Delhi High Court
Armaan Alam vs State Nct Of Delhi on 21 July, 2025
Author: Swarana Kanta Sharma
Bench: Swarana Kanta Sharma
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 21.07.2025
+ CRL.A. 319/2025 & CRL.M.(BAIL) 586/2025
ARMAAN ALAM .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Sunita Arora, Advocate
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Naresh Kumar Chahar,
APP for the State with Ms.
Piya Mann, Advocate.
Ms. Sakshi Jayant, Advocate
for Victim.
CORAM:
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1. By way of the present appeal, the appellant seeks setting aside
of the judgment dated 07.12.2024 and order on sentence dated
31.01.2025 [hereafter ‗impugned judgment and order’], passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge (FTSC)(POCSO)-02, West, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi [hereafter ‗Trial Court’] in Sessions Case No.
111/2020, arising out of FIR No. 841/2019, registered at Police
Station Nihal Vihar, Delhi for the commission of offence punishable
under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012 [hereafter ‗POCSO Act‘].
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
2. Pithily put, the facts of the present case are that on 16.12.2019
at about 05:00 PM, the victim child, aged about 14 years, had gone to
a nearby shop to buy eatables, when she had allegedly been
inappropriately touched on her chest by the accused, who had been
standing outside the said shop. The victim had returned home without
buying anything and had narrated the incident to her mother. Her
mother had immediately gone to the shop and confronted the
accused; however, he had entered into an argument with her and had
left the spot thereafter. The mother of the victim child had then
informed her husband about the incident, who, upon reaching home,
had called the police at number 100. The said information had been
recorded at P.S. Nihal Vihar vide DD No. 70-A. Pursuant thereto,
inquiry had been conducted. During the course of investigation, the
statement of the mother of the child had been recorded, as the child
had been stated to be too frightened to narrate the incident herself. On
the basis of the statement of the mother of the victim, the present FIR
had been registered.
3. During the course of investigation, the statement of the victim
child under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. was recorded wherein she
categorically alleged that the accused Armaan, who used to live in
another lane, had pressed her chest when she had visited the nearby
shop to buy something to eat. The accused was subsequently arrested.
During investigation, the age proof of the victim child, i.e. MCD
Birth Certificate was collected as per which her date of birth was
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25.12.2004. After completion of investigation, the chargesheet was
filed for commission of offence under Section 354 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter ‗IPC‘] and Section 10 of the POCSO
Act.
4. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the appellant
for commission of offence under Sections 354/354A of the IPC and
Section 10 of the POCSO Act. During the course of trial, prosecution
examined 8 witnesses, as the examination of 4 witnesses had been
dispensed with. The statement of the accused was recorded and
defence evidence was also led by the accused. Upon conclusion of
trial, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused for the offence
punishable under Sections 354/354A IPC and Section 8 of the
POCSO Act, vide impugned judgment dated 07.12.2024.
5. By way of the impugned order on sentence dated 31.01.2025,
the appellant was then sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for a period of four years along with payment of fine of ₹10,000. No
separate sentence was awarded to the appellant for the offences
punishable under Sections 354/354A of IPC. In default of payment of
fine, the appellant was directed to further undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of thirty days.
6. Aggrieved by his conviction, the appellant has approached this
Court by way of the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that
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the learned Trial Court has erred in convicting the appellant despite
the prosecution’s failure to establish the age of the victim beyond
reasonable doubt. It is contended that the birth certificate relied upon
was issued by the MCD after a delay of almost six years from the
stated date of birth, and the school records alone are insufficient to
conclusively prove her age, which was a crucial element of the
prosecution’s case. It is further argued that although the victim was
stated to be around 14 years of age at the time of the incident, the
complaint was not lodged on the basis of her own statement, but
rather on the version given by her mother. The explanation provided
by the mother, that the child was unable to speak properly due to fear,
appears inconsistent, since the victim gave a detailed statement under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. to the learned Magistrate the very next day
without any apparent difficulty, which casts doubt on the
prosecution’s case. The learned counsel also points to discrepancies
in the statements of key witnesses. While in the initial complaint , the
victim’s mother stated that her daughter had merely described the
assailant as ―a boy‖ and that she came to know his identity only upon
confronting him at the shop, the victim in her Section 164 of Cr.P.C.
