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Supreme Court of India
Urmila Devi vs Balram on 31 July, 2025
2025 INSC 915
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3300 OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10251 of 2019)
URMILA DEVI & OTHERS APPELLANTS
VERSUS
BALRAM & ANOTHER RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of impugned order dated
09.04.2019 passed in Application U/S 482 No.6543/2003 by the
High Court of Allahabad dismissing the application preferred by
the accused-appellants under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NEETU SACHDEVA
Date: 2025.07.31
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “Cr.P.C.”).
16:13:57 IST
Reason:
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2.1 Vide the impugned Order, the High Court refused to quash
the Criminal Complaint Case No.627 of 2002 titled, “Balram v.
Kodai & Ors.” under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“hereinafter, “IPC”) pending before the
Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Basti.
3. Burdened by the fear of his estate being jeopardized and
trammeled by the alcoholic obsessions of his third son-Ashish
Kumar, one Shri Ram Baksh Dubey (since deceased) (hereinafter,
“testator”) executed an unregistered will dated 23.12.1993
bequeathing all his movable and immoveable properties in the
name of his four daughters-in-law as his legatees, who, naturally,
are the respective wives of testator’s four sons and are also the
accused-appellants herein. The facts of the case can be crystallized
as under:
3.1 The testator had four sons, namely Chandra Sekhar,
Chandra Prakash, Ashish Kumar and Rajesh Kumar. In Village
Dewaragangabarar, the testator had one-half share in Land
Nos.416, 639, 640, 618, 643, 656, 632, 656/9, 686, 694.
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3.2 Apprehensive that his third son-Ashish Kumar will waste theestate to his intoxicating compulsions and vices, the testator
bequeathed all his moveable and immoveable properties in the
name of his four daughters-in-law as his legatees. The testator
recorded in his will the intent to ensure that his land and property
are not jeopardized, and his daughters-in-law and grandchildren
are not deprived of it. To that end, the testator bequeathed his
property to his daughters-in-law, who, the will notes, helped him
and cared for him.
3.3 The testator passed away on 03.01.1994. Soon thereafter, his
third son-Ashish Kumar executed a registered sale deed on
25.04.1994 for his share in testator’s property in favour of
Complainant-Respondent No.1.
3.4 It is the case of the accused-appellants that they, unaware of
the registered sale deed dated 25.04.1994, filed for Mutation in,
inter alia, Case No.1207 under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act,
1901 on the basis of the will dated 23.12.1993 and a favourable
Mutation Order was passed on 27.09.1994 by the Tehsildar,
Harraiya.
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3.5 As the complainant-respondent No.1 continuously interferedwith the peaceful possession of the accused-appellants, they
preferred O.S. No.588 of 1997 on 29.07.1997 before the learned
Civil Judge Junior Division, Basti seeking a decree of permanent
injunction against the complainant-respondent no.1 herein over
the disputed land. Vide Order dated 30.07.1997, the trial court
passed an ex-parte ad-interim order against the defendant therein
restraining him from carrying out any type of construction on the
disputed property and not to cut the crop on the disputed land.
3.6 Aggrieved by the interim order of the trial court, the
respondent filed objections against the Mutation Order dated
27.09.1994 along with an application seeking the recall of the
same based on the Sale Deed executed on 25.04.1994. However,
vide order dated 09.01.1998, the objections raised by
complainant-respondent No.1 were rejected for non-prosecution.
3.7 Subsequently, on 12.01.2001, complainant-respondent No.1
filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. alleging that
Chandra Prakash – one of the sons of the testator – had entered
into a conspiracy with accused-appellants and forged a fraudulent
unregistered will after the death of the testator with the intention
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to circumvent the sale deed dated 25.04.1994 executed by AshishKumar in favour of the respondents.
3.8 On 09.09.2001, the Investigation Officer submitted his report
stating that the complainant had no papers of the said land and
the civil case in respect of disputed land is pending before the
Tehsildar, Harraiya. Upon receipt of the police report and on
objections to it by the complainant-respondent No. 1, the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-II, Basti vide order dated
18.09.2001 directed registration of the application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case which was thereafter numbered
Complaint Case No.627 of 2002. The order notes that in support
of the application, the receipt of registration, copy of the sale deed,
copy of the will and copy of the khatauni were filed. The
complainant was examined under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and his
father-Sripat and Om Prakash were examined as PW1 and PW2.
