Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
Agali Narasappagari Chiranjeevi, … vs The State Of A.P., Rep. By P.P., … on 7 August, 2025
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APHC010104962010
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY, THE SEVENTH DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 319/2010
Between:
1. Agali Narasappagari Chiranjeevi, Agali S/o. Narasappa, driver of the
jeep bearing No. AP 02 U 4544 S.C. Colony, Agali Town & Mandal,
Ananthapur District.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. The State of A.P. Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra
Pradesh, Hyderabad.
...RESPONDENT
Revision filed under Section 397/401 of CrPC praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Criminal Revision
Case, the High Court may be pleased to set aside the judgment dated 20 20-05-
2009 passed in C.C. No. 68 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the Judicial I
Class Magistrate, Madakasira, which was partly set set-aside
aside by the judgment
dated 17-02-2010
2010 in Criminal Appeal No. 72 of 2009 on the file of the
Additional Sessions Judge,
ge, Hindupur, and allow the present revision.
IA NO: 1 OF 2010(CRLRCMP 457 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
dispense with the filing of the certified copy of the judgment dated 20-05-2009
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passed in C.C. No. 68 of 2006 on the file of the Court of the Judicial I Class
Magistrate, Madakasira.
IA NO: 2 OF 2010(CRLRCMP 462 OF 2010
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the ccircumstances
ircumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
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suspend the operation of the judgment dated 17-02-2010 in Criminal Appeal
No. 72 of 2009 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur, in partly
modifying the judgment dated 20-05-2009 passed in C.C. No. 68 of 2006 on
the file of the Court of the Judicial I Class Magistrate, Madakasira, by
releasing the petitioner on bail, pending disposal of Criminal Revision Case.
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. N RANGA REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
The Court made the following ORDER:
1. The Criminal Revision Case, under Section 397 and 401 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is filed on behalf of the
petitioner/accused assailing the judgment dated 17.02.2010 passed in
Crl.A.No.72 of 2009 on the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Hindupur (for short, ‘1st Appellate Court’), whereby the 1st Appellate Court
partly allowed the appeal, by confirming the conviction and modified the
sentence imposed against the appellant/accused for the offences punishable
under Section 304A and 338 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC‘) vide
judgment dated 20.05.2009 passed in C.C.No.68 of 2006 on the file of the
learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Madakasira (for short, ‘the Trial
Court’).
2. The parties to this Criminal Revision Case will hereinafter be referred to
as described before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience.
3. The brief facts of the prosecution’s case are that:
On 15.09.2006, at about 8:30 AM, on the Agali-Rolla metal road
near Dokkalapalli village in Agali Mandal, the accused, while driving
a jeep bearing No. AP-02 U-4541 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the
offending vehicle’), drove it rashly and negligently at high speed.
Upon encountering a bullock cart belonging to T. Thimmappa
3coming from the opposite direction, he lost control of the vehicle,
which overturned onto its left side. As a result, S. Darshini, a 6-
year-old 2nd class student, daughter of Javarayappagari Satheesh,
died on the spot, while another passenger, Manjunath (L.W.5),
sustained both simple and grievous injuries. Several school
children from Sree Lakshmi Convent, Rolla, were also travelling in
the jeep. The injured person was later shifted to the hospital for
treatment. Based on a complaint by T. Mahalingappa (L.W.1),
Crime No.21/2006 was registered under Sections 337 and 304-A
IPC. Upon completion of the investigation, the Sub-Inspector of
Police at Agali filed the charge sheet.
4. The Trial Court took cognizance against the accused under sections
304A, 337 and 338 of IPC. On the appearance of the accused, the copies of
the prosecution documents were furnished to the accused as contemplated
under section 207 Cr.Р.С. The accused was examined under Section 251
Cr.P.C. The sum and substance of the charge sheet averments were read
over and explained to the accused in Telugu, to which the accused pleaded
not guilty for the offences punishable under Sections 304A, 337 and 338 of
the IPC and claimed to be tried.
5. During the course of the trial, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 12
were examined, and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. After the closure of the
evidence of the prosecution, the accused was examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing in the
evidence let in by the prosecution, for which he denied the same and stated
that he had no defence witnesses and pleaded not guilty.
6. The Trial Court, after hearing both sides and considering the oral as
well as documentary evidence, found the accused guilty of the offences, as
stated supra, vide its judgment, dated 20.05.2009 in C.C.No.68 of 2006 and
convicted the petitioner/accused and sentenced him as follows: (i) to undergo
4suffer Simple Imprisonment for two (02) years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,500/-
and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment for three
months, for the offence punishable under section 304A of IPC; and (ii) to
undergo simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- and
in default of payment of fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for two
months, for the offence punishable under section 338 of IPC.
7. Felt aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, the
unsuccessful accused filed Criminal Appeal No.319 of 2010 before the 1 st
Appellate Court, and the 1st Appellate Court partly allowed the Criminal
Appeal and modified the sentence imposed against the accused. Felt
aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful appellant filed the present Criminal
Revision Case, challenging the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge in
Criminal Appeal No.72 of 2009.
8. I have heard the learned counsel for both parties and perused the
material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence adduced by
the prosecution before the Trial Court, as well as the judgments of both the
Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court.
