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Kerala High Court
Nibha N B vs State Of Kerala on 23 July, 2025
Author: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
Bench: V Raja Vijayaraghavan
1 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR
WEDNESDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF JULY 2025 / 1ST SRAVANA, 1947
WP(CRL.) NO. 737 OF 2025
PETITIONER:
NIBHA N B, AGED 26 YEARS
D/O BHARATHAN N V NEREPARAMBIL HOUSE,
MANAKKULANGARA P.O, KODAKARA,MANAKULANGARA
THRISSUR DISTRICT, PIN - 680684
BY ADV SRI.AJEESH M UMMER
RESPONDENTS:
1 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO
GOVERNMENT, HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM, PIN - 695001
2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR & DISTRICT MAGISTRATE,
DISTRICT COLLECTORATE, CIVIL STATION AYYANTHOLE,
THRISSUR, PIN - 680003
3 THE DISTRICT POLICE CHIEF,
DISTRICT POLICE OFFICE, CIVIL STATION,
AYYANTHOLE, THRISSUR, PIN - 680003
4 THE CHAIRMAN,
ADVISORY BOARD, KAAPA, SREENIVAS, PADAM ROAD,
VIVEKANANDA NAGAR, ELAMAKKARA, PIN - 682026
5 THE SUPERINTENDENT OF JAIL,
CENTRAL JAIL, KANNUR, PIN - 670004
BY ADVS.
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:SRI ANAS K A
THIS WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
09.07.2025, THE COURT ON 23.07.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
JUDGMENT
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
This writ petition is filed by the wife of Manu [‘detenu’ for the sake of
brevity], S/o.Mani, Tharayil House, Porunnamkunnu Desom, Aloor Village,
Thrissur District, who was detained in the Central Prison, Kannur pursuant to
Ext.P1 detention order issued by the 2nd respondent under Section 3(1) of the
Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [‘KAA(P) Act’ for the sake of
brevity]. The detenu has been classified as ‘Known Rowdy’ under Section 2p(iii)
of the KAA(P) Act.
2. The records would reveal that the detaining authority has
considered five cases for booking the detenu as Known Rowdy, which are as
follows:
Sl. Crime No. Police Station Crime Date Offences Involved under various Present Status
No. sections of the case1 243/2022 Kodakara 07.04.2022 341, 323, 324, 506(i) r/w 34 Pending trial
IPC2 738/2022 Aloor 23.09.2022 341, 323, 326, 308 r/w 34 IPC Pending trial
3 739/2022 Aloor 24.09.2022 435 r/w 34 IPC Pending trial
4 814/2024 Chalakkudy 04.07.2024 226(2), 115(2), 351(1), 296(b) Pending trial
and 3(5) BNS5 989/2024 Aloor 14.12.2024 329(1), 126(2), 110 and 3(5) Pending trial
BNS
3 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
3. Sri Ajeesh M. Ummer, the learned counsel for the petitioner,
contends that the impugned detention order has been passed without due
application of mind. He submits that the offences alleged against the detenu
pertain to private and personal issues, which do not have any bearing on public
order.
4. The last prejudicial act attributed to the detenu occurred on
14.12.2024. An FIR in respect of the said incident was registered on 15.12.2024,
and the detenu was arrested on the same day. He was subsequently released on
bail with stringent conditions on 06.02.2025. However, the detaining authority,
while issuing Ext.P1 detention order, failed to consider the nature and efficacy of
the bail conditions imposed by the court.
5. It is further submitted that the proposal of the sponsoring
authority was made on 22.01.2025, whereas Ext.P1 detention order was issued
only on 18.02.2025. The delay between the last prejudicial act, which occurred
on 14.12.2024, and the passing of the detention order has not been properly
explained. The lapse of time has, therefore, disrupted the live link between the
prejudicial activity and the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority,
thereby rendering the order unsustainable.
4 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
petitioner, who is the wife of the detenu, delivered a child on 27.04.2025. It is
stated that there is no one to take care of the petitioner and the newborn child
in the absence of the detenu. In such compassionate circumstances, it is prayed
that this Court may consider reducing the period of detention, invoking its
discretionary jurisdiction.
Submissions of the learned Public Prosecutor
7. Sri Anas K. A., the learned Public Prosecutor, vehemently opposed
the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He
submitted that the offences in which the detenu is involved are grave in nature
and have a direct bearing on public order. It was further pointed out that an
externment order has been passed against the detenu, and a rowdy history
sheet was opened in his name on 16.08.2024. Additionally, proceedings under
Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita were initiated against the
detenu for a period of one year, pursuant to which he executed a bond on
15.08.2024 .
8. On 23.09.2024, an externment order was passed against the
detenu on the basis of the report of the District Police Chief dated 31.08.2024.
During the period of externment, the detenu was involved in Crime No.989/2024
5 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
of Aloor Police Station on 14.12.2024. The learned Public Prosecutor further
submitted that a report is submitted before the jurisdictional court for the
cancellation of bail on 18.01.2025.
9. Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by this Court in
Anita Antony v. State of Kerala and Ors.1, and it was argued that
proceedings under 107 of the Cr.P.C. are in the nature of security for keeping
peace and public tranquility and are not an alternative to a proceeding under
Section 3 of the KAA(P) Act. It is submitted that the very same principles would
be applicable in the case on hand.
10. Insofar as the conditions in the bail order is concerned, the
learned Public Prosecutor urged that the detaining authority took note of the
involvement of the detenu in five cases under the IPC, and was of the view that
the stringent conditions imposed by the jurisdictional Court in the earlier crimes
did not deter the detenu from indulging in crimes one after the other.
11. We have carefully considered the submissions of both sides.
12. The first submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the last prejudicial act of the detenu was on 14.12.2024, but the sponsoring
authority mooted the proposal on 22.01.2025. The detention order was passed
on 18.02.2025. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is an
1
2022 (4) KHC 427
6 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
unexplained delay of about two months and four days in between the last
prejudicial act and the detention order. It was further submitted that the delay
was attributable to the time taken for a close scrutiny of the relevant documents
and records. Additional reports were also submitted on 12.02.2025 and
13.02.2025.
13. In T.A.Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala2, the Apex Court
observed as under:
“10. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarised
thus: The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person
necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the
time when the order is made or the live-link between the
prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard
and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable
under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid
down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a
rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months
between the offending acts and the order of detention. However,
when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial
activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to
scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily
examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable
explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called
upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether
the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of
each case.”
2
(1989)4 SCC 741
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W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
14. The delay of two months and four days in passing the detention
order and the last prejudicial act is not fatal in our view.
15. The second submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the offences alleged against the detenu pertain to private and personal
issues, which do not have any bearing on public order.
16. The Apex Court in Ashok Kumar v Delhi Administration and
others3 held that the distinction between ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a
fine one, but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereunder:
“13. The true distinction between the areas of ‘public order’
and ‘law and order’ lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but
in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction
between the two concepts of ‘law and order’ and ‘public order’ is a
fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping.
Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and
circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might
affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of
law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act
by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the
potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the
community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order.”
3 AIR 1982 SC 1143 8 2025:KER:55276 W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025 17. In the decision in Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana4, the Apex Court held as under:
“32. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu
were prejudicial to public order. While the expression ‘law and
order’ is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always
affects order, ‘Public order’ has a narrower ambit, and could be
affected by only such contravention, which affects the community
or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the
community taking the country as a whole or even a specified
locality. The distinction between the areas of ‘law and order’ and
‘public order’ is one of degree and extent of the reach, of the act in
question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the
even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to
the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect
is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct
from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and
order only. In other words, the true distinction between the areas
of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or
quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon
society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts
and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it
might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the
problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect
public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its
own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts,
but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be
very different. (See: Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda, 2004
(3) SCC 75.) 22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a decision of this
Court in Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal reported in
1969 (1) SCC 10:
4
2024 SCC OnLine SC 367
9 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025“13. … Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of
infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest
that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead
to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault
each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is
disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under
the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions
of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the
ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of
any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect
public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In
this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between
serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the
community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor
breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily
injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public
interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is
thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive
Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order
comes within the scope of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)”
18. The detenu is involved in as many as five cases, including the
offences punishable under Sections 326 and 308 IPC. Considering the nature of
the allegations, we are unable to accept the contention that the detenu is not
prejudicial to public order.
19. The third submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the detaining authority did not consider the efficacy of the bail condition
before passing the detention order. The detention order was passed without
proper application of mind and without arriving at objective and subjective
10 2025:KER:55276
W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025satisfaction by the detaining authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner
placed reliance on the decision in Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India5. In
Joy kitty’s case (supra), the Apex Court observed that the detaining authority
shall consider and record satisfaction about the efficacy of bail conditions
already imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction before passing the
detention order.
20. On going through Ext.P2 order, it is clear that the detaining
authority has applied its mind as to the efficacy and sufficiency of the bail
conditions and submitted a report for the cancellation of bail of the detenu on
18.01.2025.
21. On a careful consideration of the materials and upon hearing the
submissions of both sides, we do not find any illegality or perversity in the
impugned order. We do not find any merit in the writ petition.
The writ petition is devoid of any merit and is dismissed.
Sd/-
RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN V
JUDGE
Sd/-
K. V. JAYAKUMAR
JUDGE
Sbna/
5
2025 (4) SCC 476
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W.P(Crl.) No.737/2025
APPENDIX OF WP(CRL.) 737/2025
PETITIONER EXHIBITS
Exhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO DCTSR 1285/2024-C4
DATED 18.02.2025 ALONG WITH REASONS FOR ORDER
Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION/ARGUMENT NOTE
BEFORE THE FOURTH RESPONDENT ON 11.04.2025
Exhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF THE CONFIRMATION ORDER G.O.(RT)
NO. 1400/2025/HOME DATED 29.04.2025
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