ABSTRACT
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, established in 2016, was created to consolidate the scattered insolvency and bankruptcy structure into one unified legislation. A primary goal of this Code is to protect creditor rights and interests. It was formulated to overcome the limitations and ineffective aspects of previous insolvency regulations by departing from the debtor-in-possession model that had previously controlled the system. Rather, the Code creates a harmonized framework where creditors and debtors operate within a just and balanced system, guaranteeing that company value is maintained for all stakeholders advantage. The Code creates a strong institutional structure consisting of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), and insolvency professionals, forming a specialized environment for effective resolution processes. The legislation emphasizes corporate recovery rather than liquidation through the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), offering a 330-day timeframe for resolution while guaranteeing stakeholder involvement and optimizing asset value. The IBC’s ground breaking methodology incorporates provisions for voluntary liquidation, expedited procedures for smaller companies, and international insolvency acknowledgment, illustrating its extensive reach and flexibility to various business situations. Following its enactment, the IBC has shown considerable influence on India’s corporate governance framework, strengthening credit discipline, increasing recovery percentages, and rebuilding financial system confidence. The Code has enabled the resolution of numerous prominent corporate distress situations, including significant steel, telecommunications, and power industry companies, leading to considerable debt recovery and operational continuity. Nevertheless, the implementation process has exposed certain obstacles, including court capacity limitations, procedural delays, and the requirement for ongoing regulatory improvements to tackle emerging complexities.[1] The research analysis the IBC’s function in revolutionizing India’s method of corporate distress resolution, examining its success in harmonizing stakeholder interests while encouraging economic effectiveness. The study assesses the Code’s role in reinforcing India’s business climate, its compatibility with global best practices, and its capacity for further development to meet modern challenges in corporate insolvency resolution. The IBC represents India’s dedication to structural economic reform and its aspiration to establish a more robust and active corporate sector.
INTRODUCTION
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, insolvency indicates a situation where a person or organization cannot fulfil debt commitments. In today’s business environment, companies depend heavily on credit for operations and expansion. Nevertheless, this extensive credit usage subjects creditors to considerable risks. Should this credit flow be interrupted, it might potentially halt the entire economy. To reduce such risks, insolvency legislation is created to protect creditor interests when a corporate borrower (or company) fails to make payments. A fundamental goal of insolvency law is to eliminate a disorderly situation where creditors separately pursue claims, and alternatively, establish a systematic approach where creditor rights and remedies are temporarily halted. This guarantees that the debtor’s assets are gathered and converted in a methodical way, with just and fair distribution among creditors according to their individual claims. Insolvency law does not grant unlimited liberty for business organizations to fail without repercussions. Commercial ventures naturally involve risk-taking and handling regular challenges, thus only entities capable of successful competition will survive. Certainly, many financially troubled companies may encounter problems. The presence of strong market competition will necessarily drive some businesses to bankruptcy (according to neocapitalist theories). It may be determined that modern companies primarily function under the “survival of the strongest” principle. Various elements lead to organizational failure, including insufficient financial management, weak administration, and unfavourable market conditions.[2] Therefore, insolvency laws seek to tackle business failure through corporate reorganization to address these fundamental issues.
METHODOLOGY
This study adopts an analytical approach and is based on secondary data collected from multiple sources, including the quarterly newsletters of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, as well as relevant blogs and research papers available online. Primary sources include the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, along with its subsequent amendments in 2020 and 2021, providing the foundational legal framework for analysis. Judicial precedents form a crucial component, with detailed examination of landmark Supreme Court decisions.
