Evaluating UNCAC Compliance through Law and Practice – Lex Jura Law

By Lavanya Singh

(A student of Symbiosis Law School, Pune)

---

Corruption is recognized as a significant threat to governance, economic growth, and public accountability. Corruption remains a significant obstacle to democratic governance and sustainable development worldwide. For India, the challenge is particularly acute, with systemic corruption undermining public trust and slowing institutional reforms. Despite ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2011, India’s domestic efforts have struggled to meet international expectations.

The UNCAC, ratified by over 180 countries, serves as the global framework to address corruption through prevention, criminalization, enforcement, and public participation. The UNCAC sets out preventive and punitive measures to combat corruption, emphasizing independent enforcement, whistle-blower protection, and international cooperation. Yet, more than a decade since ratification, India continues to face legislative gaps, weak institutional capacity, and cultural normalization of corruption. India’s struggle with corruption is well-documented, with research highlighting pervasive bribery, opaque governance structures, and weak enforcement mechanisms. While the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) and Whistle Blowers Protection Act (WBPA) form the backbone of India’s legal response, gaps in implementation and enforcement persist.

In this article, the author traces the evolution of India’s anti-corruption framework, identifies key legislative and enforcement shortcomings, and illustrates how these shortcomings hinder India’s ability to fulfill its international obligations.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

This section critically examines how India has struggled to translate its UNCAC obligations—particularly Articles 16 (foreign public official bribery) and 33 (whistleblower protection)—into effective action[1]. It also explores the institutional, cultural, and legal challenges that hinder anti-corruption efforts, supported by systemic analysis, personal reflections, and reform-focused insights.

UNCAC Article 16 vs. India’s PCA: Bribery of Foreign Public Officials

The UNCAC recognizes that corruption today often transcends national borders, affecting global markets and governance structures. To address this, Article 16 obligates countries to criminalize bribery involving foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations. This is essential to ensure accountability not only within countries but also in their global interactions.

Article 16 mandates State Parties to criminalize the act of offering or giving bribes to foreign public officials. While India has amended its PCA to broaden the definition of bribery, it continues to ignore the cross-border dimension of corruption[2]. As India emerges as a global business hub, the failure to legislate on foreign official bribery paints India as inconsistent actors in international accountability. It’s like pledging to run a marathon, but refusing to lace up. The absence of specific provisions addressing foreign official bribery leaves a glaring loophole in India’s anti-corruption framework. Without legal mechanisms to prosecute such acts, Indian entities implicated in cross-border corruption often escape accountability, undermining both domestic governance and international obligations.

One such example of escape from accountability is the Rolls Royce bribery scandal[3]. Between 2005 and 2009, Rolls Royce allegedly engaged Indian intermediaries to facilitate bribes to foreign defense officials and Indian public sector undertakings, including Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and other entities, in connection with the sale of aircraft engines and defense equipment. Investigations revealed that Rolls Royce had entered into agreements with intermediaries in India, despite prohibitions under Indian defense procurement rules on the use of middlemen.

The global dimension of the case became evident when Rolls Royce, headquartered in the United Kingdom, reached a settlement with the U.S., U.K., and Brazilian authorities in 2017, agreeing to pay over $800 million in penalties for corruption and bribery across multiple jurisdictions¹. However, despite Indian nationals and companies being allegedly involved, there was no effective legal framework within Indian law at the time to prosecute Indian individuals or entities for acts of bribery committed outside Indian territory. This legislative gap continues to weaken India’s ability to fulfill its obligations under Article 16 of UNCAC, which calls for the criminalization of foreign bribery.

UNCAC Article 33 and the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014

UNCAC recognizes the importance of protecting whistleblowers who report in good faith. However, despite having a law in place, India has not implemented the Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 (WBPA). No rules have been notified, and no redressal body has been empowered.

The risks faced by whistleblowers in India remain severe due to the absence of enforceable protections, despite legislative promises. Several cases have illustrated how exposing corruption can lead to serious personal harm, deterring individuals from coming forward.

One of the most widely reported examples is that of Satyendra Dubey, an engineer in the NHAI, who was murdered in 2003 for exposing corruption in the Golden Quadrilateral project[4]. Twenty years later, no substantial progress has been made in institutionalizing whistleblower safety.

