Karnataka High Court
Mr. B N Shivaprakasha vs Bangalore Turf Club Limited on 5 August, 2025
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MFA No. 5085 of 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 5TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 5085 OF 2025 (CPC)
BETWEEN:
MR. B.N. SHIVAPRAKASHA
S/O NARASIMHAIAH N
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS
SENIOR CLERK OF THE COURSE (BTC)
BANGALORE TURF CLUB LIMITED
POST BOX NO.5038, 52
RACE COURSE ROAD, RACE COURSE
GANDHI NAGAR, BENGALURU-560 001
KARNATAKA
ALSO AT
DOOR NO.474, 3RD BLOCK
SIR M. VISVESWARAYAIAH LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 056
KARNATAKA
...APPELLANT
Digitally signed (BY SRI. DHANANJAY JOSHI, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
by ANJALI M
Location: High SRI. SHISHIRA AMARNATH, ADVOCATE)
Court of
Karnataka
AND:
BANGALORE TURF CLUB LIMITED
REPRESENTED BY "CEO AND SECRETARY"
POST BOX NO.5038, 52
RACE COURSE ROAD, RACE COURSE
GANDHI NAGAR, BENGALURU-560 001
KARNATAKA
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. S.S. RAMDAS, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. PRADEEP S. SAWKAR, ADVOCATE)
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THIS MFA IS FILED U/O.43 RULE 1(r) OF CPC, AGAINST
THE ORDER DT.23.06.2025 ON IA NO.1 IN O.S.NO.4085/2025
ON THE FILE OF THE XXV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND
SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH NO.23), REJECTING IA NO.1 FILED
U/O.39 RULES 1 AND 2 R/W SEC.151 OF CPC.
THIS MFA HAVING BEEN RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT,
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT,
DELIVERED/PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON’BLE MR JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR)
This Miscellaneous First Appeal is filed under Order
XLIII Rule 1 (r) read with Section 104 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, (for short, “CPC“), by the appellant
challenging the order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the
Court of the XXV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judges,
Bengaluru (CCH-23), in O.S.No.4085/2025, whereby the
learned trial Court rejected the appellant’s application filed
under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC seeking a
temporary injunction to restrain the respondent from
giving effect to the termination of his employment.
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2. The appellant, Sri. B.N. Shivaprakash, was
appointed as Under Study Assistant Track Manager by the
respondent – Bengaluru Turf Club Ltd., on 05.08.2012.
His services were confirmed as Assistant Track Manager on
26.03.2014. Subsequently, he was elevated to the post of
Administrator and Senior Clerk of the course with effect
from 01.10.2021. During this period, the appellant also
discharged additional functions and responsibilities, such
as secretary to race meetings, secretary general of the
turf authorities of India and other allied administrative
assignments. The appellant claims that, his performance
remained unblemished and had earned him appreciation
and recognition from the Bengaluru Turf Club as well as
other racing institutions, including the Royal Western India
Turf Club. According to the appellant, the professional
environment changed considerably following the
appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer and
Secretary on 23.06.2022. The appellant contends that,
after the said officer took charge, there was a deliberate
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effort to curtail his functions, reduce his responsibilities,
and engineering false complaints against him with the
intention of targeting him for removal. It is alleged that,
in the month of September 2023, the appellant was
allegedly demoted arbitrarily. One of the incidents central
to the appellant’s grievance occurred during Managing
Committee Meeting No. 35/2023-24 held on 12.09.2024,
when the appellant raised scientifically grounded
objections to the Club’s proposal to procure uncertified
Coco peat-based manure from a firm named M/s Virat
Smart Soil in preference to a certified supplier, namely
Dynasuper – Dynamic Lifter. The appellant asserts that,
his objection, although professional and scientifically
supported, caused discomfort among certain committee
members and eventually led to disciplinary action being
initiated against him.
3. On 08.10.2024, one Mr. Jagadish K.A., a
member of the interim committee, lodged a complaint
alleging procedural and other irregularities in the
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discharge of course maintenance responsibilities.
Following this, the Managing Committee, in Meeting No.
37/2023-24 held on 09.10.2024, resolved to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Although
the minutes of the said meeting reportedly recorded only
the issuance of a show cause notice, the appellant was
placed under suspension by notice dated 21.10.2024. It is
the appellant’s case that, such suspension was unilateral
and unauthorised, and that, the several committee
members later admitted that, no resolution had been
passed to suspend him. In response to the show cause
notice, the appellant submitted a detailed explanation, and
despite having co-operated fully with the disciplinary
process, he contends that, the process was manipulated to
secure a predetermined outcome against him.