KEYWORDS: Committee of Creditors (CoC), Pre-packaged insolvency, Cross-border insolvency, Moratorium, Corporate governance, Resolution professional, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, Corporate governance
EVOLUTION OF INSOLVENCY LAWS IN INDIA
Throughout history, India’s insolvency legislation was marked by procedural shortcomings and a debtor-favourable approach. Systems like the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under SICA were unsuccessful in reviving troubled companies, frequently leading to asset deterioration. Various forums and conflicting authorities worsened delays. Understanding the necessity for change, the government implemented the IBC in 2016, creating a fundamental transformation from a debtor-in-possession to a creditor-in-control approach, seeking to enhance recovery rates and preserve financial discipline. A major goal behind implementing the Code was to improve India’s business ease. To accomplish this, the Code shifts company management control to a resolution professional during insolvency. Previously, insolvency procedures were distributed across multiple laws, causing fragmentation and ineffectiveness. This variety of laws also generated significant uncertainty about the respective rights and authorities of creditors and debtors during insolvency, as these were regulated by different individual statutes.
OBJECTIVE AND PREAMBLE OF THE CODE
The IBC was established with the fundamental goals of unifying and reforming current insolvency legislation, guaranteeing a deadline-driven resolution mechanism for optimizing asset value, fostering business entrepreneurship, and harmonizing all stakeholder interests. The Code’s introduction highlights effective and systematic insolvency resolution to guarantee seamless credit market operations and enhance investor trust in India’s financial framework. It is widely recognized that contemporary society actively encourages corporate credit utilization. In fact, debt acquisition is crucial for numerous enterprises to fulfill investment needs and cover operating expenses. Borrowing remains generally acceptable provided the corporate borrower can manage and settle the loan within their financial means. Nevertheless, when the corporate borrower defaults on timely repayment, creditors may encounter substantial losses. To address this risk, the Code empowers creditors with the right to collect their outstanding amounts through either the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) or, when required, by commencing liquidation proceedings against the defaulting borrower. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was established with an expanded framework, designed to tackle insolvency-related issues through enhanced provisions and efficient implementation. It functions to merge and update existing legislation concerning reorganization and resolution of insolvency cases. The Code encompasses companies, partnership entities, limited liability partnerships, corporate organizations, and individuals in situations involving insolvency, liquidation, voluntary liquidation, or bankruptcy[3]. The Code’s fundamental goals are detailed as follows:
“Legislation to merge and modify laws concerning reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate entities, partnership firms and individuals within specified timeframes for optimizing asset value of such entities, to encourage entrepreneurship, credit accessibility and harmonize all stakeholder interests including modifications in the priority sequence of Government payment obligations and to create an Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India, along with related or supplementary matters.“[4]
Consequently, it is evident that the IBC’s central focus extends beyond simply recovering creditor debts but also encompasses enabling the corporate debtor’s recovery and operational continuity. It aims to protect the debtor from poor management and avoid ‘corporate demise’ through unwarranted liquidation.
INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY STRUCTURE
Insolvency represents a financial situation where a person or organization cannot fulfill debt commitments when they become payable. Black’s Law Dictionary characterizes insolvency as financial hardship resulting in the incapacity to settle debts through regular business operations.[5] Within Indian legislation, this situation acts as an essential catalyst for beginning a systematic legal resolution mechanism, aiming to equilibrate debtor and creditor interests. Bankruptcy and Insolvency, though frequently used synonymously, represent separate legal and financial principles. Insolvency constitutes simply a factual condition of financial incapacity to settle debts, while bankruptcy represents the legal pronouncement and official procedure through which the insolvency situation is resolved under regulatory processes. Bankruptcy involves court intervention to dissolve assets or restructure obligations, guaranteeing fair creditor distribution and offering the debtor a chance for renewal.
