Bhuwan Chandra Pathak vs M/S New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd on 2 August, 2025

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Delhi District Court

Bhuwan Chandra Pathak vs M/S New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd on 2 August, 2025

    IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG
     PRESIDING OFFICER : LABOUR COURT-III
  ROUSE AVENUE COURTS COMPLEX : NEW DELHI.

CNR No. DLCT13-001176-2021
Ref. No. F.24(21)/2021/Ref./CD/Lab./81 Dated 19.02.2021
LIR No. 763/2021

Sh. Bhuwan Chandra Pathak S/o Sh. Amba Dutt Pathak,
R/o 616, Pratap Vihar-2, C-Block, Kirari Extension,
Nithari, Sultanpuri, North West,
Delhi-110086
Mobile No. 8802301571,
Aadhar Card No. 5169 9586 2521             ..... Workman

                                             VERSUS

M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.,
Sh. Abhishek Gupta, Director,
3/4A, 3rd Floor, Asaf Ali Road,
New Delhi-110002.
Mobile No. 9810799222                                               ..... Management

                  Date of Institution of the case : 20.03.2021
                  Date on which Award is passed : 02.08.2025

                                              AWARD
1.      By this Award, I will dispose off the reference U/s 10(1)(C)
& 12(5) of Industrial Disputes Act, received from the office of
Dy. Labour Commissioner, District Central, Labour Department,
Govt.         of       NCT           of        Delhi         vide   order   Ref.      No.
F.24(21)/2021/Ref./CD/Lab./81 dated 19.02.2021, whereby, the
following issue has been referred to this Court for adjudication:-

        "Whether termination of services of Workman Sh.
        Bhuwan Chandra Pathak S/o Sh. Amba Dutt Pathak,
        Age around 55 years with full and final settlement of
        dues transferred to the Workman account by the
        Management is illegal and unjustified and if so, to

LIR No. 763/2021
Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
Award dated 02.08.2025                                                       Page 1 of 48
         what relief is he entitled and what directions are
        necessary in this respect?"

2.      The aforesaid reference was received by this Court on
20.03.2021, whereafter, Workman filed his statement of claim
alongwith supporting documents on 08.10.2021. Brief case of
Workman, as per his statement of claim, is that he was appointed
by Management as a dispatch clerk w.e.f. 21.07.1988 and was
continuously working to the satisfaction of Management, until,
his services were illegally terminated by Management. It is
further his case that consequent upon his illegal termination, he
raised an industrial dispute which was eventually referred to the
Labour Court and an award dated 20.03.2010 was passed by Ld.
POLC-X, Karkardooma, Delhi directing the Management to
reinstate the Workman into his job with 50 % back wages.

3.      Upon challenge of the aforesaid award by Management by
way of W.P.(C) no. 2218/2011, according to him, matter was
referred by Hon'ble Delhi High Court to Mediation Center and a
settlement dated 21.08.2013 was accordingly arrived at between
the parties. In terms of the aforesaid settlement, according to
him, he was reinstated into the services of Management with
continuity of service and a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/- was paid to him
towards compensatory wages for the intervening period. Pursuant
to the aforesaid settlement, according to him, he has rejoined the
services of Management as a Clerk and continued to work with
the Management until 31.12.2019, on which date, Management
handed over a termination letter to him. Termination of his
services by Management vide letter dated 31.12.2019, according
to him, is clearly illegal and since he is unemployed w.e.f. the

LIR No. 763/2021
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 2 of 48
 date of his illegal termination, he is entitled to his reinstatement
with full back wages, continuity of service and other
consequential benefits.

4.      Management appeared in response to notice of statement of
claim and filed its written statement on 21.07.2022. It is not
disputed by Management that pursuant to an industrial dispute
raised by Workman, an award was passed by the Labour Court
against Management, directing reinstatement of Workman with
50% back wages. It is also no disputed by Management that
during pendency of proceedings in its Writ Petition filed before
Hon'ble Delhi High Court challenging the aforesaid Award,
matter was referred to Delhi High Court Mediation Centre and
after negotiations, a settlement dated 21.08.2013 was arrived at
between the parties.

5.      Management has further admitted that pursuant to aforesaid
settlement, Workman rejoined the services of Management w.e.f.
01.09.2013 and his services were again terminated by
Management vide order dated 31.12.2019. Management has
however denied that services of Workman were terminated
illegally. Rather, according to Management, services of
Workman were lawfully terminated vide order dated 31.12.2019
after payment of all his dues upon full and final settlement of his
account. It has further been alleged in the written statement that
Workman cannot claim any dues from Management for the
period prior to his reinstatement w.e.f. 01.09.2013, since, as per
the terms and conditions of Mediation Settlement dated
21.08.2013, he agreed that after receipt of settlement amount of
Rs. 6,50,000/- from Management, he will not claim any further
LIR No. 763/2021
Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 3 of 48
 amount and shall not have any claim against Management qua
his past service.

6.      It is further the case of Management that after expiry of
more than 20 months of acceptance of his entire dues towards
notice pay, leave encashment and gratuity, upon full and final
settlement of his account, Workman has filed the present claim
merely to extort more money from Management. Management
has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of Workman while
alleging that he is gainfully employed.

7.      A rejoinder to the aforesaid written statement was thereafter
filed by Workman on 01.10.2022, wherein, he has once again
reiterated the averments made by him in his statement of claim
and has denied the contrary averments made by Management in
its written statement.

8.      Thereafter, on the basis of pleadings of parties, following
issues were settled by Ld. Predecessor of this Court vide order
dated 01.10.2022:-

        (i) Whether the Management is not an industry as
        defined u/s 2(j) of the I.D. Act, as alleged? (OPM)
        (ii) Whether the services of the Workman have been
        illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the
        Management. If so, whether the Workman is entitled
        for reinstatement with full back wages and other
        consequential reliefs as prayed for by the Workman in
        his claim petition? (OPW)
        (iii) Whether the Workman has already received his
        full and final dues from the Management as claimed by
        the Management, if so, its effect? (OPM)
        (iv) Whether the demand notice dated 06.01.2020 was
        served upon the Management prior to raising an

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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 4 of 48
         Industrial Dispute? (OPW)
        (v) In terms of reference.
        (vi) Relief, if any.
9.      Workman has thereafter examined himself as WW-1 i.e. as
the sole witness in support of his case and tendered his evidence
by way of affidavit Ex.WW1/A alongwith following documents:
         (i) Mark-A: Copy of appointment letter of Workman
         dated 20.09.1988.
         (ii) Mark-B: Copy of Mediation Settlement dated
         21.08.2013 executed between Workman and
         Management.
         (iii) Ex.WW1/3: Copy of termination letter of
         Workman dated 31.12.2019.
         (iv) Ex.WW1/4 (colly): Copies of salary slips of
         Workman issued by Management.
         (v) Ex.WW1/5 (colly): Office copy of complaints
         dated 09.10.2013 and 12.10.2013 sent by speed post
         on 14.10.2013 and complaint dated 17.10.2013 sent by
         speed post on 18.10.2013.
         (vi) Ex.WW1/6 (colly): Copy of demand notice dated
         06.01.2020 alongwith postal receipt.
         (vii) Ex.WW1/7: Copy of statement of claim dated
         12.03.2020 filed before Conciliation Officer.
         (viii)Ex.WW1/8: Copy of reply of Management dated
         05.11.2020 before Conciliation Officer.

10. Workman was duly cross-examined by Ld. AR for
Management. No other witness was examined on behalf of
Workman despite opportunity and hence, on a separate statement
of Ld. AR of Workman, Workman's evidence was closed vide
order dated 21.02.2023.

11. Management has thereafter examined its Director Sh.

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Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 5 of 48
 Abhishek Gupta as MW-1 i.e. as the sole witness in support of its
case and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.MW1/A
along with following documents:

         (i)     Mark-X: Copy of profit and loss statement.
         (ii) Ex.MW1/2: Copy of order of termination dated
         31.12.2019.
         (iii) Mark-A: Copy of order dated 29.04.2023 passed
         by Sh. Tarun Yogesh, Ld. POLC-8, RACC.
         (iv) Mark-B (colly): Photocopies of cheques dated
         26.04.2011 and 09.09.2013 for payment to Workman
         pursuant to High Court settlement.

12. MW-1 was duly cross-examined by Ld. AR for Workman.
No other witness was examined on behalf of Management
despite opportunity and hence, on a separate statement of Ld. AR
of Management, Management's evidence was closed vide order
dated 19.08.2023.

