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Delhi High Court
Medha Patkar vs V.K. Saxena on 29 July, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 15.07.2025
Pronounced on: 29.07.2025
+ CRL.REV.P. 163/2025, CRL.M.B. 904/2025
MEDHA PATKAR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sanjay Parikh, Sr. Adv.
with Ms. Sridevi Panikkar, Mr.
Abhimanue Shreshta, Mr.
Satwik Parikh, Ms. Kritika,
Advs.
versus
V.K. SAXENA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Gajinder Kumar, Ms. Kiran
Jai and Mr. Chandra Shekhar,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHALINDER KAUR
JUDGMENT
SHALINDER KAUR, J.
1. The petitioner has preferred the present Criminal Revision
Petition under Section 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), assailing the Judgment dated 02.04.2025 and
the Order on Sentence dated 08.04.2025, passed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge-05 (hereinafter referred to as “Appellate
Court”), South-East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi, in Criminal
Appeal No. 247/2024.
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2. By the said Judgment, the learned Appellate Court affirmed the
petitioner‟s conviction under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (“IPC“), as recorded by the learned Judicial Magistrate First
Class-06 (hereinafter referred to as “Trial Court”), South-East District,
Saket Courts, vide the Judgment dated 24.05.2024 in the complaint
instituted by the respondent. The learned Appellate Court further
proceeded, by the Order dated 08.04.2025, to direct release of the
petitioner on probation, albeit subject to specified conditions.
3. The learned Trial Court, by its Order on Sentence dated
01.07.2024, had awarded to the petitioner a sentence of simple
imprisonment for a period of five months, along with a direction to
pay ₹10,00,000/- to the complainant as compensation, with a further
stipulation that in default of payment, she would undergo an
additional term of simple imprisonment for three months.
FACTUAL MATRIX
4. The genesis of the controversy lies in events dating back to the
year 2000. At the relevant time, the complainant (respondent herein)
was the President of the National Council of Civil Liberties (NCCL), a
registered society stated to be actively supporting the Sardar Sarovar
Project in Gujarat and exposing purported malpractices in the public
and private sectors.
5. In opposition to the said project, stood the Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA), a movement led by the petitioner herein and the
NBA voiced concerns on environmental and human rights grounds.
6. On 10.11.2000, the NCCL published an advertisement in The
Indian Express titled “True face of Ms. Medha Patkar and her
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Narmada Bachao Andolan” [Ex. CW1/D1], criticising the NBA‟s
ideology and activities. According to the complainant/respondent, this
advertisement prompted the petitioner to retaliate through a
defamatory Press Note.
7. The complainant alleges that on 25.11.2000, the
complainant/respondent received an email [Ex. CW1/A] from one Mr.
Dilip Gohil (CW-2), a purported Rediff.com correspondent, enclosing
a Press Note dated 24.11.2000 titled “True Face of a Patriot –
Response to an Advertisement”. The Press Note, bearing the
petitioner‟s name, as per the complaint, was published in Gujarati on
the Rediff.com website [Ex. CW1/B and CW1/D2].
8. The complainant/respondent categorically denied the veracity of
these claims raised in the Press Note and deposed that he had neither
visited Malegaon nor made any donations to Lok Samiti, nor ever
praised the NBA. He issued a legal notice dated 09.12.2000 [Ex.
CW1/C] to the petitioner, which remained unanswered.
9. The complainant/respondent alleged that the Press Note caused
considerable damage to his reputation, particularly among the
Gujarati-speaking populace and supporters of the Sardar Sarovar
Project. He was confronted by several individuals after the
publication, seeking clarification on the alleged support extended by
him to the NBA.
10. In support of his case, the complainant/respondent examined
himself as CW-1, along with three other witnesses: CW-2 (Dilip
Gohil), CW-3 (Nilesh Sachdev), and CW-4 (Rajesh Kumar, Judicial
Assistant) and closed the complainant‟s evidence.
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11. The petitioner‟s statement under Section 313 of the CrPC was
recorded on 18.05.2022, wherein she denied all allegations, asserting
that she had no knowledge of the complainant‟s activities and that she
had not issued the alleged Press Note, and had no connection with
Rediff.com, the website narmada.org, or the publication in question.
She, however, chose not to lead any evidence in defence.
12. On conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court proceeded to
convict the petitioner under Section 500 of the IPC, holding that it had
been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner had published
the Press Note with the intent & knowledge that it would harm the
reputation of the respondent. Thereupon, the learned Trial Court
proceeded to pass the sentence vide Order dated 01.07.2024.
13. Dissatisfied with the Impugned Judgment and the Order on
Sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the petitioner preferred an
Appeal before the learned Appellate Court. After hearing both the
parties, the appeal was dismissed by the learned Appellate Court vide
the Order dated 08.04.2025 and the sentence was modified, whereby
the petitioner was to be released on probation, subject to the following
conditions:
i. Deposit of ₹1,00,000/- as compensation, recoverable as
fine;
ii. Execution of a probation bond in the sum of ₹25,000/-
with one surety;
iii. Submission of quarterly supervision reports by the
District Probation Officer; andSignature Not Verified
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iv. Appearance before the Trial Court once every three
months.
14. To lay a challenge to the Impugned Judgment and Order on
Sentence passed by the learned Appellate Court, the petitioner
preferred the present petition.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER
15. Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the petitioner, assailed the Impugned Judgement and Order on
Sentence on multiple grounds of legal infirmity and evidentiary
insufficiency, raising two main questions for consideration i) whether
findings of the appellate court vis-à-vis CW-3 are correct; and ii)
whether the findings based on the alleged “Admission”, both by the
Trial Court and the Appellate Court, are factually and legally tenable.
16. At the outset, it was submitted that the petitioner‟s conviction is
unsustainable in law, as it rests on material that fails to meet the
threshold of proof required in criminal law, namely, the establishment
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
17. He submitted that the conviction opposes the cardinal rules of
criminal law, namely, that each link in the chain of circumstances has
to be fully established, however, in the present case, the main link in
the chain of evidence is missing so as to support the conclusion that
the Press Note dated 24.11.2000 allegedly contained in the email
dated 25.11.2000 (Ex.CW1/1A) was sent by the petitioner to CW2.
18. The learned Senior Counsel contended that both the respondent
(CW-1) and Mr. Dilip Gohil (CW-2) tendered identical affidavits
under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Act”)
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which were exhibited as EX.CW1/X and Ex.CW2/X, in support of
same documents exhibited as Ex. CW1/1A and Ex.CW1/D2. The
cross examination of the said witnesses, he submitted, would show
that the affidavit tendered by the witnesses does not qualify as a valid
certification under Section 65B of the Act, as they do not satisfy the
mandatory conditions laid down by the law and in fact, indicate that
the same has been tendered as a mere formality.
19. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that CW2, in cross
examination admitted that the affidavit does not state on which date he
downloaded or took a printout of the said Exhibits. CW-2 also
admitted that the affidavit does not provide any information as to who
gave the print out. The learned Senior Counsel contended that CW-2
further admitted that in his previous statements dated 27.08.2018 and
26.11.2018, he did not even mention that he was the one, who took the
printout or gave it to anyone. More so, CW-2 also admitted that there
is nothing on record to show that he was employed with Rediff.com in
the year 2000 or any point before or after.