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY RESOLUTION MECHANISM
The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) covers corporate entities, encompassing companies and limited liability partnerships, requiring a minimum default amount of ₹1 crore, establishing an institutional framework for managing insolvency through organized and foreseeable methods. Financial creditors, operational creditors, or the corporate debtor may submit applications to the NCLT for CIRP initiation following default; financial creditors can apply immediately, while operational creditors must initially issue demand notices and provide time for dispute settlement. After application acceptance, a moratorium is imposed preventing lawsuit initiation, ongoing proceeding continuation, security interest enforcement, and corporate debtor asset transfers, thus maintaining debtor value and avoiding asset depletion. The Committee of Creditors (CoC), primarily consisting of financial creditors, serves as the main decision-making entity throughout CIRP, selecting the resolution professional, authorizing interim financing, assessing and voting on resolution proposals, and deciding the company’s destiny through a 66% voting requirement. Resolution candidates present revival strategies to the resolution professional, who submits them to the CoC for authorization, and proposals must guarantee equitable creditor treatment and meet legal standards, requiring NCLT approval for execution.[6] Optimally, the complete CIRP finishes within 180 days from acceptance, allowing a single 90-day extension under exceptional conditions, with recent modifications establishing a maximum 330-day limit, including court delays, to avoid indefinite processes. When the CoC cannot approve a resolution proposal within the designated period or the NCLT dismisses it, the corporate debtor advances to liquidation, where the liquidator disposes of assets and allocates proceeds following the priority structure outlined in Section 53.of the IBC. In an era of globalized business where companies hold assets and liabilities in multiple jurisdictions, effective cross-border insolvency provisions are crucial to coordinate proceedings, avoid conflicting judgments, and protect stakeholders worldwide.
Currently, Sections 234 and 235 provide for cross-border cooperation through bilateral treaties and letters of request to foreign courts, but these are rudimentary and seldom invoked, creating uncertainty for assets abroad.
CROSS BOARDER INSOLVENCY UNDER IBC
When an enterprise possesses assets and lenders spanning various nations, simultaneous insolvency procedures in numerous jurisdictions may generate disputes and uncertainty. Issues emerge regarding which insolvency procedure takes precedence, who manages the assets, and how lenders receive equitable treatment.[7] A transparent international framework is essential to guarantee coordinated resolution and value optimization.
Currently, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) addresses cross-border insolvency in a limited manner through Sections 234 and 235. These provisions allow the government to establish bilateral treaties with other nations and permit Indian tribunals to transmit request letters to foreign tribunals. Nevertheless, this system is complex, unreliable, and seldom utilized, generating uncertainty for interested parties. Recognizing these shortcomings, the Insolvency Law Committee in 2018 recommended the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 1997.[8]
This would harmonize India’s insolvency system with international best practices, enabling acknowledgment of foreign insolvency procedures and promoting collaboration between tribunals and insolvency practitioners across jurisdictions. While legislative implementation remains pending, Indian tribunals have implemented international principles in significant cases such as Jet Airways, where an international insolvency protocol was authorized between Indian and Dutch administrators. A government-designated committee is presently examining the Model Law’s modification for India, seeking to establish a comprehensive statutory framework to handle complex international insolvency matters efficiently.
Recent Amendments
Amendment 2020
The IBC Amendment Act 2020, approved by Lok Sabha on March 6, 2020 and implemented retroactively from December 28, 2019, introduced seven major reforms to enhance insolvency procedures. The modifications specified that the “insolvency commencement date” occurs when the CIRP application is accepted (not when the IRP is designated), established threshold requirements mandating homebuyers and comparable financial lenders to file collectively (minimum 100 persons or 10% of assignees), and allowed corporate borrowers experiencing insolvency to commence CIRP against other borrowers. Essential operational safeguards were strengthened by guaranteeing government permits remain active during moratorium and requiring continuous provision of vital goods and services to maintain corporate value. The reforms also accelerated the resolution procedure by mandating IRP designation on the insolvency commencement date directly, while offering protection from previous violations upon resolution plan acceptance (although individual executives remain accountable). These modifications sought to tackle implementation obstacles while preserving the basic structure that continues to disadvantage operational lenders in favor of financial lenders.
Principal features of this legislation are outlined below:
- Definition of Insolvency Commencement Date The Amendment Act eliminates the proviso to Clause (12) of Section 5 of the Code to explicitly establish the “insolvency commencement date” as the date when an application to commence the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) is accepted by the adjudicating authority. This modification removes previous uncertainty by confirming that the procedure does not start with the designation of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP), as was formerly understood.