13. Final arguments were thereafter heard on behalf of both the
parties on 02.07.2025. Besides, written arguments have also been
filed on behalf of Workman on 09.04.2024 and on behalf of
Management on 09.02.2024. It is submitted by Ld. AR for
Workman that admittedly the Workman was a permanent
employee of Management for over a period of 31 years, in as
much as, he was appointed as dispatch clerk by the Management
w.e.f. 21.07.1988 and though, his services were illegally
terminated by Management on 22.10.1997, however, pursuant to
mediation settlement dated 21.08.2013, he was reinstated into his
job w.e.f. 01.09.2013 with continuity of service.

14. However, he submits that Management had been adopting

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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 6 of 48
 unfair labour practice, in as much as, it has failed to make the
payment of bonus and minimum wages to Workman despite his
persistent demand. The persistent demand of Workman for his
stautory dues, according to him, has annoyed the Management
leading to abrupt illegal termination of his services by
Management vide letter dated 31.12.2019 without any inquiry/
charge sheet or payment of retrenchment compensation, in gross
violation of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial disputes Act,
1947.

15. He further submits that though Management has failed to
disclose any reason for abruptly terminating the services of
Workman w.e.f. 31.12.2019, however, the real reason for
termination of services of Workman is writ large on the face of
record, in as much as, Management was annoyed by the repeated
demands of Workman for his statutory dues. He submits that
there is no substance in the plea of Management that Workman is
estopped from challenging his termination, having accepted his
full and final dues, that too after expiry of more than 20 months.
He submits that Workman has never accepted the said
termination, which is apparent from the fact that he had not only
served a demand notice dated 06.01.2020 challenging his
termination within a week from his illegal termination, but, has
also filed a claim before the Conciliation Officer within three
months. Moreover, according to him, even the alleged dues were
also not paid to him by the Management at the time of his
termination and the same were later on unilaterally transferred to
his bank account.

16. He further submits that Workman has remained unemployed
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 7 of 48
 since the date of illegal termination of his services by
Management and could not get any alternative employment
despite sincere efforts. Thus, according to him, Workman is
entitled to his reinstatement with full back wages, continuity of
service and other consequential benefits. In support of his
submissions, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the following
judgments:

        (i) Their Workmen through the Joint Secretary
        (Welfare), Food Corporation of India Executive Staff
        Union Vs. Employer in relation to the Management of
        FCI and Anr. 2023 LLR 945 (SC).
        (ii) Workmen of State Bank of India Vs. CGIT-2,
        Bombay & Anr. 1990 LLR 729 (Bom) (DB)
        (iii) Executive Engineer Division CPWD Vs. Bijender
        & Anr. 2020 LLR 917 (Delhi).
        (iv) Swati Priyadarshini Vs. The State of Madhya
        Pradesh & Ors. 2024 LLR 1066 (SC)
        (v) Pramod Jha & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. 2003
        SCC (L&S) 545
        (vi) Shambhu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda 1978
        SCC (L&S) 357
        (vii) Shri Chandrika Yadav Vs. M/s Aman Scales (P)
        Ltd CWP No. 13274/1997, decided by Hon'ble P&H
        High Court on 03.07.2009
        (viii) Chief Commissioner of Income Tax
        (Administration) Bangalore Vs. V.K. Gururaj and Ors.
        1996 SCC (L&S) 579
        (ix) India Tourism Development Corp. Ltd. & Anr. Vs.
        Fayaz Ahmad Sheikh & Ors. 2023 LLR 597 (J&K).

17. On the other hand, it is submitted by Ld. AR for
Management that the services of Workman were lawfully
terminated by Management vide termination order dated

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Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 8 of 48
 31.12.2019, with an object to reduce the work force in view of
the fact that the Management was running into losses. He submits
that during his cross-examination, Workman has categorically
admitted that termination of his services by Management vide
order dated 31.12.2019 was a termination simplicitor and was not
stigmatic. Being fully aware of the fact that it was a case of
termination simplicitor, according to him, he accepted his full
and final dues to the extent of Rs. 87,362/-. Having accepted the
aforesaid amount, according to him, Workman cannot be allowed
to challenge his termination order dated 31.12.2019 on the
ground of illegality thereof.

18. Even if, it is assumed for the sake of arguments that
Management has terminated the services of Workman in
violation of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
according to him, in view of authoritative pronouncements of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in BSNL Vs Bhuru Mal AIR 2014 SC
1188 and State of Uttrakhand v. Raj Kumar AIR 2019 SC 310,
the aforesaid fact by itself shall not automatically entitle him to
an award of his reinstatement into the job of Management with
full back wages.

19. In any case, according to him, malafide intent of Workman
to extort more money from the management is apparent from the
fact that despite entering into a mediation settlement dated
21.08.2013 with the management and despite an undertaking that
he will not claim any further amount from Management,
Workman once again filed a claim against Management for
bonus w.e.f. the year 1996 by way of an application U/s 33(C)(2)
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which has since been
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 9 of 48
 dismissed by Ld. POLC vide order dated 29.04.2023. It is further
submitted by him that due to the conduct of Workman,
Management has already lost confidence/ faith in Workman, in
as much as, he is continuously dragging the Management into
unnecessary litigation merely to extort more money from
Management and hence, he is not entitled to his reinstatement,
more so, when financial condition of Management is also not
very good since it is running in losses as is apparent from a bare
perusal of financial statements of Management for last five years.

20. It is further submitted by Ld. AR for Management that since
Workman has failed to prove that he had made any efforts to
secure alternative employment, after alleged illegal termination
of his services by Management, Court should draw an inference
that he is gainfully employed and hence, is not entitled either for
his reinstatement or any back wages, more so, when the
Management is constantly running into losses and hence, no
capacity to employ the Workman and to pay him wages.
Management has thus prayed for dismissal of present claim of
Workman by relying upon the following judgments:

        (i) DTC Vs. Shyam Lal 2004 LLR 991 (SC)
        (ii) ONGC and Ors. Vs. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali
        AIR 1980 SC 1242
        (iii) BSNL Vs. Burumal AIR 2014 SC 1188
        (iv) State of Uttrakhand and Anr Vs. Raj Kumar AIR
        2019 SC 310
        (v) Babu Ram Sagar Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour
        Court-VIII, Delhi and Anr. 2009 LLR 463 (Delhi)
        (vi) Municipal Council, Sujanpur Vs. Surinder Kumar
        2006 LLR 662 (SC)

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Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.
Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 10 of 48
 21. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of both the
parties and have carefully perused the material available on
record in the light of judgments relied upon by them. My issue-
wise findings, on the issues settled by Ld. Predecessor of this
Court vide order dated 01.10.2022, are as follows:-

        Issue no. (i): Whether the Management is not an
        industry as defined u/s 2(j) of the I.D. Act, as
        alleged? (OPM)

22. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue seems to have been
inadvertently placed upon Management, in as much as, in a case
arising out of termination of services of Workman by his
employer, onus to prove the Management to be an industry
within the meaning of Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is always upon Workman.

23. Be that as it may, Management is a pvt. Ltd company and is
admittedly running its business with co-operation of employer
and employees with an intent to make profits. Workman was
admittedly appointed by Management as a dispatch clerk in its
aforesaid business. Thus, prima facie Management squarely falls
within the definition of industry u/s 2(j) of Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. The present issue was apparently settled in view of an
absolutely vague averment of Management in para 1 of its
written statement that it is not an industry within the meaning of
Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, without disclosing the
reason as to why it does not fall within the definition of an
industry.

24. Moreover, no arguments were even addressed by either of


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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 11 of 48
 the parties on the aforesaid issue. Under the aforesaid
circumstances, in my considered opinion, on the basis of material
available on record, Workman has been able to discharge its
initial onus to prove that Management is an industry, whereas,
Management has failed to disclose any reason as to why, it is
alleging itself not to be an industry.

25. Issue no. (i) is thus decided against Management.

        Issue no. (ii): Whether the services of the Workman
        have been illegally and unjustifiably terminated by
        Management. If so, whether Workman is entitled for
        reinstatement with full back wages and other
        consequential reliefs as prayed for by Workman in
        his claim petition? (OPW)

26. There is no dispute between the parties that the services of
Workman were terminated by Management, vide an order dated
31.12.2019, without any advance notice. Though, it is alleged by
Ld. AR for Workman that the said termination by Management
was by way of punishment since the Management was annoyed
by the demand of Workman for his statutory benefits which were
being denied to Workman since long, however, Management has
alleged that the termination of services of Workman vide order
dated 31.12.2019 was a termination simplicitor with an intent to
reduce the work force on account of financial losses suffered by
Management since last about 5 years.

