Supreme Court of India
Narayan Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 5 August, 2025
2025 INSC 927
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3343 OF 2025
(Arising out SLP (Crl.) No. 10595 of 2025)
NARAYAN YADAV …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
CHANDRESH
Date: 2025.08.05
19:02:02 IST
Reason:
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.,
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX
A. FACTUAL MATRIX …………………………………………………….. 2
B. ANAYLYSIS ………………………………………………………………. 6
a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence ……………………….. 7
b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in Nature ………… 20
c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872 ………………. 22
d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC …… 25
C. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………….. 34Page 1 of 35
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated
16.01.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) by
which the appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the
judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court came to
be partly allowed by altering the conviction of the appellant herein
from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, “the
IPC”) to Section 304 Part I of the IPC.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The appellant (original accused) himself lodged a First Information
Report (FIR) dated 27.09.2019 with Korba Kotwali Police Station,
District Korba, which came to be registered for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The FIR reads thus:
“On 27.09.2019 I came to the P.S. Kotwali on the
orders of Chowki Incharge for getting the Nalsi
number in Crime No. 0/19 for the offence under
Sections 302 and 380 IPC respectively. Nalsi number
detailed that I am residing in the house of my relative
Rajnath Yadav situated near the Pump House,
Korba. I earn my livelihood as a milk supplier. I
started work with Ram Babu Sharma, Thekedar past
15-20 days. Ram Babu Sharma used to call me for
having drink at his house. Ram Baby invited me at
his place on 24.09.2019. I went to his house at about
9.30 PM situated at Parshuram Nagar. We both sat
and drank. Meanwhile I showed my girlfriend’s pic
from my mobile. Then he said that get your girlfriend
at my place and leave her with me for one night.
Hearing this quarrel started between us and we
started to fight. Then I picked up a knife kept in his
house for cutting vegetables and inflicted blows on
Page 2 of 35
his neck and stomach in anger and killed him by
hitting a log of wood on his head, legs and private
part. Thereafter I dragged his dead body near the
bedside and covered it with a cloth that I took out
from an almirah. Then I ransacked his room and took
away his purse containing Rs. 7000 and keys of the
Bolero car. I locked the room from outside and got the
Bolero outside and locked the main door and ran
towards Bilaspur in Bolero. I met with an accident at
Raipur Road, ahead of Bilaspur. When I regained
consciousness in morning I found myself in Saragaon
Hospital where my mother and Yuvraj Yadu both
were present. Today morning I came to Korba after
getting discharged from the hospital. I informed about
the incident to my mausa Rajnath Yadav, Rahul
Chaudhari and Anuj Yadav and also informed the
CSEB Chowki. Then I went to Ram Babu’s house with
police people and pointed out the dead body. My
vehicle is at the place of accident. I am filing the
report. Investigation to be done.”
4. Upon registration of the FIR, lodged by the appellant himself, at the
concerned Police Station referred to above, the investigation
commenced. It appears that the investigating officer, after arresting
the appellant, took him to the house of the deceased. After breaking
open the house, the dead body of the deceased was found lying in
a pool of blood inside his residence. A panchnama of the scene of
offence was prepared in the presence of panch witnesses. The knife
allegedly used by the appellant to inflict injuries on the deceased
was recovered from the place of occurrence, i.e., the deceased’s
house. The clothes and other articles were also collected in
presence of the panch witnesses by preparing a panchnama, and
were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis.
The clothes of the appellant were discovered at his instance from
Page 3 of 35
the residence of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, by drawing a
panchnama.
5. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was drawn
in the presence of the panch witnesses. The body of the deceased
was then sent for post-mortem examination. The post-mortem
report Exhibit-PW 34 recorded the following injuries found on the
body of the deceased:
“1. An incised wound was present on the right Side
of his forehead measuring 6 X 2 cm, deep to the bone,
in a vertical position.
2. An incised wound was present on the left side of
his forehead, the size of which was 3 X 1 cm, deep to
the bone, in a vertical position.
3. An incised wound was present on the skin of the
right parietal bone of the head, which was 4 X 2 cm,
deep to the bone, in a vertical position.
4. An incised lesion was present on the skin of the
left parietal bone, which was 5 X 2 cm in size, deep
to the bone, in a vertical position, which was on the
middle part of parietal bone.
5. An incised wound was present on the anterior part
of the abdomen at the iliac fossa part which was 4 X
2 X 2 cm in size.
6. An incised wound was present on the upper right
side of the chest, below the clavicle bone, the size of
which was 4 X 2 deep to the upper part of the lung.”
6. The cause of death, as stated in the post-mortem report and duly
proved by Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), was shock resulting from
excessive bleeding from the right side of the chest and injury to the
upper lobe of the right lung.
7. Upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet came to be filed
by the investigating officer, and the filing of chargesheet for the
Page 4 of 35
offence enumerated above culminated in the Sessions Case No. 9 of
2020.