Institutional Fragmentation: Multi-agency Dysfunction

UNCAC emphasizes coordinated enforcement through specific obligations under Articles 6 and 36. Article 6 requires each country to establish or designate one or more specialized bodies responsible for preventing corruption, ensuring they have the necessary independence, resources, and authority to function effectively. Article 36 complements this by mandating the creation of independent law enforcement authorities with the autonomy to investigate corruption cases without undue influence. Together, these provisions aim to prevent fragmented, overlapping efforts by promoting institutional coordination and clearly defined mandates across enforcement bodies.

India’s institutional framework for combating corruption consists of multiple bodies, including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Lokpal, and State-level Anti-Corruption Bureaus (ACBs). However, these agencies often operate independently, with overlapping mandates and inconsistent jurisdictional boundaries. There is no unified anti-corruption architecture or standardized protocol guiding cooperation among these bodies. For instance, under Section 17A of the PCA, the CBI requires prior approval from the Central or State Government to initiate investigations against public officials, which has been criticized for causing delays and undermining investigative autonomy[5]. Similarly, although the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, was enacted to establish an independent ombudsman for high-level corruption, the Lokpal remains under-resourced and has been slow to build operational capacity[6].

This fragmented structure contributes to a diffusion of accountability, where institutional overlap results in delayed action and inconsistent enforcement.

Dysfunctional Anti-Corruption Ecosystem

[Corruption Complaint] → [Agency Overlap] → [Jurisdiction Confusion] → [Political Pressure] → [Stalled Investigation]

Article 36 and Prosecutorial Independence

UNCAC mandates that States ensure the independence of anti-corruption agencies. However, the appointment of CBI directors, Lokpal members, and other enforcement officers remains politically influenced.

The issue of political influence over investigative agencies like the CBI is not new. In fact, it was explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998), also known as the “Hawala case’’ [7]. The case arose from allegations of widespread corruption involving senior politicians and bureaucrats, exposed through financial transactions linked to the hawala system. The allegations first surfaced in the early 1990s when the Jain brothers, prominent Delhi-based businessmen, were accused of operating an extensive hawala network to facilitate the illegal transfer of funds. The system allegedly channelled large sums of money to various political leaders, bureaucrats, and influential individuals, with the funds believed to originate from questionable sources, including foreign arms deals and kickbacks. Despite the high-profile nature of the case, investigation faced delays, and most prosecutions ultimately failed due to insufficient evidence, exposing the weaknesses in India’s investigative and enforcement mechanisms at the time. The Court, in its judgment, expressed deep concern over the vulnerability of investigative agencies to political and executive interference. It emphasized that the lack of autonomy within the CBI and similar bodies directly undermines public confidence in the rule of law and accountability mechanisms. To address this, the Court issued binding directions aimed at insulating the CBI from external pressures. Key among these directions was the establishment of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) as an independent statutory body to supervise corruption investigations. The Court also mandated fixed tenures for the CBI Director and other senior officials to prevent arbitrary transfers that could disrupt investigations. The judgment reinforced the principle that investigative agencies must function free from political control to maintain their credibility and effectiveness.

Despite these measures, concerns regarding the independence of the CBI continue to surface. The process of appointments, resource allocation, and interference in high-profile cases has raised questions about the actual autonomy of these agencies, over two decades after the Vineet Narain ruling.

Article 50: Judicial Integrity and Delays

UNCAC emphasizes that anti-corruption offences should be addressed promptly and effectively through the justice system. Article 30(1) specifically calls on State Parties to ensure that those charged with corruption are subject to effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties, which requires timely investigation and adjudication to uphold public trust in accountability mechanisms[8]. High-profile corruption cases like the 2G scam and CWG scam have seen decade-long trials with inconclusive outcomes. In the 2G spectrum case, although initial findings indicated massive corruption, the accused were acquitted due to prosecutorial lapses and poor evidence handling[9].

Chart: Time Taken in Major Corruption Trials [10]

Justice delayed is not just denied—it is politicized. When outcomes are unpredictable and delayed, the deterrent value of law is eroded.

Socio-Cultural Legitimization of Corruption

UNCAC requires States to promote integrity and civic responsibility as part of their preventive framework. Article 5 emphasizes the development of coordinated anti-corruption policies promoting the rule of law and integrity, while Article 13 highlights the role of civil society, public participation, and civic education in fostering accountability and ethical conduct.

