Gujarat High Court
M/S Basic Style Pvt. Ltd vs Harshad Harishchandra Mahuvagara on 1 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10699 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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M/S BASIC STYLE PVT. LTD. & ORS.
Versus
HARSHAD HARISHCHANDRA MAHUVAGARA & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR. MH SHEKHAWAT(7194) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 01/08/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Heard Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate for Mr.
M.H.Shekhawat, learned advocate for the petitioners.
2. Mr. Prem D. Dave, learned advocate has instructions to
appear on behalf of respondent No.1 and seeks permission of
this Court to file Vakalatnama on behalf of respondent No.1.
2.1. Permission, as sought for, is granted. The Registry
shall accept his Vakalatnama for respondent No.1.
3. Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate for the petitioners has
tendered a draft amendment, whereby, seeking permission to
delete respondent No.2, who is inadvertently joined in the
array of the respondents.
3.1. Permission, as sought for, is granted. The draft
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amendment is allowed. Amendment to be carried out
accordingly. Respondent No.2 is permitted to be deleted from
the array of the respondents of the present writ application.
4. The present writ application is filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India seeking following reliefs:
“8. A) This Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside
the impugned Order dated 21.06.2025 passed by the
Appellate Court 18th Additional District Judge at Surat,
Gujarat in Civil Misc. Application (Delay) No.26 of 2024 in
Civil Appeal filed by Petitioners therein at ANNEXURE-A,
whereby dismissed the said application on the ground of
delay of about 4 years, 7 months and 11 days i.e. 1618 days
in filing the said Appeal and thereby condoned the said delay
and remand back to the Appellate Court to hear afresh and
whereby allow the Petitioners to proceed the said Appeal
before Appellate Court; after condoning the said delay in the
said matter therein;
B) This Hon’ble Court may further be pleased to grant stay or
statuquo pending admission, hearing and final disposal of
this petition and thereby stay the execution taken out by
Respondent No.1 vide Darkhast (Execution Application)
No.119 of 2023, of Respondent No.1 (original Plaintiff)
against the Petitioners before the 2nd Judge City Civil Court at
Dindoshi, Mumbai, and / or thereby the further proceedings
also in the said Darkhast (Execution Application) No.119 of
2023, pending before the 2nd Judge City Civil Court at
Dindoshi, Mumbai, for Orders be stayed or statusquo may be
granted in the interest of Justice; till the said Appeal be
finally decided by the Appellate Court thereof ;
That in the alternative;
C) That this Hon’ble Court be further pleased to quash and
set aside the impugned Order dated 15.07.2019, passed by
the Ld. 9th Addl. Senior Civil Court, at Surat, Gujarat, in
Summary Suit Case No.26 of 2018, in favour of Respondent
No.1 (Original Plaintiff) and against the Petitioners vide
impugned Order dated 15.07.2019 at ANNEXURE-B;
D) ……xxxxx…..xxxxx…xxxx”
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5. At the outset, it is required to be noted that during the
course of arguments, Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate
submitted that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are husband and wife.
This fact was neither pleaded nor pressed into service before
the Appellate Court concerned.
5.1. When this Court confronted Mr. More, learned
advocate about any proof of marriage between the petitioner
Nos.2 and 3, he has produced a copy of “Nikah Nama”
showing that they are husband and wife.
5.2. When this Court has gone through such “Nikah
Nama”, it appears that it was dated 11.08.2020, which is
undoubtedly post judgment and decree passed by the Trial
Court on 15.07.2019. The addresses, which are at Nos.2 and 3
provided in the cause-title of the present writ application as
well as in appeal filed before the Trial Court, would indicate
that petitioner Nos.2 and 3 are residing at different addresses.
Further, bare reading of name of petitioner No.3 would
indicate that he is not belonged to Muslim community.
5.3. Be that as it may, prima facie, it appears that to
divert the attention of this Court, a false plea has been taken
by the petitioners under the guise that daughter of petitioner
No.2 suffering from some illness and to contend that petitioner
No.3 happens to be father of daughter, such plea of marriage
has been pressed into service before this Court.