20. To support this argument, the learned Senior Counsel relied on
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7
SCC 1 and Smriti Madan Kasangra vs. Perry Kasangra (2021) 12
SCC 289.
21. Inviting the Court‟s attention to the documents marked as
Exhibits CW1/A and CW3/A, Mr. Parikh submitted that neither
document bears any proof of authorship, nor does it establish any
nexus with the petitioner. The purported email (Ex. CW1/A) lacks any
identifiable sender address, and the web pages (Ex. CW3/A and
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CW3/D2) relied upon by the learned Appellate Court were introduced
into evidence without any certification under Section 65B of the Act,
and in contravention of the safeguards required for admissibility of
electronic records.
22. Moreover, CW3/A was produced by CW-3 to fill up the lacuna
after examination of CW-1 and CW-2 and could not have been taken
in evidence.
23. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that as regards the
evidence of CW3, the brother-in-law of the respondent and a member
of his organisation, who introduced Ex. CW3/A is clearly biased as he
was incompetent to testify as to the authorship or authenticity of the
said document. He impressed upon the submission that CW-3 was
neither the author nor custodian of the said document and he did not
contact the administrators or owners of the website narmada.org to
confirm the provenance or authorship of the material therein. The
document in question is stated to be sourced from the website
“narmada.org”, which itself carries a disclaimer that it is not affiliated
with the petitioner or the NBA and further no administrator or
custodian of the said website was examined by the respondent.
24. The respondent has also failed to prove that the website
Narmada.org is owned by Narmada Bachao Andolan or the petitioner.
Further, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner is a
convenor of the NAPM. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that
even on appreciation of the evidence of CW-3 and the perusal of the
Ex.CW3/A and Ex.CW3/D2, it cannot be said to have been proven
that the Press Note was ever issued by the petitioner. The authenticity
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and correctness of the material placed on the record, he submitted, has
not been ascertained by anyone.
25. It was further urged that CW 3/A is beyond pleadings as the
same does not find mention either in the complaint or in the evidence
led by CW 1 and CW 2 and thus, could not be made basis for
conviction.
26. He further submitted that the objection raised by the petitioner
for taking on record Ex.CW3/A has not been dealt with either by the
learned Trial Court or the learned Appellate Court.
27. Furthermore, the learned Senior Counsel assailed the reliance
placed by the learned Trial Court on an entry in the “List of Dates”
filed in Crl.M.C. No. 6026/2018 titled as “Ms. Medha Patkar vs. The
State“, a petition filed by the petitioner in this Court seeking quashing
of the previous complaint filed by the respondent against her in the
year 2018. He submitted that the petitioner filed an application in the
said Crl. MC seeking its withdrawal on the ground of inadvertent
mistake on the part of the office of the Advocate of the petitioner in
filing a draft petition, pending approval of the petitioner. The said Crl.
M.C. was permitted to be withdrawn by this Court.
28. It was submitted that the reliance placed on the averments made
in the “List of Dates”, particularly in a withdrawn petition, does not
amount to an admission in law. The learned Senior Counsel contended
that the reliance placed on Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram
Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242 and Basant Singh v. Janki Singh 1966
SCC OnLine SC 234 by the learned Trial Court and the respondent is
entirely misplaced as both cases were civil suits, where admissions
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stand on a materially different footing. In criminal jurisprudence,
certain confessions recorded in accordance with the procedural and
evidentiary safeguards mandated by law are admissible against an
accused.
29. He further submitted that the law on admissions is well settled
as contained between Section 17 to 31 of the Act. However, the “List
of Dates” is for the convenience of the court and is neither a pleading
nor a part of the formal record and is not verified by way of an
affidavit, thus, any recital therein cannot qualify as an “Admission”.
The learned counsel submitted that law is clear that pleadings may be
binding, but “lists of dates” cannot be equated with pleadings.
Reliance was also placed on the decision in Alind Workers Congress
(affiliated to INTUC) vs United Shippers Ltd. 2008 SCC OnLine AP
270 and Leo Ispat Ltd vs. Radlay Metal Products (P) Ltd. 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 7579 to submit that same principle of law that “List of
Dates” is not part of pleadings has been reiterated in these judgments.
30. Mr. Parikh submitted that in fact, the learned Trial Court itself,
in paragraph 74 of its Judgment, acknowledges the withdrawal of Crl.
M.C. along with all accompanying documents, pursuant to an
application filed supported with an affidavit. In such circumstances, he
submitted, it is wholly impermissible in law to treat any
entry/averment in the said petition as a subsisting or binding
admission. He emphasised, once a pleading is withdrawn no part
thereof can be relied upon in subsequent proceedings to establish
culpability. Reliance was placed upon Behari Lal Pal vs Baran Mai
Dasi ILR (1895) 17 All 53, Bhimangouda vs Sangappa Irappa Patil
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AIR 1960 Mys 178 and Sukumar Banerjee vs Dilip Kumar Sarkar
AIR 1982 Cal 17
31. On sentencing, the learned Senior Counsel raised an objection,
without prejudice to rights of the petitioner and submitted that the
Appellate Court‟s decision to release the petitioner on probation is
primarily under Section 360 of the CrPC, although the Impugned
Order ambiguously invokes concept akin to those under Sections 4
and 5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to
as “Probation Act“). The two statutory provisions, he submits, operate
in different domains and cannot be invoked simultaneously. More so,
the precondition as provided in Proviso to Section 4 and Sub-Section
3 of Section 4 of the Probation Act is mandatory for application of the
said provision of the Act, which does not exist in the present case.
Sustenance is drawn from State of M.P vs Man Singh (2019) 10 SCC
161 and Biswajit Chowdhury vs S.S Distributors 2002 SCC OnLine
Cal 421.
32. While drawing the attention of this Court to the relevant
provision of the two statues, he submitted, Section 360 of the
CrPC applies where the Probation Act is not in force and is available
only for first-time offenders, with provision limited to executing a
bond for good conduct. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that
petitioner being a woman, aged 70 years with social standing as noted
in the order dated 08.04.2025 has been released on probation, being
eligible for benefit but under Section 360 CrPC. However, directions
such as filing supervision reports, to be monitored by Probation
Officer and recovery of compensation as fine are traceable only to
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Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation Act, and thus conflate the two
statutes and not applicable in this case. To support his contention, the
learned counsel further placed reliance on Chhanni v. State of U.P.
(2006) 5 SCC 396, State of M.P vs Man Singh (2019) 10 SCC 161
and Biswajit Chowdhury vs S.S Distributors 2002 SCC OnLine Cal
421.
33. In any event, the applicability of the Probation Act, it was
submitted, is limited by territorial constraints. The petitioner resides in
Madhya Pradesh and no material was placed before the learned
Appellate Court to indicate that a local probation officer had been
appointed or was in a position to ensure compliance with the
directions issued by the learned Appellate Court.
34. On the maintainability of the present revision petition, Mr.
Parikh while drawing support from the decision in Amit Kapoor v.
Ramesh Chander (2012) 9 SCC 460, submitted that this Court, in
exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the CrPC, is
empowered to interfere where the findings in the Impugned Order are
based on illegal admission of evidence and its appreciation, resulting
in error and non-compliance with the provisions of law.
