Vyapar Udhyog Pratisthan was comprised of three partners,
namely, Arun Fatehpuria, Deepak Fatehpuria and Ankit Fatehpuria.
The pleadings indicate that the rent was paid to the respondent
from the bank account of the above firm. However, neither the
partnership firm nor the third partner Ankit Fatehpuria have been
impleaded as party in the eviction application submitted by the
respondent. According to the petitioners, the said application was
suffering from non-joinder of necessary parties and, therefore, the
same is liable to be rejected.
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18. This fact is not in dispute that the shop in question was let
out to Shankar Lal Fatehpuria and not to the partnership firm
M/s.Vyapar Udhyog Pratishthan, however, the rent was paid to the
respondent from the bank account of the above firm. Now, the
question before this Court is “Whether tenant of the landlord was
Shankar Lal Fatehpuria individually or the partnership firm ‘M/s
Vyapar Udhyog Prathisthan’?”
19. The word ‘tenant’ has been defined under Section 2(i) of the
Act of 2001 which reads as under:-
“2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless subject or
context otherwise requires,-
(a) to (h) XX XX XX
(i) “tenant” means-
(i) the person by whom or on whose
account or behalf rent is, or but for a
contract express or implied, would be
payable for any premises to his landlord
including the person who is continuing in
its possession after the termination of his
tenancy otherwise than by an order or
decree for eviction passed under the
provisions of this Act; and
(ii) in the event of death of the person
referred to in sub-clause (i),-
(a) in case of premises let out for
residential purposes, his surviving
spouse, son, daughter, mother and
father who had been ordinarily residing
with him in such premises as member
of his family upto his death;
(b) in case of premises let out for
commercial or business purposes, his
surviving spouse, son, daughter,
mother and father who had been
ordinarily carrying on business with
him in such premises as member of his
family upto his death”
Perusal of the aforesaid Section 2(i) of the Act of 2001
clearly indicates that tenant means that the person by whom or on
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[2025:RJ-JP:26949] (10 of 15) [CW-10566/2025]whose account or on his behalf rent of the premises is paid to the
landlord.
20. The Act of 2001 does not provide any procedure for suing a
partnership firm or its partners where the tenancy has not been
created in their favour. In general law, “partnership firm” is not a
distinct legal entity, however, the definition of ‘tenant’ under
Section 2(i) of the Act of 2001 includes a person by whom or on
whose behalf rent is paid to the landlord for any premises. A rent
petition against the partnership firm is liable to be filed only if the
tenancy is created in the name of such firm, in case such firm or
its partners have taken the premises on rent for conducting their
business. There is neither any provision under Section 9 of the Act
of 2001 nor under Order 30 Rule 1 CPC to file any suit against
such firm for its eviction in the absence of any tenancy in its
favour.
21. Eviction petition is filed by the landlord for eviction of his/
her tenant. If the tenant is a partnership firm then, certainly, the
petition can be filed against such firm, however, the partners are
not tenant in their personal capacity and they are tenants as
partners of the firm. Inheritance of tenancy of a partnership firm
under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, upon death of a partner
will not be in operation. While the legal heirs inherit the rights of
the deceased partners, they do not inherit the tenancy created in
favour of the partnership firm.
22. In the instant case, the subject premises was let out to
Shankar Lal Fatehpuria and not to his partnership firm. Merely,
because he established a firm and the rent was paid from the
bank account of that firm to the landlord does not confer any right
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on his firm. The tenant-Shankarlal carried out his business of
agriculture equipment, spare parts, pumps, etc. in the name of
M/s.Vyapar Udhyog Pratishthan, however that does not mean the
firm automatically became the ‘tenant’ merely because of the fact
that the rent was paid from its bank account.
23. The plea raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the shop
premises was originally taken on rent by Shankar Lal Fatehpuria
from the respondent in the year 1954, who subsequently, started
his business in a partnership firm. Therefore, all the partners are
the tenants of the respondent and accordingly, the firm and all its
partners are necessary parties to the eviction application and as
such, the application has been filed under Section 9 of the Act of
2001 by the respondent is not maintainable on account of non-
joinder of all these necessary parties.
The above objections of the petitioners are not tenable for
the reason that it is an admitted case of both the sides that
tenancy was created solely in favour of the tenant Shankar Lal
Fathepuria and not in favour of his partnership firm M/s.Vyapar
Udhyog Pratisthan and there is no material on record to indicate
and establish the tenancy was ever created in favour of the firm at
any point of time. Accordingly, the partners of the firm have no
right, title or interest in respect of the rented premises to claim
themselves as tenant of the subject premises, either in the
individual capacity or collectively as the partnership firm. The
premises rented to Shankar Lal Fatehpuria shall be governed by
the provisions contained under the Act of 2001. Therefore, neither
M/s Vyapar Udhyog Pratisthan nor Ankit Fatehpuria have any right
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to be impleaded as party in the eviction petition submitted by the
respondent against the petitioners.