8. The Sessions Judge, Korba, proceeded to frame charge against the
appellant for the offences mentioned above. The appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. In the course of
trial, the prosecution examined the following witnesses:
i. PW-1, Rahul Kumar Chaudhari, panch witness (turned hostile);
ii. PW-2 Kamlesh Kumar, son of the deceased;
iii. PW-3 Ravishanker Sriniwas, panch witness;
iv. PW-4 Rampradeep Sharma, panch witness;
v. PW-5 Ramniwas Sharma, panch witness;
vi. PW-6 Jalashwar Sakar, panch witness;
vii. PW-7 B.R. Chaudhary, Police witness
viii. PW-8 Sudama Prasad, Police witness
ix. PW-9 Ashok Pandey, Police witness
x. PW-10 Dr. R.K. Divya, Medical Officer who performed post-
mortem
xi. PW-11 Hemant Patle, Police witness
9. The prosecution also adduced a few documentary evidence.
10. Upon completion of the recording of the oral evidence, further
statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In his statement, the appellant
claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime
and asserted his complete innocence.
Page 5 of 35
11. The Trial Court, upon overall appreciation of both oral as well as
the documentary evidence on record, reached the conclusion that
the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and
accordingly, it held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder
and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.
12. The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment and order of
conviction passed by the Trial Court, preferred an appeal before
the High Court. The High Court partly allowed the appeal and
altered the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 of the IPC
to Section 304 Part I of the IPC, giving benefit of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC.
13. In such circumstances referred to above the appellant is before
this Court with the present appeal.
B. ANAYLYSIS
14. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the High Court committed
any error in passing the Impugned Judgment.
15. The entire judgment of the High Court could be termed as
erroneous on several grounds, there are errors apparent on the
face of the Impugned Judgment. The first misstep was that the
High Court examined the medical evidence on record in detail and
then proceeded to directly corroborate it with the contents of the
FIR lodged by the appellant himself. In doing so, the High Court
Page 6 of 35
fully convinced itself that the appellant’s statements in the form of
a confession, as contained in the FIR, were entirely corroborated
by the medical evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that
the appellant had committed the alleged crime. In arriving at such
a conclusion, the High Court overlooked some fundamental
principles of criminal jurisprudence.
a. Confessional FIR is not Admissible in Evidence
16. The FIR was exhibited in evidence (Exhibit P-14) through the oral
evidence of the investigating officer PW-9, Ashok Pandey. PW-9
proved his signature on the FIR and also identified the signature
of the first informant i.e., the appellant-herein. However, the other
contents of the FIR could not have been proved through the
testimony of the investigating officer. A plain reading of the FIR
indicates that it contains a confession by its maker i.e., the
appellant-herein, regarding the commission of the alleged offence.
17. A statement in an FIR can normally be used only to contradict its
maker as provided in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(for short, “the Act of 1872”), or to corroborate his evidence as
envisaged in Section 157 of the Act of 1872. In a criminal trial,
however, neither of these is possible as long as the maker of the
statement is an accused in the case, unless he offers himself to be
examined as a witness [See: Nisar Ali v. State of U.P., 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 42]. J.L. Kapur, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench
in that decision has observed:
“A first information report is not a substantive piece
of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the
statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence
Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act.
Page 7 of 35
It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at
the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to
corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this
case, therefore, it is not evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. The High Court failed to take into consideration two landmark
decisions of this Court – one in Faddi v. State of M.P., 1964 SCC
OnLine SC 123, and the other in Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of
Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109.
19. In Faddi (supra), this Court stated that:
“If the FIR given by the accused contains any
admission as defined in Section 17 of the Evidence
Act there is no bar in using such an admission
against the maker thereof as permitted under Section
21 of the Act, provided such admission is not
inculpatory in character. In the judgment their
Lordships distinguished Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC
366] in the following lines:
“But it appears to us that in the context in which
the observation is made and in the
circumstances, which we have verified from the
record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had
definitely held the first information report lodged
by the co-accused who was acquitted to be
inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High
Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this
observation really refers to a first information
report which is in the nature of a confession by
the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first
information report cannot be used against the
maker when he be an accused and necessarily
cannot be used against a co-accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)Page 8 of 35
20. In Aghnoo Nagesia (supra), this Court sounded a note of caution
that when the statement in the FIR given by an accused contains
incriminating materials and it is difficult to sift the exculpatory
portion therefrom, the whole of it must be excluded from evidence.
21. In Faddi (supra), the issue before this Court was whether the FIR
lodged by the accused himself therein was admissible in evidence.
In the facts of the said case, this Court held that the objection to
the admissibility of the FIR lodged by the appellant was not sound,
as the FIR only contained a few admissions, and those admissions
did not amount to a confession so as to render the entire FIR
inadmissible in evidence. We quote the relevant observations made
by this Court in Faddi (supra) as under:
“14. It is contended for the appellant that the first
information report was inadmissible in evidence and
should not have been therefore taken on the record.
In support, reliance is placed on the case reported
as Nisar Ali v. State of U.P [AIR 1957 SC 366]. We
have considered this contention and do not see any
force in it.
15. The report is not a confession of the appellant. It
is not a statement made to a police officer during the
course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act
and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do
not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission
by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing
on the question to be determined by the Court viz.
how and by whom the murder of Gulab was
committed, or whether the appellant’s statement in
Court denying the correctness of certain statements’
of the prosecution witnesses is correct or not.
Admissions are admissible in evidence under Section
21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be
a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests
any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact,
Page 9 of 35
and which is made by any of the persons, and under
the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act.
Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and
may be proved as against a person who makes them.
Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to Section 21 are of the
circumstances in which an accused could prove his
own admissions which go in his favour in view of the
exceptions mentioned in Section 21 to the provision
that admissions could not be proved by the person
who makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions
of an accused can be proved against him.