35. Lastly, it was pointed out that the respondent had previously
filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) before the Supreme Court titled
as National Council for Civil Liberties vs Union of India and Ors.
(2007) 6 SCC 506, which was dismissed with cost. This, it was
submitted, underscores the background of hostility between the
parties, and provides relevant context in which the allegations made
by the respondent ought to be assessed.
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SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
36. Mr. Gajinder Kumar, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent, submitted that the present petition is entirely devoid of
merit and warrants dismissal. He submitted that the Impugned
Judgment and the Order on Sentence have been passed after duly
considering the entire evidence on record and are neither vitiated by
any legal infirmity nor do they suffer from perversity of reasoning
warranting interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by
this Court.
37. It was submitted that the scope of interference under Section
397 of the CrPC is narrow and well circumscribed. A revisional court
is not vested with the jurisdiction to re-appreciate or reassess evidence
as if sitting in appeal. In support of this submission, learned counsel
also placed reliance on the decision in Amit (supra). This principle, it
was urged, has been reiterated in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of
Chhattisgarh (2022) 8 SCC 204 and Chandra Babu alias Moses v.
State (2015) 8 SCC 774, which categorically cautions the Revisional
Courts from assuming the role of a fact-finding authority.
38. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Trial Court as
well as the learned Appellate Court have concurrently returned
findings of fact and law, holding that the respondent had succeeded in
establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that the petitioner had authored
and disseminated the impugned defamatory Press Note dated
24.11.2000. The Appellate Court, while upholding the conviction, did
not find it necessary to disturb the factual findings of the learned Trial
Court. Much emphasis was laid on the submission that the petitioner‟s
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challenge is, in effect, an attempt to seek reappreciation of evidence
under the guise of a revision, a course wholly impermissible in law.
39. Mr. Gajinder Kumar placed reliance on the petitioner‟s
admission in the “List of Dates” filed before this Court in earlier
proceedings, submitting that such an Admission, being part of the
judicial record attracts the rigour of Sections 17 and 58 of the Act. No
attempt was made by the petitioner during trial to explain and/or
qualify, the said admission at the relevant time. The admission, it was
submitted, thus stands unrebutted on record. Accordingly, the
admission stood conclusive. The learned counsel relied upon the
desicion in Basant Singh v. Janki Singh & Ors./Kishundhari Singh
& Ors. 1966 SCC OnLine SC 234.
40. He further submitted that the petitioner‟s attempt to now
wriggle out of her own stand taken in prior judicial proceedings is
legally impermissible. As per Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, Conduct
and Admissions made by a party are relevant and admissible.
41. The learned counsel submitted that the High Court, being a
Court of Record under Article 215 of the Constitution, accords
sanctity to statements and material forming part of its judicial record.
Merely withdrawing a petition, it was urged, does not efface the
evidentiary value of admissions made therein. More so, no explanation
was offered at the material time, and the petitioner‟s attempt to now
disown the admission is an afterthought. The learned counsel relied on
the decisions in Haripada Das & Ors. v. Ashok Das 2019 SCC
OnLine Cal 6442, Ram Niranjan Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria &
Ors., Jugal Kishore Kajaria v. Sheo Prakash Kajaria & Ors. (2015)
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10 SCC 20, Malla Reddy v. Future Builders Cooperative Housing
Society & Ors., Jai Lakshmi v. Future Builders Cooperative
Housing Society & Ors. and Raghava Reddy & Anr. v. Future
Builders Cooperative Housing Society & Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 349,
Mohd. Seraj v. Adibar Rahaman Sheikh & Ors. 1968 SCC OnLine
Cal43 and Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr.
(1998) 4 SCC 409
42. It was further submitted that CW-4, an official from the
Registry of this Court, produced certified copies of the pleadings filed
in Crl.M.C. No. 6026/2018, including the “List of Dates” bearing the
petitioner‟s admission. No cross-examination was directed at CW-4,
and no effort was made to challenge the provenance or authenticity of
the said material. In law, therefore, the contents of Ex. CW4/A stand
admitted and unrebutted.
43. On the petitioner‟s contention that the admission in the
withdrawn petition ought to be disregarded, the learned counsel
submitted that no judicial precedent supports the proposition that
„admissions‟ made in pleadings lose their evidentiary force merely
upon withdrawal. Reliance was placed on the desicion in Nagindas
Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam Brijram & Ors (1974) 1 SCC 242.
44. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Trial Court
rightly concluded that the Press Note dated 24.11.2000 was a
retaliatory response to the respondent‟s advertisement published on
10.11.2000. The chronology, the advertisement on 10.11.2000, the
email enclosing the Press Note dated 25.11.2000, and the Press Note
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itself dated 24.11.2000, forms a corroborated chain of events
indicative of authorship and deliberate publication by the petitioner.
45. It was further pointed out that the petitioner did not lead any
evidence in defence. No steps were taken to rebut the respondent‟s
case or to demonstrate that the Press Note was fabricated or authored
by a third party. He submitted, in a case where the complainant had
discharged its initial burden through a combination of oral and
documentary evidence, the petitioner‟s silence assumes evidentiary
relevance.
46. Moreover, the petitioner‟s statement under Section 313 of the
CrPC, particularly to Question No. 4, was vague and non-committal.
She neither specifically denied authorship nor offered any alternative
explanation for the Press Note‟s widespread publication.
47. The learned counsel submitted that CW-1 and CW-2, both of
whom tendered affidavits under Section 65B of the Act, provided
mutually corroborative accounts. CW-2, a correspondent with
Rediff.com at the relevant time, deposed that he had received the Press
Note from the petitioner through an email, and had subsequently
forwarded it to the complainant as recipient of the forwarded email,
also deposed accordingly as CW-1.
48. As regards CW-3, it was submitted that his testimony, coupled
with the documentary evidence marked as Ex. CW3/A, establishes
that the Press Note dated 24.11.2000 was uploaded on the
website www.narmada.org, which bore the petitioner‟s name and
propagated the cause of the NBA. The petitioner, in cross-examination
of CW-3, did not deny her association with the NBA or the NAPM.
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More significantly, it was pointed out that the petitioner herself
confronted CW-3 with Ex. CW3/D2, thereby accepting the
authenticity of the document and precluding any valid challenge to its
admissibility.
49. It was further submitted that CW-2, in his cross-examination,
admitted that the Press Note dated 24.11.2000 appeared on multiple
public platforms. The dissemination of the same content through
various sources reinforces the inference that the Press Note was
intentionally circulated by or on behalf of the petitioner, rather than
being an isolated upload. Sustenance is drawn from the desicion in
R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P.
Temple & Anr. (2003) 8 SCC 752, Balu Sudam Khalde & Anr. v.
State of Maharashtra 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 279 and Sonu Allias Amar
vs State of Haryana (2017) 8 SCC 570
50. The electronic records, it was submitted, were duly proved in
accordance with law, and no contemporaneous objection was raised
regarding their admissibility or mode of proof. The learned counsel
also submitted that a certificate under Section 65B of the Act is not
required as both the parties are relying on the same document i.e. Ex.
CW-3/A and Ex. CW-3/D2.
