Jharkhand High Court
Pramod Kumar Sinha vs Chairman on 28 July, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:21030
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 4411 of 2020
---
Pramod Kumar Sinha, aged about 53 years, son of Sri Satya
Narayan Prasad Sinha, resident of SAIL City, P.O.-Dhurwa,
P.S.- Pundag, District – Ranchi ………..Petitioner
Versus
1. Chairman, Coal India Ltd. having its office At – Coal
Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.-Newtown, Rajarhat, Kolkata -700156
(W.B.).
2. Director (P & IR), Coal India Ltd. having its office At-Coal
Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Newtown, Rajarhat, Kolkata-700156
(W.B.).
3. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Ltd.
having its office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O.,
P.S.-Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. General Manager (P & IR), Central Coalfields Ltd. having its
office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali,
District – Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Sri Swayam Prakash, Chief Manager (Personnel), LP&R
Department, Central Coalfields Ltd., having its office at
Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District –
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
6. General Manager, B&K Area, Central Coalfields Ltd., At-
Kargali, P.O. & P.S.- Bermo, District-Bokaro.
7. The Project Officer, Kargali O.C.P., Central Coalfields Ltd.,
At Kargali, P.O. & P.S.-Bermo, District – Bokaro
…………Respondents
with
W.P.(S) No.1595 of 2021
—
Bharatjee Thakur, aged about 57 years, son of Late Mangru
Thakur, resident of Qtr. No. C-9, G.M. Colony, P.O.-Dhori,
P.S.-Bermo, District-Bokaro ….Petitioner
Versus
1. Chairman, Coal India Ltd. having its office At – Coal
Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.-Newtown, Rajarhat, Kolkata -700156
(W.B.).
2. Director (P & IR), Coal India Ltd. having its office At-Coal
Bhawan, P.O. & P.S.- Newtown, Rajarhat, Kolkata-700156
(W.B.).
3. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Central Coalfields Ltd.
having its office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O.,
P.S.-Kotwali, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. General Manager (P & IR), Central Coalfields Ltd. having its
office at Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali,
District – Ranchi, Jharkhand.
5. Sri Swayam Prakash, Chief Manager (Personnel), LP&R
Department, Central Coalfields Ltd., having its office at
Darbhanga House, Ranchi, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District –
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
6. General Manager, B&K Area, Central Coalfields Ltd., At-
Kargali, P.O. & P.S.- Bermo, District-Bokaro.
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2025:JHHC:21030
7. Staff Officer (Personnel), B& K Area, Central Coalfields Ltd.,
P.O.-Sunday Bazar, P.S.-Bermo, District-Bokaro
8. Project Officer, B&K Area, Central Coalfields Ltd., P.O.-
Sunday Bazar, P.S.-Bermo, District-Bokaro
….Respondents
—
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
—-
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Uday Prakash, Advocate
[in both cases]
For the Respondents: Mr. Shivam Utkarsh Sahay,
Advocate
[in both cases]
—
C.A.V. ON 18.06.2025 PRONOUNCED ON 28/07/2025
W.P.(S) No. 4411 of 2020
The instant writ petition has been preferred by
the Petitioner for the following reliefs:
(i) For quashing the punishment order dt. 31.08.2017
(Annexure-14) passed by the Respondent No. 3, whereby and
whereunder petitioner has been awarded minor penalty of
“withholding of two increments for a period of two years
without cumulative effect” in the matter of minor penalty
proceedings initiated against him by the Memorandum of the
Charge dt. 7.10.2016 issued to him and also to quash the
Appellate Order dt. 28.01.2020 (Annexure-16) passed by
Respondent No. 1, whereby and whereunder punishment of
withholding of two increments for a period of two years
without cumulative effect, inflicted upon the petitioner has
been upheld by the Respondent No. 1/Appellate Authority in
the matter of departmental appeal; against the said
punishment; preferred before him by the petitioner.
(ii) For a further direction(s) upon the respondents to grant
petitioner’s basic of Rs. 1,58,280/- as on 01.04.2018 and to
continue with the same and fixing his further basic thereby
as to Rs. 1,63,030/- as on 01.04.2019, which have been
withheld consequent to passing of punishment order dt.