statement directly named the accused as Arman, indicating prior
knowledge. This, it is argued, amounts to a material improvement in
the prosecution’s version. It is also contended that the mother of the
victim claimed that the appellant appeared to be drunk at the time of
the incident, yet the medical examination of the appellant does not
indicate any signs of intoxication. Moreover, PW-1 did not state in
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her deposition that the victim had returned home crying, which
contradicts the narrative mentioned in the complaint. The learned
counsel further submits that the arrest memo of the appellant reflects
the time of arrest as 8:40 PM on 16.12.2019, whereas the FIR was
registered only later at around 10:39 PM, which raises serious
questions regarding the sequence of events. Additionally, PW-5, the
shopkeeper at the scene, admitted in his testimony that he did not
witness the incident himself, which weakens the prosecution’s case.
Attention is also drawn to inconsistencies in the testimonies of PW-2
(the victim’s mother) and her husband regarding the PCR call –
specifically, the time at which it was made and the phone from which
it was made. Furthermore, it is pointed out that no independent or
public witness was examined during the trial, which further affects
the credibility of the prosecution’s version. In view of these
discrepancies and inconsistencies, learned counsel contends that the
learned Trial Court had failed to appreciate the evidence in its proper
perspective and had wrongly proceeded to convict the accused. Thus,
it is prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the impugned
judgment and order be set aside.
8. On the other hand, the learned APP for the State opposes the
present appeal and submits that the learned Trial Court has rightly
convicted the appellant after appreciating all the material evidence. It
is argued that the victim’s age was duly proved through the MCD
birth certificate and school records, which are admissible and
trustworthy. The victim’s statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. was
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recorded without delay and the victim clearly named the present
appellant, ruling out any doubt regarding identity. It is also contended
that the fact that the complaint was initially lodged by the mother
does not weaken the prosecution’s case, especially when the victim
later gave a clear and consistent account of the incident. It is further
stated that minor discrepancies in statements of witnesses do not
affect the core of the prosecution’s case. The learned APP submits
that non-examination of public witnesses is not fatal and the evidence
of the victim and her mother was sufficient and reliable to convict the
present appellant. It is thus argued that the learned Trial Court
committed no error in convicting the accused.
9. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of both
the parties and has perused the material available on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
10. To appreciate and adjudicate the contentions raised on behalf
of the appellant, it shall be first apposite to take note of the
allegations against the accused and the statements of the witnesses in
this regard.
Testimonies of the Material Prosecution Witnesses
11. In the present case, the General Diary Entry No. 70A had been
recorded at P.S. Nihal Vihar at 17:42:38 regarding the incident of
―chhed khani‖ and touching of breasts of a 14-15 year old girl child.
The statement of the mother of the victim, i.e. the one given to the
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police on the basis of FIR was registered specifically mentions that
when her daughter had gone to buy some eatables from a nearby
shop, the accused had touched her breast, and her daughter had then
come back home weeping and narrated the incident to her. The
mother of the victim had clarified at the time of registration of FIR
itself that the child was scared due to the incident and would not be
able to explain the same incident properly.
12. Further, PW-2, the victim’s mother, deposed before the learned
Trial Court that on 16.12.2019, when her daughter returned from her
tuitions at around 5:00 PM, she asked for permission to go to the
market to buy something to eat, which PW-2 granted. As her
daughter stepped out of the house, the accused, Armaan Alam, who
appeared to be in an intoxicated state, was standing nearby. He
approached her, touched her chest, and said, ―Toffee logi?‖, which
frightened her. She immediately returned home and narrated the
entire incident to her mother, also pointing out that the accused was
still standing there and asked her to intervene. PW-2 then went to the
spot and confronted the accused. When she questioned his conduct,
he denied the allegation. She subsequently called her husband, who
arrived shortly, and the police was then informed. PW-2 also
identified the accused before the Court.