51. As for the website “narmada.org,” it was submitted that despite
its general disclaimer, it contains multiple references linking the NBA
to the petitioner, including her address and contact information. The
learned Appellate Court has rightly concluded that the website, while
nominally unaffiliated, was substantively aligned with the NBA‟s
objectives.
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52. He submitted that as recorded in para 11(b) of the Impugned
Judgment, the learned Appellate Court, with respect to the
website www.narmada.org, observed it to be a website regularly used
by the NBA for publishing their press releases. This further
corroborates that the Press Note dated 24.11.2000 hosted thereon
emanated from source associated with the petitioner.
53. With respect to the Order on Sentence dated 08.04.2025, Mr.
Gajinder Kumar submitted that the same is traceable not to Section
360 of the CrPC, but to Sections 4 and 5 of the Probation Act. The
imposition of compensation and conditions regarding supervision fall
squarely within the statutory framework of the Probation Act. The
direction to recover compensation “as fine” is merely a procedural
mechanism for enforcement and does not alter the essential nature of
the relief granted. Reliance is placed on Gulzar v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2007) 1 SCC 619 and Lakhanlal @ Lakhan Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 6 SCC 100
54. To conclude, the learned counsel submitted that the concurrent
findings of the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court are
well-reasoned, legally sound, and supported by cogent evidence. The
present petition, it is urged, is a disguised attempt to re-appreciate and
argue the entire case on facts and therefore, deserves to be dismissed.
SUBMISSION IN REBUTTAL
55. In rejoinder, Mr. Parikh submitted that the contention of the
respondent that the revisional jurisdiction does not permit examination
of facts or evidence is overly restrictive and contrary to law. While
drawing this Court‟s attention to paragraph 20 of the decision in Amit
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Kapoor (supra), he submitted that the Supreme Court has clarified that
where a legal error results in manifest miscarriage of justice, this
Court is not precluded from interfering. He submitted that the
petitioner is not seeking re-appreciation of evidence per se, but has
pointed out fundamental evidentiary lapses and legal errors that have
tainted the conviction. These fall squarely within the scope of Section
397 read with Section 401 of the CrPC.
56. The learned Senior Counsel further rebutted the claim of the
respondent and submitted that the reliance on CW-3/A is
misconceived and impermissible in law. He submitted that no original
email was produced by CW-2, and the finding in paragraph 11 of the
learned Appellate Court‟s judgment is based on assumptions drawn
from typed names and alleged website addresses, which is speculative
and vitiated by surmises and conjectures. The learned Senior Counsel
placed reliance on the decision in Digamber Vaishnav and Anr. vs
State of Chhattisgarh (2019) 4 SCC 522.
57. The learned Senior Counsel, at the cost of repetition submitted
that the mandatory compliance of Section 65B of the Act has not been
done in the present case and that the reliance placed on electronic
records, including CW-3/A and CW-1/A, is incorrect in the absence of
a valid certificate under Section 65B of the Act. Moreover, the 65B
certificates furnished by CW-1 and CW-2 are perfunctory and fail to
satisfy statutory conditions.
58. Reiterating his previous submission, the learned Senior Counsel
submitted that no case has been made out beyond reasonable doubt.
He submitted that the respondent has failed to establish guilt even on
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the standard of preponderance of probabilities, let alone beyond a
reasonable doubt. He submitted that the learned Trial Court‟s own
findings acknowledge that there is no direct evidence linking the
petitioner to the alleged Press Note, and yet a conviction has been
returned by importing surmises into the factual matrix.
59. Further, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that as regards
“List of Dates” (Ex. CW-4/A), the learned Trial Court and Appellate
Court have misdirected themselves in treating such an entry as an
unequivocal judicial admission. In Basant Singh (supra), he
submitted, the admission arose from a plaint that was produced and
accepted; it was not a withdrawn pleading, thus, the reliance on the
said judgment is misplaced. The factual scenario, he submitted, is
materially distinguishable. In the present case, the petition
was withdrawn unconditionally along with its annexures and can no
longer form the basis of an adverse inference.
60. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that even assuming
without admitting that any such entry amounts to an admission, such
admission must be clear, unambiguous, and conclusive. Reliance was
placed upon Nagubai Ammal & Ors. vs B. Shama Rao & Ors.1956
SCC OnLine SC 14. It was submitted that the present case does not
satisfy any of those criteria. Thus, the reliance on Ram Niranjan
(supra), is also inapposite as the Court in that case dealt with resiling
from admissions made in formal pleadings after 15 years, which is
clearly distinguishable on facts.
61. As regards Mohd. Seraj (supra), and other Judgments, the
learned Senior Counsel submitted that these decisions run counter to
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the broader and binding legal precedent of withdrawn pleadings and
the evidentiary status of documents not forming part of the record.
62. The learned Senior Counsel further contended that the
submission of the respondent that the learned Trial Court construed
the entry in the “List of Dates” as a „judicial admission‟ and not
„admission on pleadings‟ is not only wholly erroneous but also
contrary to the law. He submitted that Section 58 of the Act, lays
down three situations in which no proof of the admitted fact may be
required:
i) In any proceeding in which parties or their agents agree
to admit at the hearing; or,
ii) Before the hearing, they agree to admit by writing under
their hands; or,
iii) Which by any pleadings in force at the time they are
deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.
63. He submitted that the first two categories may fall within
„judicial admission‟, while the third would fall under the ambit of
admission through pleadings. Such an admission should be as per the
rules of pleading, like the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However,
the case of the respondent does not essentially fall under any of the
above three categories.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
64. This Court has carefully examined the record, the deposition of
the witnesses, the statements and the reasoning adopted in the
Impugned Judgments passed by the learned Trial Court and the
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Appellate Court and the arguments and position of law put forth on
behalf of the parties.
65. To begin with, it is to be noted that the scope of interference
under Sections 397 (now Section 438 of the BNSS) and 401 (now
Section 442 of BNSS) of the CrPC is indeed limited and
circumscribed by well established legal principles. These provisions
empower the High Court to call for and examine the records of the
Trial Courts, to ensure the lawfulness, credibility and trueness of
findings. However, this power is not meant to function as an appellate
mechanism.
66. It is a settled position of law that the revisional jurisdiction
under Section 438 of the BNSS (erstwhile 397 of the CrPC) is to be
exercised sparingly and only on specific grounds, that is, when the
decision under challenge is grossly erroneous; there is non-compliance
with the provisions of law; the finding recorded is based on no
evidence or material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion has
been exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These grounds are indicative
and not exhaustive, emphasising the need for a well-founded error to
justify interference. Fundamentally, the High Court, while exercising
revisional jurisdiction, is not to re-appreciate evidence or to arrive at a
different conclusion, even if a different view is possible.
67. The Supreme Court has time and again laid down the
limitations and contours of revisional jurisdiction in a catena of
Judgments, just to note a few. In Amit Kapoor (supra) it was held as
under:
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“11. Before examining the merits of the
present case, we must advert to the discussion
as to the ambit and scope of the power which
the courts including the High Court can
exercise under Section 397 and Section 482 of
the Code.
