Uttarakhand High Court
(Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.) vs State Of Uttarakhand And Another on 5 August, 2025
2025:UHC:6958
Reserved on 30.07.2025
Delivered on 05.08.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc. Application No. 1413 of 2016
(Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.)
Vaibhav Kumar and Others ...........Applicants
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and Another ........Respondents
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Presence:-
Ms. Pushpa Joshi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.
Bhagendra Bhadana and Mr. Rajat Kholia, learned counsel for the
applicants.
Mr. B.N. Molakhi, learned Deputy A.G. for the State.
Mr. Neeraj Garg, learned counsel for respondent
no.2/complainant.
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Hon'ble Mr. Alok Mahra, J.
This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
has been filed by the applicants seeking quashing of
the impugned order dated 09.09.2016 passed in
Misc. Case No. 267 of 2014 “Smt. Ritu Raj Vs.
Vaibhav Kumar and Others” under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 (“DV Act“), pending before the Court of IVth
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun as
well as the entire criminal proceedings of the
aforesaid case. The grievance of the applicants is
that the learned Magistrate erroneously rejected
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their objection on the point of territorial jurisdiction
and proceeded to entertain the complaint.
2. Brief facts of the case, as per record, are
that applicant no. 1 is the husband of respondent
no. 2; that, the applicant nos. 2 and 3 are father-in-
law and mother-in-law and applicant no. 4 is her
sister-in-law of respondent no.2; that, the marriage
of applicant no.1 was solemnized with respondent
no.2 on 29.04.2013 at Dehradun according to Hindu
rites; that, after marriage, applicant no. 1 and
respondent no. 2 lived together in London, U.K., as
husband and wife. On 17.11.2013, respondent no. 2
lodged a complaint with London Police alleging
harassment and assault by applicant no. 1; that,
after investigation, London Police filed an N.F.A. (No
Further Action) report, finding no offence; that,
respondent no. 2 then voluntarily left the company
of applicant no. 1. Thereafter, applicant no. 1 filed
for divorce before the Family Court, Croydon, U.K.,
and obtained a decree absolute; that, applicant no.1
also filed a petition under Sections 11 & 12 of the
Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court,
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Faridabad; that, respondent no. 2, through a
General Power of Attorney to her mother, filed an
application under Section 12 of the DV Act before
the 2nd Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, on
03.03.2014; that, thereafter, the respondent no.2
moved Transfer Petition No. 1224 of 2014 in the
Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein the Hon’ble
Supreme Court stayed the proceeding pending
before the Family Court at Faridabad; that, the
applicant no.1 filed an application in the case filed
by respondent no.2 under Section 12 of the D.V. Act
before the court concerned raising issue of
jurisdiction; that, the said application has been
dismissed by learned trial court vide impugned
order dated 09.09.2016. Hence, this application.
3. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicants
would submit that the marriage between applicant
no. 1 and respondent no. 2 was solemnized on
29.04.2013 at Dehradun. On 12.05.2013, applicant
no. 1 left for London, leaving respondent no. 2 at
her parental home in Dehradun for the purpose of
processing her visa. After obtaining the visa, both
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travelled to London on 10.09.2013; that, while
living together in London as husband and wife,
respondent no. 2, on 17.11.2013, lodged a
complaint with the London Police alleging
harassment and assault. The London Police, after
thorough investigation, submitted a No Further
Action (N.F.A.) report, finding no offence against
applicant no. 1. Immediately thereafter, respondent
no. 2 voluntarily left the shared household without
informing applicant no. 1.
4. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the applicant that the Family Court,
Croydon (U.K.) granted a decree absolute of divorce
in favour of applicant no. 1, specifically recording
that respondent no. 2 had abandoned the
matrimonial home without cause. The couple had
lived together for only about two months and seven
days in London; that, respondent no. 2 returned to
Dehradun on 24.11.2013 to attend her sister’s
marriage, served a legal notice dated 27.12.2013
on the applicants, and then left for London on
01.01.2014 after executing a General Power of
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Attorney in favour of her mother. Neither applicant
no. 1 nor the other applicants were aware of her
whereabouts thereafter.
5. Learned Senior Counsel would further
submit that applicant no. 1 thereafter filed HMA
Petition No. 175 of 2014 before the Family Court,
Faridabad under Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu
Marriage Act seeking annulment/nullity of marriage.
