Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Shahnoor Ali vs Ut Of J&K And Another on 1 August, 2025
2025:JKLHC-JMU:2038
Sr. No. 24
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
CRM(M) No. 194/2025
CrlM No. 387/2025
Shahnoor Ali .....Petitioner(s)
Through: Mr. N.A Gattoo, Advocate
Vs
UT of J&K and another ..... Respondent(s)
Through: Mr. Sumeet Bhatia, GA for R-1
Ms. Shehreen Batt, Advocate for R-2
Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHD. YOUSUF WANI, JUDGE
ORDER (ORAL)
01.08.2025
1. Through the medium of the instant petition filed under the provisions of
Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘BNSS’ for short), the petitioner has sought quashment of the
case FIR bearing No. 468 of 2024 under Sections 281/125 (A) of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), registered against him with respondent No. 1-SHO
Police Station, Udhmapur on the grounds that the complainant/respondent
No. 2 during initial investigation of the case agreed that the accident has
taken place on account of his visual problem and old age, who has
accordingly, compromised with him (petitioner) and that a coy of the
written compromise constituting Annexure-III has been placed on the
petition.
2. The statements of the petitioner and the respondent No. 2/complainant have
been recorded by the Registry on 11.03.2025 pursuant to the order dated
same of this Court.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petition may be
allowed and the impugned case FIR, be set aside in view of the mutual
settlement between the petitioner/accused and the respondent No.2/
complainant.
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5. The learned UT counsel Mr. Sumeet Bhatia, Government Advocate,
however, submitted that the compromise entered between the
petitioner/accused and the respondent No.2/complainant may not be
entertained in the interest of justice as the same shall encourage the guilty
persons. He submitted that the quashment of the impugned case FIR on the
basis of mutual settlement of the parties is likely to cause miscarriage of
justice as the criminal justice system is likely to become a casually.
6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that
it may meet the ends of justice, in case the petition is allowed and the
impugned case FIR is quashed. Otherwise also, the case is not likely to meet
its fate on merits in view of the compromise between the parties. Proceeding
with the impugned case FIR is likely to be a futile exercise.
7. Although this Court is of the opinion that an FIR cannot be generally and in
routine manner allowed to be quashed in exercise of the powers under
Section 528 of BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of the Code on the
main ground that the parties have settled their controversy that had become
the cause of occurrence, yet exceptional ground appears to be made out in
the opinion of the Court, in the facts and the circumstances of the case, for
invoking its extraordinary powers under Section 528 of BNSS to quash the
FIR in question.
8. The provisions of Section 359 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 320
of the Code do not restrict but limit and circumvent the powers of this
Court under Section 528 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 482 of the
Code regarding quashment of FIR’s and criminal proceedings for the sake
of the society at large which is real beneficiary of the criminal justice
delivery system.
9. This Court in its opinion feels fortified with an authoritative judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court cited as “Gopal Kumar B. Nar Vs. CBI (2014) 5
SCC 800″ in which it has been held that “though quashment of non-
compoundable offence under Section 482 CrPC, following a settlement
between the parties would not amount to circumvention of Section 320, but
such power has to be exercised with care and caution and would depend on
facts of each case.
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10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Ors vs State of Gujarat and Anr. (2017) 9
SCC 641″ has considered the aspect of the invocation of the inherent
powers by the High Courts under Section 528 of the BNSS corresponding
to Section 482 of the Code and was pleased to lay down some broad
governing principles for invocation of such power of the High Courts. The
relevant portions of the judgment are reproduced as under for the sake of
convenience:
“Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision. The
statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a
superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise
to secure the ends of justice.
The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a First Information Report or a
criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding an offence. While compounding an
offence, the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i)
to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an
abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
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circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been
settled, the High Court must have due regard to
the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and
serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the
family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may
be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or
predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand
on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or
similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise
between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic
well-being of the state have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
consequences of the act complained of upon the
financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
11. It is also needful to reproduce the relevant portion of the law laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Kapil Gupta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and
Anr 2022 15 SCC 44″ on an appeal, impugning the judgment and order
dated 28.09.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Delhi thereby dismissing the criminal petition, which was filed for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as under:
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i. In present case, consent given by respondent No. 2
for putting an end to proceeding was voluntary and
without any coercion and duress. Respondent No. 2,
in order to live in peace, wants to bring an end to
criminal proceedings.
ii. Though court should be slow in quashing
proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences
are involved. High Court is not foreclosed from
examining as to whether there exists material for
incorporation of such offences or as to whether there
is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to
proving for offence charged with.
iii. Court has also to take into consideration as to
whether settlement between the parties is going to
result in harmony between them which may improve
their mutual relationship.
iv. It is also relevant to consider as to what is the stage
of proceedings. If application (for quashing
proceedings) is made at belated stage wherein
evidence has been led and matter is at stage of
arguments or judgment, Court should be slow to
exercise power to quash proceedings. However, if
such application is made at initial stage before
commencement of trial, said factor will weight with
Court in exercising its power.
v. In present case, facts and circumstances are
peculiar. Respondent 2 is young lady of 23 years. She
feels that going through trial in one case, where she
is complainant, and in other case, wherein she is
accused, would rob prime of her youth. She feels that
if she is made to face trial rather than getting any
relief, she would be faced with agony of undergoing
trial.
vi. In both aforesaid cases, though charge-sheets have
been filed, charges are yet to be framed and as such,
trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted
that since Respondent 2 herself is not supporting
prosecution case, even if criminal trial is permitted to
go ahead, it will end in nothing else than acquittal. If
request of parties is denied, it will be amounting to
only adding one more criminal case already
overburdened criminal courts.
vii. In that view of the matter, though in heinous or
serious crime like rape, Court should not normally
exercise powers of quashing proceedings, in peculiar
facts and circumstances of present case and in order
to give succour to respondent 2 so that she is saved
from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one
as victim and one as accused, present is a fit case
wherein extraordinary powers of Supreme Court be
exercised to quash criminal proceedings.
viii. In that view of the matter, proceedings in criminal
cases arising out of both aforesaid FIRs are quashed
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and set aside.