4. On 21.11.2024, a formal charge sheet was
issued to the appellant. A domestic enquiry was
commenced and continued for several months, extending
over 40 sittings between November 2024 and May 2025.
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During the course of the enquiry, the appellant examined
several witnesses, including DWs. 1 to 5, who were
persons familiar with the procurement transactions, race
course conditions, and related matters. The appellant
contends that, the evidence placed on record clearly
exonerated him of the charges and exposed material
irregularities on the part of the management, including
tampering of committee minutes, illegal procurement
practices, and violations of statutory fertilizer guidelines.
The appellant further contends that, midway through the
enquiry, the enquiry officer, Mr. N. Srinivasa, abruptly
withdrew from the proceedings, citing personal distress
caused by questions raised by one of the defence
witnesses. This sudden withdrawal disrupted the enquiry
process and left the proceedings inconclusive.
5. The appellant’s grievance intensified when the
managing committee, in Meeting No. 15/2024-25 held on
10.05.2025, passed a resolution to terminate the
disciplinary enquiry. The same meeting also recorded the
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decision to terminate the appellant’s services. Thereafter,
a termination letter dated 12.05.2025 was issued to the
appellant by the respondent, citing clause 20 of the
appointment order dated 05.08.2012 and Rule 10 of the
Bangalore Turf Club Service Rules, 2019. The appellant
contends that, the termination is illegal and void, as Rule
10 specifically prohibits termination of a permanent
employee when disciplinary proceedings are pending, and
that his employment status was that of a confirmed
permanent employee. It is also his case that, termination
without awaiting the outcome of the enquiry amounts to a
direct and gross violation of the principles of natural
justice.
6. In response to the said termination, the
appellant filed a suit in O.S.No.4085/2025 seeking a
declaration that, the order of the termination is illegal,
arbitrary, and void ab initio and sought a direction for
reinstatement to his former position. He simultaneously
filed I.A.No.1 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC
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seeking a temporary injunction to stay the operation of
the termination order pending disposal of the suit.
7. The respondent resisted the application by
contending that, the appellant’s services were terminated
in accordance with the terms and conditions of his original
appointment, which allowed for termination by either party
with one month’s notice. It was contended that, the
relationship between the appellant and respondent was
purely contractual in nature and governed by private
employment terms, not protected by any statute such as
the Industrial Disputes Act or Article 311 of the
Constitution. The respondent also submitted that, the
Writ Petition filed earlier by the appellant under Article 226
of the Constitution in W.P. No. 15820/2025 challenging
the same termination had been voluntarily withdrawn by
the appellant on 11.06.2025. It was further submitted
that, granting temporary injunction would amount to
granting the principal relief of reinstatement and is not
permissible at an interim stage.
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8. The learned trial Court, upon hearing both sides
and perusing the materials on record, held that, the
appellant had failed to make out a prima facie case for the
grant of temporary injunction. The Court observed that,
an injunction staying the operation of the termination
order would, in effect, amount to interim reinstatement,
which cannot be granted under the limited scope of Order
XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC. It also noted that, the
termination had already taken place and that the appellant
had access to alternative legal remedies in the pending
suit. On these grounds, I.A.No. 1 was dismissed.
Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has preferred
the present appeal before this Court.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant with all
vehemence submits that, in view of the facts so brought
on record by the appellant in the plaint as well as the
illegal actions of the defendant, he was compelled to file a
civil suit by withdrawing the writ petition. He submits
that, the very rules so framed with regard to the
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functioning of the respondent – Club – are violated by the
committee and initially there was a suspension, and
thereafter termination order by stopping the enquiry,
which is against the principles of natural justice. In
support of his submission, the learned counsel for the
appellant took this Court to various citations, such as
Suraj Narredu v. Bangalore Turf Club Limited in MFA
No. 4323/2021 passed by this Court.
10. As against this submission, the counsel for the
respondent submits that, the employment of the appellant
is governed by the Contract Act. The appellant cannot take
the assistance of the Civil Court to get him reinstated. He
submits that, the termination order has been rightly
passed by the committee by passing a resolution and such
a reinstatement cannot be done by passing the interim
order. He submits that, when there is enforcement of the
contract for personal service, the general rule is that
declaration that appellant continued to be in service etc, is
not permissible. He submits that, an employer cannot be
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forced to take an employee with whom relations have
reached a point of complete loss of faith between the two.
In support of his submission, he relied upon the provisions
of Sections 14(b) and 34 of the Specific Relief Act and
also a judgment of the Apex Court in Pearlite Liners (P)
Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 172.