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5.4. It is very deplorable and disgraceful conduct on the
part of the petitioners to use the medical condition of a child
not born out of the wedlock of petitioner Nos.2 and 3, even if
it is believed that they got married on 11.08.2020.
5.5. Mr. More, learned advocate would not be in a position
to dispute the aforesaid factum of execution of “Nikah Nama”
placed it before this Court. This Court is not at all accept such
kind of mischief played by the present petitioners just to get
out of inordinate delay in filing their appeal before the
Appellate Court. As such, this Court is going to impose
exemplary costs upon the petitioners to mislead and misguide
this Court in the aforesaid aspect.
6. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
6.1. Now, adverting to the facts of the present case, it
appears that petitioners herein are original defendants of
Summary Suit No.26 of 2018 filed by the respondent herein
wherein on service of summons, petitioners have appeared
through their lawyer and sought time to file leave to defend
on service of summons of judgment upon him.
6.2. The impugned judgment passed by the Appellate Court
indicates that despite granted sufficient opportunity, no such
leave to defend was filed. Consequently, as per Order 37 of
Civil Procedure Code, a decree of Rs.28,01,894/- was passed
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by the Trial Court on 15.07.2019. The petitioners did nothing
for years together having not questioned such decree.
6.3. It further appears that having faced with the execution
proceedings initiated by the respondent, they thought it to file
Regular Appeal under Section 96 read with Order 41 of Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”)
before the Appellate Court, which appears to have been filed
on 26.02.2024. So, there was a delay of 4 years, 7 months and
11 days in filing such appeal.
6.4. This Court is not having copy of delay application
submitted by petitioners along with their appeal but to place
on record the copy of impugned judgment which has
incorporated most of the facts which are narrated in the delay
application.
6.5. The main ground set out by the petitioners for such
inordinate delay was, having not been informed by the lawyer
engaged by them and another ground set out is illness of
petitioner No.2’s daughter. The lame excuse also given by the
petitioners that due to Covid-19 situation, appeal could not be
filed in time.
6.6. After hearing the parties, the Appellate Court has not
found any sufficient cause made out by the petitioners,
whereby, rejected impugned delay application vide its order
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dated 21.06.2025.
7. Having dissatisfied with the aforesaid order passed by the
Appellate Court, the petitioners happen to be the original
appellants – defendants have preferred the present writ
application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
8. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS – DEFENDANTS.
8.1. Mr. Sunil More, learned advocate would submit that
due to Covid-19 situation and due to medical condition of
petitioner No.2’s daughter, appeal could not be filed in time,
which ought to have been considered as a sufficient cause in
not filing an appeal in time.
8.2. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that
petitioners were not made aware about passing of ex-parte
decree inasmuch as lawyer engaged by the petitioners have
never communicated this fact to the petitioners. It is submitted
that sufficient cause may be construed liberally and hyper
technical approach may be avoided to advance justice to the
parties.
8.3. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that
petitioners have no malafide intention not to file an appeal in
time but due to facts, which are set out in the delay
application and constitutes sufficient cause, requires to have
been considered by the Appellate Court and having not done
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so, committed serious errors of law, which may be corrected
by this Court while exercising powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.
8.4. Mr. More, learned advocate would further submit that
as such, petitioners have a good case on merits and according
to him, Summary Suit itself was not maintainable, thereby,
one opportunity may be given to the petitioners to present
their case on merit.
8.5. Lastly, Mr. More, learned advocate would submit that
this Court may exercise its supervisory jurisdiction in the
present case and may condone the delay in filing the appeal
by imposing any reasonable cost which can compensate
otherside.