12. This Court in its opinion also feels fortified with the authoritative
judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court cited as “Gyan Singh Vs. State of
Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and “Narender Singh Vs. State of Punjab
(2014) 6 SCC 466”, the relevant paras of which are reproduced as
hereunder for the sake of convenience:
“Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012)10 SCC 303″
61. “In other words, the High Court must
consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal
proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding
would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it
is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and
if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to
quash the criminal proceedings.”
“Narender Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC
466″
29.”In view of the aforesaid discussion, we
sum up and lay down the following principles by
which the High Court would be guided in giving
adequate treatment to the settlement between the
parties and exercising its power under Section
482of the Code while accepting the settlement and
quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the
settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482of
the Code is to be distinguished from the power
which lies in the Court to compound the offence
sunder Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under
Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings
even in those cases which are not compoundable,
where the parties have settled the matter between
themselves. However, this power is to be exercised
sparingly and with caution;
29.2 When the parties have reached the
settlement and on that basis petition for quashing
the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor
in such cases would be to secure :(i) ends of justice,
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or(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to
form an opinion no neither of the aforesaid two
objectives.
29.3 Such a power is not be exercised in
those prosecutions which involve heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.”
13. Having regard to the amicable settlement of the dispute between the
petitioner/accused and the complainant/respondent No. 2, the continuance of the
criminal proceedings sought to be quashed appears to be a futile exercise, for
just completing the procedure for recording an order of acquittal. In its opinion,
this Court is fortified with the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in, (i)
Satesh Nehra V/S Delhi Administration 1996 (III) Crimes 85 SC; (ii) Madan
Mohan Abott Vs. State of Punjab AIR 2008 SC 1969′ and (iii)
JugdishChananan and ors Vs. State of Haryana and anr. AIR 2008 SC 1968.
Relevant Paras of the referred judgments deserve a needful mention as
under:
“Satesh Nehra V/S Delhi Adminstration 1996 (III)
Crimes 85 SC.”
“But when the judge is fairly certain that there is no
prospect of the case, ending in conviction, the valuable time
of the court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for
purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce
the conclusion at a future date. Most of the Sessions Courts
in India are under heavy pressure of work load. If the
Sessions Judge is almost certain, that the trial would be only
an exercise in futility or sheer wastage of time, it is
advisable to truncate or swap the proceedings.”
“(ii) Madan Mohan Abott Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2008 SC 1969”
“In disputes where the question involved is of a purely
personal nature the court should ordinarily accept the terms
of compromise even in criminal proceedings keeping the
matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the
prosecution in a luxury, which the courts, grossly
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overburdened as they cannot afford and that the time so save
can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful
litigation.”
“(iii) Jugdish Chananan and ors Vs. State of Haryana
and anr AIR 2008 SC 1968”
“In the light of the compromise it is unlikely that the
prosecution will succeed in the matter. We also see that the
dispute is a purely personal one and no public policy is
involved in the transaction that had been entered into between
the parties. To continue with the proceedings, therefore,
would be a futile exercise we accordingly allow the appeal
and quash FIR83/12.3.2001 P/S City Sonapat and on
subsequent proceedings.”
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court has permitted the compounding of the offences
even at the appellate stage having regard to the mutual settlement between
the contesting parties and the nature of the offences involved in the
proceedings being personal in nature “[Mulukri Sira Prassad Vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh 2001 (4) SC 254, Khursheed and Anr. Vs. State of UP and
Anr. 2007 and Ab. Sattar Vs. State of M.P AIR 1981 SC 1775].”
15. Allowing the complainant/victim and the accused in a criminal proceeding
at any stage of investigation, trial or appeal to seek quashment of the
proceedings or the compounding of the offences even in cases where
commission of non-compoundable offences of personal nature not
involving public/social aspect is alleged, on the basis of amicable
settlement, is not likely to prove detrimental to the scope and object of the
provisions of Section 359 of the BNSS corresponding to Section 320 of the
Code. Such an approach is likely to put an end to some further apprehended
litigation of both civil and criminal nature and to allow the parties to have a
peaceful and cordial relation, besides saving the precious time of the
Criminal Courts being already grossly over-burdened as the continuance of
such criminal proceedings is likely to prove a futile exercise only for the
purpose of completing the procedure for recording an order of acquittal at
the end. Provisions of Section 320 of the Code corresponding to Section
359 of the BNSS do not restrict but only limit the powers of this Court
under Section 482 of the Code corresponding to Section 528 of BNSS so
that the extraordinary powers are used only in exceptional circumstances to
meet the ends of justice. Provisions of Section 482 of the Code (528 of
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BNSS) have an overriding affect and are not to be read as subject to the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code (359 of BNSS). The criminal
proceedings, involving heinous offences of anti- social nature or offences
under special penal statutes do not qualify for being quashed/compounded
in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code (528 BNSS).
16. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the case FIR bearing No. 468 of
2024 registered with respondent No. 1-SHO Police Station, Udhmapur
under Sections 281/125 (A) of BNS, is quashed alongwith all subsequent
proceedings, if any.
17. Disposed of.
(Mohd. Yousuf Wani)
Judge
Jammu
01.08.2025
Vijay
Whether the order is speaking: No
Whether the order is reportable: No