27. A bare perusal of termination letter dated 31.12.2019 Ex.
WW1/3 shows that through the aforesaid letter, Management has
simply informed the Workman that it had decided to relieve the
Workman of his services with immediate effect and a sum of Rs.
87,362/-, towards his salary for the month of July 2019, notice
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 12 of 48
 pay for a period of one month, encashment of leaves for a period
of 42 days and gratuity for a period of six years, shall be
deposited by Management into his saving bank account by the
end of the day. There is no mention in the aforesaid termination
letter that services of Workman were being terminated by
Management by way of punishment on account of any
misconduct on his part. In fact, even the Workman, in para 4 of
his statement of claim, has categorically alleged that the
Management has abruptly ended his services without any rhyme
or     reason.         Further,         during         his        cross-examination     dated
21.02.2023, Workman has categorically admitted that the order
dated 31.12.2019, terminating his services by Management, was
an order of termination simplicitor and the same was not
stigmatic.

28. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my considered
opinion, plea of Ld. AR of Workman, that his services were
illegally terminated by Management by way of punishment on
account of repeated demands of Workman for his statutory dues,
is beyond the pleadings as well as evidence of Workman. Even
otherwise, Workman has failed to tender any document in his
evidence to prove that after the year 2013 and until his
termination vide order dated 31.12.2019, he had ever raised any
dispute with Management qua non-payment of his statutory dues.

29. In view of aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion,
termination of Workman w.e.f. 31.12.2019 was a termination
simplicitor i.e. termination otherwise than by way of punishment
and hence the said termination squarely falls within the definition
of retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of Industrial Disputes Act,
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 1947. If that be so, while terminating the services of Workman,
Management was required to comply with the provisions of
Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

30. No doubt, in calculation of full and final dues of Workman
consequent upon his termination, Management has included one
month's salary in lieu of advance notice as required U/s 25F(a) of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, however, a bare perusal of
calculation chart of dues of Workman, as per termination letter
dated 31.12.2019, shows that Management has failed to include
any retrenchment compensation payable to Workman in terms of
Section 25F(b) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor, has the
Management ever served any notice upon the appropriate Govt./
competent authority in terms of Section 25F(c) of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.

31. Management has failed to either plead or prove that it has
ever made the payment of any service compensation to Workman
in terms of Section 25F(b) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or
that it has complied with the requirement under the provisions of
Section 25F(c) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Though, it is
sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Management that
Workman is estopped from challenging termination of his
services by Management vide order dated 31.12.2019, having
accepted the payment offered to him at the time of termination of
his services, however, it is significant to note that Management
has not handed over payment of dues of Workman to him
simultaneously with the termination letter dated 31.12.2019 and
has unilaterally transferred the amount mentioned in the
termination order to the bank account of Workman after
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 14 of 48
 terminating his services.

32. I am also unable to accept the plea of Management that
Workman has approached this Court after 20 months of his
alleged illegal termination by Management, in as much as, a bare
perusal of record reveals that admittedly the Claimant had
approached the conciliation officer alongwith his statement of
claim way back in the month of March 2020, pursuant to which
the present reference was made by him to this Court. Although, it
is alleged by Ld. AR for Workman that even prior thereto,
Workman had served a demand notice dated 06.01.2020 upon
Management, disputing his illegal termination and seeking his
reinstatement into the job of Management, however, in my
considered opinion, Workman has failed to prove the service of
aforesaid demand notice upon Management. The reasons for
aforesaid opinion of this Court shall be given while dealing with
issue no. (iv) herein below.

33. Be that as it may, even if, it is assumed for the sake of
arguments that the Workman had accepted the payment of Rs.
87,362/- from Management, he cannot be estopped from
challenging termination of his service by Management to be in
violation of provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, since, there can be no estoppel against the statute. While
taking the aforesaid view, I draw support from the judgment of
Hon'ble J & K High court in Indian Tourism Development
Corporation Limited & Anr. vs. Fayaj Ahmad Sheikh & Ors.
(supra).

34. In view of aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion,

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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 15 of 48
 Workman has been able to prove illegal termination of his
services by the Management in violation of provisions of Section
25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

35. Coming to the issue-whether the Workman is entitled to his
reinstatement with full back wages as prayed for by him in his
statement of claim, while relying upon the judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in BSNL vs. Burumal's case (supra) and State
of Uttrakhand vs. Raj Kumar (supra), it is sought to be
contented by Ld. AR for Management that a finding of the court
qua illegal termination of services of Workman on account of
non-payment of retrenchment compensation shall not lead to his
automatic reinstatement with full back wages. Ld. AR for
Management has also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi
High Court in Babu Ram Sagar's case (supra), to submit that
the relief of reinstatement of Workman, even otherwise, shall not
be appropriate in the peculiar facts and circumstances of present
case, since Management has lost confidence/faith in Workman.
Moreover, according to him, the relief of reinstatement with back
wages is also not suitable in the present case considering the
precarious financial condition of Management who was
constrained to discharge the Workman due to financial losses
since last more than five years prior to the date of his
termination.

36. Ld. AR for Management has also relied upon the judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Municipal Council
Sujanpur vs. Suresh Kumar (supra) to contend that despite the
onus to prove, that Workman made efforts to secure alternative
employment, being upon Workman, Workman has failed to lead
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Award dated 02.08.2025                                            Page 16 of 48
 any evidence to show that he had made any efforts to secure any
alternative employment after termination of his services by
Management and hence, he is not entitled to the relief of back
wages. While relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in Babu Ram Sagar's case (supra), he submits that it is
highly improbable that in Delhi a Workman, who was having an
experience of more than 31 years, would not have got any
alternative employment. Under the aforesaid circumstances,
according to him, this Court should draw an inference that
Workman is gainfully employed since the date of termination of
his services by Management and hence is dis-entitled to the relief
of his reinstatement and any back wages.

37. On the contrary, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the
judgment of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in Workmen of State
Bank of India vs. CGIT-2, Bombay & Anr.(supra) and
judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Executive Engineer
Division CPWD vs. Bijender and Anr.(supra), to submit that
even a simple discharge of an employee from the services
without payment of retrenchment compensation shall make him
entitled to his reinstatement with full back wages.

38. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of both the
parties have carefully perused the material available on record in
the light of judgments relied upon by both the parties.

39. So far as the prayer of Workman for the relief of his
reinstatement is concerned, no doubt, Section 11A of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 gives a wide discretion to the Labour Court
in determination of the relief which can be awarded to a

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 Workman after his termination is held to be illegal by the Court,
however, it is settled legal position that the aforesaid discretion is
to be exercised by the Court judiciously while taking into
consideration all the relevant facts in the interest of industrial
peace and harmony. It is also well-settled that though ordinarily a
finding of the Court in favour of Workman qua illegal
termination of his services by the Management should lead to an
order of his reinstatement with full back wages, however, such an
order is not automatic and the Court may, in appropriate and
exceptional cases, mould the relief to suit the facts and
circumstances of a particular case.

40. Very recently, in a Judgment reported as Vikas Kumar Vs.
SDMC (2023) SCC online Delhi 274, Hon'ble Delhi High Court
has dealt with the issue of service benefits to which a Workman,
whose termination is held to be illegal by the Court, is entitled.
While referring to various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India on the subject, Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the
aforesaid judgment has held that the latest trend adopted by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions is that even if the
order of termination of Workman is found to be illegal by the
Court on account of non-payment of retrenchment compensation,
it does not necessarily result in automatic reinstatement of
Workman in service and compensation may be granted in lieu of
reinstatement. In none of the judgments relied upon by Ld. AR
for Workman, any contrary proposition of law has been laid
down by Hon'ble Bombay High Court or yy Hon'ble Delhi High
Court.

41. Even in the judgment relied upon by Ld. AR for Workman,
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 Hon'ble Bombay High Court has categorically observed that
once it held that discharge of a Workman from the service was
illegal and void, though, the normal relief to be granted is of
reinstatement and full back wages, however, it is also well settled
that in particular cases, the Court can depart from the above
normal rule.

42. Some of the relevant factors to be considered by the Court
in determining the question whether a Workman is entitled to
reinstatement with or without back wages and continuity of
services or to the compensation in lieu of reinstatement have
been succinctly stated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mehboob
Deepak vs. Nagar Panchayat Gajraula (2008) 15 SCC 575 in
the following words:

            "6. Such termination of service, having regard to the
            fact that he had completed 240 days of work during a
            period of 12 months preceding the said date, required
            compliance with the provisions of Section 6-N of the
            U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. An order of retrenchment
            passed in violation of the said provision although can be
            set aside but as has been noticed by this Court in a large
            number of decisions, an award of reinstatement should
            not, however, be automatically passed.

            7. The factors which are relevant for determining the
            same, inter alia, are:

            (i) whether in making the appointment, the statutory
            rules, if any, had been complied with;

            (ii) the period he had worked;

            (iii) whether there existed any vacancy; and

            (iv) whether he obtained some other employment on the
            date of termination or passing of the award.