However, in India, corruption is often seen as an enabler. From bribes for ration cards to under-the-table payments for school admissions, it has become a normalized survival tool. As per a survey conducted by Transparency International show that over 60% of Indians believe paying bribes is the only way to access government services[11].

Vicious Cycle of Cultural Corruption Acceptance

[Poor Service Delivery] → [Bribe Payment] → [Quick Resolution] → [Public Accepts It] → [No Pressure for Reform]

Absence of Preventive Infrastructure

UNCAC (Article 5) emphasizes prevention of corruption through institutional mechanisms.

India lacks predictive audits, compliance risk assessments, and preventive data analytics. Unlike Singapore, which flags suspicious contracts using algorithmic tools, Indian departments rely on human discretion, which is often compromised[12]. Other jurisdictions have adopted similar data-driven preventive models. For instance, South Korea operates the “Clean Portal” system that uses real-time monitoring and public disclosure of government contracts to identify irregularities[13]. Likewise, Estonia’s e-Governance framework integrates predictive risk analysis to flag suspicious financial transactions within public procurement processes[14].

In contrast, India’s monitoring remains largely manual and reactive, with audits or investigations often conducted only after project completion, limiting opportunities for early intervention. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), established under Article 148 of the Constitution, conducts financial and compliance audits, but these typically occur well after public funds have been disbursed, reducing their preventive value[15].

Prevention is cheaper and cleaner than prosecution. We invest in fire trucks but ignore smoke alarms.

Missing Preventive Chain in Indian Governance

[Project Approval] → [No Real-Time Monitoring] → [Audit Only After Completion] → [Minor Penalty or Closed File]

Lack of a Compliance Culture in Public and Private Sectors

The 2018 amendment to the PCA introduced corporate criminal liability under Section 9, which holds commercial organizations accountable if any person associated with them offers or gives undue advantage to a public servant to obtain or retain business. However, the provision allows companies to defend themselves by demonstrating that they had “adequate procedures” in place to prevent bribery.

While the term “adequate procedures” is not explicitly defined within the Act, it refers to the implementation of internal anti-bribery controls, including risk assessments, employee training, whistleblower mechanisms, and periodic monitoring of high-risk transactions. Similar to the UK Bribery Act, where companies are required to adopt proportionate procedures to prevent corruption, Indian companies are expected to integrate structured compliance programs tailored to their operational risks. In the absence of detailed regulatory guidelines in India, this requirement remains vague, limiting its practical enforcement and leaving companies uncertain about the scope and standard of compliance expected. However, India has no guiding framework akin to the UK Bribery Act. One of the clearest examples of how the absence of “adequate procedures” led to large-scale corruption is the coal block allocation scam, which came to light in 2012. The CAG reported that coal blocks were allocated to private companies without competitive bidding, proper due diligence, or transparent disclosures. Many of the recipient firms lacked internal compliance mechanisms or mandatory audit structures to flag conflicts of interest, irregularities, or procedural violations.

Had there been enforceable requirements for mandatory audits, risk assessments, and public disclosure of corporate transactions—as envisaged under global anti-corruption frameworks—the flawed allocation process could have been identified much earlier[16]. The scandal resulted in estimated losses of over ₹1.86 lakh crore to the public exchequer and exposed systemic gaps in corporate governance and regulatory oversight in India’s natural resources sector.

Compliance needs to be incentivized, and not just penalized.

Tokenistic Whistleblower Protection

India’s WBPA has remained in legislative limbo. Despite the law being passed, no rules have been notified for its implementation. This legal vacuum has cost lives. The tragic murder of Satyendra Dubey remains emblematic. More recently, whistleblowers in the banking sector, who flagged irregularities in loan disbursement and NPA management, have faced institutional backlash rather than support. A prominent example is the ICICI Bank case, where whistleblowers raised concerns about conflict of interest and irregularities in high-value loan disbursements to the Videocon Group, implicating senior management, including then-CEO Chanda Kochhar. The whistleblowers alleged that loans worth ₹3,250 crore were granted to Videocon in violation of internal procedures, and that Kochhar’s family had undisclosed financial ties to the borrower. Despite the gravity of these claims, the initial response was institutional resistance rather than protection for the whistleblowers. Their complaints triggered internal inquiries only after significant media coverage and public pressure, highlighting the absence of effective legal safeguards for individuals reporting corporate corruption in India[17]. Contrast this with the protection mechanisms in Australia or the U.S., where anonymous reporting hotlines, monetary rewards, and legal support are granted. India’s failure is not due to legislative absence, but due to administrative inertia.