12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court
with the power to call for and examine the
records of an inferior court for the purposes of
satisfying itself as to the legality and
regularity of any proceedings or order made
in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction
or law. There has to be a well-founded error
and it may not be appropriate for the court to
scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it
bears a token of careful consideration and
appear to be in accordance with law. If one
looks into the various judgments of this Court,
it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under
challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no
compliance with the provisions of law, the
finding recorded is based on no evidence,
material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or
perversely. These are not exhaustive classes,
but are merely indicative. Each case would
have to be determined on its own merits.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
20. The jurisdiction of the court under Section
397 can be exercised so as to examine the
correctness, legality or propriety of an order
passed by the trial court or the inferior court,
as the case may be. Though the section does
not specifically use the expression “prevent
abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice”, the jurisdiction
under Section 397 is a very limited one. The
legality, propriety or correctness of an order
passed by a court is the very foundation of
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 but
ultimately it also requires justice to be done.
The jurisdiction could be exercised whereSignature Not Verified
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there is palpable error, non-compliance with
the provisions of law, the decision is
completely erroneous or where the judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily. On the
other hand, Section 482 is based upon the
maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non
potest i.e. when the law gives anything to
anyone, it also gives all those things without
which the thing itself would be unavoidable.
The section confers very wide power on the
Court to do justice and to ensure that the
process of the court is not permitted to be
abused”
68. In State of Kerela vs Puttumana Illath Jathavedan; (1999) 2
SCC 452 the Supreme Court, while examining the scope of revisional
jurisdiction, held as under:-
“5. Having examined the impugned judgment
of the High Court and bearing in mind the
contentions raised by the learned counsel for
the parties, we have no hesitation to come to
the conclusion that in the case in hand, the
High Court has exceeded its revisional
jurisdiction. In its revisional jurisdiction, the
High Court can call for and examine the
record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality
or propriety of any finding, sentence or order.
In other words, the jurisdiction is one of
supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court for correcting miscarriage of justice.
But the said revisional power cannot be
equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second
appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the High Court
to reappreciate the evidence and come to its
own conclusion on the same when the evidence
has already been appreciated by the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought
to the notice of the High Court which wouldSignature Not Verified
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otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of
justice.”
69. The same principle of law has been stated in Malkeet Singh
Gill (supra) and Chandra Babu (supra).
70. Keeping the scope of interference in mind while exercising
revisional jurisdiction, this Court now proceeds to deal with the
grounds of challenge to the Impugned Judgment and Order on
Sentence passed by learned Appellate Court. As noticed above, the
complaint pertains to the allegation of defamation made by the
respondent against the petitioner.
71. On defamation, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the
constitutional validity of criminal defamation laws, emphasising the
protection of an individual‟s reputation as a fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
72. In the decision in Om Prakash Chautala vs Kanwar Bhan &
Ors.; (2014) 5 SCC 417, the Supreme Court observed as under:-
“Reputation is fundamentally a glorious
amalgam and unification of virtues which
makes a man feel proud of his ancestry and
satisfies him to bequeath it as a part of
inheritance on posterity. It is a nobility in
itself for which a conscientious man would
never barter it with all the tea of China or for
that matter all the pearls of the sea. The said
virtue has both horizontal and vertical
qualities. When reputation is hurt, a man is
half-dead. It is an honour which deserves to
be equally preserved by the downtrodden and
the privileged. The aroma of reputation is an
excellence which cannot be allowed to be
sullied with the passage of time. The memory
of nobility no one would like to lose; none
would conceive of it being atrophied. It is dearSignature Not Verified
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to life and on some occasions it is dearer than
life. And that is why it has become an
inseparable facet of Article 21 of the
Constitution. No one would like to have his
reputation dented. One would like to perceive
it as an honour rather than popularity.”
73. This decision underscores the Apex Court‟s recognition of
Reputation as an inseparable part of Article 21 of the Constitution.
74. In the landmark decision in Subramanian Swamy vs Union of
India; (2016) 7 SCC 221, the Supreme Court while upholding the
constitutional validity of Section 499 and 500 of the IPC and Section
199 of the Cr.P.C, observed as under:-
“207. Another aspect required to be addressed
pertains to issue of summons. Section 199
CrPC envisages filing of a complaint in court.
In case of criminal defamation neither can any
FIR be filed nor can any direction be issued
under Section 156(3) CrPC. The offence has
its own gravity and hence, the responsibility of
the Magistrate is more. In a way, it is immense
at the time of issue of process. Issue of
process, as has been held in Rajindra Nath
Mahato v. T. Ganguly, is a matter of judicial
determination and before issuing a process,
the Magistrate has to examine the
complainant. In Punjab National Bank v.
Surendra Prasad Sinha it has been held that
judicial process should not be an instrument of
oppression or needless harassment. The Court,
though in a different context, has observed that
there lies responsibility and duty on the
Magistracy to find whether the accused
concerned should be legally responsible for
the offence charged for. Only on satisfying that
the law casts liability or creates offence
against the juristic person or the persons
impleaded, then only process would be issued.
At that stage the court would be circumspect
and judicious in exercising discretion andSignature Not Verified
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should take all the relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before
issuing process lest it would be an instrument
in the hands of the private complaint as
vendetta to harass the persons needlessly.
Vindication of majesty of justice and
maintenance of law and order in the society
are the prime objects of criminal justice but it
would not be the means to wreak personal
vengeance. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special
Judicial Magistrate, a two-Judge Bench has
held that summoning of an accused in a
criminal case is a serious matter and criminal
law cannot be set into motion as a matter of
course.
208. We have referred to these authorities to
highlight that in matters of criminal
defamation the heavy burden is on the
Magistracy to scrutinise the complaint from all
aspects. The Magistrate has also to keep in
view the language employed in Section 202
CrPC which stipulates about the residence of
the accused at a place beyond the area in
which the Magistrate exercises his
jurisdiction. He must be satisfied that
ingredients of Section 499 CrPC are satisfied.
Application of mind in the case of complaint is
imperative.”
75. From a perusal of the above decisions, what emerges is that the
Supreme Court has clarified that Sections 499 and 500 of the IPC,
which criminalise defamation, are not vague or ambiguous and serve a
legitimate state interest in safeguarding an individual‟s dignity. The
decisions collectively affirm that criminal defamation laws are
constitutionally valid and protection of an individual‟s right to
Reputation is a fundamental right.
76. Now reverting to the present case and to appreciate the
submissions raised on behalf of the parties, it is apposite to refer to the
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observations of the learned Appellate Court recorded in paragraph
nos. 11(b) to 11(e) of the Impugned Judgment, wherein, the learned
Appellate Court has observed as under:
“11.(b) In this regard, it is observed that the
document Ex. CW3/A bearing URL
www.narmada.org/nba-press-
releases/press.releases .2000
.html#march2000 contains a complete catalog
and hyper links to press releases issued by
Narmada Bachao Andolan during several
years including in the year 2000. In the section
of press releases for November 2000, the press
release for November 24, 2000, is titled as
“True Face of A Patriot – Response to an
Advertisement”.