Only after learning of this petition did respondent
no. 2, acting through her mother as Power of
Attorney holder, file an application under Section 12
of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 before the learned 2nd Judicial
Magistrate, Dehradun on 03.03.2014, without even
filing an affidavit in support thereof.
6. She would further state that the complaint
under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is false, baseless,
and filed only as a counterblast to the ongoing case
under the Hindu Marriage Act. The learned
Magistrate, in a very casual manner and without
properly applying the provisions of the D.V. Act,
proceeded with the matter. As per Section 12(1) of
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the D.V. Act read with Rule 5(1) of the 2006 Rules,
the Magistrate is required to obtain a Domestic
Incident Report (DIR) from the Protection Officer
before proceeding. In this case, the DIR does not
mention any specific incident of domestic violence,
nor does it state the date, place, or name of the
alleged offender; that, without such essential
details, the complaint becomes vague and does not
meet the legal requirements of the D.V. Act..
7. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant
would further submit that the allegations, such as a
demand for a male child within three months of
marriage, are inherently improbable, particularly
against a well-educated woman (MBA) living and
working abroad, these assertions appear to be the
figment of the Attorney’s imagination, as she was
never present at the alleged place of occurrence,
whether in Noida or London; that, as the Power of
Attorney holder was not an eyewitness to any
incident, the allegations are based purely on
hearsay and conjecture. Moreover, respondent no. 2
falsely stated before the learned trial court on
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15.03.2014 that she was residing with her mother
in Prem Nagar, Dehradun when the complaint was
filed on 03.03.2014; that, official records, including
a statement from London Police, show that she was
in fact in London on that date; that, ahe applicants
submit that such conduct demonstrates deliberate
suppression of material facts and an abuse of the
process of law.
8. Learned senior counsel for the applicants
would submits that during the pendency of the
Hindu Marriage Act case in the Family Court at
Faridabad, respondent no. 2 filed a transfer petition
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court stayed the proceedings before the Family
Court, Faridabad. Later, when applicant no. 1 came
to know about the transfer petition, he engaged a
counsel, who appeared before the Supreme Court
on 23.03.2015 and stated that his client was willing
to withdraw the petition under Sections 11 & 12 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; that, on the same
day, the applicants came to know that a complaint
under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from
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Domestic Violence Act (in short “the D.V. Act“) was
pending before the 2nd Judicial Magistrate,
Dehradun; that, the applicants engaged a lawyer in
Dehradun to get the case details and upon
inspecting the court file, the applicants know about
the facts and got an ex-parte order set aside on
their application; that, no summons have been
served on the applicants till date.
9. Learned senior counsel for the applicant
would further submit that the UK Government
granted British citizenship to applicant no. 1 after
confirming through UK police records that there was
no case or charge pending against him; that, the
respondent no. 2 visited India from 24.11.2013 to
01.01.2014 for her sister’s marriage and in August
2014 for her father’s last rites; that, other than
these visits, since 2013 she has been living and
working independently in the UK; that, the trial
court wrongly allowed respondent no. 2 to file a
false and malicious the D.V. Act complaint through
her mother using a General Power of Attorney on
03.03.2014; that, this effectively removed the need
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for the aggrieved person to be present in court,
which is against the spirit of the Act; that, Section
27(1)(a) of the DV Act states that the court having
jurisdiction is where the aggrieved person
permanently or temporarily resides, carries on
business, or is employed. This means the aggrieved
person must actually be living at the place where
the case is filed. The word “resides” is in the
present tense, showing that the legislature intended
the person to be residing there during the trial;
that, the Act also expects the aggrieved person’s
presence because only she can accurately explain
the alleged incidents of domestic violence; that, her
physical presence is primary; territorial jurisdiction
is secondary.
10. Learned Senior Counsel would further
submit that in this case, respondent no. 2’s
presence was completely bypassed by using a
Power of Attorney; that, the 2nd Judicial Magistrate,
Dehradun, did not question why the complaint and
the Domestic Incident Report were filed by her
mother instead of respondent no. 2 herself, when
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the trial court raised the question of jurisdiction,
respondent no. 2, her mother, and their counsel
falsely stated that respondent no. 2 was residing at
Prem Nagar, Dehradun, however, in reality,
respondent no.2 was in the U.K. and exemptions
from her court appearance were regularly granted
without inquiry, violating the Act.