31.08.2017 (Annexure-14) and pay the arrears with
consequential benefits arising thereof, alongwith interest.
W.P.(S) No. 1595 of 2021
The instant writ petition has been preferred by
the Petitioner for the following reliefs:
(i) For quashing the punishment order dt. 31.08.2017
(Annexure-10) passed by the Respondent No. 3, whereby
and whereunder petitioner has been awarded minor
penalty of “withholding of three increments for a period of
three years without cumulative effect” in the matter of
minor penalty proceedings initiated against him by the
Memorandum of the Charge dt. 7.10.2016 issued to him
and also to quash the Appellate Order dt. 28.01.2020
(Annexure-17) passed by Respondent No. 1, whereby and
whereunder punishment of withholding of three
increments for a period of three years without cumulative
effect, inflicted upon the petitioner has been upheld.
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2025:JHHC:21030
(ii) For a further direction upon the respondents to grant
petitioner’s entitled basic as on 01.04.2018, 01.04.2019
and 01.04.2020, which have been withheld consequent to
passing of punishment order dt. 31.08.2017 (Annexure-
10); and pay the arrear with consequential benefits
thereof.
(iii) Upon quashing and setting aside the impugned orders a
further direction upon respondents to grant promotion to
the petitioner from the post of Senior Manager (P) in E-6
Grade to the post of Chief Manager (P) in E-7 Grade
retrospectively from the date, when his juniors in the post
of Sr. Manager (P)/E-6 Grade have been promoted;
alongwith payment of back wages arising thereof, as
petitioner was not considered for promotion owing to
currency of punishment of withholding of annual
increments for three years.
2. Since issues involved in both these writ
applications are same and similar and are also
interconnected; as such, both were heard together and being
disposed of by this common order. The brief facts lie in a
narrow compass. The petitioners, Shri Pramod Kumar Sinha
and Shri Bharatjee Thakur, are officers in the executive cadre
under the Personnel Discipline of Central Coalfields Limited1,
a subsidiary of Coal India Limited2. They were subjected to
minor penalty proceedings under the provisions of the Coal
India Limited Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (as
amended up to April 2000)3.
The origin of the proceedings arise from a matter
concerning a non-executive employee. One Shri Swaminath
Singh, who was serving as a Senior Overman at the Kargali
Open Cast Project (KOCP), B&K Area of CCL was initially
appointed in the year 1980, and his date of birth was
recorded as 15.02.1956, based on a medical certificate, in his
service book. He continued in service on the strength of this
recorded date of birth.
In the year 2014, during an RTI-related exercise
requiring verification of educational and statutory certificates,
Shri Swaminath Singh failed to submit his matriculation and
statutory certificates despite repeated reminders. As a result,
1
hereinafter referred to as “CCL”
2
hereinafter referred to as “CIL”
3
hereinafter referred to as “CIL-CDA Rules”
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a charge-sheet was issued to him on 23.12.2014 for non-
compliance and disobedience, and a departmental enquiry
was initiated. Shri Bharatjee Thakur, petitioner in WP(S) No.
1595 of 2021, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer by Memo
dated 31.01.2015.
During the pendency of the enquiry, the Directorate
General of Mines Safety (DGMS), Dhanbad, vide letter dated
13.01.2015, informed that as per its records, the date of birth
of Shri Swaminath Singh, as recorded in the Overman
Certificate, was 05.01.1953. The discrepancy between the
service book entry and statutory certificate came to light. In
view of this, and after discussion with the Area authorities,
Shri Bharatjee Thakur prepared a note on 10.04.2015
recommending removal of the employee on account of his
deemed superannuation on 31.01.2013.
The said recommendation was placed before Shri
Pramod Kumar Sinha, petitioner in WP(S) No. 4411 of 2020,
then posted as Senior Manager (Personnel) at the
Headquarters in Ranchi. He endorsed the view that the
employee had already attained the age of superannuation
based on the statutory certificate and advised that his name
be struck off the rolls and the pending enquiry be dropped.
