Chattisgarh High Court
Sanat Kumar Banerjee vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 28 July, 2025
1
2025:CGHC:36531
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 4796 of 2020
1 - Sanat Kumar Banerjee S/o Late Onkar Banerjee, Aged About 58 Years
Presently Posted As Head Constable, Police Station, Champa, District -
Janjgir - Champa Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa,, (C.G.)
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Secretary, Home (Police)
Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.)
2 - The Director General Of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.)
3 - The Deputy Director General Of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur
Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, (C.G.)
4 - The Inspector General Of Police, Bilaspur Range, Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.,
District : Bilaspur, (C.G.)
5 - The Superintendent Of Police, Janjgir, District - Janjgir - Champa
Chhattisgarh., District : Janjgir-Champa, (C.G.)
... Respondents
{Cause title is taken from Case Information System}
For Petitioner : Mr. Vimlesh Bajpai, Advocate appears on behalf
of Ms. Nirupama Bajpai, Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Rajeev Bharat, Govt. Advocate.
2
(Hon’ble Mr. Justice Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Order on Board
28.07.2025
1. Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has
been filed by the petitioner against the order dated 29.06.2019 (Annexure
P-3) passed by respondent No. 4- The Inspector General of Police, Bilaspur
Range, Bilaspur whereby the petitioner has been held guilty of misconduct
under paragraph 64 (10) of the Police Regulation and inflicted penalty of
reduction of rank from the post of “Assistant Sub-Inspector” to the post of
“Head Constable” for three years from the date of passing of order and the
order dated 14.02.2020 (Annexure P-1) whereby appeal preferred against
the order dated 29.06.2019 was dismissed by respondent No. 2 – The
Director General of Police, Police Headquarter, Raipur (C.G.).
2. Facts of the case, as projected by the petitioner, in nutshell, are that
while the petitioner was posted as “Assistant Sub Inspector” in Police Station
Jaijaipur, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.), he was served with the charge-
sheet on the allegation that while investigating Crime No. 128 / 2018 against
accused – Briahspat Sahu for the offence under Sections 380 & 454 of the
IPC, the petitioner has obtained amount from Shyam Sundar Sahu (brother
of accused) for providing undue benefit to accused Briahspat Sahu. The
petitioner filed reply to the charge-sheet denying the allegation.
2.1 Being dissatisfied with the reply, respondent authorities initiated
departmental enquiry against petitioner and after completion of departmental
enquiry, Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 4.8.2018 (Annexure R-1)
before respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 while accepting enquiry
report, vide impugned order dated 29.06.2019 (Annexure P-3) imposed
major penalty upon the petitioner and he was demoted in the lower rank to
3
the post of “Head Constable” from “Assistant Sub Inspector”. Appeal
preferred by the petitioner against the order dated 29.06.2019 was also
dismissed by respondent No. 2 vide impugned order dated 14.02.2020
(Annexure P-1). Therefore, the petitioner filed instant writ petition seeking
relief of setting aside / quashment of both the orders on the ground
mentioned in the writ petition.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that without
affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, he has been inflicted
major penalty of reducing his rank from the post of “Assistant Sub Inspector”
to the post of “Head Constable”. He would further submit that in
departmental enquiry, neither the documents relied upon by the Enquiry
Officer had been provided to the petitioner nor adequate opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses has been provided to him. It is further
submitted that the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty only on the
basis of Audio-Video CD without proving it with the certificate issued under
Section 65 (B) of the Evidence Act, 1872. It is further contended that without
any reliable evidence, petitioner has been penalized with major penalty and
the appellate authority also did not consider aforesaid facts and dismissed
the appeal in mechanical way. Learned counsel further submitted that at
present, the petitioner has been retired from service, therefore, he prayed
that instant petition may be allowed and the impugned orders passed by
disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority may be set aside
directing the respondent authorities to re-instate the petitioner on his
previous post from the date of reduction of his rang by giving him all
consequential benefits.
4
4. The respondents / state has filed its reply. Learned counsel for the
state while referring to its reply would submit that the petitioner had
demanded and received money from brother of the accused – Briahspat
Sahu in connection with Crime No. 128/2018, which was recorded by the
complainant in his mobile phone. On being complaint made against the
petitioner along with C.D., departmental enquiry was instituted against him,
in which, due opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner by
following Rules, Regulations and principle of natural justice. During enquiry,
the Enquiry Officer recorded evidence of departmental witnesses and
evidence adduced by delinquent employee / petitioner and after analyzing
the same, charge of misconduct levelled against the petitioner under
Regulation 64 (10) was found proved by the Enquiry Officer. Learned
counsel further submits that thereafter, explanation was sought for from
petitioner by disciplinary authority by providing him copy of enquiry report,
which was also replied by the petitioner. It is further submitted that earlier
also, i.e. in the year 2017, major penalty was imposed against the petitioner
for alike offence, thus, he was found to be a habitual wrongdoer, but his
conduct was not improved, therefore, the petitioner has been inflicted major
penalty of reducing his rank from the post of “Assistant Sub-Inspector” to the
post of “Head Constable”. It is next contended that the petitioner has not
produced any valid fact to interfere with the departmental proceedings and
punishment inflicted against him and it settled position of law that in
Departmental Enquiry proceeding, writ court has very limited jurisdiction and
it cannot sit as an appellate authority. No any grave error or mistake has
been pointed out by the petitioner to be interfered with under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
Hence, the appeal is liable to be rejected. In this regard, he relied upon in
5
the case of State of Rajasthan & others vs. Bhupendra Singh 1 and State
Bank of India and another vs. K.S. Vishwanath2.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the
record with utmost circumspection alongwith record of departmental enquiry
proceedings.