11. She would further submit that the learned
trial court wrongly interpreted the phrase “any
other person may present the application” in
Section 12(1) of the DV Act. This provision is meant
only for exceptional situations where the aggrieved
person is confined, incapacitated, or in a critical
condition and cannot come to court, despite
residing within the court’s territorial limits. In such
cases, the Magistrate or an appointed official can
record her statement. Using this clause to let a
Power of Attorney handle the case entirely, without
the aggrieved person’s presence, is against the D.V.
Act. She would further submit that having no other
option, applicant no. 1 withdrew the case from the
Faridabad Family Court and filed for divorce before
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the Croydon Court, UK, on grounds of cruelty and
abandonment, among other reasons. Respondent
no. 2 contested the case fully, but her appeal was
rejected. The Croydon Family Court granted a final
divorce decree on 23.05.2016.
12. Learned senior counsel would further
submit that the applicant nos. 2, 3, and 4 are
elderly parents and relatives of applicant no. 1, and
cannot be held guilty of domestic violence.
Applicant no. 2 lives in his native village, and
applicant no. 4 has been living in Indonesia with her
husband from 23.07.2013 to 10.11.2023.
Respondent no. 2 herself admitted this in paragraph
5 of the complaint; that, they have never lived with
respondent no. 2 in a shared household. The
address of Noida mentioned as C-53, Sector 47 was
a rented house of applicant no. 4’s husband. Under
Section 2(f) of the DV Act, a “domestic relationship”
exists only when two persons live or have lived
together in a shared household and are related by
marriage or otherwise as specified. The word used
is “are related” (present tense), not “were related.”
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Here, respondent no. 2 voluntarily left the shared
household in London on 17.11.2013 and never lived
with applicant no. 2 thereafter; that, the divorce
decree by the Croydon Family Court is final. The
trial court should have considered whether any
domestic relationship existed at the time of filing
the complaint. Moreover, the complaint does not
mention a single incident of domestic violence in
India. All alleged incidents occurred in London,
where the police found no evidence and refused to
file charges, therefore, the Magistrate in Dehradun
had no territorial jurisdiction.
13. Learned senior counsel for the applicant
would submit that the applicant no.1 had raised the
jurisdiction issue before the trial court, but it was
dismissed without proper application of mind on
09.09.2016. The trial court also ignored the
requirement under Section 12(1) of the DV Act to
consider a Domestic Incident Report from the
Protection Officer before passing any order. In this
case, neither the complaint nor the Domestic
Incident Report was signed by respondent no. 2,
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and no affidavit was filed by her or her attorney.
14. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 wuld
submit that the trial court rightly passed the
impugned order after considering all material on
record; that, the court correctly held that the Court
at Dehradun has jurisdiction to hear the complaint
under Section 12 of the DV Act, even when filed
through a power of attorney holder. The objections
raised by the applicants regarding maintainability
and jurisdiction were without merit, and there was
no jurisdictional error in rejecting those objections.
15. To this, learned Senior Counsel for the
applicants would submit that the applicants have
filed this application to quash the entire proceedings
of Case No. 267 of 2010 Smt. Ritu Raj vs. Vaibhav
Kumar and Others under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
pending before the IV Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Dehradun. The Magistrate rejected the
applicants’ jurisdictional objection and entertained
the complaint filed by opposite party no.3 under
Section 12 of the DV Act.
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16. Learned senior counsel for the applicants
would submit that the Magistrate acted under a
misconception of law by issuing notices despite
lacking territorial jurisdiction. They argue that the
alleged incidents took place entirely in Croydon,
United Kingdom, and the complaint itself contains
no allegation of any incident in Dehradun. On the
date of filing the application (03.03.2014),
respondent no.2 was employed in Croydon, London.
From paragraph 25 of her application, it is clear that
she only made casual visits to Dehradun to attend
her sister’s marriage before returning to London.