Whistleblower Risk Cycle in India

[Complaint Filed] → [Identity Leaked] → [Threats/Retaliation] → [Transfer or FIR] → [No Legal Remedy]

Institutional Design and Bureaucratic Incentives

Corruption is embedded in bureaucratic architecture. The promotion and transfer systems in government departments are opaque and susceptible to lobbying. The idea of a ‘lucrative posting’ is not a myth—it is a negotiated reality in many departments. The lack of financial and professional incentives for ethical behavior further deteriorates morale[18].

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

India’s anti-corruption legal structure is built primarily around three pillars: Prevention of Corruption Act, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – provisions on criminal procedure, and sectoral laws. The influence of UNCAC is visible but partial.

When it comes to sectoral laws, there are various legislations and institutions which complement India’s anti-corruption framework. The Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946[19], serves as the foundation for the functioning of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which is tasked with investigating complex corruption and economic offences. Despite its mandate, concerns around the CBI’s autonomy and the requirement of prior approvals for certain investigations continue to affect its effectiveness. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA)[20], addresses the financial dimension of corruption by enabling authorities to trace and confiscate proceeds of crime. However, inconsistent enforcement and procedural delays have limited its deterrent impact. Laws such as the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988[21], also aim to prevent individuals from concealing illicit assets, but overlapping mandates and fragmented implementation weaken their potential.

Over the years, Indian courts have delivered several important judgments that have shaped the legal landscape for tackling corruption. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh (2012)[22], the Supreme Court raised concerns about excessive delays in granting prosecution sanctions against public officials, which often stall investigations. In Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI (2015)[23], the Supreme Court of India clarified the principle of corporate liability, explaining that senior company officials can be held personally responsible for corporate misconduct, but only if there is sufficient evidence of their direct involvement. Another significant case, Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011)[24], expanded the scope of corporate criminal responsibility by holding that companies can be prosecuted for criminal acts, reinforcing the idea that legal entities cannot claim immunity from accountability.

Together, these legislative measures and judicial pronouncements have shaped the framework for fighting corruption in India. However, the persistent gaps in enforcement, lack of whistle-blower protections, and vague compliance requirements continue to undermine their intended impact.

Indian Legal Framework and UNCAC Compliance [25]

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESSTIONS

India’s engagement with anti-corruption law, particularly through its UNCAC commitments, reflects a gap between policy and practice. While laws like the PCA and the WBPA mark progress, their weak enforcement and lack of institutional independence limits their impact.

Corruption in India runs deeper than legal loopholes—it is entrenched in daily governance and social norms. The casual acceptance of small bribes, often dismissed as harmless, gradually enables larger scandals to flourish. Combating this requires more than laws; it demands a cultural shift from the ground up. The real challenge lies in selective implementation. Laws emerge in response to public outrage but often fade without meaningful enforcement. The WBPA exemplifies this—while whistleblowers like Satyendra Dubey are praised in public, policy support remains absent. Unless this disconnect ends, India’s Constitutional and international promises against corruption will remain unfulfilled.

Recommendations and Reflections

1. Make the Whistle Blowers Protection Act Functional: This law needs urgent operationalization. Without rules and a redressal authority, it remains ornamental. We must also include provisions for anonymous reporting, safe houses for whistleblowers, and mental health support, as seen in countries like Norway and Australia[26]. Monetary incentives and state-funded legal support could encourage reporting of systemic frauds.

2. Criminalize Bribery of Foreign Officials: India’s international reputation depends on how seriously it treats cross-border corruption. Including provisions similar to Article 16 of UNCAC within PCA would ensure that Indian companies cannot escape liability abroad.

3. Institutional Independence Must Be Non-Negotiable: The CBI, Lokpal and other functionaries must be protected from executive interference. Fixed tenure, parliamentary oversight, and independent budget allocations can help preserve their neutrality.

4. Create a National Anti-Corruption Compliance Charter: All public and private entities should adopt mandatory anti-corruption compliance policies. This charter can define “adequate procedures” for corporate entities, modelled after the UK Bribery Act.

