Telangana High Court
D. Shekar Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 1 August, 2025
Author: Juvvadi Sridevi
Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
CRIMINAL PETITION No.4682 OF 2022
O R D E R:
This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-
complainant seeking to quash the impugned order dated
02.11.2021 passed in Criminal Revision Petition No.30 of
2018 by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Medak at
Sangareddy (hereinafter referred to as “the learned Sessions
Judge”), whereby the learned Sessions Judge confirmed the
order dated 18.06.2018 passed in C.F.R.No.163 of 2018
(Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.78 of 2018) in Crime
No.368 of 2018 by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First
Class, Special Mobile Court at Sangareddy (hereinafter
referred to as “the learned trial Court”). By the said order,
the learned trial Court dismissed the protest complaint filed
by the petitioner under Section 190(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’).
02. Heard Sri V.T.Kalyan, learned counsel
representing Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned counsel for
2
the petitioner; Smt.S.Madhavi, learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the respondent Nos.1 and 5-State;
and Sri V.Surender Rao, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.2. No representation for the respondent
Nos.3 and 5. Perused the record.
03. It is the case of the petitioner that he instituted a
suit for cancellation of the sale deed bearing document
No.19481 dated 29.11.2005 on the file of the learned
Principal Junior Civil Judge, Sangareddy, in which an interim
order of status-quo was granted against the respondent No.2
herein along with other defendants therein. It is alleged that
during the subsistence of the said status quo order, the
respondent No.2 executed a sale deed bearing document
No.30381 dated 13.12.2006 in favour of the respondent No.3
and subsequently cancelled the said sale deed by executing
a cancellation deed bearing document No.19595 of 2013
dated 13.09.2013. However, the fact of cancellation was
brought to the notice of the learned Junior Civil Judge after a
lapse of one and a half years, by which time 36
adjournments had taken place, and the petitioner was
3
compelled to attend the Civil Court proceedings by travelling
from Bangalore, thereby causing him undue hardship and
harassment. The petitioner alleges that this sequence of
events caused him harassment and amounted to a violation
of the interim order by the unofficial respondents. For which,
the petitioner sought for invoking criminal proceedings
against the unofficial respondents for the offences
punishable under Sections 120-B, 327, 406, 409, 420, 424,
467, 468, and 471 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short ‘IPC‘).
04. Learned counsel for the petitioner-complainant
submitted that both the Courts have failed to appreciate the
allegations made by the petitioner in proper perspective and
erroneously dismissed his case. It is contended that the Civil
Court had passed an order of status-quo on 07.07.2006, and
despite having full knowledge of the said order, the
respondent No.2 in collusion with the respondent No.4
executed a sale deed in favour of the respondent No.3 with a
dishonest intention to frustrate the petitioner’s claim and to
cause inordinate delay in the disposal of the suit. The
4
respondents compelled the petitioner to attend the Civil Court
on 36 occasions, travelling from Bangalore, thereby causing
him considerable hardship, including loss of valuable time
and money. While praying to allow this Criminal Petition by
quashing the orders passed by both the Courts, he relied
upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan
and another v. Krishnaveni and another 1 wherein it was
held at Paragraph No.14 that:
“14. In view of the above discussion, we hold that
through the revision before the High Court under
sub-section (1) of Section 397 is prohibited by
sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the
High Court is still available under Section 482 of
the Code and as it is paramount power of
continuous superintendence of the High Court
under Section 483, the High is justified in
interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of
justice and in setting aside the order of the courts
below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for
decision on merits after consideration of the
evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone
into the merits of the case. Since the High Court
has left the matter to be considered by the1
(1997) 4 Supreme Court Cases 241
5Magistrate, it would be in appropriate at this stage
to go into that question. We have only considered
the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High
Court in the in the context of the revisional power
under Section 397 (1) read with Section 397(3)
and the inherent powers. We do not find any
justification warranting interference in the appeal.”
05. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State and the learned counsel
for respondent No.2 contended that the learned trial Court as
well as the learned Sessions Judge had rightly dismissed the
case of the petitioner, and that there is no illegality or
irregularity in their respective orders warranting interference
by this Court. It is further submitted that the present Criminal
Petition is not maintainable, as the petitioner’s revision
application has already been adjudicated upon by the
learned Sessions Judge. While praying to dismiss this
Criminal Petition, he relied upon a decision of the
Honourable Supreme Court in Rajan Kumar Machananda
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v. State of Karnataka 2 wherein it was held at Paragraph
No.2 that:
“2. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. The
respondent State had challenged the order before
the Court of Sessions when the learned
Magistrate before whom the matter was
proceeding directed release of the truck in favour
of the appellant. The Revisional Court dismissed
the petition of the State. A second Revision did
not lie at the instance of the State to the High
Court in view of the provisions of Section 397(3)
of Cr.P.C. Obviously, to avoid this bar, the
application moved by the State before the High
Court was stated to be under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
asking for exercise of inherent powers. In
exercise of that power, the High Court has
reversed the order of the Magistrate as affirmed
by the Sessions Judge. The question for
consideration is as to whether the bar under
Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. should have been taken
note of to reject the revision at the instance of the
State Government or action taken by the High
Court in exercise of its inherent power has to be
sustained. It is not disputed by counsel appearing
for the State that the move before the High Court
was really on application for revision of the order2
MANU/SC/0267/1987
7of the Magistrate releasing the truck. That is
exactly what is prohibited under Section 397(3)
Cr.P.C. Merely by saying that the jurisdiction of
the High Court for exercise of its inherent power
was being invoked the statutory bar could not
have been overcome. If that was to be permitted
every revision application facing the bar of
Section 397(3) of the Code could be labelled as
one under Section 482. We are satisfied that this
is a case where the High Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the revision. The appeal is allowed
and we set aside the order of the High Court. The
Order of the Magistrate as affirmed by the
Session Judge is upheld.”
06. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the case and upon considering the submissions advanced by
both sides, it is evident on the face of the record that during
the pendency of the civil proceedings between the parties,
wherein an interim status-quo order was subsisting, the
unofficial respondents had executed certain documents
behind the petitioner. It is alleged by the petitioner that the
said acts of the unofficial respondents amounts to violation of
the court orders and caused him much hardship and
inconvenience. In such scenario, the petitioner ought to
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have availed the remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2(A) of the
Civil Procedure Code (for short ‘CPC‘) for necessary action
against the unofficial respondents for violation of the interim
orders passed by a Civil Court. But the petitioner tried to
invoke criminal jurisdiction for violation of a civil court order.
07. It is to be noted that in Krishnan‘s case cited
supra, the Honourable Supreme Court at Paragraph No.10
held that:
“10. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by
Section 397(3) of the Code, a person
accused/complainant – cannot be allowed to take
recourse to the revision to the High Court under
Section 397 (1) or under inherent power of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it
may amount to circumvention of the provisions of
Section 397 (3) or section 397(2) of the Code. It is
seen that the High Court has suo motu power
under Section 401 and continuous supervisory
jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So,
when the High Court on examination of the record
finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or
abuse of process of the courts or the required
statutory procedure has not been complied with
or there is failure of justice or order passed or
9sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires
correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to
have it corrected at the inception lest grave
miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is,
therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent
abuse of the process that the High Court is
preserved with inherent power and would be
justified, under such circumstance, to exercise the
inherent power and in an appropriate case even
revisional power and in appropriate case even
revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with
Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may
be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless
multiplicity or procedure, unnecessary delay in
trial and protraction of proceedings.”
08. In the above authority, it is made clear that when
a revision is barred under Section 397(3) of Cr.P.C. an
accused or complainant cannot invoke the revisional
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 397(1) of Cr.P.C.
or resort to its inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
as doing so would amount to circumventing the statutory bar.
However, the High Court possesses suo motu powers under
Section 401 of Cr.P.C. and supervisory jurisdiction under
Section 483 of Cr.P.C. Thus, where the High Court, upon
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examining the record, finds a grave miscarriage of justice,
abuse of process, non-compliance with statutory procedure,
or any failure of justice, it is not only empowered but duty-
bound to intervene. In such exceptional circumstances, to
secure the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process, the
High Court may justifiably exercise its inherent powers under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C and, where warranted, its revisional
powers under Sections 397(1) & 401 of Cr.P.C.
Nonetheless, such powers must be exercised sparingly to
avoid procedural multiplicity, undue delay, or protraction of
trial proceedings.
09. In Rajan Kumar Machananda‘s case cited
supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the party cannot
invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to circumvent the statutory bar and
merely labeling a second revision as an application under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C does not confer jurisdiction and ruled
that the High Court had no authority to entertain such a
petition and restored the order of the Magistrate as affirmed
by the Sessions Court.
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10. Having regard to the settled principle of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and upon a careful
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the present
case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
petitioner, instead of initiating contempt proceedings for the
alleged violation of the court’s interim orders, has sought to
invoke the criminal jurisdiction of this Court, notwithstanding
the fact that he has already exhausted his remedy of revision
before the learned Sessions Judge. In light of the legal
principle that the inherent powers of the High Court under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly and only
in exceptional circumstances, the petitioner was required to
approach this Court strictly within the confines of such limited
jurisdiction, but, in the present case, there are no such
exceptional circumstances shown by the petitioner. In that
view of the matter, this Criminal Petition is not maintainable
and is liable to be dismissed.
11. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
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As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if
any, shall stand closed.
__________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Dated: 01.08.2025
KHRM
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