This recommendation was further endorsed by the
General Manager (P&IR), CCL and accordingly, the employee
was disengaged from service on 21.04.2015.
3. Subsequently, based on a vigilance report arising
out of a complaint dated 25.02.2015, both petitioners were
issued charge memos on 07.10.2016. They were alleged to
have facilitated the retirement of the said employee during
the pendency of a departmental enquiry, which is in
contravention of company rules, thereby allegedly enabling
the release of retiral benefits and acting prejudicially to the
interest of the company.
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2025:JHHC:21030
4. The petitioners submitted detailed explanations
denying the charges. Despite this, by order dated 31.08.2017,
the Disciplinary Authority imposed punishment on Shri
Pramod Kumar Sinha-the penalty of withholding two
increments for two years without cumulative effect and on
Shri Bharatjee Thakur-the penalty of withholding three
increments for three years without cumulative effect.
Both petitioners preferred departmental appeals
against their respective punishment orders. However, the
appeals were rejected, thereby affirming the findings and
punishments imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
Aggrieved by the said punishment and appellate orders, the
petitioners have filed the respective writ petitions.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted
that in their respective memorandum of charge, it has not
been stated as to what were the exact rules which were
violated by the petitioners or how the said actions of paving
way for peaceful retirement of Shri Singh and release of his
retiral dues were detrimental to the interest of the company.
Further, he submitted that to the contrary, Clause 34
of the Certified Standing Orders of M/s CCL provides for
superannuation of an employee of the company on his
reaching the age of 60 years, and there is no clause in the
Certified Standing Orders of M/s CCL stipulating to continue
with a departmental enquiry initiated during the service
period, after the employee’s superannuation. The company’s
administrative guidelines vide letter dated 17/18.07.2006
also speak so.
6. He contended that despite bringing all relevant
facts and documents on record, the disciplinary authority-
respondent no.3 passed the impugned orders dated
31.08.2017 punishing petitioner-Shri Pramod Kumar Sinha
with withholding of two increments for two years without
cumulative effect and petitioner-Shri Bharatjee Thakur with
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withholding of three increments for three years without
cumulative effect.
Learned counsel further submitted that the
disciplinary authority failed to explain how the employee
could have continued beyond the age of 60 years on the basis
of the date of birth recorded in the service book, discarding
the correct date of birth recorded in the statutory certificates,
i.e., 05.01.1953. Further, no explanation was given in the
punishment order as to why the findings of the statutory
authority (DGMS) were not accepted. The authority acted on
hypothetical reasoning and ignored the settled legal position.
7. Further, he submitted that the disciplinary
authority failed to appreciate that the departmental
proceeding initiated against Shri Swaminath Singh had to be
discontinued upon his superannuation, as there was no
provision in the Certified Standing Orders permitting its
continuation. It was also contended that even otherwise, the
disciplinary authority, while imposing the punishment, did
not apply its own mind but acted on the dictates of the
vigilance department. From the records (page 123 of WP(S)
No. 4411/2020), it is evident that the disciplinary authority
did not exercise its own judgment in determining the
quantum of punishment.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the Respondents
has submitted that the departmental proceedings as well as
the appeal preferred by the petitioners clearly demonstrate
that the petitioners have failed to produce any document or
evidence to prove their innocence. Moreover, after giving full
opportunity of hearing, the Disciplinary Authority, having
considered the gravity of the lapses, imposed the
aforementioned minor penalty on the petitioners. All aspects
of the matter were duly considered by the Disciplinary
Authority before arriving at the decision.
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9. Learned counsel to support his contention has
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana4,
wherein, at para 11, it has been held that where an applicant
obtains office by misrepresenting facts or playing fraud upon
the competent authority, such appointment cannot be
sustained in law. It is well settled that fraud vitiates all
judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal, and that fraud and
collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any
civilized system of jurisprudence. Dishonesty should not be
permitted to yield benefit to those who have practiced fraud
or misrepresentation. If employment is secured by such
means, it renders the same voidable at the option of the
employer.