24. This partnership firm and Ankit Fatehpuria are not tenants,
hence, they are not entitled to claim their right on the subject
premises as tenants. Therefore, they are not even a formal party
much less necessary party.
25. The petitioners submitted an application under Order 14 Rule
5 CPC read with Section 21 of the Act of 2001 seeking amendment
that the partnership firm has not been impleaded as a party in the
eviction application. The said application was rejected by the
Tribunal vide order dated 09.03.2022, against which the
petitioners submitted S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5394/2022, but
the same was also rejected by this Court vide order dated
09.05.2022, hence, the order dated 09.03.2022 has attained
finality. However, liberty was granted by this Court to the
petitioners to raise their objections before the Tribunal.
Both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have dealt with
the objections of the petitioners in their respective impugned
order by recording concurrent findings. The judgments relied upon
by the petitioners are not applicable in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
26. Now, this Court proceeds to deal with the second argument
advanced by the petitioners regarding personal bona fide need of
the subject premises by the respondent. The respondent
submitted the application on the ground of his bona fide need to
open a jewelry showroom. The personal need/requirement of the
respondent was found to be bona fide not only by the Tribunal but
also by the Appellate Tribunal through concurrent findings.
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27. This Court finds no substance in the arguments of the
petitioners that the respondent has alternative shops available
which are suitable for his business. While the respondent may
have some other properties, which are under tenancy of the other
tenants, it is entire within his discretion to seek eviction of the
petitioners from the subject premises based on his personal bona
fide necessary to establish a jewelry showroom. He cannot be
forced to initiate such proceedings against the other tenants. It is
for the landlord to take a decision in this regard and once he has
decided to get the subject premises vacated, no error or illegality
can be attributed to his decision. It has been clearly established
on record through concurrent findings of both the Tribunal and the
Appellate Tribunal that the subject premises is more suitable place
for the respondent to establish a jewelry showroom. Hence, the
bona fide need of the respondent stands duly proved.
28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh
Bawa Vs. Asha Devi reported in 2016 (10) SCC 209 has held
that “it is perfectly open for the landlord to choose a more suitable
premises for carrying on the business.”
29. This Court also observed that in another judgment passed by
Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Dhannalal Vs.
KalawatiBai & Ors. reported in (2002) 6 SCC 16, the Apex
Court has held as under:-
“A landlord cannot be compelled to carry on
business in rented premises and the proved
requirement cannot be defeated by the tenant
submitting that the landlord can start or
comfortably continue to run his business in
rented premises”
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[2025:RJ-JP:26949] (14 of 15) [CW-10566/2025]
“27. The bona fides of the need of the landlord
for the premises or additional premises have to
be determined by the Court by applying objective
standards and once the Court is satisfied of such
bona fides then in the matter of choosing out of
more accommodations than one available to the
landlord, his subjective choice shall be respected
by the Court”.
30. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kanahaiya
Lal Arya (supra) has held in Para No.11 as under:-
“In the case at hand, the appellant-landlord may
be having some other properties under tenancy
of various persons but once he has decided to
get the suit premises vacated for the bona fide
need of establishing an ultrasound machine for
his two unemployed sons, he cannot be forced to
initiate such a proceeding against the other
tenants. It is for the appellant-landlord to take a
decision in this regard and once he has decided
to get the suit premises vacated, no error or
illegality could be pointed out in his decision.
Secondly, it has come on record by clear finding
of the court of first instance that the suit
premises is the most suitable accommodation for
establishing an ultrasound machine. The reason
being that it is situated adjacent to a medical
clinic and a pathological centre and is the most
appropriate place for establishing any medical
machine. Moreover, the appellant-landlord has
also proved his capacity to invest in purchasing/
establishing an ultrasound machine and that his
two sons are unemployed and as such the suit
premises is required to establish them in
business and to augment the family’s income.
Therefore, the bona fide need of the appellant-
landlord stands duly established.”
31. In the considered opinion of this Court, it is for the landlord
to decide and take a call for how the rented premises is required
by the owner of the premises, i.e., the landlord. This Court is of
the view that it is not within the domain of the tenant to suggest
or to show that the landlord does not have the bona fide necessity
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of the rented premises. The necessity of the rented property is
required to be adjudged from the perspective of the landlord and
not from the perspective of the tenant.
32. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
petitioners have no application in the facts and circumstances of
the present case.
Conclusion:-
33. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, this Court does
not find any error or infirmity in the orders passed by the Rent
Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal. This writ petition being bereft
of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
34. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, also
stand dismissed.
(ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J
Ayush Sharma/16
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