16. The Privy Council, in very similar circumstances,
held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor [LR 44 IA
137] such first information reports to be admissible in
evidence. It was said in that case at p. 142:
“It is important to compare the story told by Dal
Singh when making his statement at the trial with
that what he said in the report he made to the
police in the document which he signed, a
document which is sufficiently authenticated. The
report is clearly admissible. It was in no sense a
confession. As appears from its terms, it was
rather in the nature of an information or charge
laid against Mohan and Jhunni in respect of the
assault alleged to have been made on Dal Singh
on his way from Hardua to Jubbulpur. As such
the statement is proper evidence against him….
It will be observed that this statement is at
several points at complete variance with what Dal
Singh afterwards stated in Court. The Sessions
Judge regarded the document as discrediting his
defence. He had to decide between the story for
the prosecution and that told for Dal Singh.”
Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the
facts of that case were distinguishable in some
respects from the facts of this case. Such a
distinction, if any, has no bearing on the question of
the admissibility of the report. The report was held
admissible because it was not a confession and it
was helpful in determining the matter before the
Court.
Page 10 of 35
17. In Nisar Ali case [AIR 1957 SC 366] Kapur, J.
who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the
facts:
“An objection has been taken to the admissibility
of this report as it was made by a person who
was a co-accused. A first information report is not
a substantive piece of evidence and can only be
used to corroborate the statement of the maker
under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict
it under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used
as evidence against the maker at the trial if he
himself becomes an accused, not to corroborate or
contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore,
it is not evidence.”
It is on these observations that it has been contended
for the appellant that his report was inadmissible in
evidence. Ostensibly, the expression ‘it cannot be
used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he
himself becomes an accused’ supports the
appellant’s contention. But it appears to us that in the
context in which the observation is made and in the
circumstances, which we have verified from the
record of that case, that the Sessions Judge had
definitely held the first information report lodged by
the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible
against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not
refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really
refers to a first information report which is in the
nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of
course a confessional first information report cannot
be used against the maker when he be an accused
and necessarily cannot be used against a co-
accused. Further, the last sentence of the above-
quoted observation is significant and indicates what
the Court meant was that the first information report
lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not
evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not mean
— as it had not to determine in that case — that a
first information report which is not a confession
cannot be used as an admission under Section 21 of
the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under
any other provisions of that Act. We find also that thisPage 11 of 35
observation has been understood in this way by the
Rajasthan High Court in State v. Balchand [AIR 1960
Raj 101] and in State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Singh [AIR
1962 Raj 3] and by the Allahabad High Court
in Allahdia v. State [1959 All LJ 340] .
18. We therefore hold that the objection to the
admissibility of the first information report lodged by
the appellant is not sound and that the Courts below
have rightly admitted it in evidence and have made
proper use of it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in Aghnoo
Nagesia (supra). The following observations of this Court at
paragraphs 9 to 18 are relevant and are quoted below:-
“9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the
provisions of law dealing with confessions made by
an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be
found generally in Ss. 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act
and Ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence
Act are to be found under the heading “Admissions”.
Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt
with in Ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is
evidence against the maker of it, unless its
admissibility is excluded by some provision of law.
Section 24 excludes confession caused by certain
inducements, threats and promises. Section 25
provides: “No confession made to a police officer shall
be proved as against a person accused of an offence”.
The terms of S. 25 are imperative. A confession made
to a police officer under any circumstances is not
admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers
a confession made when he was free and not in
police custody, as also a confession made before any
investigation has begun. The expression “accused of
any offence” covers a person accused of an offence at
the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence
when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibitsPage 12 of 35
proof against any person of a confession made by
him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made
in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The
partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession
made to a person other than a police officer. Section
26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by S.
25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section
27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the
ban imposed by Ss. 24, 25 and 26.It provides that
when any fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received from a person
accused of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly
to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids
the use of any statement made by any person to a
police officer in the course of an investigation for any
purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the
offence under investigation, save as mentioned in the
proviso and in cases falling under sub-s. (2), and it
specifically provides that nothing in it shall be
deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the
Evidence Act. The words of S. 162 are wide enough
to include a confession made to a police officer in the
course of an investigation. A statement or confession
made in the course of an investigation may be
recorded by a Magistrate under S. 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards
imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by
S. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused
to a police officer is absolutely protected under S. 25
of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of
an investigation, it is also protected by S. 162 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any
other person made by him while in the custody of a
police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made
in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These
provisions seem to proceed upon the view that
confessions made by an accused to a police officer or
made by him while he is in the custody of a police
officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used
Page 13 of 35
in evidence against him. They are based upon
grounds of public policy and the fullest effect should
be given to them.
10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides for the recording of the first information. The
information report as such is not substantive
evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant
under S. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him
under S. 145 of the Act, if the informant is called as
a witness. If the first information is given by the
accused himself, the fact of his giving the information
is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct
under S. 8 of the Evidence Act. If the information is a
non-confessional statement, it is admissible against
the accused as an admission under S. 21 of the
Evidence Act and is relevant, see Faddi v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, Cri. Appeal No. 210 of 1963, dated
24-1-1964: (AIR 1964 SC 1850), explaining Nisar Ali
v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 and Dal Singh
v. King Emperor, 44 Ind App 137: (AIR 1917 PC 25).