13. Similarly, the statement of the child victim (PW-1) recorded
before the learned Trial Court reveals that she specifically stated that
when she went to the shop to buy something to eat, after taking ₹5/-
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from her mother, the accused Armaan, who lived in the next lane,
was standing there. He placed his hand on her chest and asked,
―Toffee logi toffee‖. Frightened, she ran back home and narrated the
incident to her mother, who then called her father and informed him.
After her father returned home, he dialled 100 and called the police.
PW-1 also identified the accused before the Court.
14. PW-3, the father of the victim, deposed before the learned
Trial Court that on 16.12.2019, sometime after 5:00 PM, he received
a call from his wife informing him that their daughter ‗S’ had gone to
a shop across the street to buy something, and the accused, Armaan,
had touched her chest. He told his wife to call the police at 100
number, but she was unable to do so. PW-3 stated that his office was
about 2.5 kilometers from their residence. Upon reaching home, he
called the police at 100 number from his wife’s phone, after which
the police arrived at the spot.
15. Having carefully examined the statements and testimonies of
the victim and her parents, this Court finds that the immediate
disclosure of the incident by the child to her mother reflects a natural
and spontaneous response to the trauma of sexual assault. The child’s
conduct was instinctive and consistent with the behaviour expected of
a victim of such tender age. Her narration of the incident to her
mother is corroborated by the latter’s statement recorded under
Section 164 of Cr.P.C. as well as her testimony before the Court.
16. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that
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there were material discrepancies in the statements of the prosecution
witnesses, this Court, upon a careful examination of their testimonies
recorded before the learned Trial Court, finds no such material
inconsistencies. Both PW-1 (the child victim) and PW-2 (her mother)
were cross-examined at length, yet no material contradiction or
discrepancy could be elicited. It is entirely natural for a 14-year-old
child to feel scared and shaken when subjected to such an incident in
broad daylight, just outside a shop near her home. PW-2 also clarified
during her cross-examination that the shop in question was situated
immediately outside their house. Even the cross-examination of PW-
3 (the victim’s father) did not yield anything to discredit the
prosecution’s version.
17. The statement of the child victim thus stands fully corroborated
by her mother’s testimony, and her mother’s account is, in turn,
supported by the testimony of her husband, PW-3, with respect to the
sequence of events. Taken together, the testimonies are coherent,
consistent, and inspire the confidence of the Court.
18. It is also material to note that PW-5, the shopkeeper of the
concerned shop where the alleged incident took place, though he
stated that he had not personally witnessed the incident of sexual
assault, deposed that he heard the cries of the child at the relevant
time. He specifically stated, “When I was taking out goods from
inside my shop, I heard the noise of crying of the victim and she
immediately left my shop. I came to the counter.” While PW-5 did
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not witness the act itself, as he was inside the shop, his testimony
corroborates the version of the victim that the incident occurred just
outside the shop. The fact that he heard the child crying and saw her
running from the spot lends further credence to the prosecution’s
case. The statement of PW-5 thus assumes significance, as it supports
the immediate reaction of the child to the incident – that she ran back
home crying. This version is further corroborated by the testimony of
PW-2, the mother of the victim, who has categorically stated that the
child returned home crying and narrated the incident to her.
Moreover, the victim has remained consistent in her account, both in
her statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. and in her
deposition before the Court.