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             8. The respondent is a local authority. The terms and

conditions of employment of the employees are
governed by a statute and statutory rules. No
appointment can be made by a local authority without
following the provisions of the recruitment rules. Any
appointment made in violation of the said rules as also
the constitutional scheme of equality as contained in
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India would be
a nullity.

9. Due to some exigency of work, although recruitment
on daily wages or on an ad hoc basis was permissible,
but by reason thereof an employee cannot claim any
right to be permanently absorbed in service or made
permanent in absence of any statute or statutory rules.
Merely because an employee has completed 240 days of
work in a year preceding the date of retrenchment, the
same would not mean that his services were liable to be
regularized.

10. Applying the legal principles, as noticed
hereinbefore, the relief granted in favour of the
appellant by the Labour Court is wholly unsustainable.
The same also appears to be somewhat unintelligible.

11. The High Court, on the other hand, did not consider
the effect of non-compliance with the provisions of
Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The appellant was entitled to compensation, notice and
notice pay.

12. It is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this
Court that in a situation of this nature in stead and in
place of directing reinstatement with full back wages,
the workmen should be granted adequate monetary
compensation. (See M.P. Admn. v. Tribhuban [(2007) 9
SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 264] .)

13. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that
as the appellant had worked only for a short period, the
interest of justice will be subserved if the High Court’s
judgment is modified by directing payment of a sum of
Rs 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand only) by way of
damages to the appellant by the respondent. Such
payment should be made within eight weeks from this

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date, failing which the same will carry interest at the
rate of 9% per annum.”

43. The relevant factors in this regard have also been stated by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagbir Singh vs Haryana State
Agricultural Marketing Board
(2009) 15 SCC 327 in following
words after reference to precedents:

“17. While awarding compensation, a host of factors,
inter alia, manner and method of appointment, nature of
employment and length of service are relevant. Of
course, each case will depend upon its own facts and
circumstances.”

44. The following observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey
[(2006) 1 SCC 479 are also worth quoting:

“41. The Industrial Courts while adjudicating on disputes
between the Management and the workmen, therefore, must
take such decisions which would be in consonance with the
purpose the law seeks to achieve. When justice is the
buzzword in the matter of adjudication under the Industrial
Disputes Act
, it would be wholly improper on the part of the
superior courts to make them apply the cold letter of the
statutes to act mechanically. Rendition of justice would bring
within its purview giving a person what is due to him and not
what can be given to him in law.

42. A person is not entitled to get something only because it
would be lawful to do so. If that principle is applied, the
functions of an Industrial Court shall lose much of their
significance.

43. The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions
of this Court, probably having regard to the changes in the
policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing
market economy, globalisation, privatisation and
outsourcing, is evident.

44. In Hindustan Motors Ltd. v. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya
[(2002) 6 SCC 41 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 818] this Court noticed
Raj Kumar [(2001) 2 SCC 54 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 365] and

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Hindustan Tin Works [(1979) 2 SCC 80 : 1979 SCC (L&S)
53 : (1979) 1 SCR 563] but held: (SCC p. 45, para 16)

“16. As already noted, there was no application of
mind to the question of back wages by the Labour
Court. There was no pleading or evidence whatsoever
on the aspect whether the respondent was employed
elsewhere during this long interregnum. Instead of
remitting the matter to the Labour Court or the High
Court for fresh consideration at this distance of time,
we feel that the issue relating to payment of back
wages should be settled finally. On consideration of
the entire matter in the light of the observations
referred to supra in the matter of awarding back wages,
we are of the view that in the context of the facts of
this particular case including the vicissitudes of long-
drawn litigation, it will serve the ends of justice if the
respondent is paid 50% of the back wages till the date
of reinstatement.”

45. The Court, therefore, emphasised that while granting
relief, application of mind on the part of the Industrial Court
is imperative. Payment of full back wages, therefore, cannot
be the natural consequence.”

45. Similar are the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. v. M.C. Joshi [(2007)
9 SCC 353:

“9. Although according to the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant the Labour Court and the
High Court committed an error in arriving at a finding
that in terminating the services of the respondent, the
provisions of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Dis-
putes Act were contravened, we will proceed on the ba-
sis that the said finding is correct. The question, how-
ever, would be as to whether in a situation of this na-
ture, relief of reinstatement in services should have
been granted. It is now well settled by reason of a
catena of decisions of this Court that the relief of rein-
statement with full back wages would not be granted
automatically only because it would be lawful to do so.
For the said purpose, several factors are required to be
taken into consideration, one of them being as to
whether such an appointment had been made in terms
of the statutory rules. Delay in raising an industrial dis-

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pute is also a relevant fact.”

46. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements, in
my considered opinion, the claimant can’t seek his automatic
reinstatement into the services of Management, with or without
back wages and continuity of service, merely on the basis of
finding of this Court that his termination vide order dated
31.12.2019 is illegal and this Court is required to take a decision
regarding the relief to be granted to him while considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

47. As has already been observed hereinabove, termination of
Workman in the present case can not be said to be by way of
punishment. Rather, in para 5 of his evidence by way of affidavit,
MW-1 has categorically deposed that financial condition of
Management is not very good and Management has been
continuously running into losses which is evident from Profit and
Loss Statement of Management for a period of five years. He has
further deposed that since the Management wanted to reduce its
overhead expenses, the employees were offered their full and
final dues, which were duly accepted by them. Statement of
Profit and Loss Account of Management for a period of five
years was also tendered by him in his evidence as Mark X. The
aforesaid testimony of MW-1 has remained uncontroverted
despite his lengthy cross-examination by Ld. AR for Workman,
nor, any objection qua mode and manner of proof of document
Mark-X was raised by Workman. Workman has not even
disputed the genuineness of the said documents. On the contrary,
Workman, during his cross-examination has expressed his
inability to admit or deny the suggestion that during last 4-5
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years Management was running into losses.

48. In view of observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India in BSNL v. Bhuru Mal’s case (supra), even if, the Court
orders reinstatement of Workman into his job, nothing can stop
the Management to again terminate his services after compliance
with the provisions of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 i.e. by making the payment of service compensation.
Moreover, Workman, in the present case has already attained the
age of superannuation, in as much as, during the course of
arguments, he has disclosed the date of his birth to be
20.06.1965. Also the services of Workman were terminated by
Management more than 5 years ago and Workman has failed to
plead or prove that there still exists any vacancy in the
Management firm to accommodate him.

49. Thus, in the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances of
present case, relief of reinstatement of Workman into the services
of Management is considered to be inappropriate.

50. So far as the relief of back wages is concerned, no doubt,
Management has failed to lead any affirmative evidence to prove
that Workman is gainfully employed, however, even the
Workman has failed to prove by leading any cogent evidence that
he had made any efforts to secure any alternative employment
after termination of his services by Management. He could not
even disclose the name of the firms wherein he had allegedly
applied for alternative job after termination of his services by
Management. In view of observations made by Hon’ble Delhi
High Court in Babu Ram Sagar’s case (supra), this Court is

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unable to believe that in a city like Delhi, Workman would have
remained unemployed for over a period of five years, particularly
when termination of his services by Management was not
stigmatic.

51. Issue no. (ii) is thus partly decided in favour of Workman so
as to hold that though his services were terminated by
Management illegally, however, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, he is not entitled to his reinstatement
with or without back wages as prayed for by him in his statement
of claim.

Issue no. (iii): Whether the Workman has already
received his full and final dues from the Management
as claimed by the Management, if so, its effect?
(OPM)

52. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Management. It
is sought to be contended by Ld. AR for Management that since
the Management had already made the payment of settlement
amount of Rs. 6,50,000/- to the Workman towards full and final
settlement of his dues, pursuant to Mediation Settlement dated
21.08.2013, in the year 2013 itself, while, allowing the Workman
to rejoin his duties with Management w.e.f. 01.09.2013,
Workman could not have claimed any dues towards service
compensation or gratuity for the period prior to 01.09.2013.

53. He further submits that Management has admittedly already
cleared all his dues towards earned wages, notice pay, gratuity as
well as leave encashment considering the length of his service
w.e.f. 01.09.2013 and hence nothing remains to be paid by
Management to Workman.

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54. On the other hand, it is submitted by Ld. AR for Workman
that payment of Rs. 6,50,000/-, made by Management to
Workman pursuant to settlement dated 21.08.2013, was only
towards back wages of Workman since the date of illegal
termination of his services by the Management until his
reinstatement and hence, Management was liable to pay the
bonus, arrears of minimum wages, service compensation as well
as gratuity to the Workman by considering him to be in
continuous employment since the year 1988 until 31.12.2019, in
as much as, his reinstatement into the services of Management
w.e.f. 01.09.2013 was with continuity of service.