But a confessional first information report to a police
Officer cannot be used against the accused in view of
S. 25 of the Evidence Act.
11. The Indian Evidence Act does not define
“confession”. For a long time, the Courts in India
adopted the definition of “confession” given in Art. 22
of Stephen’s Digest of the Law of Evidence. According
to that definition a confession is an admission made
at any time by a person charged with crime, stating
or suggesting the inference that he committed that
crime. This definition was discarded by the Judicial
Committee in Pakala Narayanaswami v. Emperor, 66
Ind App 66 at p. 81: (AIR 1939 PC 47 at p. 52). Lord
Atkin observed:
“…….no statement that contains self exculpatory
matter can amount to confession, if the
exculpatory statement is of some fact which if
true would negative the offence alleged to be
confessed. Moreover, a confession must either
admit in terms the offence, or at any rate
substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence. An admission of a gravely incriminatingPage 14 of 35
fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not
of itself a confession, e.g., an admission that the
accused is the owner of and was in recent
possession of the knife or revolver which caused
a death with no explanation of any other man’s
possession.” These observations received the
approval of this Court in Palvinder Kaur v. State
of Punjab (1), 1953 SCR 94 at p. 104; (AIR 1952
SC 354 at p. 357). In State of U. P. v. Deoman
Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 at p. 21: (AIR 1960
SC 1125 at pp. 1128-1129). Shah, J., referred to
a confession as a statement made by a person
stating or suggesting the inference that he has
committed a crime.
12. Shortly put, a confession may be defined as an
admission of the offence by a person charged with
the offence. A statement which contains self-
exculpatory matter cannot amount to a confession, if
the exculpatory statement is of some fact which, if
true, would negative the offence alleged to be
confessed. If an admission of an accused is to be
used against him, the whole of it should be tendered
in evidence and if part of the admission is
exculpatory and part inculpatory, the prosecution is
not at liberty to use in evidence the inculpatory part
only. See Hanumant Govind v. State of M. P. 1952
SCR 1091 at p. 1111: (AIR 1952 SC 343 at p. 350)
and 1953 SCR 94 : (AIR 1952 SC 354). The accused
is entitled to insist that the entire admission including
the exculpatory part must be tendered in evidence.
But this principle is of no assistance to the accused
where no part of his statement is self-exculpatory;
and the prosecution intends to use the whole of the
statement against the accused.
13. Now, a confession may consist of several parts
and may reveal not only the actual commission of the
crime but also the motive, the preparation, the
opportunity, the provocation, the weapons used, the
intention, the concealment of the weapon and the
subsequent conduct of the accused. If the confession
is tainted the taint attaches to each part of it. It is not
permissible in law to separate one part and to admit
Page 15 of 35
it in evidence as a non-confessional statement. Each
part discloses some incriminating fact, i.e., some fact
which by itself or along with other admitted or proved
facts suggests the inference that the accused
committed the crime, and though each part taken
singly may not amount to a confession, each of them
being part of a confessional statement partakes of the
character of a confession. If a statement contains an
admission of an offence, not only that admission but
also every other admission of an incriminating fact
contained in the statement is part of the confession.
14. If proof of the confession is excluded by any
provision of law such as S.24, S. 25 and S. 26 of the
Evidence Act, the entire confessional statement in all
its parts including the admissions of minor
incriminating facts must also be excluded, unless
proof of it is permitted by some other section under as
S. 27 of the Evidence Act. Little substance and
content would be left in Ss. 24, 25 and 26 if proof of
admission of incriminating facts in a confessional
statement is permitted.
15. Sometimes, a single sentence in a statement may
not amount to a confession at all. Take a case of a
person charged under S. 301-A of the Indian Penal
Code and a statement made by him to a police officer
that “I was drunk: I was driving a car at a speed of
80 miles per hour. I could see A on the road at a
distance of 80 yards; I did not blow the horn: I made
no attempt to stop the car; the car knocked down A”.
No single sentence in this statement amounts to a
confession; but the statement read as a whole
amounts to a confession of an offence under S. 304-
A of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not be
permissible to admit in evidence each sentence
separately as a nonconfessional statement. Again,
take a case where a single sentence in a statement
amounts to an admission of an offence. ‘A’ states “I
struck ‘B’ with a tangi and hurt him”. In consequence
of the injury ‘B’ died. ‘A’ committed an offence and is
chargeable under various sections of the Indian Penal
Code. Unless he brings his case within one of the
recognised exceptions, his statement amounts to an
Page 16 of 35
admission of an offence, but the other parts of the
statement such as the motive, the preparation, the
absence of provocation, concealment of the weapon
and the subsequent conduct, all throw light upon the
gravity of the offence and the intention and
knowledge of the accused, and negatives the right of
private defence, accident and other possible
defences. Each and every admission of an
incriminating fact contained in the confessional
statement is part of the confession.