10. Further, he has submitted that the allegations
levelled against the petitioners were duly proved by the
competent authority after affording ample opportunity of
hearing. Accordingly, vide order dated 31.08.2017, minor
penalty were imposed upon respective petitioners, which is
completely justified. The charge-sheet clearly sets out that
the respective petitioners committed misconduct and
consequently conferred undue benefit upon the employee Shri
Swaminath Singh.
He also submits that while it is partly disputed and
denied that the petitioner, Pramod Kumar Sinha, acted solely
in an advisory capacity, it is submitted that it was on the
basis of his recommendation that the ongoing departmental
proceeding against Shri Swaminath Singh was dropped and
he was allowed to retire peacefully despite being passed his
stipulated date of retirement.
11. He submitted that although the letter dated
17/18.07.2006 dealt with the issue of continuation of
departmental proceedings after retirement, it applied only
4
(1999) 5 SCC 762
7
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where an enquiry is pending and cannot be continued after
superannuation. In this case, the Petitioner- Mr. Sinha,
without examining the DGMS letter or issuing a fresh notice,
made a direct recommendation to drop proceedings.
Moreover, the appeal dated 28.09.2017 was duly
processed and placed before the Appellate Authority in
accordance with Rule 36.1. The Appellate Authority, after
examining all documents, representations, and the penalty
imposed, found the punishment commensurate with the
misconduct and passed a well-reasoned and speaking order
dated 28.01.2020, which was duly communicated to the
petitioners.
12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
after going through the documents annexed with the
respective affidavits and the averments made therein, it
appears that the Petitioners-Shri Pramod Kumar Sinha & Shri
Bharatjee Thakur, the officers in the executive cadre of
Central Coalfields Limited (CCL), were subjected to minor
penalty proceedings under the CIL Conduct, Discipline and
Appeal Rules, 1978. The departmental proceedings had
arisen from a case involving one Shri Swaminath Singh, a
Senior Overman at Kargali Open Cast Project (KOCP), whose
service records reflected his date of birth as 15.02.1956.
However, during a certificate verification exercise in 2014, the
DGMS, Dhanbad, vide letter dated 13.01.2015, informed that
the employee’s date of birth, as per his statutory Overman
certificate, was 05.01.1953.
In light of this discrepancy, Petitioner-Shri Bharatjee
Thakur, then posted at KOCP, initiated a proposal on
10.04.2015 for treating the employee as deemed retired on
31.01.2013. Petitioner-Shri Pramod Kumar Sinha, then at
CCL Headquarters, endorsed the proposal, including the
recommendation to drop the pending departmental enquiry.
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Based on these recommendations, Shri Swaminath Singh was
disengaged from service on 21.04.2015.
Subsequently, both Petitioners were charge-sheeted on
07.10.2016 for allegedly facilitating premature retirement of
the employee during the pendency of departmental enquiry,
contrary to company norms and thereby enabling release of
retiral benefits. The Petitioners submitted explanations
stating that their actions were in accordance with Clause 34
of the Certified Standing Orders, the CCL Circular- I.I. No. 76
dated 25.04.1988 and the administrative guideline dated
17/18.07.2006 which did not permit continuation of enquiry
after superannuation.
Nevertheless, by orders dated 31.08.2017, the
Disciplinary Authority imposed minor penalties of
withholding of increments. The Departmental appeals filed by
the petitioners were also dismissed.
13. The issues falling for consideration in this case
are as follows:
i. Whether the impugned Memorandum of charge dated
07.10.2016 issued to the respective petitioners makes
out a case far-less a case of misconduct as alleged
against him ?
ii. Whether the recommendation of the petitioners to treat
Shri Swaminath Singh as superannuated and drop the
departmental enquiry was in accordance with company
rules, policies and law ?
iii. Whether the disciplinary and appellate orders suffer
from any infirmity warranting interference under Article
226 of the Constitution of India ?