55. Upon a careful reading of Mediation Settlement dated
21.08.2013, arrived at between the parties to the present claim, it
is apparent that since Workman was earlier reinstated into his job
on 01.09.2013 with continuity of service, length of his service for
computation of his gratuity dues as well as dues towards service
compensation in terms of Section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, in my considered opinion, shall be considered to be with
effect from the date of his initial appointment i.e w.e.f.
21.07.1988 until 31.12.2019. It has already been observed herein
above that at the time of termination of services of Workman on
31.12.2019, Management has failed to make the payment of any
service compensation to Workman in terms of Section 25F of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Further, even the gratuity has been
calculated by Management while considering the length of his
services to be merely six years.

56. Thus, in my considered opinion, Management has failed to
discharge its onus to prove that Workman had already received
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his full and final dues from Management.

57. Issue no. (iii) is thus decided against Management.

Issue no. (iv): Whether the demand notice dated
06.01.2020 was served upon Management prior to
raising an Industrial Dispute? (OPW)

58. Onus to prove the aforesaid issue was upon Workman. A
perusal of record reveals that in Para 9 of his statement of claim,
Workman has alleged that he had sent a demand notice dated
06.01.2020 to the Management by speed post through his
Advocate, however, Management did not respond to the
aforesaid notice, nor, did the Management take him back on duty.
On the contrary, in the corresponding para of its written
statement, Management has denied the receipt of any demand
notice from Workman.

59. In order to discharge his onus to prove the service of
demand notice dated 06.01.2020 upon Management, Workman
has examined himself as WW-1 i.e. as the sole witness and
tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ex. WW-1/A besides a
copy of demand notice dated 06.01.2020 and postal receipt as
Ex.WW1/6 (colly). In Para 7 of his affidavit, he has once again
reaffirmed the averments already made by him in Para 9 of his
statement of claim. The entire statement of claim or for that
matter evidence by way of Affidavit Ex. WW-1/A of Workman
is conspicuously silent about the fact whether or not the demand
notice Ex. WW-1/6 was ever served upon Management. Both the
statement of claim as well as affidavit Ex. WW-1/A are also
silent about the fact that the said notice was ever dispatched by
Workman to the correct address of Management.

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60. A bare perusal of postal receipt Ex.WW1/6 shows that it
does not contain the complete address of Management. Merely
because the copy of demand notice Ex. WW-1/6 mentions the
correct address of Management, Court can’t draw a presumption
to the effect that the said notice was actually sent by Workman to
the same address of Management, more so, when the Workman
has failed to make any deposition in this regard. In fact, a bare
perusal of statement of claim as well as evidence by way of
affidavit of Workman shows that Workman has not even alleged
therein that the said notice was dispatched by him through speed
post. Rather, the claim of Workman is that the said notice was
sent by him to Management through his Counsel. Even the postal
receipt mentions the name of his counsel as the sender. No
witness from the office of counsel for Workman has been
examined in his evidence by the Workman so as to prove that the
notice was sent to Management at its correct address through
speed post. Even the copy of envelope mentioning the address of
Management has also not been tendered in evidence.

61. It is significant to note that a presumption u/s 27 of General
Clauses Act, 1897 read with Section119 BSA, 2023 qua service
of a letter sent through post after prepayment of postal charges
may be drawn only if it is proved by the Workman that the notice
was in fact sent by him to the correct address of Management
after prepayment of postal charges and the same was neither
received back by him nor has received the AD. As has already
been observed hereinabove, Workman has failed to plead or
prove either of the aforesaid facts and hence, the Court shall not
be able to draw any presumption qua service of demand notice

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dated 06.01.2020 upon the Management, more so, when even the
complete address of Management has not been mentioned on the
postal receipt.

62. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered
opinion, reliance by Ld. AR of Workman upon the observations
made by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in para 1 of its
judgment reported as Chief Commissioner of Income Tax
(Administration), Bangalore Vs. V.K. Gururaj and Ors.(Supra
),
is highly misplaced. It is significant to note in this regard that the
said observations were made by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in respect of a notice, which was sent by Hon’ble Supreme Court
to some of the respondents therein through registered post, and
since neither the unserved envelopes nor the AD cards were
received back by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the aforesaid
respondents were deemed to have been duly served. Once the
notices were sent by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the issue
as to whether the same were sent to the correct addresses of
respondents did not arise before Hon’ble Supreme Court,
however, in the case in hand, it has already been observed
hereinabove that there is not only no proof available on record
that the notice was sent by Workman to correct address of
Management but even the pleadings of Workman are also
conspicuously silent about the aforesaid fact.

63. It is sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Workman that
Management has failed to dispute the receipt of notice dated
06.01.2020 before Conciliation Officer and hence, Management
can’t be allowed to raise the aforesaid plea before this Court. I do
not find any force in the aforesaid submission of Ld. AR for
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Workman, in as much as, a bare perusal of claim of Workman,
filed before Conciliation Officer, shows that the same is
conspicuously silent about the dispatch of demand notice dated
06.01.2020 by Workman to the Management, despite the fact that
the aforesaid claim was filed by Workman before Conciliation
Officer after about three months from the date of alleged dispatch
of demand notice. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my
considered opinion, there was no occasion for Management to
dispute the receipt of aforesaid demand notice from the
Workman in its reply to the statement of claim before the
Conciliation Officer.

64. Next question, which arises for consideration of this Court,
is about the effect of non-service of demand notice by Workman
upon Management prior to his approaching the Conciliation
Officer. It is sought to be submitted by Ld. AR for Management
that since Workman has failed to prove the service of any
demand notice dated 06.01.2020 upon Management, challenging
his illegal termination and seeking his reinstatement, there was
no industrial dispute in existence before the Appropriate
Government, which could have been referred to this Court for
adjudication vide order dated 19.02.2021.

65. On the other hand, Ld. AR for Workman has relied upon the
judgment of Hon’ble Supreme court in Shambhu Nath Goyal’s
case (supra) to contend that Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 no-
where contemplates that the dispute would come into existence in
any particular, specific or prescribed manner and for coming into
existence of an Industrial Dispute, a written demand notice is not
a sine qua non. He further submits that since after sending the
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aforesaid demand notice dated 06.01.2020, Workman has
approached the Labour Department challenging illegal
termination of his services, wherein, the Management has
participated without raising any objection to the maintainability
of aforesaid claim before Conciliation Officer on the ground of
non-service of demand notice, the reference dated 19.02.2021
cannot be rejected on the ground that no industrial dispute exists
between the parties to the present claim.

66. I do not find any force in the aforesaid submission made on
behalf of Workman. No doubt, Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Shambu Nath’s Case (Supra) has observed that for coming into
existence of an industrial dispute, a written demand notice is not
a sine qua non unless of course in case of public utility service,
however, there is a long line of cases, wherein, Hon’ble Delhi
High Court, after reconciliation of the aforesaid observations of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shambu Nath’s case (supra) with the
propositions of law laid down by a three judge bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation
Limited v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat
AIR 1968 SC 529 has
held that unless the workman serves the demand notice for his
reinstatement upon the management, the industrial dispute can
not come into existence till that time.
The relevant observations
of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Nagendra Sharma Vs.
Management
of M/s Rajasthan Timber Corporation ILR (2006)
I Delhi 1030 in this regard are being reproduced herein below for
ready reference:

“23. In Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited v.
Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat
, AIR 1968 SC 529, an

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employee was transferred to the subsidiary company by his
principal employer with his consent. He received
retrenchment compensation from his new employer. The
services of the workman were terminated by the subsidiary
company. He claimed a lien on his post with the principal
company and when informed that the post which he
occupied stood filled up, the employee sought retrenchment
compensation from the principal company. This was not
paid by the principal company. In these circumstances, a
reference of the industrial dispute was sought by him
whereupon the appropriate government made a reference
relating to reinstatement of the employee into service with
the principal company.

The Apex Court was of the view that if no dispute at all is
raised by the employees with the management, any request
sent by them to the Government would be in the nature of
a demand by them and would not be an industrial dispute
between them and their employer. An industrial dispute, as
statutorily defined under Section 2(k) is of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947
, must be a dispute between employers
and employers, employers and workmen and workmen and
workmen. The Government is required to come to an
opinion that an industrial dispute does exist and that an
opinion can only be formed on the basis that there was a
dispute between the employee and the employer.
Thus, when the retrenched employee and the union had
conveyed a demand to the management only for
retrenchment compensation, and did not make any demand
for reinstatement, it was held by the Apex Court that the
reference made by the Government under Section 10 in
respect of the reinstatement is not competent and that the
only reference which the Government could have made had
to be related to payment of retrenchment compensation.

