Meghalaya High Court
Date Of Decision: 06.08.2025 vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 6 August, 2025
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
2025:MLHC:700
Serial No. 02
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
W.P.(Crl.) No. 5 of 2025
Date of Decision: 06.08.2025
Shri. William Richmond Marbaniang,
S/o (L) T.S. Richmond,
R/o Windcrest, Nongrimbah Road, House No.
39, Shillong, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
........ Petitioner
- Vs-
Central Bureau of Investigation,
(North East) Zone, Represented by its Joint
Director, Government of India. 1st Floor,
Opp. Balaji Temple, N.H. - 37, P.O.
Gorchuk, Guwahati - 781035.
........ Respondent
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. N. Khera, Adv.
Mr. R. Kharkrang, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Dr. N. Mozika, DSGI with
Ms. R. Fancon, Adv.
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
1
2025:MLHC:700
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
1. Heard Mr. N. Khera, learned counsel for the petitioner.
2. Also heard Dr. N. Mozika, learned DSGI assisted by Ms. R.
Fancon, learned counsel for the respondent/CBI.
3. A short question of laws and facts is required to be decided in this
case. It is a credit to the expertise of the learned counsels, who have made
the endeavour to advance their submission at this stage of the proceedings,
and for the matter to be concluded at the first hearing itself.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that he is involved as an accused in
Sessions Case No. 76 (T) 2013 pending trial before the Court of the learned
Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shillong.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that,
apparently, the trial has taken about 12(twelve) years or so, and this has
troubled the petitioner being of advanced age nearing about 75 years old or
so, and being diligent in his appearance before the court all along, the manner
in which the trial has proceeded, has caused concern to the petitioner as to
when the trial will be finally over, given the fact that there are altogether
102(one hundred two) witnesses out of which 58(fifty eight) of them have
been examined and discharged so far.
2
2025:MLHC:700
6. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that, if the natural
course of trial is expected to be conducted, it would take another 75 weeks
to complete, if the case is taken up on a weekly basis. It is on this sole ground
that the petitioner has now approach this Court with a prayer that the case
against the petitioner be quashed, as continuance of the same, would result
in violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights.
7. On a query made by this Court, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has referred to the authorities cited in the case of:
i) Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors v. R.S. Nayak & Anr reported
in (1992) 1 SCC 225;
ii) P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka reported in (2002)
4 SCC 578; and
iii) Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors reported in
(2008) 16 SCC 117.
8. In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra) at para 18 of the
same, the Apex Court has emphasized on the importance of application of
the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, vis-à-vis, the
deprivation of life and liberty of a person undergoing trial in a criminal case,
to say that such person has a right to be tried speedily which means that
speedy trial is a right available to a person undergoing trial in a criminal case.
3
2025:MLHC:700
The principle formulated by the Apex Court in this case have been
crystalized and laid down at para 86 which is reproduced herein below:
“86. In view of the above discussion, the following
propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must
forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is
difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down
any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in
Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused
to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the
accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest
or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it
any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of
all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is
determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.
(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That
is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no
reason to take a restricted view.
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial
from the point of view of the accused are:
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction
detention should be as short as possible. In other
words, the accused should not be subjected to
unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior
to his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to
his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly
prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should
be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the
ability of the accused to defend himself, whether
on account of death, disappearance or non-
availability of witnesses or otherwise.
4
2025:MLHC:700
(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that
it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the
proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known
defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the
accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily
prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses,
disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work
against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may
be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also
delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the
right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the
first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible
for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good
faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by
them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time
taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards
delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or
proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning
cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The
mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an
order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof
that the proceeding is not a frivolous. Very often these stays
are obtained on exparte representation.
(5) While determining whether undue delay has
occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial)
one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances,
including nature of offence, number of accused and
witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing
local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic
delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure
a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a
realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such
matters instead of a pedantic one.