11.(c) The hyper link of aforementioned press
release dated November 24, 2000, leads to
URL – www.narmada.org/nbapressreleases/
november-2000/response.to.ad.html whose
contents are completely same as the contents
of e-mail Ex. CW1/A sent by CW2 to CW1. The
said Press Note is written in first person by
Medha Patkar and signed-off by her at its
bottom. In the opening paragraph of said
Press Note, Medha Patkar referred to
advertisement dated November 10 & 11, 2000,
in The Indian Express newspaper in following
manner – “which is defamatory for both
myself and my colleague Chittaroopa as well
as a people‟s movement, Narmada Bachao
Andolan (NBA) in more than one way”. There
is no doubt that the said NBA Press Note
contained in URL – www.narmada.org/nba-
pressreleases / november-2000/ response
.to.ad.html was authored and issued
personally by Medha Patkar.
11.(d) The URL-www.narmada.org/about-
us.html (Ex. CW3/D2) is titled as „Friends of
River Narmada‟. Amongst other content, it
contains the contact information of NBA, as
per which the office of NBA is at Badwani,
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Madhya Pradesh, at the address – Narmada
Ashish, Off Kasravad Road, Navalpura,
Badwani, Madhya Pradesh – 451551, which is
the same as residence of appellant Medha
Patkar as per her affidavit annexed with the
appeal.
11.(e) It is observed that on one hand web
portal www.narmada.org claimed that it was
not run by Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA),
on the other hand, it actively advanced the
propaganda of NBA through press releases
issued by NBA and „organized visits by Medha
Patkar‟ as a tool for public outreach and
education. The active involvement of Medha
Patkar in authoring of the Press Note dated
24/11/2000 and its publication in document
Ex. CW3/A bearing URL –
www.narmada.org/nba-pressreleases
/november-2000/ response .to ad.html is writ
large on face of record. Conversely, the
involvement of Medha Patkar is as hidden as
an elephant behind an office table. It is only
that Medha Patkar used smoke screen of
virtual world of Internet to disseminate the
Press Note in contention. Ld. Trial Court
erroneously observed that it was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt that Press Note was
issued by accused Medha Patkar (appellant
herein).”
77. The learned Appellate Court, upon appreciation of the evidence
and the submissions made before it on behalf of the parties, concluded
as follows:-
“12.(a) The obvious intention behind
publication of Press Note dated 24/11/2000
through URL www.narmada.org/nba-press
releases /november-2000/ response .to.ad.html
was to widely disseminate it to largest
audience possible. It got published by
rediff.com as a Gujarati language article vide
http://www.rediff.com/gujarati/2000/nov/24
nba.htm (Ex. CW1/B), and it was also referredSignature Not Verified
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to in the e-mail Ex. CW1/A sent by CW2 Dilip
Gohil to CW1/complainant V. K. Saxena.
12.(b) It is observed that rediff.com only
published a Press Note that was already
published by Medha Patkar through
Narmada.org, with the only difference that
rediff.com translated the Press Note of English
language into news article of Gujarati
language. Whether Press Note in contention
was personally sent by Medha Patkar to
rediff.com or it was sent by someone else on
her behalf, was completely inconsequential.
13. There is no gainsaying that the contents of
Press Note Ex. CW3/A (also Ex. CW1/B & Ex.
CW1/D2) were factually false and defamatory
to the complainant. The complainant never
visited Malegaon, neither gave any cheque to
Lok Samiti of NBA. In fact, complainant
actively supported Sardar Sarovar Dam
Project and actively raised voice against NBA
that was spear-headed by Medha Patkar. By
creating the false impression that complainant
V. K. Saxena gave cheque to NBA and by
calling him coward and not a patriot, the
Press Note sought to discredit the complainant
and to malign his reputation in the eyes of
public at large. There is no force in argument
that defamation could not be proved by CW3
Nilesh Sachdev, he being related to the
complainant as their wife are sisters.”
78. The moot question, thus, is whether the learned Trial Court and
the learned Appellate Court acted beyond their jurisdiction in taking
into consideration Ex CW 3/A, as it was being contended by the
petitioner that Ex. CW-3/A is beyond pleadings and that the same is
not referred to in the statements of CW-1 or CW-2, but was produced
for the first time in the Court in the evidence of CW-3.
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79. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that even though
the petitioner took an objection to the tendering of Ex. CW-3/A while
the statement of CW-3 was being recorded, however, the objection
was vague and incoherent and did not clarify whether the objection
was with respect to the mode of proof or to the admissibility of the
document.
80. It is to be noted that the underlying theme of the complaint is
that a Press Note dated 24.11.2000, Ex. CW-1/D2, titled “True Face of
a Patriot – Response to an Advertisement” bearing the petitioner‟s
name upon being translated from its English version, Ex. CW-2/D1,
was published in Gujarati on Rediff.com website. The said Press Note
caused considerable damage to the reputation of the respondent. The
contents of Ex. CW-3/A which is stated to be also available on the
website Narmada.org are same as that of Ex. CW-2/D1 published on
Rediff.com website.
81. Since the entire case of the respondent rests on the
aforementioned Press Note dated 24.11.2000, being in the public
domain, sought to discredit the respondent and to diminish his
reputation. As the contents of both the Press Notes, Ex. CW-2/D1 and
Ex. CW-3/A are essentially the same, there is no merit in the argument
raised on behalf of the petitioner that Ex. CW-3/A is beyond
pleadings.
82. Ex. CW-3/A, in no manner sets up a new claim or is beyond the
specific claim of defamation raised by the respondent in his complaint.
In fact, it is within the defined scope of the averments raised in the
complaint, the question to be determined in controversy pleaded in the
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complaint and so deposed by CW-1 and CW-2. More so, even during
the cross-examination of CW-3, the petitioner has not challenged the
admissibility of Ex. CW-3/A, not being a part of the complaint. Thus,
the evidence of CW-3 with respect to Ex. CW-3/A is in furtherance of
the case set up by the respondent and Ex. CW-3/A, even if introduced
at a later stage through the testimony of CW-3, does not change the
nature of allegations or case set up against the petitioner.
83. Now, turning to the next plea raised on behalf of the petitioner
with respect to the admissibility of Ex. CW-3/A. The learned Senior
Counsel submitted that the said document originates from the website
narmada.org. It was strongly contended that administrator of the said
website was not examined by the respondent so as to verify the source
of Ex. CW-3/A, having been posted on narmada.org, specifically
when the website itself has clarified that they are not Narmada Bachao
Andolan. More so, Ex. CW-3/A being an e-document is not supported
with certificate under Section 65B of the Act, which is a mandatory
condition and well settled by the Supreme Court in a catena of
decisions.
84. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, it was urged that
in the facts of the present case, certificate under Section 65B of the
Act is not required as the existence of the website www.narmada.org
is not denied and rather, the petitioner during the cross-examination of
CW-3 herself produced the document, Ex. CW-3/A, now exhibited as
Ex. CW-3/D2 and with petitioner‟s reliance on the same document, it
does not require further proof.
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85. While it is not in dispute that whenever an electronic record or
its print out is produced before the court, the same must be
authenticated with a certificate under Section 65B of the Act that
identifies the electronic record, it is also a settled principle of evidence
that a party who relies on a document during cross-examination
cannot subsequently object to its admissibility.