24. Noticing the facts of the case before it, the Supreme
Court had observed that when the conciliation officer
reported to the Government that an industrial dispute did
exist, the appropriate government had to be satisfied on the
material before it that such dispute had been raised by the
respondent with the management. In this behalf, the court
observed thus:

“If no dispute at all was raised by the respondents with
the management, any request sent by them to the
Government would only be a demand by them and not
an industrial dispute between them and their employer.

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An industrial dispute, as defined, must be a dispute
between employers and employers, employers and
workmen, and workmen and workmen. A mere demand
to a Government, without a dispute being raised by the
workmen with their employer, cannot become an
industrial dispute. Consequently, the material before the
Tribunal clearly showed that no such industrial dispute,
as was purported to be referred by the State Government
to the tribunal, had ever existed between the appellant
Corporation and the respondents and the State
Government, in making a reference, obviously
committed an error in basing its opinion on material
which was not relevant to the formation of opinion. The
Government had to come to an opinion that an industrial
dispute did exist and that opinion could only be formed
on the basis that there was a dispute between the
appellant and the respondents relating to reinstatement.
Such material could not possibly exist when, as early as
March and July, 1958, respondent No. 3 and respondent
No. 2 respectively had confined their demands to the
management to retrenchment compensation only and did
not make any demand for reinstatement. On these facts,
it is clear that the reference made by the Government
was not competent. The only reference that the
Government could have made had to be related to
payment of retrenchment compensation which was the
only subjectmatter of dispute between the appellant and
the respondents.”

25. A similar point came for consideration of two Judge
Bench of the Apex Court in (1978) 2 SCC 353 : AIR 1978
SC 1088 entitled Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda. In
this case, the petitioner workman was an employee of the
Bank of Baroda. After service of a charge-sheet and conduct
of inquiry, he was dismissed from service. Admittedly, the
workman appealed against the order of dismissal but was
unsuccessful. An industrial dispute arising out of the
dismissal of the workman was espoused by the Punjab Bank
Workers Union. Upon failure of the conciliation proceedings,
the Government of India made a reference in the following
terms:

“Whether the action of the management of Bank of
Baroda in dismissing Shri Shambhu Nath Goyal, Clerk,
Civil Lines Branch, was justified? If not, to what relief is
he entitled?”

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The respondent bank raised a preliminary objection that no
demand in respect of Shri Shambhu Nath Goyal was made
on the management and that therefore there was no
industrial dispute in existence. It was urged that for this
reason, the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947
, was incompetent.

The industrial tribunal held in favour of the respondent/bank
on this petition. However, the Apex Court in this behalf
noticed thus:

“xxxxxxxxx

8. In this case the Tribunal completely misdirected itself
when it observed that no demand was made by the
workman claiming reinstatement after dismissal. When
the inquiry was held, it is an admitted position, that
the workman appeared and claimed reinstatement.
After his dismissal he preferred an appeal to the
appellate forum and contended that the order of
dismissal was wrong, unsupported by evidence and in
any event he should be reinstated in service. If that was
not a demand for reinstatement addressed to employer
what else would it convey? That appeal itself is a
representation questioning the decision of the
Management dismissing the workman from service
and praying for reinstatement. There is thus
unimpeachable evidence that the concerned
workman persistently demanded reinstatement. If in
this background the Government came to the conclusion
hat there exists a dispute concerning workman S.N.
Goyal and it was an industrial dispute because there was
demand for reinstatement and a reference was made,
such reference could hardly be rejected on the ground
that there was no demand and the industrial dispute did
not come into existence. Therefore, the Tribunal was in
error in rejecting the reference on the ground that the
reference was incompetent. Accordingly this appeal is
allowed and the A ward of the Tribunal is set aside and
the matter is remitted to Tribunal for disposal according
to law. The respondent shall pay cost of the appellant in
this Court. As the reference is very old the Tribunal
should dispose it of an expeditiously as possible.”

26. So far as the question of raising a demand upon the
management is concerned, the court held thus:

“xxxxxxxxxxxx

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5. A bare perusal of the definition would show that
where there is a dispute or difference between the parties
contemplated by the definition and the dispute or
difference is connected with the employment or non-
employment or the terms of employment or with the
conditions of labour of any person there comes into
existence an industrial dispute. The Act nowhere
contemplates that the dispute would come into existence
in any particular, specific or prescribed manner. For
coming into existence of an industrial dispute a written
demand is not a sine qua non, unless of course in the
case of public utility service, because Section 22 forbids
going on strike without giving a strike notice. The key
words in the definition of industrial dispute are ‘dispute’
or ‘difference’. What is the connotation of these two
words? In Beetham v. Trinidad Cement Ltd. Lord
Denning while examining the definition of expression
‘Trade dispute’ in Section 2(1) of Trade Disputes
(Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance of Trinidad
observed:

By definition a ‘trade dispute’ exists whenever a
‘difference’ exists; and a difference can exist long
before the parties locked in a combat. It is not
necessary that they should have come to blows. It
is sufficient that they should be sparing for an
opening.

6. Thus the term ‘industrial dispute’ connotes a real and
substantial difference having some element of
persistency and continuity till resolved and likely if not
adjusted to endanger the industrial peace of the
undertaking or the community. When parties are at
variance and the dispute or difference is connected with
the employment, or nonemployment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labour there
comes into existence an industrial dispute. To read into
definition the requirement of written demand for
bringing into existence an industrial dispute would
tantamount to re-writing the section.”

27. Thereafter, the court held that in the light of the
pronouncement of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1958 SC
53 entitled Madras State v. C.P. Sarthi, while making a
reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, the Government is performing an administrative act
which is based on an opinion as to the factual existence of an

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industrial dispute. So far as the order is concerned, so long
there is some material which would enable the government to
form an opinion, it is not open for the industrial tribunal to
examine the same.

28. The court distinguished the judgment rendered by the
Apex Court in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Limited
(Supra) holding that the question raised before the Apex
Court in the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation case (Supra)
was as to whether there was an industrial dispute in existence
on the date of the reference and not a question as to whether
in the case of an apprehended dispute, the government can
make a reference or not. In this behalf, the court held thus:

“The Tribunal, however, referred to the decision of this
Court in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation Ltd. v.
Industrial Tribunal
, (1968) 1 Lab LJ 834 : (AIR 1968
SC 529) in which this Court proceeded to ascertain
whether there was in existence an industrial dispute at
the date of reference, but the question whether in case of
an apprehended dispute Government can make reference
under S. 10(1) was not examined.

xxxxxxxxx

29. The Apex Court distinguished the decision of this court
in Sindhu Resettlement Corporation on facts and held thus:

“We further consider whether the notification dated
1212-1968 could be construed to be one under Section 7
assuming that the mention of Section 8 therein was
wrong. A notification under Section 7 would have to be
for the constitution of another Labour Court, inasmuch
as the Labour Court presided over by Shri Baweja still
continued. This notification dated 12-12-1968 does not
constitute a new Labour Court presided over by Shri
Desh Deepak and cannot, therefore, be upheld under
Section 7 also.”

30. It is, therefore, apparent that the Apex Court decided
the facts of the case before it which were at variance with
the facts and issues raised in the Sindhu Settlement
Corporation
Case (Supra).

31. The same issue had arisen for consideration before a
Division Bench of this court in Fedders Lloyd Corporation
(Pvt.) Limited v. Lt. Governor, Delhi
reported at AIR 1979
Delhi 60.

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32. In this case, the respondent No. 3 Ajayab Singh was an
employee of M/s Fedders Lloyd Corporation Pvt. Limited
and had expressed his inability to work and resigned. Based
on this reason, he was relieved of his duty on 4th July, 1967.
He accepted the ex gratia payment made by the petitioner
which was paid on the basis of workers which retrenched
from service. The workman received payment in full and
final settlement of all claims and even requested for
certificate which was issued by the petitioner. The workman,
thereafter, did not make any demand on the petitioner
company directly but wrote the letter to the labour
commissioner stating that an industrial dispute exists
between him and petitioner company and sought a reference.
In the enclosed statement, the respondent No. 3 alleged that
his services were terminated by way of retrenchment and that
this retrenchment should be set aside and respondent No. 3
should be reinstated into service.