16. If the confession is caused by an inducement,
threat or promise as contemplated by S. 24 of the
Evidence Act, the whole of the confession is excluded
by S. 24. Proof of not only the admission of the offence
but also the admission of every other incriminating
fact such as the motive, the preparation and the
subsequent conduct is excluded by S. 24. To hold that
the proof of the admission of other incriminating facts
is not barred by S. 24 is to rob the section of its
practical utility and content. It may be suggested that
the bar of S. 24 does not apply to the other
admissions, but though receivable in evidence, they
are of no weight, as they were caused by
inducement, threat or promise. According to this
suggestion, the other admissions are relevant but are
of no value. But we think that on a plain construction
of S. 24, proof of all the admissions of incriminating
facts contained in a confessional statement is
excluded by the section. Similarly, Ss. 25 and 26 bar
not only proof of admission of an offence by an
accused to a police officer or made by him while in
the custody of a police officer but also admissions
contained in the confessional statement of all
incriminating facts related to the offence.
17. A little reflection will show that the expression
“confession” in Ss. 24 to 30 refers to the confessional
statement as a whole including not only the
admissions of the offence but also all other
admissions of incriminating facts related to the
offence. Section 27 partially lifts the ban imposed by
Ss. 24, 25 and 26 in respect of so much of the
information whether it amounts to a confession or
Page 17 of 35
not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered in
consequence of the information, if the other conditions
of the section are satisfied. Section 27 distinctly
contemplates that an information leading to a
discovery may be a part of the confession of the
accused and thus fall within the purview of Ss. 24,
25 and 26. Section 27 thus shows that a confessional
statement admitting the offence may contain
additional information as part of the confession.
Again, S. 30 permits the Court to take into
consideration against a co-accused a confession of
another accused affecting not only himself but the
other co-accused. Section 30 thus shows that matters
affecting other persons may form part of the
confession.
18. If the first information report is given by the
accused to a police officer and amounts to a
confessional statement, proof of the confession is
prohibited by S. 25. The confession includes not only
the admission of the offence but all other admissions
of incriminating facts related to the offence contained
in the confessional statement. No part of the
confessional statement is receivable in evidence
except to the extent that the ban of S. 25 is lifted by
S. 27.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. The legal position, therefore, is this – a statement contained in the
FIR furnished by one of the accused in the case cannot, in any
manner, be used against another accused. Even as against the
accused who made it, the statement cannot be used if it is
inculpatory in nature nor can it be used for the purpose of
corroboration or contradiction unless its maker offers himself as a
witness in the trial. The very limited use of it is, as an admission
under Section 21 of the Act of 1872, against its maker alone, and
only if the admission does not amount to a confession.
Page 18 of 35
24. To put the aforesaid in simpler terms, an FIR of a confessional
nature made by an accused person is inadmissible in evidence
against him, except to the extent that it shows he made a
statement soon after the offence, thereby identifying him as the
maker of the report, which is admissible as evidence of his conduct
under Section 8 of the Act of 1872. Additionally, any information
furnished by him that leads to the discovery of a fact is admissible
under Section 27 of the Act of 1872. However, a non-confessional
FIR is admissible against the accused as an admission under
Section 21 of the Act of 1872 and is relevant.
25. Thus, the first error that the High Court committed was to read
the contents of the FIR lodged by the appellant into evidence. As
observed earlier, the FIR lodged by the appellant amounts to a
confession, and any confession made by an accused before the
police is hit by Section 25 of the Act of 1872. There was no question
at all for the High Court to seek corroboration of the medical
evidence on record with the confessional part of the FIR lodged by
the appellant.
26. Once we say that the contents of the FIR are hit by Section 25 of
the Act of 1872, being a confession before a police officer, the only
remaining evidence on record is the medical evidence and the oral
evidence of the panch witnesses.
Page 19 of 35
b. Evidence of an Expert Witness is only Advisory in
Nature
27. At this stage, we may look into some curious findings recorded by
the High Court in its Impugned Judgement. We quote the relevant
paragraphs as under:
“16. Now, the next question for consideration would
be whether the accused/appellant herein is the
perpetrator of the crime in question, which the
learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by
relying upon the testimony of Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10),
who conducted post-mortem had opined that the
cause of death is shock due to right side of
haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right
lung secondary to incised wound over upper part of
right side of front of chest. The Doctor ultimately
opined through his report the nature of death to be
homicidal. Thus, on the basis of testimony of Dr R.K.
Divya (PW-10), it is clear that it is the appellant herein
who on the fateful date and time has caused grievous
injuries to the deceased, due to which he died. As
such, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is
the appellant/accused who has caused injuries over
the body of the deceased and caused his death.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
26. Conviction of the appellant is based on the
evidence of Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10), who has
conducted postmortem on the body of deceased, vide
Ex.P/34 and he found following injuries on the dead
body of the deceased.
27. According to Dr. R.K. Divya (PW-10). the cause of
death of deceased is shock due to right side of
haemothorax due to laceration of apex lobe of right
lung secondary to incised wound over upper part of
right side of front of chest and nature of death was
homicidal. It has been also opined by the concerned
Doctor that the injury caused to the deceased has
been by the sharp edged weapon and the same may
be caused by knife.
28. Reverting to the facts of the present case, in light
of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of
Page 20 of 35
the Supreme Court in the above stated judgments, it
is quite vivid that the appellant himself has lodged a
First Information Report alleging that, on the date of
incident, some quarrel took place between the
appellant and the deceased on the ground of showing
the photograph of his girlfriend to the deceased and
the deceased stated to bring his girlfriend and left her
with him for one night, then out of anger and on
sudden quarrel, the appellant assaulted the
deceased with a knife on his chest, by which, he
received grievous injury and died on the same day of
the incident on account of excessive bleeding due to
injury on his chest. It further appears from the fact on
record that appellant after committing the crime in
question, has lodged the report and upon his
memorandum some incriminating articles have been
recovered from his instance and upon further
investigation, second memorandum has been
recorded, by which, his clothes were recorded. It is
apparent that though there was no premeditation on
the part of the appellant to cause death of deceased,
but he had given false version.”