Defence of Accused
19. Now, as far as the version put forth by the accused is
concerned, he mentioned in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
that he has been falsely implicated at the instance of the victim’s
mother. He stated that there was a quarrel regarding the victim child
standing outside the shop to purchase eatables, at which time he had
also reached the spot. According to him, due to water logging in front
of the shop caused by ongoing construction, his foot accidentally
stepped on the foot of the victim, following which she went home
and informed her mother. He further alleged that, in connivance with
Vijay Pradhan, the parents of the victim demanded ₹25,000/- from
him, and upon his refusal to pay, he was falsely implicated in the
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present case. However, a perusal of the record and the impugned
judgment reveals that the accused gave inconsistent explanations
regarding his alleged false implication during the cross-examination
of prosecution witnesses. While cross-examining PW-1 (the victim),
the accused suggested that he was not present at the spot at the time
of the incident and that there was a prior dispute between him and the
parents of the victim. These suggestions were categorically denied by
the victim. Further, during the cross-examination of PW-2 (the
victim’s mother), it was suggested to her that the child had not gone
to the shop to buy anything on the day of the incident and that, while
PW-2 was on the first floor of their house, she saw the accused
standing downstairs and began hurling abuses at him without any
provocation. It was also suggested to her that the accused had
accidentally touched the victim while carrying milk and tea leaves in
a polythene bag. All these suggestions were expressly denied by PW-
2. In addition, while cross-examining PW-5 (the shopkeeper), the
defence suggested that while the accused was crossing the water-
logged area in front of the shop, he accidentally stepped on the
victim’s foot. PW-5, however, clearly stated that he did not witness
any such occurrence.
20. Considering the aforesaid, this Court concurs with the learned
Trial Court’s observation that the accused took inconsistent and
shifting defences during the proceedings. Initially, he claimed he was
not present at the shop. He later stated that he accidentally touched
the complainant due to water logging, then asserted that the victim
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had not gone to the shop on the day of the incident, and then claimed
that his foot accidentally stepped on the victim’s foot while crossing
the water-logged area. Thereafter, in the statement recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., he alleged that the parents of the victim were
demanding ₹25,000/- from him in connivance with one Mr. Vijay
Pradhan. However, no evidence in this regard was placed on record
by the accused.
Age of the Victim
21. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant regarding the age of the child not being proved beyond
reasonable doubt is concerned, no error can be found in the findings
of the learned Trial Court. The Assistant Public Health Inspector,
Najafgarh Zone, Delhi, was examined as PW-4, and Ms. Usha Tyagi,
Principal of the school where the victim was studying, was examined
as PW-8, both to prove the age of the prosecutrix. The birth entry of
the child in the municipal records was made on the basis of the order
of the Tehsildar dated 12.07.2020, and stood duly proved. The
learned Trial Court has rightly held that, since the said entry was
made on the basis of an order passed by the Tehsildar, Punjabi Bagh,
and no cross-examination was conducted on behalf of the accused to
challenge the same, the testimony of these witnesses remained
unrebutted and unchallenged. It is therefore not open to the appellant
to now dispute the age of the child. The school records, as well as the
municipal birth entry, were duly proved by the respective witnesses.
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22. The learned Trial Court has also rightly relied upon the
observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Yuvaprakash v.
State rep. by Inspector of Police: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 846. Further,
as per Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, the age for the
purpose of the POCSO Act is to be decided based on the following
documentary evidence:
―…(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned
examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be
determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical
age determination test conducted on the orders of the
Committee or the Board..‖
23. The records produced by the Principal of the school and the
Assistant Public Health Inspector, MCD, in the absence of any cross-
examination, stand duly proved. Thus, there is no infirmity in the
finding of the learned Trial Court that the age of the prosecutrix was
14 years at the time of the incident. Accordingly, the contention of
the appellant in this regard is rejected.
Presumption under Section 29 and 30 of POCSO Act
24. Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, which stipulates certain
presumptions, are set out below:
―29. Presumption as to certain offences.–Where a person is
prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit
any offence under sections 3, 5, 7 and section 9 of this Act, the
Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed orCRL.A. 319/2025 Page 13 of 17
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abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be
unless the contrary is proved.