33. The petitioner company alleged that it learnt of this only
when a notice was received from the conciliation officer and
the petitioner resisted the claim of the respondent No. 3 on
the ground that there was no industrial dispute between the
parties which could be referred to adjudication. In the
judgment in Fedders Lloyd Corporation Pvt. Limited case,
the court held that despite facts being placed before it, the
Delhi Administration made an order of reference which was
assailed by the company in a writ petition before this court.
The Division Bench held thus:

“11. Under Section 10(1) of the Act, the appropriate
Government is empowered to make a reference if it is of
the opinion that an industrial dispute either exists or is
apprehended. The reference at annexure ‘A’ to the
petition is of an existing industrial dispute. Weare not,
therefore, concerned in this case with any apprehended
dispute. The question is whether an industrial dispute
existed before it was referred to the Labour Court.
Section 2(k) of the Act defining an “industrial dispute”

refers to a dispute or difference. This means that one
party asserts something, which is denied by the other or
that the demand of one party is refused by the other.
Preamble of the Act says that the Act makes provision
for the investigation and settlement of Industrial
Disputes. Chapter II of the Act constitutes certain
authorities to compose any material difference of
opinion or to settle industrial disputes between the
employers and the employees. Such authorities include
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Conciliation Officers as well as the Labour Courts. In
Chapter III of the Act
, Section 10 deals with the
reference of the disputes by the appropriate Government
for settlement to the authorities under the Act and
Section 10-A deals with voluntary reference of the
disputes by the parties to arbitration. Chapter IV has laid
down the procedure, powers and duties of the authorities
in dealing with industrial disputes. From the scheme of
the Act, therefore, it is clear that an industrial dispute
must exist or must be apprehended before it can be
referred by the appropriate Government under Section
10(1)
to the authorities mentioned therein. Section 12
which deals with the duties of the Conciliation Officer
pre-supposes that an industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended before the Conciliation Officer can deal
with it thereunder. It does not contemplate that an
Industrial dispute can arise for the first time during the
proceedings before the Conciliation Officer. When the
parties are unable to settle the dispute between
themselves, an application is made under sub section (2)
of Section 10 of the Act for reference of the dispute to an
authority under the Act by the appropriate Government.
The contents of such an application are to include,
according to R. 3(e) of the Rules, the efforts made by the
parties themselves to adjust the dispute. This would also
show that a dispute must exist between the parties before
an approach is made to the appropriate Government for
reference of the dispute to adjudication. The application
made by respondent No. 3 in the present case is at
annexure ‘D’ of the writ petition. It begins by saying that
an industrial dispute exists between the parties. But the
particulars of the dispute given in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 3 are significantly silent about any
demand made by respondent No. 3 against the petitioner
company. It does not say that any effort was made by
respondent No. 3 to settle any dispute with the
petitioner-company. The inference that arises is that no
demand whatever was made by respondent No. 3 on the
petitioner-company before he applied under Section
10(2)
to the appropriate Government, for such reference
of the dispute for adjudication. Respondent No. 3 has
not placed any documentary evidence on the record
that he made demand on the petitioner-company
before making the application under Section 10(2).
The referring Judge, therefore, called for the proceedings

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before the Conciliation Officer and found that the same
application under Section 10(2) was before the
Conciliation Officer. The claim of respondent No. 3 was
sent by the Conciliation Officer to the management for
comments, but no comments were received in writing.
The matter was, however, orally discussed and the
management conveyed to the Conciliation Officer their
defence on merits. As there was no possibility of
settlement, the Conciliation proceedings were closed and
a report was made by the Conciliation Officer to the
Government. Under Section 12(5) of the Act on a
consideration of this report, the Government was
satisfied that there was a case for reference to the Labour
Court and accordingly the reference at annexure ‘A’ to
the petition was made.

34. The Division Bench then discussed the pronouncement of
the Supreme Court in the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation
Limited v. Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat
(supra) and further
stated thus:

13. In our anxiety to understand precisely what the
Supreme Court meant I studied the whole of their
decision and also the Gujarat High Court decision
reported in (1965) 2 Lab LJ 268 (Guj), which was
reversed by the Supreme Court. At page 271 of the
report of the Gujarat High Court Judgment it is stated
that respondent No. 3 had made a complaint to his
Union, respondent No. 2, who thereupon presented the
demand to the Corporation for the reinstatement of
respondent No. 3. But the Supreme Court has held
that the evidence before the Tribunal clearly showed
that no such demand was made by the workmen
concerned or by the Union on the Management of the
Sindhu Re-settlement Corporation and I feel bound to
accept this later position. The Supreme Court has held
that the evidence before the Tribunal clearly showed that
no such demand was made by the workmen concerned
or by the Union on the Management of the Sindhu
Resettlement Corporation and I feel bound to accept this
later position. The Supreme Court has also clarified
that even if the Conciliation Officer found that an
industrial dispute existed and so reported to the
Government, this could not be regarded as the
existence of the industrial dispute which has to be
founded upon a demand by the workmen on the
employers. If this is the ratio of the Supreme Court
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decision, it cannot be said that an industrial dispute
existed in the present case as no demand was made by
respondent No. 3 on the petitioner-company before he
made an application under Section 10(2) for redemand
of respondent No. 3 was forwarded by the Conciliation
Officer to the petitioner-company and was not accepted
by the latter would not constitute an industrial dispute.
The observation in Standard Coal Company v. S.P.
Verma
, AIR 1952 Pat 56, in paragraph (15), that
xxxxxxxxx

We are of the view that the decision of the Supreme
Court in AIR 1968 SC 529 referred to above, has finally
established the proposition that a demand by the
workmen must be raised first on the Management
and rejected by them before an industrial dispute can
be said to arise and exist and that the making of such
a demand to the Conciliation Officer and its
communication by him to the Management, who
reject the same is not sufficient to constitute an
industrial dispute. The decisions and dicta of some of
the High Courts to the contrary can no longer be
considered good law.”

35. It is noteworthy that in the Shambhu Nath Goyal case
(Supra), the petitioner had agitated against his dismissal
and had even filed an appeal before the bank against the
same. Therefore, the court was of the view that the
petitioner had been persistently demanding reinstatement
from its employer and for this reason, rendered the
judgment as noticed above.

36. So far as the reliance on judicial precedent is concerned,
it has been repeatedly observed that court should not place
reliance on decision without discussing as to how factual
situation fits in the fact situation of the decision on which
reliance is placed. In this behalf, I may refer to the principles
laid down in the pronouncement of the Apex Court reported
in JT 2002 (1) SC 482Haryana Financial Corporation v.
Jagdamba Oil Mills
. In this case, the court held thus:

“19. Courts should not place reliance on decisions
without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in
with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance
is placed. Observations of Courts are not to be read as
Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute. These
observations must be read in the context in which they

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appear. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as
statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a
statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark
into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to
explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they
do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of
statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.
In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton, (1951 AC
737 at p. 761), Lord Mac Dermot observed:

“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by
treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though
they were part of an Act of Parliament and
applying the rules of interpretation appropriate
thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight
to be given to the languages actually used by that
most distinguished judge.”

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (1970 (2) All ER

294) Lord Reid said, “Lord Atkin’s speech ………. is
not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will
require qualification in new circumstances.” Megrry, J in
(1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course,
construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J.
As if it were an Act of Parliament.” And, in Herrington
v. British Railways Board, ((1972) 2 WLR 537) Lord
Morris said:

“There is always peril in treating the words of a
speech or judgment as though they are words in a
legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered
that judicial utterances made in the setting of the
facts of a particular case.”

Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different
fact may make a world of difference between
conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly
placing reliance on a decision is not proper.

20. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter
of applying precedents have become locus classicks:

“Each case depends on its own facts and a close
similarity between one case and another is not
enough because even a single significant detail
may later the entire aspect. In deciding such
cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide
cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour
of one case against the colour of another. To

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decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case
falls, the broad resemblance to another case falls,
the broad resemblance to another case is not at
all decisive.”

xxxxxxxxx

“Precedent should be followed only so far as it
marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead
wood and trim off the side branches else you will
find yourself lost in thickets nd branches. My plea
is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions
which could impede it.”

37. In the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation case, Fedders
Lloyd Corporation (Pvt.) Limited case and in the instant
case, no demand or notice of any kind had been served
upon the employer/management with regard to the
demand of the workman.
Therefore, the fact situation
before the Apex Court in Shambhu Nath Goyal case was
quite different from the facts which were before the court
in the Sindhu Resettlement Corporation case, Fedders
Lloyd
case and the case in hand.

38. Judicial decorum, legal propriety and bindingness of
precedents mandate that a judgment rendered by a larger
bench of the Apex Court, which is prior in time, would
prevail over latter judgment of the Apex Court which may
have been rendered by a smaller Bench. A judgment
rendered by a two bench of the Apex Court which
distinguishes the earlier judgment by the larger bench on
the facts of the case would, therefore, not be laying down a
binding principle of law.