86. As noticed above, the petitioner in the course of cross-
examination of CW-3 referred/made use of Ex. CW-3/A and produced
the same document, now exhibited as Ex. CW-3/D2. Thereby the
petitioner is deemed to have accepted the document as part of the
evidentiary record. It is noticed that the petitioner confronted the CW
3 with same document by putting the portion marked as “A” to “A” on
Ex CW 3/D2, and by linking it to portion marked as “A” to “A” of
document Ex CW 3/A. The relevant portion of the said document is
reproduced herein below:-
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87. Relevantly, the petitioner actually wanted to put it to CW 3 that
the website www.narmada.org is not owned by the petitioner and she
confronted CW 3 by producing the details of the “About us”
mentioned on the website. In the process of doing so, the petitioner
has admitted the document Ex CW 3/A. Accordingly, any objection
to the admissibility of such document is misconceived. This position
is supported by the doctrine of approbate and reprobate, which
precludes a party from both affirming and denying the validity of the
same document in the course of proceedings.
88. Much emphasis was placed by Mr. Parikh on the argument that
the owner of the website www.narmada.org has themselves declared
that they are not „Narmada Bachao Andolan‟, and that as such CW
3/A could not have been relied upon against the petitioner. While the
argument appears attractive on first blush, however, a deeper inquiry
shows that the contention here is not that the Press Note issued was by
„Friends of River Narmada‟ or „Friends of River Narmada‟ is
„Narmada Bachao Andolan‟ or not, or the website is being operated
by the petitioner. The real issue is whether the Press Note dated
24.11.2000 is issued by the petitioner and that the said Press Note is
available in public domain on the website www.narmada.org.
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89. In addition to the observations made hereinabove, a perusal of
the printout from the web page shows that on the website, many links
with respect to press releases are being posted from October, 1998 to
2006. Further details of month of October, 2000, November, 2000 and
December, 2000 are also shown. It is also noticed amongst others,
there are posts on 25.10.2000, 27.10.2000 and 24.11.2000. The said
document containing the press releases is reproduced hereinunder:-
90. The petitioner has not challenged the veracity of other posts
pertaining to NBA, or to the petitioner, as appearing on the websiteSignature Not Verified
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www.narmada.org. Significantly, as observed in the Impugned
Judgment passed by the Learned Appellate Court, the website
www.narmada.org actively advanced the propaganda of NBA through
press releases issued by NBA; and various visits of the petitioner, and,
that the said Press Note was already published on the said website.
Needless to say, the petitioner, has not invoked any action against the
owners of the website www.narmada.org at any point of time in
respect of other posts, muchless the Press Note in question.
91. Adverting to the next argument raised on behalf of the
petitioner that the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court
wrongly relied upon the records of Crl. M.C. No. 6026/2018. It was
contended that at an earlier point of time, petitioner had filed the said
petition seeking quashing of another complaint case filed by the
respondent against the petitioner. However, the said petition was
withdrawn on 09.01.2019, in view of the averments made in the
application for withdrawal. The records whereof, were produced by
CW-4, exhibited as Ex. CW-4/A to Ex. CW-4/D.
92. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the entire record of
the said petition stands wiped out and cannot be relied upon. He
submitted that both the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate
Court have erred in relying on the recitals in „list of dates‟ as an
„admission‟ to the effect that it was detailed in the „list of dates‟ to
come to the conclusion that the Press Note contained in Ex. CW-1/A
was published by the petitioner.
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
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93. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the finding of the learned
Appellate Court, who upon appreciation of evidence has concluded as
under:-
“14.(e) It is observed that Crl. M. C. No. 6026
of 2018 (Ex. CW4/A) was filed alongwith
accompanying affidavit of Medha Patkar
through which she affirmed all the contents of
the petition as correct. For her own reasons
mentioned in the application, Medha Patkar
sought permission to withdraw the petition,
that was allowed. As per application seeking
withdrawal, the petition was only a „draft
copy‟ that was inadvertently filed in haste by
counsel instead of „corrected draft‟ sent to him
by Ms. Medha Patkar.
14.(f) Notably, in the application for
withdrawal it was not mentioned which part of
Crl. M. C. No. 6026 of 2018 was not meant to
be included in the „corrected draft‟. There is
no ground to assume or be represented that a
part of „List of Dates‟, and especially the
content attached with date 24/11/2000 was
included in „draft petition‟ but was meant to be
omitted in the „corrected draft‟ of petition.
There is no escape from the conclusion that
even if aforementioned petition was withdrawn
by Medha Patkar, its content in „List of Dates‟,
for date 24/11/2000 could be read against her
as an admission of fact as it directly touched
the fact in issue in present case. There is no
substance in argument that Ld. Trial Court
wrongly relied upon the contents of petition
Ex. CW4/A, since it was withdrawn by Medha
Patkar.”
94. It is no doubt true that the petitioner did withdraw the Criminal
M. C. No. 6026/2018. The ground for withdrawal, as stated by the
petitioner was that the draft petition was inadvertently filed by the
Advocate, although the said draft had not been finalised by the
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
petitioner before it could be filed in Court. Pending her approval, the
Advocate, by mistake, filed the draft petition in the Court. Further
challenging the admissibility of „List of Dates‟, the learned Senior
Counsel vehemently submitted that the contents of any „List of Dates‟
accompanying the petition is merely for the convenience of the Court,
however, is not part of the pleadings as it is not by an affidavit or the
signatures of the petitioner, so as to fall within the provision of
„Admissions‟, that is, either a judicial admission or an admission on
pleadings.
95. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that neither the learned
Trial Court nor the learned Appellate Court applied their mind to the
withdrawal application filed by the petitioner before this Court, which
was supported by an affidavit and signed by both the petitioner and
her Advocate, clearly mentioning that it was filed on account of a
mistake on the part of an Advocate and was an inadvertent error. He
contended that if an entry in the „List of Dates‟ is stated to be an
Admission, on the same analogy, the entire pleading containing
statements, being a part of the pleading, should also be construed as
Admission.
96. In the present case, the issue is with respect to the admissions
made in the „List of Dates‟, giving the chronology of the facts and
events leading to filing of the Petition, and whether it could be relied
upon in the subsequent proceedings or not.
97. The position of law has been correctly applied by the Learned
Trial Court, as laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of
Basant Singh (Supra) to the following effect:
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
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“Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
makes no dis- tinction between an admission
made by a party in a pleading and other
admissions. Under the Indian law, an
admission made by a party in a plaint signed
and verified by him may be used as evidence
against him in other suits. In other suits, this
admission cannot be regarded as conclusive,
and it is open to the party to show that it is not
true. The explanation of Janki Singh and
Kailashpati Singh that the plaint was drafted
by their lawyer Ramanand Singh at the
instance of the panchas including- one
Ramanand and they signed and verified the
plaint without understanding its contents
cannot be accepted. There is positive evidence
on the record that the plaint was drafted at the
instance of Janki Singh and was filed under his
instructions. The plaint was signed not only by
Janki Singh and Kailashpati Singh but also by
their lawyer, Ramanand Singh. Neither
Ramanand Singh nor the panch Ramanand
was called as a witness.”
98. Thus, an admission made in previous pleading retain their
evidentiary value, unless explicitly rebutted regardless of the status of
such pleading and whether it has been withdrawn or is pending. In the
present case, no doubt the petitioner withdrew Criminal M.C. No.