6. In the instant case, departmental enquiry was conducted against the
petitioner in pursuance of the complaint made by Shyam Sundar Sahu –
brother of accused Briahspat Sahu, who was arrested in connection with
Crime No. 128 / 2018 for the offence punishable under Sections 380 & 454
of the IPC. In departmental enquiry, following charge was inflicted against
the petitioner :-
vkjksi
vipkjh lmfu lur dqekj cuthZ
“01 Fkkuk tStSiqj ds vi-dz- 128@18 /kkjk 380] 454 Hkknfo dh
foospuk djrs gq, vkjksih c`gLir lkgw dks ykHkkfUor djus vkjksih ds
HkkbZ ‘;ke lqanj lkgw ls :i;s izkIr dj Hkz”V vkpj.k iznf’kZr dj
iqfyl jsX;qys’ku ds iSjk 64 dh dafMdk ¼10½ ds foijhr vkpj.k
iznf’kZr djuk A”
7. Perusal of original record of enquiry report shows that while supplying
charge-sheet, the petitioner was also supplied list of witnesses alongwith
documents. In this regard, he had submitted his receipt on 28.11.2018 to
the Sub Divisional Officer (Police), Champa, District Janjgir-Champa. During
enquiry, four departmental witnesses were examined, who have also been
cross-examined by the petitioner himself. Enquiry Officer, after recording
1 2024 SCC Online SC 1908
2 (2022) 15 SCC 190
6
evidence, held guilty to the petitioner for the said misconduct. Record of
Enquiry report also shows that after receiving enquiry report, the same was
accepted by disciplinary authority, opportunity of hearing was afforded to the
petitioner by the disciplinary authority and after considering his entire service
record, in which, the petitioner was also found penalized for 62 times for
minor punishment and at once imposed major punishment in the year 2017,
the petitioner has been inflicted punishment, as has been sated in opening
paragraph of the order.
8. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India in a case of present nature, is no longer res integra. In
the case of State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao 3, a three judge
Bench held as under :-
‘7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether
the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and
according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there
is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to
hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court
may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities
have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
3 AIR 1963 SC 1723
7inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the
statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and
the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced
by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar
grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is
otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be
some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can
be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’
(emphasis supplied)
9. While considering the same issue, in the case of State Bank of India
and another Vs. K. S. Vishwanath (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court while
considering various judgments, has observed as under :-
“18. Recently in the case of State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj4
after considering other decisions of this Court on judicial review
and the power of the High Court in a departmental enquiry and
interference with the findings recorded in the departmental
enquiry, it is observed and held that the High Court is not a court
of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is further
observed and held that the High Court is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that
behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf,
4 (2020) 3 SCC 423
8and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. It is
further observed that if there is some evidence, that the authority
entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and
which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to review/reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at an
independent finding on the evidence.”
19. In paragraphs 9 to 14, Hon’ble Supreme Court had
considered other decisions on the power of the High Court on
judicial review on the decisions taken by the Disciplinary Authority
as under: [See : N. Gangaraj case, SCC pp. 426-30, paras 9-14]
“9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao 5 , a three-
Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High
Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of
the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
The Court held as under : (AIR pp. 1726 27, para7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine
whether the enquiry is held by an authority
competent in that behalf, and according to
the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence,
5 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6 : AIR 1963 SC 1723
9
which the authority entrusted with the duty
to hold the enquiry has accepted and which
evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of
the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to
arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence.”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India 6, again a three Judge Bench of
this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a
decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal
in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings
on the evidence. It was held as under : (SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but
a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that
the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to
determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent
officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied
with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on
some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power
to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to
reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding
must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical
rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence
as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
6 (1995) 6 SCC 749
10
authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of
judicial review does not act as appellate authority to
reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. The
Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held
the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of
inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by
the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the
conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person
would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may
interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould
the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of
each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive
power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union
of India v. H.C. Goel7 , this Court held that if the conclusion,
upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of
the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari
could be issued.”