39. In these circumstances, I am unable to agree with Shri
K.L. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the
judgment of the Apex Court in Shambhu Lal Goyal v. Bank
of Baroda
case supra would be binding for the purposes of
adjudication of the present case.
As I have already noticed,
the facts which were before the Apex Court in Shambhu
Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda
are different from the case set
up by the present petitioner before the industrial adjudicator.

40. In JT 1989 (3) SC 156 entitled Jayantbhai Manubhai
Patel v. Arun Subodhbhai Mehta
, the court held that the
observations of the Apex Court in the judgments which were

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relied upon by the High Court did not constitute the ratio of
the judgment in that case and consequently, the High Court
need not have considered itself bound by the observations in
the judgment of the Apex Court cited before it. In this case,
the Apex Court held thus:

“In our view, the learned Judges of the Gujarat High
Court who delivered the judgment under consideration
before us need not have considered themselves bound by
the aforesaid observations in Chandrakant Khaire’s
case, as they have done. In the first place, these
observations do not constitute the ratio of the judgment
in that case. The question in that case was whether a
meeting which was duly convened and had commenced
could have been adjourned by the Municipal
Commissioner and not whether a notice convening a
meeting issued by the Municipal Corporation could be
cancelled by him before the commencement of the
meeting with a view to have the meeting held on a
subsequent date. We are of the view that the Division
Bench was not really called upon to consider the
situation in such a case, as we have pointed out earlier.
Moreover, it appears that the Division Bench has not
taken into account the provisions of section 21 of the
Bombay General Clauses Act or the principles
underlying that section. No argument was advanced
before the Division Bench on the basis of that section at
all. The attention of the Division Bench was not drawn
to the judgment of this Court in Mohd. Yunus Saleem’s
case, might not have made the afore-stated observations
at all.”

41. In the judgment reported in (1989) 1 SCC 101 entitled
MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, an issue was raised before the Apex
Court as to whether an order passed with the consent of
parties would amount to a pronouncement of law and
constitute binding precedent. In this behalf, the court
observed thus:

“10. It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is
made by consent of the parties, the court does not
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor does it lay
down any principle. Quotability as ‘law’ applies to the
principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only thing in
a judge’s decision binding as an authority upon a
subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case
was decided. Statements which are not part of the ratio
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decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not
authoritative. The task of finding the principle is fraught
with difficulty because without an investigation into the
facts, as in the present case, it could not be assumed
whether a similar direction must or ought to be made as
a measure of social justice. That being so, the direction
made by this Court in Jamna Das case could not be
treated to be a precedent. The High Court failed to
realise that the direction in Jamna Das case was made
not only with the consent of the parties but there was an
interplay of various factors and the court was moved by
compassion to evolve a situation to mitigate hardship
which was acceptable by all the parties concerned. The
court no doubt made incidental observation to the
Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Article
38(2)
of the Constitution and said:

Article 38(2) of the Constitution mandates the
State to strive to minimise, amongst others, the
inequalities in facilities and opportunities amongst
individuals. One who tries to survive by one’s own
labour has to be encouraged because for want of
opportunity destitution may disturb the conscience
of the society. Here are persons carrying on some
paltry trade in an open space in the scorching heat
of Deli sun freezing cold or torrential rain. They
are being denied continuance at that place under
the specious lea that they constitute an obstruction
to easy access to hospitals. A little more space in
the access to the hospital may be welcomed but
not at the cost of someone being deprived of his
very source of livelihood so as to swell the rank of
the fast growing unemployed. As far as possible
this should be avoided which we propose to do by
this short order.

This indeed was a very noble sentiment but incapable of
being implemented in a fast growing city like the
Metropolitan City of Delhi where public streets are
overcrowded and the pavement squatters create a hazard
to the vehicular traffic and cause obstruction to the
pedestrians on the pavement.

11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the
ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not
authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who
passed the order in Jamna Das case and to the learned

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Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this
Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without
argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of
the Act conferring express power on the Municipal
Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from
any public place like pavements or public streets, and
without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not
propose to uphold the decision of the High Court
because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and
cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant
provisions. A decision should be treated as given per
incuriam which it is given in ignorance of the terms of a
statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far as
the order shows, no argument was addressed to the court
on the question whether or not any direction could
properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation
to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement
squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond
on Jurisprudence, 12th edn. Explains the concept of sub
silentio at p. 153 in these words:

A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical
sense that has come to be attached to that phrase,
when the particular point of law involved in the
decision is not perceived by the court or present to
its mind. The court may consciously decide in
favour of one party because of point A, which it
considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown,
however, that logically the court should not have
decided in favour of the particular party unless it
also decided point B in his favour; but point B was
not argued or considered by the court. In such
circumstances, although point B was logically
involved in the facts and although the case had a
specific outcome, the decision is not an authority
on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio.

12. In Gerard v. Worth of Paris Ltd. (k)., the only point
argued was on the question of priority of the claimant’s
debt, and, on this argument being heard, the court
granted the order. No consideration was given to the
question whether a garnishee order could properly be
made on an account standing in the name of the
liquidator. When, therefore, this very point was argued
in a subsequent case before the Court of Appeal in
Lncaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., the
court held itself not bound by its previous decision. Sir
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Wilfried Greene, M.R., said that he could not help
thinking that the point now raised had been deliberately
passed sub silentio by counsel in order that the point of
substance might be decided. He went on to say that the
point had to be decided by the earlier court before it
could make the order which it did; nevertheless, since it
was decided ‘without argument, without reference to the
crucial words of the rule, and without any citation of
authority’, it was not binding and would not be followed.
Precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no
moment. This rule has ever since been followed. One of
the chief reasons for the doctrine of precedent is that a
matter that has once been fully argued and decided
should not be allowed to be reopened. The weight
accorded to dicta varies with the type of dictum. Mere
casual expressions carry no weight at all. Not every
passing expression of a judge, however eminent, can be
treated as an ex cathedra statement, having the weight of
authority.”

42. In view of the above, I have no manner of doubt that the
facts of the instant case, which are on all fours with the fact
situation before the Apex Court in Sindhu Resettlement
Corporation
case supra and the principles laid down therein
would bind this court.” (Emphasis mine)

67. The aforesaid judgment has been followed by Hon’ble Delhi
High Court in subsequent cases including in S.N. Tiwari Vs.
Govt of NCT of Delhi and Anr.
2009 SCC Online Delhi 2510.

68. In view of aforesaid discussion, issue no. (iv) is hereby
decided against Workman while holding that Workman has
failed to serve any demand notice upon Management challenging
his illegal termination and seeking his reinstatement prior to
filing his claim before this Court and hence, no industrial dispute
existed between the parties as on the date of reference dated
19.02.2021. The present claim of Workman is thus liable to be
dismissed on this ground alone.

Issue no. (v): In terms of reference: “Whether

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termination of services of Workman Sh. Bhuwan
Chandra Pathak S/o Sh. Amba Dutt Pathak, Age
around 55 years with full and final settlement of dues
transferred to the Workman account by the
Management is illegal and unjustified and if so, to
what relief is he entitled and what directions are
necessary in this respect?”

69. In view of my finding on issue no. (ii) hereinabove, though,
the Workman has been able to prove that his services were
illegally terminated by Management on 31.12.2019 without
payment of any service compensation in terms of Section 25F of
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and hence he could have been
entitled to a lump sum compensation and not to his reinstatement
with or back wages, however, in view of my finding on issue no.

(iv) hereinabove, reference is answered against Workman.

Issue no. (vi): Relief, if any.

70. In view of my finding on issue no. (iv) hereinabove,
Workman is not entitled to any relief.

71. Present claim of the Workman is thus disposed off and
reference dated 19.02.2021 is answered against Workman in the
following terms:

“Though Workman has been able to prove that his
services were illegally terminated by Management on
31.12.2019 without payment of any service
compensation in terms of Section 25F of Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, however, he is not entitled to any
relief since no industrial dispute existed between the
parties to present claim as on the date of this reference
for want of service of any demand notice by Workman
upon the Management challenging his termination.”

72. Ordered accordingly.

LIR No. 763/2021

Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.

Award dated 02.08.2025 Page 47 of 48

73. Requisite number of copies of this award be sent to the
competent authority for publication as per rules.

Announced in the open Court on this 02nd day of August, 2025.

This award consists of 48 number of signed pages. ARUN        Digitally signed by
                                                                          ARUN KUMAR GARG
                                                                  KUMAR   Date: 2025.08.02
                                                                  GARG    16:03:18 +05'30'


                                                      (ARUN KUMAR GARG)
                                            Presiding Officer Labour Court-III
                                               Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi




LIR No. 763/2021

Bhuwan Chandra Pathak Vs. M/s. New Fields Advertising Pvt. Ltd.

Award dated 02.08.2025 Page 48 of 48



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