28. The High Court should have been mindful of the fact that a doctor
is not a witness of fact. A doctor is examined by the prosecution
as a medical expert for the purpose of proving the contents of the
post-mortem report and the medical certificates on record, if any.
An expert witness is examined by the prosecution because of his
specialized knowledge on certain subjects, which the judge may
not be fully equipped to assess. The evidence of such an expert is
of an advisory character. The credibility of the expert witness
depends on the reasons provided in support of his conclusions, as
well as the data and material forming the basis of those
conclusions. An accused cannot be held guilty of the offence of
murder solely on the basis of medical evidence on record. So far as
Page 21 of 35
the panch witnesses are concerned their depositions do not inspire
any confidence.
29. Most of the panch witnesses turned hostile. If at all, the public
prosecutor wanted to prove the contents of the panchnamas after
the panch witnesses turned hostile, he could have done so through
the evidence of the investigating officer. However, the investigating
officer also failed to prove the contents of the panchnamas in
accordance with law. Thus, there is nothing on record by way of
evidence relating to any discovery of fact is concerned. In other
words, no discovery of fact at the instance of the appellant,
relevant and admissible under Section 27 of the Act of 1872, has
been established.
c. Implication of Section(s) 27 and 8 of the Act of 1872
30. The learned counsel appearing for the State, strenuously urged
before us to take into consideration the conduct of the appellant
which, according to him, is relevant under Section 8 of the Act of
1872. He led stress on the following circumstances:
i. The appellant himself went to police station and lodged the
FIR;
ii. While, at the scene of offence panchnama was being drawn,
appellant pointed out that the body of the deceased was lying
in between the two walls inside the house of the deceased;
iii. The appellant led the Investigating Officer and the panchnama
witnesses to the house of his uncle, Rajnath Yadav, and
pointed out the place where he had kept his clothes worn at
the time of the incident.
Page 22 of 35
iv. A bloodstain was also found on the shirt of the appellant,
however, the learned counsel fairly conceded that there is
nothing to indicate that the bloodstain matched with the blood
group of the deceased.
31. The first and most fundamental flaw in the testimony of all the
aforementioned prosecution witnesses is that none of them have
specifically deposed to the exact statement allegedly made by the
appellant, which purportedly led to the discovery of a fact relevant
under Section 27 of the Act of 1872.
32. Section 27 of the Act of 1872 reads thus:
“27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is
deposed to as discovered inconsequence of
information received from a person accused of any
offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of
such information, whether it amounts to a confession
or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.”
33. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 of the
Act of 1872 are:
i. That consequent to the information given by the accused,
it led to the discovery of some fact;
ii. The fact discovered must be one which was not within the
knowledge of the police and the knowledge of the fact for
the first time was derived from the information given by the
accused;
iii. The discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such
information;
Page 23 of 35
iv. Only such portion of the information as connected with the
said discovery is admissible;
v. The discovery of the fact must relate to the commission of
some offence.
34. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision
of this Court in Murli v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2009)
9 SCC 417, which held that the contents of the panchnama are
not the substantive piece of evidence. It reads thus;
“34. The contents of the panchnama are not the
substantive evidence. The law is settled on that
issue. What is substantive evidence is what has been
stated by the panchas or the person concerned in the
witness box.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
35. In the aforesaid context, our attention was drawn to a decision of
this Court in the case of A. N. Venkatesh & Anr. v. State of
Karnataka, reported in (2005) 7 SCC 714, which states thus:
“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the
conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such
conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in
issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the
circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed
out to the police officer, the place where the dead
body of the kidnapped boy was found and on their
pointing out the body was exhumed, would be
admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of
the fact whether the statement made by the accused
contemporaneously with or antecedent to such
conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not
as held by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (UT
of Delhi) [Prakash Chand v. State (UT of Delhi), (1979)
3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656] . Even if we hold that
the disclosure statement made by the appellant-
accused (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible under
Page 24 of 35
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant
under Section 8.”
(Emphasis supplied)
36. In this context, we deem it necessary to sound a note of caution.
While the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact under
Section 8 of the Act of 1872, it cannot, by itself, serve as the sole
basis for conviction, especially in a grave charge such as murder.
Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of the accused is
merely one of the circumstances the court may consider, in
conjunction with other direct or circumstantial evidence on record.
To put it succinctly, although relevant, the accused’s conduct
alone cannot justify a conviction in the absence of cogent and
credible supporting evidence.
d. Incorrect application of Exception 4 to Section 300 of
the IPC
37. We could have concluded the judgment at this stage by allowing
the appeal and thereby acquitting the appellant of all the charges
against him. However, we consider it necessary to make certain
observations regarding Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC. We
wish to explain why the High Court could not have invoked
Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and altered the conviction
from Section 302 to 304 Part I of the IPC. Had there been any
other oral or documentary evidence on record connecting the
appellant herein with the alleged crime, we would have dismissed
his appeal. Even while dismissing his appeal and holding him
guilty of the offence of murder, we would not have been in a
position to interfere with the erroneous application of Exception 4,
as there is no appeal at the instance of the State challenging the
Page 25 of 35
acquittal under Section 302 of the IPC. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to explain why the High Court committed an error in
bringing the case within Exception 4 of Section 300 of the IPC.