Having found a prima facie case made out against the accused-
appellants, summons were issued on 23.10.2002 returnable on
27.11.2002.
3.9 Aggrieved by the registration of the complaint case and
issuance of summons, the accused-appellants preferred
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Application U/S. 482 Cr.P.C. No. 6543/2003 before the Allahabad
High Court seeking quashing of the Criminal Complaint Case
No.627/2002 and the summons issued thereunder. It was, inter
alia, argued by the accused-appellants before the High Court that
neither the will dated 23.12.1993 nor the order of the Tehsildar
dated 09.01.1998 rejecting the objection to the Mutation Order
have been challenged.
3.10 During the pendency of the application before the High
Court, the complainant-respondent No.1 filed a counter-claim in
O.S. No.588/1997 preferred by the accused-appellants. However,
on 22.09.2007, the learned Addl. Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Basti ordered that the suit was liable to be proceeded against
complainant-respondent No.1 herein ex-parte and that the
counter-claim was liable to be rejected for want of prosecution by
complainant-respondent.
3.11 After a period of sixteen years since institution, the
application filed by the accused-appellants seeking quashing of the
complaint case was dismissed vide Impugned Order dated
09.04.2019. The High Court took the view that the allegations
clearly satisfy the ingredients of offences under Sections 419, 420,
467, 468, and 471 IPC and that the question whether the
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document is forged or not is a matter to be examined in the inquiry
and not at this stage. Having found no miscarriage of justice, the
High Court found no reason to interfere and resultantly, dismissed
the application.
4. Hence, this appeal.
5. On 08.11.2019, this Court issued notice in the special leave
petition and stayed further proceedings in Case No.672/02
pending before the CJM, Basti.
6. During the course of submissions, Sri Tripurari Ray, learned
counsel for the accused-appellant contended that this is not a case
where any of the ingredients for the alleged offences under
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC are even prima
facie present. It was contended that the circumstances make it
apparent that the criminal proceedings were initiated only to abuse
the process of law with the oblique aim of settling the civil disputes
between the parties.
6.1 Furthermore, it was contended that the High Court failed to
appreciate that the Mutation Order in favour of the appellants was
passed after granting full opportunity to the complainant-
respondent No.1 and that once the objections filed by the
complainant-respondent No.1 were dismissed, no further
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proceedings were initiated. Similarly, as no further proceedings
were ever initiated challenging the rejection of the counter-claim,
the order rejecting the counter-claim had attained finality.
6.2 Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Prof.
R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739
(“R.K. Vijayasarathy”) and Anand Kumar Mohatta & Anr. V.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 (“Anand Kumar
Mohatta”), to contend that the High Court should have been
vigilant enough and exercised its inherent powers under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings that are essentially of a
civil nature but have been given the disguise of a criminal offence
with a veiled object.
7. Per contra, it was argued by Sri D.P. Singh Yadav, learned
counsel on behalf of complainant-respondent No.1 that the High
Court was correct in observing that the allegations in the
complaint clearly satisfied the ingredients of the offences under
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC and that the
question of ascertaining the veracity of forgery is subject to
determination by trial. It was therefore argued that the High Court
had rightly construed the dispute to be of a criminal nature and
refused to quash the complaint case.
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8. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at
length and perused the material on record. We have given our
thorough consideration to the arguments advanced at the bar in
light of the material on record.
8.1 At the outset, we may place reliance on the seminal judgment
of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference
to paragraph ‘102’ therein and sub-paras 1, 3, 5 and 7, which read
as under:
“102. (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
***
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
***
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
***
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”9
8.2 On perusal of the record, it is noted that based on thecomplaint filed by complainant-respondent No.1, a complaint case
No. 627/2002 was registered against the appellants under
Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC. For ease of
reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:
“419. Punishment for cheating by personation.-
Whoever cheats by personation shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part
of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or
sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
xxx xxx xxx
467. Forgery of valuable security, will etc.- Whoever
forges a document which purports to be a valuable
security or a will, or an authority to adopt a son, or which
purports to give authority to any person to make or
transfer any valuable security, or to receive the principal,
interest or dividends thereon, or to receive or deliver any
money, movable property, or valuable security, or any
document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt
acknowledging the payment of money, or an acquittance
or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or
valuable security, shall be punished with [imprisonment
for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and also be liable to
fine.
xxx xxx xxx
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468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.- Whoever commits
forgery, intending that the [document or electronic record
forged] shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
xxx xxx xxx
471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic
record.- Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as
genuine any document or electronic record which he
knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or
electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner
as if he had forged such document or electronic record.”8.3 Upon giving our thorough consideration to the arguments
advanced at the bar, we fail to understand as to how the
allegations against the appellants herein who are only legatees
under the Will in question, could be sustained in light of the
material on record.