- Threshold Requirements for Specific Financial Lenders The Amendment alters Section 7 of the Code by incorporating explanations that impact financial lenders, particularly homebuyers and lenders in specific categories. It establishes a threshold condition where such lenders may only apply for CIRP jointly, provided they satisfy either of the following standards: a minimum of 100 persons or 10% of the total assignees or lenders in the same project or category, whichever is smaller. Additionally, any outstanding applications by these groups that have not yet been accepted by the adjudicating authority must be modified to meet these conditions within 30 days of the Amendment Act’s implementation, otherwise they will be deemed withdrawn.
- Corporate Borrowers Permitted to Commence CIRP The Amendment provides clarity to Section 11 by declaring that corporate borrowers experiencing insolvency themselves are not prohibited from commencing CIRP against another corporate borrower. This represents a notable change from the previous understanding that limited such actions. An explanation incorporated to Section 11 permits corporate borrowers who are under CIRP, have finished CIRP within the previous 12 months, or are under liquidation, to submit CIRP applications against others.
- Government Permits and Authorizations to Stay Active During Moratorium An explanation incorporated to Section 14 confirms that government-granted permits, licenses, quotas, concessions, or registrations will not be suspended or canceled solely because of insolvency proceeding initiation. This safeguard, however, depends upon the corporate borrower staying current on obligations resulting from the utilization of such authorizations during the moratorium period.
- Continuous Provision of Vital Goods and Services A new subsection (2A) is added under Section 14, requiring that providers of essential goods and services cannot stop their provision to the corporate borrower during the moratorium. The continuation is crucial to sustain operations and maintain value, as decided by the IRP or RP. However, this safeguard is not unconditional—it does not apply if the borrower fails to compensate for such provisions or under other designated circumstances.
- Timeline for Designating Interim Resolution Professional The Amendment modifies the schedule in Section 16 for designating an Interim Resolution Professional. Currently, the designation must happen on the insolvency commencement date directly, rather than within 14 days from that date, seeking to streamline and accelerate the resolution procedure.
- Protection from Previous Violations upon Resolution Plan Acceptance A new Section 32A has been incorporated to offer legal safeguarding to the corporate borrower from responsibilities for violations committed before the initiation of the CIRP, once a resolution plan is accepted by the adjudicating authority. However, this protection is provided only if the resolution plan leads to a modification in management or control. While the corporate borrower is safeguarded, persons such as company executives or LLP partners responsible for the violations remain individually accountable. Furthermore, the Amendment protects the corporate borrower’s property from seizure, attachment, or confiscation in such situations.
2021 Amendment
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2021 received the President’s assent on August 11, 2021. A principal characteristic of this legislation is the official establishment of the Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP), particularly created for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs).[9] The Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP) is an organized framework that allows the corporate borrower (CD) and its lenders to jointly develop a resolution plan beyond the official insolvency structure. This plan is developed and mutually accepted before the commencement of official proceedings, guaranteeing a quicker and more effective resolution. After consensus is achieved, the plan is presented to the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) for authorization, thus providing it legal legitimacy.
The Pre-Packaged Insolvency Resolution Process (PPIRP) serves as an alternative to the traditional Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). Nevertheless, its application is presently restricted to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). The model distinctively combines the rapidity and adaptability of informal agreements with the legal enforceability of an official procedure. Unlike traditional insolvency proceedings that typically are prolonged and expensive, or informal workouts that lack legal safeguarding, pre-packs provide a compromise. They deliver the advantages of both methods while preserving statutory protections for all interested parties. In a PPIRP, the procedure is commenced by the borrower, who suggests a resolution plan with lender participation. An independent insolvency practitioner is designated to supervise the proceedings, guaranteeing that the procedure complies with the IBC’s goals—primarily, the conservation and optimization of asset value. Significantly, pre-packs can be suggested even before a default happens, permitting proactive intervention. To guarantee transparency and responsibility, the insolvency practitioner remains accountable for any misconduct even after the procedure’s completion. This supervision guarantees that the procedure remains equitable, objective, and law-compliant.