38. Section 299 of the IPC explains culpable homicide as, causing
death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with
the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, or with the knowledge that the act complained of is likely to
cause death. The first two categories require the intention to cause
death, or the likelihood of causing death. While, the third category
confines itself to the knowledge that the act complained of is likely
to cause death. On the facts of this case, the offence of culpable
homicide is clearly made out.
39. Section 300 of the IPC explains murder and it provides that
culpable homicide is murder if, the act by which the death is
caused is done with the intention of causing death, or the act
complained of is so imminently dangerous that it must in all
probability cause death, or “such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death”. There are some exceptions when culpable homicide is not
murder and we are concerned with Exception 4 which reads:
“Exception 4. – Culpable homicide is not murder if it is
committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and
without the offender having taken undue advantage
or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” Explanation.
– It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the
provocation or commits the first assault.”Page 26 of 35
40. Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the absence of any
premeditation. This is very clear from the words used in the
provision itself. It contemplates that the sudden fight must occur
in the heat of passion, or upon a sudden quarrel. The Exception
deals with a case of provocation not covered by Exception 1,
although it would have been more appropriately placed after that
exception. It is founded upon the same principle, as both involve
the absence of premeditation. However, while Exception 1 involves
total deprivation of self-control, Exception 4 refers to that heat of
passion which clouds a person’s sober reason and urges them to
commit acts they would not otherwise commit. There is
provocation in Exception 4, as there is in Exception 1, but the injury
caused is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact,
Exception 4 addresses cases where, notwithstanding that a blow
may have been struck or provocation given at the outset of the
dispute, regardless of how the quarrel originated, yet the
subsequent conduct of both parties’ places them on an equal
footing with respect to guilt.
41. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and the exchange of
blows on both sides. In such cases, the homicide committed is
clearly not attributable to unilateral provocation, nor can the
entire blame be placed on one side. If it were, Exception 1 would be
the more appropriate provision. There is no prior deliberation or
intention to fight; the fight breaks out suddenly, and both parties
are more or less to blame. One party may have initiated it, but had
the other not aggravated the situation by their own conduct, it may
not have escalated to such a serious level. In such scenarios, there
Page 27 of 35
is mutual provocation and aggravation, making it difficult to
determine the precise share of blame attributable to each
participant. The protection of Exception 4 may be invoked if death
is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with
the deceased.
42. To bring a case within Exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned
therein must be satisfied. It is important to note that the term
“fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC is not
defined in the IPC. A fight necessarily involves two parties – it takes
two to make a fight. The heat of passion requires that there must
be no time for the passions to cool, and in such case, the parties
may have worked themselves into a fury due to a prior verbal
altercation. A fight is a combat between two and more persons,
whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate
any general rule as to what constitutes a “sudden quarrel”. This is
a question of fact, and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must
necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the
application of Exception 4, it is not enough to show that there was
a sudden quarrel and no premeditation. It must also be shown that
the offender did not take undue advantage or act in a cruel or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in
the provision means “unfair advantage”.
43. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is
confronted with the question whether the offence is “murder” or
Page 28 of 35
“culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, it will be convenient
to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be
considered at the first stage is, whether the accused committed an
act which caused the death of another person. Proof of a causal
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting death
leads to the second stage, for considering whether that act of the
accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299
of the IPC. If the answer to this question is, prima facie, found in
the affirmative, the next stage involves considering the application
of Section 300 of the IPC. At this stage, the court must determine
whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within
the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of “murder”
contained in Section 300. If the answer to this is in the negative,
the offence would be “culpable homicide not amounting to
murder”, punishable under either the first or the second part of
Section 304, depending respectively on whether the second or the
third clause of Section 299 is applicable. However, if the answer is
in the positive, but the case falls within any of the exceptions
enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be “culpable
homicide not amounting to murder”, punishable under the Part I
of Section 304 of the IPC.
44. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.,
reported in (1976) 4 SCC 382, this Court, while drawing a
distinction between Section 302 and Section 304, held as under:-
“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable
homicide” is genus and “murder” its specie. All
“murder” is “culpable homicide” but not vice- versa.
Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sansPage 29 of 35
“special characteristics of murder”, is “culpable
homicide not amounting to murder”. For the purpose
of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of
this generic offence, the Code practically recognises
three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what
may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”.
This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which
is defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second
may be termed as “culpable homicide of the second
degree”. This is punishable under the first part of
Section 304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the
third degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable
homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also,
the lowest among the punishments provided for the
three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is
punishable under the second part of Section 304.”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. In Budhi Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, reported in
(2012) 13 SCC 663, this Court has held as under:-
“18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is
incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating
any principle of universal application. This will
always have to depend on the facts of a given case.