14. The first issue for consideration is whether the
impugned Memorandum of Charge dated 07.10.2016 issued
to the Petitioners makes out a case, far less a case of
misconduct, as alleged against him.
It is the contention of the Petitioners that the
term “misconduct” implies a wrongful intention and not a
mere error of judgment, as defined in P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s
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The Law Lexicon5 and that misconduct is not necessarily the
same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude, as laid
down in Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi6.
In the said case, the definition of misconduct has been noted
down as per Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary which runs as:
“Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of
negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not
constitute such misconduct.”
However, the recommendation for approval a
proposal for immediate removal of Shri Singh from the
employment of CCL, Shri Sinha favoured Shri Singh against
whom departmental enquiry for misconduct was pending and
his advice that the departmental enquiry initiated against
him may also be dropped as no fruitful purpose would be
served in proceeding with the same ahead coupled with the
note “immediate action please” shows his act was in a
manner prejudicial to the interests of the Company as such
leniency towards employees found prima facie guilty of major
fraud and cheating may encourage others to indulge in
similar activities incurring huge loss to the Company.
15. Insofar as, the issue, whether the
recommendation of the Petitioners to treat Shri Swaminath
Singh as superannuated and drop the departmental enquiry
was in accordance with company rules, policies and law is
concerned; the key fact remains that a departmental
proceeding was pending against Shri Singh for non-
submission of statutory certificates. During the pendency of
that proceeding, the Petitioners, upon discovery of an
alternative date of birth, recommended his immediate
removal by treating him as having already superannuated
and simultaneously recommended dropping the disciplinary
proceedings.
5
5th Edn., at p. 1232
6
(2007) 4 SCC 566
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While it is correct that the Clause 34 of the
Certified Standing Orders of M/s CCL provides for
superannuation of an employee of the company on his
reaching the age of 60 years and there is no provision in the
Certified Standing Orders to continue a proceeding post-
superannuation, this principle applies only when
superannuation would have occurred naturally and not when
it was enforced based on unverified data during the pendency
of a departmental proceeding. The action of the Petitioners
resulted in pre-empting the outcome of the departmental
enquiry, which ought to have been concluded or converted
into a fresh charge based on the DGMS communication.
16. It is also evident from record that the DGMS,
Dhanbad, had sent a proposal on 13.01.2015 to CCL
Headquarters for removal of Swaminath Singh from the
employment of the company; instead the Petitioner made a
proposal to the headquarters for stopping the employee from
the employment and strike of his name in the manpower role
of the company as well as dropping the ongoing departmental
proceeding initiated against him without any guideline /
circular and any provision of the Certified Standing Orders
for workman of establishment under respondent company.
As stated hereinabove, there was no guideline /
circular or any provision in the Certified Standing Orders of
the workman of establishments under CCL for stopping
employee from employment and striking of his name in the
manpower role and dropping the ongoing enquiry. The letter
dated 13.01.2015 of DGMS conveying the date of birth of
Swaminath Singh has not been adduced in the enquiry
proceedings nor fresh show cause was served to the employee
for establishing the fact that his date of birth was
05.01.1953. If DGMS submitted Mining Sirdar /Overman
Certificate of the employee, which contains the date of birth
of the employee, the certificate is valid one and the
recommendation made by the petitioner was correct.
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But, as per the service records, date of birth of
Swaminath Singh was 15.02.1956 and there was enough time
to enquire the matter by giving him fresh show cause notice
and examination of the documents dated 13.01.2015 of
DGMS which was not made in any of the enquiry. Therefore,
the Petitioners misguided the higher authority and the
employee was allowed to retire peacefully against possible
dismissal / removal and forfeiture of his gratuity.
17. Thus, due to wrong recommendation of the
Petitioners, the employee got all retiral benefits and was
stopped from services w.e.f. 21.04.2015 without conclusion of
any departmental action. Thus, in the absence of any rule
authorizing such a mode of forced retirement during enquiry
and without affording due process to the charged employee,
the Petitioners’ recommendation were procedurally flawed.