11. Further, he submits that, the prayer in the
plaint cannot be granted by the Civil Court. The said
prayer is barred under the provisions of the specific Relief
Act. By filing the suit, the plaintiff wants to seek specific
performance of a contract of his personal service, which is
specifically barred under the Specific Relief Act. Further,
he submits that, the learned trial Court has rightly
rejected the interim application filed by the appellant. In
support of his submission, he relied upon the following
judgment:
(i) State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs Sandeep
Kumar Balmiki and others reported in (2009)
17 SCC 555 paras – 4, 5 and 6.
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(ii) Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd vs Manorama Sirsi
reported in (2004) 3 SCC 172 paras – 7, 8
and 10.
(iii) Bank of Baroda Ltd vs Jeewan Lal Mehrotra
reported in (1971) (3) SCC 677 paras – 2
and 3.
(iv) Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co.Ltd., Rae Bareli and
another vs Badri Nath Dixit and others
reported in (1991) 3 SCC 54 paras 10.
(v) Integrated Rural Development Agency vs Ram
Pyare Pandey reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC
493 paras 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
(vi) Apollo Tyres Limited vs C P Sebastian
reported in (2009) 14 SCC 360 paras 1, 8, 9
and 10.
12. I have given my anxious consideration to the
arguments of both sides. This Court has carefully
examined the order under challenge, the documents on
record, and the submissions advanced by both the parties.
It is apparent from the appellants’ own pleadings that, the
termination was preceded by a series of disciplinary steps,
including show cause notices, charge sheet, and a
protracted enquiry process. The facts so presented reflect
that, the enquiry had progressed substantially and that
defence evidence had been led before it was suddenly
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discontinued by the respondent. The question is, whether
the termination was legally sustainable in the absence of
an enquiry report and whether the respondent acted in
violation of its own rules or issues that, merit adjudication
in the trial. However, for the purpose of the present
appeal, the scope of consultation is restricted to whether
the learned trial Court was correct in rejecting the prayer
for temporary injunction.
13. The legal position is well settled that, interim
injunction cannot be granted if it would result in granting
the main relief itself. The Court cannot, at an interlocutory
stage, by way of temporary injunction, grant what would
essentially be the fruit of a final decree. Such a course
would be, indirect contravention of the well-known Maxim
“Quia timet”, which justifies preventive relief only where
the threatened harm is irreparable and not speculative.
The appellants claim in the suit is for a declaration that,
the termination is void and for consequential
reinstatement. Courts must exercise restraint in matters
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involving enforcement of personal service contracts, as
rightly argued by the counsel of the respondent,
particularly when the termination has already taken effect
and the employer-employee relationship has ceased to
subsist.
14. It is also important to note that the
observations made by the learned trial Court regarding the
appellant’s failure to establish irreparable harm or balance
of convenience are legally tenable. The appellant
continues to have access to the civil remedy and can press
his claims during trial. No material is placed before this
Court to indicate that, the appellant would suffer such
hardship or injury as would justify reversal of the trial
Court’s order at this stage. Furthermore, it appears from
the record that, the appellant had earlier pursued
constitutional remedies through a Writ Petition and then
elected to pursue civil remedies. In these circumstances,
no exceptional case is made out to interfere with the
discretion exercised by the trial Court.
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15. Moreover, interim reliefs are inherently
discretionary, and the exercise of that discretion is
governed by equitable principles such as, “he who seeks
equity must do equity”, and “equity aids the vigilant, not
those who slumber on their rights”. Courts must therefore
exercise restraint, particularly in matters involving
enforcement of contracts of personal service, where the
employer – Employee relationship has been severed and
where such relationships are not governed by statutory
protection under service jurisprudence. Granting
reinstatement, even indirectly, through an interim
injunction, would blur the distinction between interlocutory
and final relief, which is impermissible in law.
16. This Court is of the considered view that, the
order of the trial Court is based on sound reasoning and
requires no interference. However, this Court also clarifies
that, all observations made in this judgment are restricted
to the scope of the present appeal, which relates only to
the refusal of interim relief. These findings shall not
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influence or bind the trial Court in its independent
adjudication of the suit on merits. All questions regarding
the validity of the termination, alleged violation of Rule 10,
the applicability of natural justice principles, and the reliefs
claim shall be decided uninfluenced by this order.
17. Resultantly, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Appeal is dismissed.
(ii) The order dated 23.06.2025 passed by the
XXV Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru in O.S.No. 4085/2025 is
affirmed.
No order as to cost.
Sd/-
(RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR)
JUDGE
AM
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 29