Since she neither resided nor worked in Dehradun
on the filing date, the application was not
maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction; that
in paragraph 12 of her own application, where she
states that on 17.11.2013 in London, she was
allegedly assaulted and called the police, who
registered a domestic violence case. She also
admits that she came to India on 23.11.2013 for
her sister’s marriage and then returned to London.
17. Learned senior counsel for the applicants
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emphasized that on the filing date, respondent no.2
was not present in Dehradun, therefore, the
Magistrate have no jurisdiction to entertain her
complaint. In support of her arguments, she relied
upon the judgment in the case of Sharad Kumar
Pandey v. Mamta Pandey 2010 SCC Online Del
2977, where the Delhi High Court discussed
“temporary residence” under Section 27 of the DV
Act. The Court held that temporary residence
means a dwelling where a person stays for a
meaningful period, not just for a casual or fleeting
visit. It does not include places visited only to file a
case or attend proceedings. Temporary residence
must be continuous from the date it is acquired
until disposal of the case. She also relied on the
Bombay High Court’s judgment in Afia Rasheed
Khan v. Mazharuddin Ali Khan (2021) SCC Bom
4605 passed in W.P. No. 4148 of 2021, which
clarified that “temporary residence” requires an
intention to stay on a continuing basis for a specific
reason, and not just a short or casual visit.
18. Learned Senior Counsel would further
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submit that the marriage between applicant no.1
and respondent no.2 had already been dissolved by
a decree of divorce passed by the competent court
at Croydon, UK, which remains unchallenged. The
complaint under the D.V. Act is, therefore, an abuse
of process of law; that, the alleged domestic
violence took place in London, where police
investigated and found no evidence, refusing to
press charges. Moreover, the Section 12 D.V. Act
application was not even filed by respondent no.2
herself but by her mother as attorney holder,
without any supporting affidavit, rendering it not
maintainable, therefore, the impugned order dated
09.09.2016 rejecting the applicants’ jurisdictional
objection is illegal and liable to be quashed.
19. On the other hand, learned counsel for
respondent no. 2 would submit that respondent
no.2 is living at her parents’ house in Premnagar,
Dehradun. He referred to the order of a Coordinate
Bench of this Court dated 25.03.2022, where the
Court had asked Respondent No. 2 to clarify the
following :
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“(i) when she came to Dehradun before
filing her application under Section 12 of
the Domestic Violence Act.
(ii) Where she was staying at the time the
application was filed.
(iii) Whether she was living in London,
and if so, to give details and the duration
of her stay.
(iv) To provide her travel details for the
year 2014, along with a copy of her
passport and immigration records.”
20. He would further submit that in compliance
of the same, respondent no. 2 filed a
supplementary affidavit stating that she came to
India on 24.11.2013 and stayed at her residence in
Dehradun till 01.01.2014. At the time of filing her
application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, she
was living in London at 89 Seyssel Street. Her stays
in London were: 11.09.2013 to 23.11.2013,
01.01.2014 to 18.07.2014, 26.09.2014 to
28.10.2014, 09.12.2015 to 28.10.2018, and from
07.12.2018 till date. Her travel to India in 2014
was: 24.11.2013 to 01.01.2014 and 19.07.2014 to
25.09.2014. She stated this was not just a casual
visit.
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21. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 would
further submit that the temporary resident of
respondent no.2 is at Dehradun, therefore, the
Magistrate has rightly entertain the complaint of
respondent no.2 under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.
In support of his submission, learned counsel relied
on the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
in Vikram vs. Vaishali & Others, 2023 SCC
OnLine Bom 1091, wherein, relying on the ratio of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that mere
temporary residence in a place does not confer
jurisdiction on the courts of that place unless such
residence satisfies the statutory requirement of
permanency or continuity under Section 27 of the
D.V. Act. Reliance was also placed the judgment of
Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of K.C.
Vijayakumar & Another vs. State of Karnataka,
wherein it was clarified that under Section 27 of the
D.V. Act, the Magistrate having jurisdiction is one
within whose local limits the aggrieved person
permanently or temporarily resides, but such
temporary residence must not be a fleeting or
casual visit; it must have some degree of continuity
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or intention to stay. Further reliance was placed
upon the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Google India Private Limited vs.