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil 8, this Court held
that interference with the decision of departmental authorities is
permitted if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the
principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations
prescribing the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under :
7 AIR 1964 SC 364
8 (2000) 1 SCC 416
11“16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000)
1 LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have
approached the case as though it was an appeal
against the order of the administrative/disciplinary
authority of the High Court. Interference with the
decision of departmental authorities can be permitted,
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in
violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode
of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is
vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence
and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by
the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary
or capricious that no reasonable person could have
arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to
the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the
facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The
settled legal position is that if there is some legal
evidence on which the findings can be based, then
adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya 9 ,
this Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court and
reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on
the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If
the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are
based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be ground for interfering with
the findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under :
(SCC pp. 58788, paras 7 & 10)
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act
as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
9 (2011) 4 SCC 584
12domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry
has been fairly and properly held and the findings are
based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings
of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where
such findings are based on no evidence or where they are
clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see
whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at
such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The
courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India
[B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , Union of India v. G. Ganayutham
[Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1806] and Bank of India v. Degala
Suryanarayana [Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana,
(1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036] , High Court of
Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil [High Court of Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil [(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S)
144] .)
xxx xxx xxx
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted
the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not
in any way render a completed disciplinary proceeding
invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of guilt or
consequential punishment. The standard of proof required
in criminal proceedings being different from the standard
of proof required in departmental enquiries, the same
charges and evidence may lead to different results in the
two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in
the criminal proceedings. This is more so when the
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departmental proceedings are more proximate to the
incident, in point of time, when compared to the criminal
proceedings. The findings by the criminal court will have
no effect on previously concluded domestic enquiry. An
employee who allows the findings in the enquiry and the
punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain finality by
non challenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal
court has acquitted him.”
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v. P.
Gunasekaran reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC
(L&S) 554] , this Court held that while reappreciating evidence
the High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to
when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary
proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High
Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks
its conscience.”
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies upon the
judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari reported in
(2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335] , wherein this Court held that if
the disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported by any
evidence whatsoever or a finding which is unreasonably arrived at, the writ
court could interfere with the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not
14
find that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could
interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It is not the
case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the ground
that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The
discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no evidence. The
inquiry officer has appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the
respondent is guilty of misconduct.”
20. That thereafter the Supreme Court has observed and held in
paragraph 7, 8 and 15 as under:
“7. The disciplinary authority has taken into consideration the
evidence led before the IO to return a finding that the charges
levelled against the respondent stand proved.
8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.
The power of judicial review is confined to the decisionmaking
process. The power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate
authority.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An
appeal before the State Government was also dismissed. Once
the evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority,
in exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High
Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate
authority. We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed
the larger Bench judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P.
v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723] and B.C. Chaturvedi
[B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 80] as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders
passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent
illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.”
15
10. Applying the ratio of law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in afore-
cited cases to the facts of the instant case, it is quite vivid that due
opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner prior to institution of
Departmental Enquiry Proceeding and prior to imposing punishment. The
petitioner himself had cross-examined the departmental witnesses, as such,
principle of natural justice with regard to due opportunity of hearing has been
followed by the respondent authorities while initiation of departmental
enquriy and while imposing major penalty upon the petitioner.
11. Allegation against the petitioner is getting money from brother of
accused Briahspat Sahu to provide him undue benefit in the crime registered
against the accused. The said allegation was recorded by complainant in his
mobile video, which was also seen by Enquiry officer. It is alleged by
petitioner that recording of audio-video CD was not provided to the
petitioner, whereas, he himself had submitted receipt before the Enquiry
Officer that he has received documents as per list. He himself had cross-
examined the witnesses, therefore, aforesaid contention raised by the
petitioner is not found to be sustainable.
12. In departmental enquiry proceeding or in a quashi judicial proceeding,
strict provisions of The Evidence Act, 1872 is not applicable, rather in such
proceedings, allegations are considered / proved on the basis of principle
preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, contention raised by the petitioner
that Audio-Video C.D. has not been proved as per the provisions contained
in Evidence Act is not sustainable.
13. Upon perusal of record of departmental enquiry, it is not found that the
petitioner has been held guilty on said misconduct without any evidence,
even otherwise the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter,
16
which can be canvassed before the High Court, rather this issue is
considered by the appellate authority.
14. Nothing has been brought by the petitioner before this Court, which
induces this Court to interfere with the proceeding conducted by respondent
authorities by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. As per
impugned order (Annexure P-3), earlier also the petitioner had been
penalized for alike misconduct, despite that his conduct did not improve and
he was penalized again for the same misconduct. As such, I do not find any
good ground to interfere with the impugned orders passed by disciplinary
authority and affirmed by the appellate authority.
15. As a fallout and consequence of the aforesaid discussion, writ petition,
being sans merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. No cost (s).
Sd/-
(Naresh Kumar Chandravanshi)
Judge
Digitally signed
AMIT by AMIT
KUMAR DUBEY
KUMAR Date:
DUBEY 2025.08.04
13:20:00 +0530