8.4 The allegations against the accused-appellants, in sum and
substance, are that they entered into a conspiracy with other
individuals to fabricate a forged will after the death of the testator
that was then used to circumvent the sale deed dated 25.04.1994.
8.5 Upon appreciating the facts and circumstances, we do not
find that the offences aforementioned are made out in the present
case. Neither do we find any criminal breach of trust nor do we find
any cheating by impersonation. We also do not find any cheating
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and dishonestly inducing delivery of property. In thesecircumstances, we fail to see how it could be alleged that the
accused-appellants cheated and dishonestly induced the
complainant-respondent No.1.
8.6 It is writ large on the face of the record that the complaint
case has been employed as a circuitous tool to abuse the process
of law, especially after the complainant-respondent No.1 failed to
pursue the remedies available to it. The chronology of events
indicates that the criminal proceedings in the year 2001 were
instituted only after approximately seven years of the mutation
order dated 27.09.1994, four years after the ex-parte ad-interim
order issued on 30.07.1997 and three years after the rejection of
the objections to the Mutation Order vide Order dated 09.01.1998.
8.7 In this regard, our attention was drawn to paras 42-44 and
46 of Inder Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007)
12 SCC 1, dealing with Sections 420 and 467 IPC, which are
extracted hereunder:
“42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest
that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts
which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the
first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or
dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second
class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which
the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were12
not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing
must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of
acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be
fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention
which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of
cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent
or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one
cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention
to break the promise from the beginning.
43. We shall now deal with the ingredients of Section 467
IPC. …
44. The following ingredients are essential for commission
of the offence under Section 467 IPC:
1. the document in question so forged;
2. the accused who forged it;
3. the document is one of the kinds enumerated
in the aforementioned section.
x x x
46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is
not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking
private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise
the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we
are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable
to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the
exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In
view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment
cannot be sustained.”
(underlining by us)13
8.8 This Court, in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs.Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692,
(Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia) reasoned that the criminal
process cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose. This Court also
observed that the court should quash those criminal cases where
the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and no useful
purpose is likely to be served by continuation of a criminal
prosecution.
8.9 In R.K. Vijayasarathy, this Court held that while exercising
powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, a High Court can examine
whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been
given a cloak of a criminal offence. Recently, in Vishal Noble
Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680,
this Court held that courts have to be vigilant to ensure that the
machinery of criminal justice is not misused for achieving oblique
motives and agendas. Tacitly endorsing such misuse only
unnecessarily burdens the courts and the criminal justice system.
In Anand Kumar Mohatta, this Court, whilst quashing the FIR
and chargesheet therein, highlighted the following words of this
Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC
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699, that describe the fundamental principle for exercise of powers
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the
conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would
be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in
civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a
salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding
ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled
object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
material on which the structure of the prosecution rests
and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the
proceeding in the interest of justice.”
(underlining by us)
9. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
dicta, we find that none of the offences alleged against the accused-
appellants herein are made out. The instant case is just another
one in a string of cases filed in recent years that seek to disguise a
civil dispute as criminal. The complaint case against the accused-
appellants has been pending for over two decades and its
continuation would not serve any purpose. The observations made
by this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia inform our
decision and the judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal
and particularly sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102
extracted above, squarely apply to the facts of this case. In our
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view, it is in the interest of justice that present proceedings be
quashed.
10. In the circumstances, the impugned order of the High Court
is set-aside and consequently, the proceedings in Complaint Case
No.627 of 2002 pending before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Basti stand quashed. Needless to state, any
observations made herein shall not have a bearing on any civil
proceedings, if any, pending between the parties.
The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
JULY 31, 2025
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