Visakha Industries & Ors., AIR 2020 SC 350,
wherein the Court reiterated the guidelines in
paragraph 102 of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, illustrating
categories of cases wherein the High Court may
exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
to prevent abuse of process of the court and to
secure the ends of justice, particularly where the
allegations do not disclose the commission of any
offence or where proceedings are manifestly
attended with mala fides.
22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material available on record.
23. It is admitted that the marriage between
the applicant and respondent no. 2 took place on
09.04.2013. After the marriage, respondent no. 2
went to London, United Kingdom, with her husband
(applicant no. 1). It is also undisputed that the
alleged incident of domestic violence took place in
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London, where she lodged a complaint with the
local police. After inquiry, the UK police found the
allegations unsubstantiated. It is further not in
dispute that, in her application under Section 12 of
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 (“D.V. Act“), respondent no. 2 gave her
address as 62, Topmast Point, The Quarter Deck,
POP, London E14 8SN, which is different from the
address of applicant no. 1 mentioned in the
complaint.
24. Section 27(1)(a) of the D.V. Act clearly
states as under:
(1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class
or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,
within the local limits of which
(a)the person aggrieved permanently or
temporarily resides or carries on business or
is employed; or
(b)the respondent resides or carries on
business or is employed; or
(c)the cause of action has arisen, shall be
the competent Court to grant a protection
order and other orders under this Act and to
try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be
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enforceable throughout India.
25. The judgment in Vikram v. Vaishali
(Supra) cited by learned counsel for respondent
no.2 clarifies that “temporary residence” must be
actual, substantial, and existing at the time of filing
the complaint. A past stay or short visit before filing
is not enough to give jurisdiction.
26. In this case, by her own admission,
respondent no. 2 was living in London when she
filed the case. Her short visits to India, months
earlier, cannot be treated as “temporary residence”
for the purpose of jurisdiction. Even in her affidavit,
she stated that her stays in Dehradun were only for
limited periods between long stays in London. The
Supreme Court in Rupali Devi v. State of U.P.,
(2019) 5 SCC 384, held that jurisdiction can also
arise where the effects of domestic violence
continue at a certain place. However, there must be
a clear pleading and evidence to show such
continuing effects. In this case, there is no such
factual basis. Merely visiting Dehradun for personal
or family reasons is not the same as residing there
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with the intention to stay for a reasonable time.
27. The Karnataka High Court decision relied
upon by the respondent does not help her case
because, in K.C. Vijayakumara (Supra), the
aggrieved person was actually living within the
Magistrate’s jurisdiction when the case was filed —
which is not the situation here.
28. The words “temporarily resides” mean that
the stay must show some continuity and intention
to live there, not just a casual short visit. The
Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja v.
Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, explained that
a “shared household” can include a place where the
woman lived in a domestic relationship, even if
owned by in-laws. But if the in-laws live separately
and there is no evidence of their involvement in
cruelty, they cannot be made parties.
29. The record shows that respondent no. 2
came to Dehradun only to attend her sister’s
wedding and then returned to London, meaning
thereby, that the respondent no.2 had no intention
to reside, even temporarily, at her parental home in
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Dehradun. The respondent no.2 was not residing in
Dehradun permanently or even temporarily at the
time of filing the complaint. Therefore, Dehradun
does not qualify as her “temporary residence” under
Section 27 of the D.V. Act. It is also admitted that
applicant no. 1 and respondent no. 2 lived together
for only a short time, and the other applicants never
lived with them. Under the D.V. Act, the law applies
to people who have lived together in a shared
household. Simply naming relatives in a complaint,
without giving clear details of incidents, dates, or
acts, is not enough to proceed against them.
30. Considering these facts and the settled
legal principles, the complaint filed before the court
at Dehradun is without territorial jurisdiction. The
proceedings, therefore, are liable to be quashed
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which empowers the High
Court to prevent abuse of the process of the court
and secure the ends of justice.
31. In view of the above discussion, this Court
finds that it is a fit case to exercise inherent powers
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the
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application is allowed. The impugned order dated
09.09.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 267 of 2014
(Smt. Ritu Raj v. Vaibhav Kumar and Others) under
Section 12 of the D.V. Act, pending in the Court of
4th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, is
hereby quashed.
33. Pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.
(ALOK MAHRA, J.)
05.08.2025
Mamta
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