While applying this principle, the primary obligation
of the court is to examine from the point of view of a
person of reasonable prudence if there was such
grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably
conclude that it was possible to commit the offence of
culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a
culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence
resulting from grave and sudden provocation would
normally mean that a person placed in such
circumstances could lose selfcontrol but only
temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of
provocation. The provocation could be an act or series
of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting
in inflicting of injury. Another test that is applied more
often than not is that the behaviour of the assailant
was that of a reasonable person. A fine distinctionPage 30 of 35
has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave
provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss
of selfcontrol and the one which inspires an actual
intention to kill. Such act should have been done
during the continuation of the state of mind and the
time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the
dominion over the mind. Once there is premeditated
act with the intention to kill, it will obviously fall
beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder…..”
(Emphasis supplied)
46. In the case of Kikar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in
(1993) 4 SCC 238, this Court held as under:-
“8. The counsel attempted to bring the case within
Exception 4. For its application all the conditions
enumerated therein must be satisfied. The act must
be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight
in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3)
without the offender’s having taken undue
advantage; (4) and the accused had not acted in a
cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, there must be a
mutual combat or exchanging blows on each other.
And however slight the first blow, or provocation,
every fresh blow becomes a fresh provocation. The
blood is already heated or warms up at every
subsequent stroke. The voice of reason is heard on
neither side in the heat of passion. Therefore, it is
difficult to apportion between them respective
degrees of blame with reference to the state of things
at the commencement of the fray but it must occur as
a consequence of a sudden fight i.e. mutual combat
and not one side track. It matters not what the cause
of the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary, or who
draws or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be
without any intention to kill or seriously injure the
other. If two men start fighting and one of them is
unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the
one who uses such weapon must be held to have
taken an undue advantage denying him thePage 31 of 35
entitlement to Exception 4. True the number of
wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the
accused and the deceased with regard to their arms
used, the manner of combat must be kept in mind
when applying Exception 4. When the deceased was
not armed but the accused was and caused injuries
to the deceased with fatal results, the Exception 4
engrafted to Section 300 is excepted and the offences
committed would be one of murder. 9. The occasion
for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden but the
party assaulted must be on an equal footing in point
of defence, at least at the onset. This is specially so
where the attack is made with dangerous weapons.
Where the deceased was unarmed and did not cause
any injury to the accused even following a sudden
quarrel if the accused has inflicted fatal blows on the
deceased, Exception 4 is not attracted and
commission must be one of murder punishable under
Section 302. Equally for attracting Exception 4 it is
necessary that blows should be exchanged even if
they do not all find their target. Even if the fight is
unpremeditated and sudden, yet if the instrument or
manner of retaliation be greatly disproportionate to
the offence given, and cruel and dangerous in its
nature, the accused cannot be protected under
Exception 4….”
(Emphasis supplied)
47. This Court, in the case of Surain Singh v. State of Punjab,
reported in (2017) 5 SCC 796 has observed that:
“The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is
caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden
fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and
(d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To
bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients
mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that
the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC
is not defined in IPC……… A fight is a combat between
two and more persons whether with or withoutPage 32 of 35
weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general
rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden
quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel
is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the
proved facts of each case. For the application of
Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was
a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It
must further be shown that the offender has not
taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual
manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used
in the provision means “unfair advantage”.”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. Section 304 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. Part I of this Section provides
that if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention
of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, then the punishment may extend up to imprisonment for
life. On the other hand, Part II of Section 304 provides that if the
offending act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause
death, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, then the punishment may
extend to imprisonment for 10 years.
49. The High Court considered only the first part of Exception 4 to
Section 300 of the IPC. This part refers to the absence of
premeditation in a sudden fight arising from a sudden quarrel in
a heat of passion. However, it does not end there. The exception
further requires that the offender must not have taken undue
advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Having regard
to the manner in which the assault was carried out, could it not
Page 33 of 35
be said that the offender i.e., the appellant-herein took undue
advantage and also could be said to have acted in a cruel or
unusual manner. The deceased was unarmed, it was not mutual
fight between two individuals that would bring the case within the
ambit of Exception 4. The deceased was absolutely harmless when
the appellant inflicted injuries all over his body indiscriminately.
50. Therefore, if at all the High Court intended to extend the benefit
of any of the Exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, it ought to have
considered Exception 1 of Section 300 of the IPC. However, it is
not necessary for us to delve into Exception 1 i.e., grave and
sudden provocation since, we have already reached the
conclusion that the case in hand is, one of no legal evidence and
therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. We refer to
Exception 1 merely to illustrate that, if at all, it was this exception
that could have been examined. It is alleged that while the
appellant and the deceased were consuming alcohol at the
deceased’s residence, the appellant showed the deceased a
photograph of his girlfriend. The deceased allegedly made an
obscene remark, “get your girlfriend to my place and leave her with
me for one night.” Such a statement might have provoked the
appellant, who then picked up a vegetable-cutting knife lying in
one corner of the house and inflicted injuries upon the deceased.
This aspect could have been considered in that context.
C. CONCLUSION
51. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the
Impugned Judgement passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh
Page 34 of 35
in Criminal Appeal No. 1538 of 2021 dated 16.01.2025 is not
sustainable in law.
52. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
53. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges, and he be set free
forthwith if not required in any other case. The bail bonds stand
discharged, if any.
54. The Registry shall circulate one copy each of this judgment to all
the High Courts.
………………………………J.
(J.B. Pardiwala)
………………………………J.
(R. Mahadevan)
New Delhi:
5th August 2025.
Page 35 of 35