8.6. To buttress his arguments, Mr. More, learned advocate
would rely upon the following four decisions, which are as
under:
i. Nainesh Girishkumar Panchal V/s. Chirag Girishkumar
Panchal (decided by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in CA
NO.134 of 2021 in F/Appeal from Order No.26865 of 2020
[on 08th March, 2021]);
ii. Decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of The
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. V/s Standard Casting Pvt. Ltd.,
(decided on 13.05.2022);
iii. Jyotsna K. Valia V/s. T.S.Parekh and Co., (decided on
26.04.2007) andPage 7 of 18
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iv. Decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of
Corporation Bank Vs. Bhukya Ramesh in Suit No.197/ 2013
(decided on 10.12.2013).
8.7. Making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. More, learned
advocate requests this Court to allow the present writ
application.
9. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT – PLAINTIFF.
9.1. Mr. Pradip D. Dave, learned advocate would submit
that as such, there is no error much less any gross error of
law committed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the
impugned delay application.
9.2. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that
the Appellate Court has examined the delay application on its
merit and considered each and every aspects of the case and
having come to definite conclusion that there is no sufficient
cause made out by the petitioners.
9.3. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that
the petitioners were served with the summons of Summary Suit
wherein they have appeared through lawyer, to whom, copy of
summons for judgment was served and then after, learned
advocate for the petitioners sought time to file leave to defend
which never filed on record. It is submitted that when no
leave to defend application came to be filed by the petitioners,
as per provisions of Order 37 of C.P.C., decree is required to
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be passed by the Trial Court and accordingly, such decree was
passed on 15.07.2019.
9.4. Mr. Dave, learned advocate would further submit that
there was long, inordinate and unexplained delay of 4 years, 7
months and 11 days in filing Regular Appeal, challenging such
judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and as such,
till date, respondent has not received any amount under decree
and in that view of the matter, this Court may not exercise its
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in favour
of the petitioners.
9.5. It is respectfully submitted that wherever there is a
long, inordinate and huge delay on the part of the applicant/s
in legal proceedings, if it is found that there is a gross
negligence on the part of the applicant/s, such delay should
not be condoned in a routine manner.
9.6. So, making the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Dave,
learned advocate requests this Court to reject this writ
application.
10. POINT FOR DETERMINATION
10.1. The short question falls for my consideration as to
whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, any gross
error committed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the
delay application filed by the present petitioners.
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11. ANALYSIS
12. The facts, which are stated hereinabove, are not in
dispute. As such, the delay of more than 4 years, 7 months
and 11 days in filing Regular Civil Appeal by petitioners is
neither satisfactorily explained nor any sufficient cause made
out by them. It is remained undisputed as observed by the
Appellate Court in para-7 that summons for judgment was
served upon advocate of petitioners, who did not file any leave
to defend on behalf of the petitioners.
13. So, in that situation, no fault can be found with the Trial
Court when it passed decree as per provisions of Order 37 of
C.P.C. Such decree was passed on 15.07.2019 and
undisputedly, as judicial notice can be taken of the fact that
Covid-19 situation was not in existence at that point of time.
The petitioners have tried to take undue advantage of Covid-19
situation which erupted in India only in the month of March
2020 onwards which was lasted till mid of 2022.
14. Be that as it may, post Covid-19 situation, there was
ample opportunity and time available with the petitioners to
file appeal, which they did not do for more than one and half
years as appeal was filed only on 26.02.2024. The non-
communication of judgment and decree by lawyer engaged by
petitioners would not be a ground and it did not constitute
sufficient cause inasmuch as it was duty of petitioners to take
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update of the case instituted against them.
15. It appears that petitioner No.1 is a limited company and
it cannot play ignorance of law as affairs of private limited
company would be handled by not an illiterate person.
16. Likewise, medical condition of daughter of petitioner
No.2, which was pressed into service before the Appellate
Court, is also not found satisfactory reason for seeking
condonation of delay by petitioner No.1 happens to be the
company / jury’s person.
17. It has been specifically observed by Appellate Court in
para-8 of its impugned judgment that no evidence has been
submitted to show that daughter of petitioner No.2 was
continuously hospitalized during entire period i.e. between
15.07.2019 till appeal came to be filed on 26.02.2024.