(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily
prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his
advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker “it
cannot be said how long a delay is too long in a system
where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The
same ideal has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell, 15
5
2025:MLHC:700
L Ed 2d 627, in the following words:
“… the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is
necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has
orderly expedition, rather than more speed, as its essential
ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution
amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights
depends upon all the circumstances.
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as
presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of
incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The
prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution.
But when does the prosecution become prosecution, again
depends upon the facts of a given case.
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is
called the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he
is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence,
an accussed’s plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be
defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a
speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand
and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in
his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot
be put against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of
demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker
and other succeeding cases.
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the
several relevant factors-‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing
process’- and determine in each case whether the right to
speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the
conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has been
infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be,
shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The
nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case
may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the
interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to
make such other appropriate order-including an order to
conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not
concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has6
2025:MLHC:700concluded-as may be deemed just and equitable in the
circumstances of the case.
(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any
time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be
qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to
shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders
of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of
right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to
justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty
of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case
before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court
of USA too as repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time-
limit inspite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that
not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee
of right to speedy trial.
(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy
trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed
to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a
plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in
a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in
High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority
basis”.
9. It is also the submission of the learned counsel that the Apex
Court in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao (supra), has reiterated the principle
laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay (supra) as far as the issue of
rights and liberty of a person undergoing trial in a criminal case is concerned,
particularly with reference to a speedy trial in that respect. Para 29 of the P.
Ramachandra Rao case is a reiteration of the Court to the principle laid down
in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay.
10. However, the learned counsel has also referred to the case of
7
2025:MLHC:700
Pankaj Kumar (supra), wherein the Apex Court taking note of the proposition
of law laid down in the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay and the case of P.
Ramachandra Rao, has however emphasized the fact that speedy trial is a
must and has to be resorted to, the delay as far as speedy trial is concerned
has to be pinpoint and attributed to certain factors, for e.g. the conduct of the
parties, etc. Though the Court at para 18 of the Pankaj Kumar case has opined
that “it is open to the court to make appropriate orders, including fixing the
period for completion of trial; (viii) it is neither advisable nor feasible to
prescribe any outer time-limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings…”
11. The learned counsel has however fairly submitted that at this
stage, quashing of the proceedings against the petitioner would not be
insisted, nevertheless, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to issue
necessary directions for the Trial Court to expedite the proceedings to ensure
that the petitioner is not faced with unnecessary delay as far as the trial is
concerned.
12. The learned DSGI, in response on behalf of the respondent/CBI,
has also stressed on the fact that apart from the severity of the offence which
the petitioner is undergoing trial, though not as the main accused, since the
trial involved offences under Sections 302/201/203 IPC, the sections of law
implicated against the accused refers only to Section 201 and 203 IPC, his
8
2025:MLHC:700
case may not be decided in isolation.
13. Be that as it may, the learned DSGI has submitted that it would
not be proper for quashing of the proceedings against the petitioner, given
the fact that there is another co-accused person involved, who is facing trial,
particularly for an offence under Section 302 IPC.
14. However, the learned DSGI has also fairly conceded that the
prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner for this Court to pass
necessary directions as regard the manner in which the trial is to proceed, is
found acceptable.
15. Under such circumstances, this Court would not go further into
any unnecessary discussion on the merits of this case, however, taking into
account the age of the petitioner and the number of years the trial has
proceeded, would dispose of the same with the following directions:
i) That the learned Trial Court is requested to take up the
proceedings expeditiously, taking recourse to the provision
of Section 309 Cr.P.C, particularly to ensure that, if
possible, the case is taken up on a day-to-day basis; and
ii) That the prosecution be directed to revisit the list of
witnesses cited, and to cut down the list by striking off
irrelevant or unnecessary witnesses, if any;
9
2025:MLHC:700
16. With the above noted observations, this petition is accordingly
disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Signature Not Verified 10
Digitally signed by
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2025.08.06 18:25:47 IST
[ad_1]
Source link