30. Presumption of culpable mental state.–(1) In any
prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a
culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Special
Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it
shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had
no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an
offence in that prosecution.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved
only when the Special Court believes it to exist beyond
reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is
established by a preponderance of probability.
Explanation.–In this section, ―culpable mental state‖ includes
intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or
reason to believe, a fact.‖
25. It is well-settled that once the foundational facts of the case are
established by the prosecution, the onus is upon the accused to lead
evidence to rebut the presumption. In the present case, the age of
victim stands proven, that the same was below 18 years, and the
victim was a ‗child’ as defined under the provisions of POCSO Act.
Further, the testimonies of the material witnesses i.e. PW-1, 2, 3 and
5 clearly establish that the alleged incident had taken place, and the
present appellant had inappropriately touched/ pressed the breasts of
the victim child.
26. The appellant was thus required to rebut the statutory
presumptions under the POCSO Act by leading cogent and credible
evidence. However, as noted above, the defence taken by the accused
was inconsistent, uncorroborated, and riddled with contradictions. He
failed to present any evidence to support his version or to discredit
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the consistent and reliable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
This Court is therefore of the opinion that the learned Trial Court has
rightly held that the appellant failed to discharge the burden of
rebutting the presumptions, and the prosecution has successfully
established its case beyond reasonable doubt.
Offence under Section 8 of POCSO Act and Sections 354/354A of
IPC
27. Section 8 of the POCSO Act provides that whoever commits
sexual assault shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of not
less than three years, which may extend up to five years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
28. The term ‗sexual assault’ is defined under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act which provides that whoever, with sexual intent, touches
the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child or makes the child touch
the vagina, penis, anus or breast of such person or any other person,
or does any other act with sexual intent which involves physical
contact without penetration – is said to commit sexual assault.
29. Further, Section 354 of IPC reads as under:
―354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage
her modesty – Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any
woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he
will there by outrage her modesty, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and
shall also be liable to fine.‖
30. A plain reading of Section 354 of IPC makes it clear that the
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essential ingredients of the offence include (i) the victim being a
woman, (ii) an act of assault or application of criminal force, and (iii)
the presence of intent to outrage or knowledge that such an act is
likely to outrage her modesty [Ref: Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State
of Maharashtra: (2004) 4 SCC 371].
31. Moreover, Section 354A of the IPC defines sexual harassment,
which includes physical contact and advances involving unwelcome
and explicit sexual overtures, and provides punishment for the said
offence.
32. In the facts of the present case, it is clearly apparent that the
victim was subjected to sexual assault by the appellant, by pressing
her breasts, in broad daylight near her residence, and outside the shop
of PW-5.
33. As rightly held by the learned Trial Court, as per Section 7 of
the POCSO Act, touching a child’s sexual part with sexual intent
amounts to committing the offence of sexual assault. The learned
Trial Court has also rightly taken note of the decision in Ramji Lal
Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan: (2025) 5 SCC 117 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held that rubbing the breast of a child would
constitute the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of POCSO
Act. The learned Trial Court has also rightly observed that the
ingredients of offence punishable under Sections 354 and 354A of
IPC are fulfilled.
34. The statements of the material witnesses, specifically the child
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victim, proves that the child was inappropriately touched on her
breast by the appellant, and her statement has been found trustworthy.
The Decision
35. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment vide
which the present appellant was found guilty of offence under
Section 8 of the POCSO Act and Section 354/354A of the IPC.
36. There is also infirmity in the impugned order on sentence, vide
which the appellant was awarded sentence only in respect of Section
8 of the POCSO Act. The appellant has been awarded minimum
imprisonment i.e. rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years.
Thus, the impugned order on sentence is also upheld.
37. In view of the above, the present appeal, along with pending
application, if any, stands dismissed.
38. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
JULY 21, 2025/zp
TS/TD
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