18. It is correctly observed by the Appellate Court that
assuming for the timing that petitioner No.2 might be
occupying herself with medical illness of her daughter but such
condition was not prohibiting petitioner Nos.1 and 3 in
prosecuting any affairs of the company, thereby, they could
have easily filed the appeal. I am in complete agreement with
the view taken by the Appellate Court on this regard.
19. Having so observed in the earlier part of this judgment,
how condition of child has been pressed into service by the
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petitioners just to get undue advantage of such situation and to
get condoned such huge delay of more than 4 years in filing
the appeal. This Court cannot allow such dilatory tactics used
by the petitioners, which is deprecated.
20. At this stage, it would be apt to refer and rely upon the
recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India
delivered on 08-01-2025 in a case of H. Guruswamy & Ors.
Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased By Lrs. reported in Civil
Appeal No. 317 of 2025 reported as 2025 INSC 53, wherein
held as under:
“[13] We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court
overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the
High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court
has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the
concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”,
“substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison
the substantial law of limitation.
[14] We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited
complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a
judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the
parties.
[15] The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of
parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
[16] The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While consideringPage 12 of 18
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the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation.
It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
[17] We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court
should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.1. In the case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr V/S Ved Prakash
reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406, wherein held as under;
“[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of
the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial court.
We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the
litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in
attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a
moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by
itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the
litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to
be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court
initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be
permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and
thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.
[12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of
this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State
Insurance Corporation, 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as
under:-
“The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that
actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the
availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the
defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to
the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and
sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed
to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The
principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the
maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws
give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep).
Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a
person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as alsoPage 13 of 18
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to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.2. It is also apposite to refer and rely upon the decision
in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra
Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after
revisiting the law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
“10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a
court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be
exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due
diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v.
Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not
supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable,
satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K.
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus,
it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no
negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.,
(2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for
condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in
Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar
Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
“21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation
of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their
proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that
these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper
perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for
emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of
delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to
be taken note of.
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21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation
of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should
not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts
are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the
conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally
unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay
of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is
attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the
first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a
liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into
consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts
are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the
name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged
in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to
expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.3. Last but not least, it is also profitable to refer to and
rely upon ratio laid down by recent past decision of
Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy
Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 :
2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its previous
decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation
vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of “sufficient cause”.
It has been held thus:-
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“[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be
an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the
right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for
a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period
of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept
in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of
limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay
if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient
cause is established for various factors such as, where there is
inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not
mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not
satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning
the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.”
(emphasis supplied)
20.4. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of case of
Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, wherein it is held as under:-
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“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient
cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented
him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found
to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or
remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard
to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts
to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. The judgments, which are cited by Mr. More, learned
advocate for the petitioners, in support of his submissions are
not going to help in light of the aforesaid clear pronouncement
of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, which is
binding to this Court. So, this Court not thought it fit to deal
with any of such decisions cited by learned advocate for the
petitioners.
22. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of
the present case and having applied the ratio laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the above referred
decisions, I am of the view that there is neither any gross
error of law nor any jurisdictional error committed by the
Appellate Court while rejecting the impugned delay
application, rather, I am in complete agreement with the view
taken by the Appellate Court while rejecting the delay
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NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/10699/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/08/2025
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application.
23. CONCLUSION.
23.1. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in the
present writ application inasmuch as no sufficient cause made
out by the petitioners in their delay application filed before
the Appellate Court. Having come to this, the present writ
application is bereft of any merit, requires to be rejected,
which is hereby REJECTED.
23.2. This Court would not have burdened the petitioners by
imposing a cost while rejecting the present writ application but
having considered the conduct of the petitioners, which is
recorded in the first part of this judgment, this Court deems it
fit to impose a costs of Rs.25,000/-, to be deposited by the
petitioners before District Legal Services Authority, Surat within
a period of two weeks from today. Compliance of this part of
order be taken care by the Trial Court / Executing Court.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
Lalji Desai
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