18. The other prime issue is whether the disciplinary
and appellate orders suffer from any infirmity warranting
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
As to the punishment imposed, this Court finds
that due opportunity was given to the Petitioners; the
disciplinary authority recorded reasons and imposed minor
penalties and the appellate authority considered the appeal,
though it could have been more elaborative. Herein, the Court
cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view
unless the findings are perverse or in violation of principles of
natural justice. The disciplinary authority’s conclusion that
the Petitioners’ actions facilitated avoidance of formal
adjudication is not perverse, especially considering the
vigilance input.
In State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj7, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has again reiterated that Courts
must not interfere with departmental findings unless mala
7
(2020) 3 SCC 423
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fides, perversity or violation of procedure are evident. The
relevant paragraphs have been quoted hereinbelow:
“10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S)
80] , again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that power
of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of
the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court.
The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive
at its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as
under: (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a
review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of
judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court.
When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine
whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or
whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether
the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the
authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has
jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or
conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence.
Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of
fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty
of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial
review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or
where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding
be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to
the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-
extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union
of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR
718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] , this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error
on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ
of certiorari could be issued.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya [State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721] , this Court
held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and
reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on
the ground that another view is possible on the material on
record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground
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for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. The
Court held as under : (SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10)
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an
appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic
enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is
possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded
in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The
test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting
reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on
the material on record. The courts will however interfere with
the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural
justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the
order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on
extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [Union
of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
1806] and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana [Bank of
India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC
(L&S) 1036] , High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High
Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 :
2000 SCC (L&S) 144] .)
***
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted
the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in
any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor
affect the validity of the finding of guilt or consequential
punishment. The standard of proof required in criminal
proceedings being different from the standard of proof required
in departmental enquiries, the same charges and evidence may
lead to different results in the two proceedings, that is, finding
of guilt in departmental proceedings and an acquittal by giving
benefit of doubt in the criminal proceedings. This is more so
when the departmental proceedings are more proximate to the
incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have no
effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee
who allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by
the disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge,
cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the ground
that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted him.”
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC
610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] , this Court held that while
reappreciating evidence the High Court cannot act as an appellate
authority in the disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the
parameters as to when the High Court shall not interfere in the
disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the
High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
14
2025:JHHC:21030
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks
its conscience.””
In the case at hand, none of these grounds are
attracted.
19. Moreover, Petitioners’ reliance over the case of
Supreme Court rendered in Nareshbhai Bhagubhai v.
Union of India8 wherein it has been quoted in para 14.2
that the file noting in the office files of the competent
authority cannot be considered to be an order on the
objections, can also not be relied upon in the present case
as one of the Petitioners, Shri P.K. Sinha, made straight
away recommendation to immediately stop Swaminath Singh
from employment in the Company and this recommendation
was in contradiction to the proposal of the area authorities
for removal of Swaminath Singh and guideline for recovery of
excess salary/allowances drawn.
20. Having regard to the discussion made
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any illegality,
irregularity or perversity in the conduct of the disciplinary
proceedings or in the orders passed by the Disciplinary
Authority and the Appellate Authority.
It is well settled that the scope of judicial review
in matters of departmental proceedings is limited. The Court
does not sit as an appellate authority over the decision of
the Disciplinary Authority. Unless there is a clear case of
violation of natural justice or findings are shown to be
perverse, this Court ought not to interfere with the
conclusions arrived at in a properly conducted enquiry.
In the instant case, the charges against the
Petitioners were specific, inquiry was conducted after
affording due opportunity, and the findings recorded cannot
be said to be either perverse or unsupported by evidence.
8
(2019) 15 SCC 1
15
2025:JHHC:21030The penalty imposed is minor in nature and commensurate
with the nature of misconduct, which has been adequately
established.
21. Accordingly, both the writ petitions being W.P.(S)
No. 4411 of 2020 and W.P.(S) No. 1595 of 2021 are
dismissed. Pending I.A., if any, also stands closed. However,
no cost.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Jk
NAFR/A.F.R
16