5. Invest in Predictive Analytics and Data-Driven Auditing: Borrowing from Singapore and Estonia, India must use data tools to identify patterns of fraud or corruption risk in procurement, licensing, and project execution. Predictive governance is smarter and cheaper than post-facto accountability.

6. Mainstream Ethics and Civic Integrity in Education: Long-term change begins with education. Law schools, public administration programs, and even secondary schools should introduce modules on ethical conduct, governance values, and civic responsibility.

7. Recognize and Celebrate Whistleblowers: Instead of isolating or threatening whistleblowers, they must be honored. Public recognition, awards, and fast-track legal support will foster a culture of bravery and integrity.

8. Localize the Bhutan Model: Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness (GNH) framework includes integrity as a key governance indicator. India should develop a State Integrity Index and evaluate civil servants not just on performance but also ethical behavior.

Corruption does not exist in a vacuum. It festers when laws are toothless, when institutions are manipulated, and when society becomes indifferent. The UNCAC was meant to be a beacon—but in India, it risks becoming just another symbolic agreement unless we treat its principles as non-negotiable. It is not just a legal reform issue but a moral obligation too. If India must rise, it must rise with clean hands. Accountability must be proactive, not reactive. Reform must be cultural, not just statutory.

The Way Forward

[Legislate Fully] → [Empower Institutions] → [Incentivize Integrity] → [Protect the Truth-tellers] → [Prevent Before Punishing]

---

Foonotes:

[1] United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.

[2] United Nations Convention Against Corruption, art. 16, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.

[3] Rolls-Royce Agrees to $800 Million Bribery Settlement, BBC News (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-38644114.

[4] Rakesh Bhatnagar, Who Will Protect India’s Whistleblowers?, DNA India (Nov. 27, 2003), https://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-who-will-protect-india-s-whistleblowers-1502.

[5] Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 49 of 1988, § 17A, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India).

[6] Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, No. 1 of 2014, Acts of Parliament, 2014 (India).

[7] Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 S.C.C. 226 (India).

[8] United Nations Convention Against Corruption art. 30(1), Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.

[9] CBI v. A. Raja, CBI Spl. Ct., Dec. 21, 2017 (India).

[10]The Hindu (2017); The Indian Express (2020); Business Standard (2022).

[11] Transparency Int’l, People and Corruption: Asia Pacific, Global Corruption Barometer (2017), https://www.transparency.org/en/gcb/asia-pacific/asia-pacific-2017.

[12] Gov’t of Singapore, Corruption Control Framework, in Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Annual Report (2021).

[13] Jong-Sung You, South Korea’s Anti-Corruption Success: The Role of e-Government and Citizen Participation, 73 Korean J. Pol. Sci. 119, 126–28 (2014).

[14] Transparency Int’l, E-Governance and Public Procurement in Estonia: Building Integrity Through Technology (2018), https://www.transparency.org/en/news/e-governance-estonia-public-procurement.

[15] India Const. Art. 148.

[16] Comptroller & Auditor Gen. of India, Performance Audit of Allocation of Coal Blocks and Augmentation of Coal Production by Coal India Limited, Report No. 7 of 2012-13 (Aug. 2012) ; Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Sec’y & Others, (2014) 9 S.C.C. 516 (India).

[17] ICICI Bank CEO Chanda Kochhar Steps Down Amid Loan Irregularity Probe, Reuters (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-icici-bank-kochhar-resignation-idUSKCN1ME0Q6.

[18] Transfers in Indian Bureaucracy Often Linked to Bribes, Hindustan Times (Aug. 9, 2014), https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/transfers-in-indian-bureaucracy-often-linked-to-bribes/story-wd49qzv8gKk5d9vQ7HVXDM.html.

[19] Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, No. 25 of 1946, Acts of Parliament, 1946 (India).

[20] Prevention of Money Laundering Act, No. 15 of 2003, Acts of Parliament, 2003 (India).

[21] Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, No. 45 of 1988, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India).

[22] Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 S.C.C. 64 (India).

[23] Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI, (2015) 4 S.C.C. 609 (India).

[24] Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 S.C.C. 74 (India).

[25] Prevention of Corruption Act, No. 49 of 1988, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (India); Whistle Blowers Protection Act, No. 17 of 2014, Acts of Parliament, 2014 (India); United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.

[26] Van der Velden et al., Mental Health Problems Among Whistleblowers, 122 Psychol. Rep. 1 (2019).