6026/2018 on the basis of an application made before this Court. The
respondent got the said record produced through CW-4, who exhibited
the entire record of Criminal M.C. No. 6026/2018 as Ex. CW-4/A.
The testimony of the said witness is unrebutted, being a witness of
record. It is seen that the entire record was put to the petitioner vide
Question no. 5 in her statement under Section 313 of the CrPC before
the learned Trial Court. To which the petitioner accepted the entire
record as “matter of record”. The petitioner chose not to rebut the
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same or give an explanation to any portion of the record exhibited as
Ex. CW-4/A, despite being well aware of the contention being raised
by the respondent.
99. More so, the „list of dates‟ though may not form part of the
pleadings as stated on behalf of the petitioner, however, they will
remain a part of Criminal M.C. No. 6026/2018. The Court will
presume that correct facts are stated, even in the list of dates.
Furthermore, in the application seeking withdrawal of Criminal M.C.
No. 6026/2018, the entire thrust of the petitioner was that the petition
filed before the Court was a „draft‟ in which several factual changes
were required to be made by the petitioner. However, the application
is silent on anomaly, if any, in the „List of Dates‟. The learned
Appellate Court has rightly observed that in the application for
withdrawal, it was not mentioned which part of the Crl. M.C was not
meant to be included in the corrected draft.
100. Noticeably, the three judgments relied upon by the petitioner
are distinguishable on their own facts. In Bihari Lal Pal (supra), the
Allahabad High Court considered the effect of withdrawal of a suit
with permission to bring a fresh suit on same cause of action and held
that “it is most probable that the legislature intended that when a suit
was withdrawn with permission under first paragraph of Section 373
of Act No. XIV of 1882, the effect should be to leave the parties in the
same position in which they would have been if the suit had never
been brought”. The same principle of law was reiterated by the
Mysore High Court in the case of Bhimangouda (supra) and by
Calcutta High Court in Sukumar Banerjee (supra).
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
101. In conclusion, the arguments advanced by the petitioner are
more in the nature of hair splitting and hinge on technicalities. The
petitioner has not even referred to the text and context of Press Note,
not even a single submission is made on the same. The record
suggests that the essential ingredients of Section 499 of the IPC are
clearly made out. The imputations made were specific, published in
the public domain and caused harm to the reputation of the
respondent. It is cardinal principal of law in a criminal proceedings,
the complainant is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
against the accused and not on the basis of preponderance of
probabilities as in a civil case.
102. In the present case, a conspectus of all the facts, evidence, the
reading of the reasoning by the learned Trial Court, as modified by the
learned Appellate Court, establishes that the respondent has been able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Press Note is defamatory in
nature.
103. Upon careful perusal of the record, appreciation of the
arguments advanced by both sides, and a thorough examination of the
Impugned Judgment, this Court finds no illegality, perversity, or
material irregularity in the findings recorded by the learned
Trial/Appellate Court. The order under challenge appears to have been
passed after due consideration of the evidence on record and the
applicable law. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate glaring defect
in following the procedure or a manifest error on the point of law
resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice that would justify
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
interference by this Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction
under Section 397/401 of the CrPC.
CHALLENGE TO THE ORDER ON SENTENCE
104. It was next contended on behalf of the petitioner, though,
without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner, that Section 360 of the
CrPC and Section 4 of Probation Act operate in their individual
spheres and cannot be invoked simultaneously. Mr. Parikh submitted
that from the tone and tenor of the Order on Sentence passed by the
learned Appellate Court, it can be ascertained that the learned
Appellate Court passed the order of probation under Section 360 of
the CrPC and not under Section 4 of the Probation Act.
105. He submitted that Section 360(1) of the CrPC provides that “the
Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment,
direct that he be released on his entering into bond”. “To appear and
receive sentence when called upon”. The petitioner, being a woman
aged about 70 years, thus, has been granted probation under Section
360 of the CrPC.
106. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that in view of
language of Section 357(3) of the CrPC, the Order granting
Compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- could not have been passed, more
particularly, without there being any finding that the respondent
“suffered any loss or injury” and thus, the same is passed without
jurisdiction. Further directing deposit of Compensation as pre-
condition to furnishing the probation bond is also illegal.
107. He submitted that the pre-conditions, as provided in the Proviso
to Section 4 and Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the Probation Act are
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
to be followed, which has not been done in the present case, therefore,
apparently, the learned Appellate Court never intended to invoke
Section 4 or Section 5 of the Probation Act. Thus, the Order for
supervision, that is, directing the petitioner to appear before the
learned Trial Court every three months, during the consideration of
supervision report are also unsustainable. More so, the supervisory
orders can be passed specifically when the convict is within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Court, however, in the present case, the
petitioner is a resident of Madhya Pradesh and not Delhi. Similarly,
the direction to pay Compensation is without jurisdiction and illegal.
Therefore, the Order on Sentence has necessarily been passed under
Section 360 of the CrPC.
108. To rebut the above submissions, the learned counsel for the
respondent urged that from the bare reading of the Order on Sentence,
it is clear that the Order is premised on Section 4 of the Probation Act
and the learned Appellate Court never intended to pass an order under
Section 360 of the CrPC.
109. He submitted that the learned Appellate Court rightly directed
the petitioner to pay compensation under Section 5 of the Probation
Act and has simultaneously called for the report of the Probationary
Officer while directing the release of the petitioner on probation bond
alongwith Order on supervision, as contemplated under Section 4(3)
of the Probation Act. He also submitted that even though the petitioner
may not be a local resident in Delhi, she can still furnish a surety bond
by bringing a local surety and that the judicial discretion has been
rightly exercised by the learned Appellate Court.
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
110. In so far as the sentence of the petitioner is concerned, the
learned Appellate Court has already taken a lenient view keeping in
mind the age and social standing of the petitioner. The learned Trial
Court has evidently considered the character of the petitioner by
observing that the petitioner herself is a person of repute and is 70
years of age, being satisfied, granted the benefit of probation. More so,
it is the case of the petitioner herself that she is eligible for the benefit
of being released on probation on account of her age and social
standard although the benefit is being claimed under Section 360
CrPC.
111. Thus, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of
this case, when the Appellate Court has satisfied itself about the
character, antecedents and permanent place of abode, the Order on
Sentence does not warrant any interference by this Court in its
Revisional jurisdiction. More so, the report of District Probation
Officer has already been summoned simultaneously by the learned
Appellate Court.
112. However, the condition of the probation that the petitioner shall
appear before the learned Trial Court every three months during
consideration of the periodical supervision report, is modified to the
extent that the petitioner is at liberty to either appear physically,
through Video Conferencing or to be represented by an Advocate
during such appearances before the learned Trial Court. Nonetheless,
all the other conditions do not require any interference by this Court.
The petitioner to appear before the learned Appellate Court to comply
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By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
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with the directions vide Order on Sentence dated 08.04.2025 within
three weeks from today.
113. In view of the above, the Criminal Revision Petition, along with
pending application, stands disposed of.
SHALINDER KAUR, J
JULY 29, 2025/ss/FRK
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed CRL.REV.P. 163/2025 Page 44 of 44
By:RASHIM KAPOOR
Signing Date:29.07.2025
18:27:19
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