Case laws
- Swiss Ribbons Case[10]
This Supreme Court ruling, issued by Justices Rohinton Fali Nariman and Navin Sinha, handled numerous constitutional challenges to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The Court confirmed the constitutional legitimacy of all challenged provisions, determining that:
(1) the designation of NCLT and NCLAT members satisfied the Madras Bar Association guidelines through appropriate Selection Committee processes;
(2) the distinction between financial lenders and operational lenders is constitutionally legitimate due to basic differences in their character – financial lenders typically offer secured loans involving substantial amounts with organized repayment schedules and are better positioned to evaluate business feasibility, while operational lenders provide goods/services, are typically unsecured, involve smaller sums, and face greater dispute likelihood;
(3) excluding operational lenders from voting in the Committee of Creditors under Sections 21 and 24 is warranted since financial lenders possess superior knowledge in assessing resolution plans and their interests correspond with business recovery, while operational lenders are sufficiently protected through Regulation 38’s equitable treatment provisions and payment precedence;
(4) Section 12A’s 90% threshold for withdrawal authorization reflects legislative policy guaranteeing comprehensive lender consensus and is subject to NCLT/NCLAT examination for arbitrary determinations;
(5) resolution practitioners operate as facilitators under Committee supervision rather than possessing independent adjudicatory authority; and
(6) Section 53’s asset distribution precedence favoring secured financial debts over unsecured operational debts serves the legitimate goal of capital movement in the economy while maintaining traditional safeguards for workers’ dues, thereby fulfilling Article 14’s equality requirements through rational classification based on intelligible differentia related to the IBC’s purposes.
- Essar Steel Case[11]
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Essar Steel case (November 15, 2019) substantially strengthened the differential treatment of operational lenders under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, establishing crucial precedents that further disadvantage this category of lenders. The Court established two essential principles: first, that operational lenders need not receive equal treatment with financial lenders under resolution plans, and second, that all pre-insolvency obligations of the corporate borrower would be eliminated post successful resolution. This ruling particularly affects operational lenders who lack a conventional financial relationship with corporate borrowers, being owed money primarily for goods and services supplied rather than financial lending. The judgment solidified the existing discriminatory structure where operational lenders are systematically excluded from the Committee of Creditors (CoC), which consists only of financial lenders except in unusual cases where no financial lenders exist. Even when operational lenders are provided participation rights, they can only attend CoC meetings if their debt represents at least 10% of the total corporate debt, effectively preventing most operational lenders from meaningful involvement in the resolution procedure.
The case revealed the practical reality that despite Section 53’s assurance that operational lenders would receive more than liquidation value, most corporate borrowers carry such considerable outstanding debts that the liquidation value often decreases to zero, leaving operational lenders with no recovery. This situation is further worsened by the priority arrangement under Section 53, which positions unsecured financial lenders (often related parties like promoters or majority shareholders) two levels above operational lenders in the waterfall mechanism, despite the lack of any economic rationale for prioritizing those who were merely vendors supplying goods and services.
The Essar Steel ruling thus established a system where operational lenders, including essential MSME suppliers who constitute the foundation of the real economy, face the possibility of complete non-payment while financial lenders receive preferential treatment. This method contradicts the fair objectives of the IBC and fails to acknowledge that an economy functions not merely on financial systems but fundamentally on the provision of goods and services that generate actual economic value, making the current prioritization structure both economically unreasonable and legally questionable under Article 14’s equality principles.
- Jaypee Infratech Case[12]
The Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL) case emerged as a landmark in Indian insolvency law when IDBI filed insolvency proceedings against the company for ₹526.11 crores on August 9, 2017, leading the NCLT Allahabad to admit the application and appoint an IRP with moratorium effect. The case exposed critical gaps in the IBC framework regarding homebuyers’ rights, as thousands who had invested life savings in residential projects faced uncertainty about claim filing and protection vis-à-vis financial creditors, prompting IBBI to introduce “Form F” for consumer claims. When homebuyers approached the Supreme Court through a writ petition, the Court stayed the NCLT order on September 4, 2017, recognizing their unique predicament of potentially losing both homes and investments. Following IDBI’s counter-application supported by the Union of India arguing that stay would restore harmful erstwhile management, the Supreme Court crafted a balanced five-point solution: directing IRP to continue management and submit interim resolution plan within 45 days, mandating senior counsel participation in CoC meetings to advocate for homebuyers, restricting the managing directors of JIL and JAL from leaving India without court approval, mandating JAL to deposit ₹2,000 crores, and requiring court permission for any asset sales. and maintaining moratorium while ensuring professional management. This watershed case established crucial precedents by recognizing homebuyers as more than mere unsecured creditors deserving special protection, demonstrating judicial activism in crafting innovative stakeholder-balancing solutions, and ultimately 2018 amendment to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) reclassified homebuyers as financial creditors with enhanced rights, thereby transforming their role and empowering them to actively participate in insolvency proceedings. Indian insolvency law’s approach to consumer protection in corporate insolvency proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, signifies a transformative shift in India’s corporate insolvency resolution framework., replacing a disjointed legal framework with a streamlined, time-sensitive process that emphasizes revival over winding up while safeguarding the rights of all parties involved. By unifying previously scattered regulations and creating dedicated bodies such as the NCLT and IBBI, the IBC has tackled systemic inefficiencies, boosted debt recovery, and strengthened financial accountability. The Code’s focus on the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP), coupled with forward-thinking measures like pre-packaged insolvency for MSMEs and provisions for international insolvency cases, demonstrates its adaptability in addressing corporate financial crises.[13] Nevertheless, practical application has uncovered hurdles, including procedural hold-ups, court backlogs, and unequal treatment of operational creditors, as evidenced by pivotal rulings such as Swiss Ribbons, Essar Steel, and Jaypee Infratech. Although judicial decisions have provided much-needed clarity and upheld creditor protections, the IBC’s long-term efficacy will require ongoing updates—for instance, integrating global standards for cross-border insolvency and enhancing safeguards for smaller claimants. As India’s economic landscape becomes increasingly globalized, the IBC must continue to adapt to new challenges, ensuring both swift resolutions and equitable outcomes. In essence, the Code serves as a pillar of India’s financial reforms, promoting a more stable and competitive business climate, yet its enduring impact will rely on persistent policy enhancements, stronger institutional frameworks, and an unwavering dedication to fairness and efficiency in resolving insolvency cases.
NAME: PRATEEK TYAGI
COLLEGE: BHARTI VIDYAPEETH INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT AND RESEARCH
[1] Das, A., Agarwal, A. K., Jacob, J., Mohapatra, S., Hishikar, S., Bangar, S., Parekh, S., Basu, S., & Sinha, U. K. (2020). Insolvency and Bankruptcy Reforms: The Way Forward. SAGE Journals.
[2] IBC Law &practise by Akaant Kumar Mittal
[3] Ravi, Prasanth (2018). “The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: A Critical Analysis.” Indian Journal of Corporate Law, 11(1), 1-25.
[4]https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/15479/1/the_insolvency_and_bankruptcy_code%2C_2016.pdf
[5] Overview of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code | A Comprehensive Summary by Taxman
[6] Chambers & Partners, Insolvency 2024 – India: Trends and Developments, CHAMBERS GLOBAL PRACTICE GUIDES
[7] A to Z of IBC | A beginner’s guide to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code by Bharat Chugh
[8] Introduction and Overview of the Concept of Cross-Border Insolvency Law in India by Harshith Sai Boddu
[9] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2021.pdf
[10] Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.,(2019) 4 SCC 17; MANU/SC/0079/2019
[11] Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531
[12] Chitra Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 18 SCC 575; MANU/SC/0871/2018.
[13] Supra note 10 page No.7