9. Now, the points that arise for consideration are:
(I) Whether the revision petitioner / accused has made out any
grounds for interference in the impugned judgment of
conviction passed by the Trial Court, which was confirmed
by the 1st Appellate Court(II) Does the sentence passed by the 1st Appellate Court
warrant any interference?
POINT NO.I:
10. While exercising revisional jurisdiction, this Court is to examine the
correctness, legality, and propriety of the judgment/order passed by the trial
Court as well as the first appellate Court. This Court is not ordinarily required to
re-examine and re-appreciate the evidence which is already appreciated by
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the trial Court and the appellate Court unless it is found that there is clear non-
appreciation of the evidence already on record or appreciation of inadmissible
evidence, or that finding has been recorded without any evidence on record. If
there is evidence on record on the point of decision formulated by the Courts
below for arriving at a conclusion of guilt, this Court is not required to enter
into the records again to substitute its view in place of the view taken by the
trial Court and the appellate Court.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused submits that both the
Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court failed to properly consider the evidence
on record, including witness statements and other material available on
record. It is further contended that both Courts overlooked the fact that the
prosecution failed to establish rashness and negligence on the part of the
accused before convicting him for the offence punishable under section 304A
of the IPC.
12. The Trial Court noted that PW.1 (L.Mahalingappa) is both the
complainant and an eyewitness to the accident. According to his testimony, he
and his wife, PW.2 (Sakamma), were in the fields and they witnessed the
crime vehicle, carrying school children, travelling from Agali towards Rolla; at
the same time, a bullock-cart was approaching from the opposite direction,
i.e., from Rolla towards Agali; the jeep deviated from its path and overturned
on the left side; on hearing the cries of the children, PW.2 and PW.3 (Kumar
Swamy) rushed to the scene; they saw the accused lifting the jeep and found
a child underneath, whose forehead had been crushed; he later came to know
that the deceased child was the daughter of PW.7 (J.Sattesh); the accused
took the child to the village doctor, who declared her dead.
13. PW.2, in her testimony, stated that they saw a bullock-cart approaching
from the Rolla direction when the driver of the offending vehicle (jeep),
travelling at high speed, lost control and the vehicle overturned on the left side
of the road; she, along with PWs.1 and 3, then rescued the victims of the
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accident. During cross-examination, she reaffirmed that the offending vehicle
was being driven by the accused at high speed at the time of the incident.
14. PW.3 corroborated the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2, stating that the
offending vehicle came from the Agali side at high speed and overturned; he,
along with PWs.1, 2, and the accused, rescued the children from the accident
place. PW.4, T. Thimmappa, another eyewitness, testified that approximately
25 passengers were in the jeep. He further stated that PW.5 (Manjunath)
sustained a leg fracture and that one child died while being shifted to the
hospital.
15. PW.5, an injured eyewitness, testified that the crime vehicle (jeep) fell
on the deceased, Darshini, and that he sustained an injury to his left leg. His
evidence establishes that he was one of the passengers in the jeep at the time
of the accident. He categorically stated that the accident occurred due to the
rash and negligent driving of the accused. PW.6, Diwakar, is also cited as an
eyewitness; however, his testimony reveals that he only heard the cries and
rushed to the scene of the offence, where he saw the accused carrying the
injured Darshini in the opposite direction. As PW.6 did not witness the
accident directly, his evidence is not helpful in determining the manner in
which the accident occurred.
16. PW.7, the father of the deceased Darshini, testified that upon learning
of the accident, he and his wife rushed to the scene and found Darshini lying
in front of Chandrappa’s house with her head crushed. He confirmed that she
had died and also observed that PW.5 had sustained a leg fracture. The
prosecution examined PW.8, Krishna Reddy, as a witness to the inquest held
over the deceased’s body. PW.9, Thippeswamy, testified that the Sub-
Inspector of Police conducted the scene observation in his presence,
prepared the observation mahazar, and obtained his signature.
17. The prosecution examined PW.10, Dr. K. Krishna Murthy, who
conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the deceased,
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Darshini. He issued the postmortem certificate (Ex.P2) and opined that the
cause of death was a crush injury caused by violent force, resulting in
intracerebral haemorrhage, multiple fractures, significant blood loss,
hypovolemic shock, brain death, and ultimately, cardiac arrest. His testimony
also indicates that he examined PW.5, found injuries on him, and issued a
wound certificate (Ex.P3) accordingly. PW.11, S. Sreeramulu, Sub-Inspector
of Police, was examined to prove the investigation conducted by him. PW.12,
G.V. Prasad, Motor Vehicle Inspector, deposed that he inspected the crime
vehicle and issued the report marked as Ex.P8, opining that the accident did
not occur due to any mechanical defect in the vehicle.
18. The defence taken by the accused is that it had rained the day prior to
the accident, and the road, being a metal road, was slippery. He contended
that while attempting to avoid a collision with an oncoming bullock-cart, he
steered the jeep towards the left, causing it to skid and overturn. As noted in
paragraph 22 of the Trial Court’s judgment, the accused did not dispute the
prosecution’s case that he was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.
Similarly, the prosecution did not dispute the fact that a bullock-cart was
approaching from the opposite direction and that the jeep was carrying
approximately 25 passengers, including 12 school-going children, at the time
of the incident.
19. PW.4’s evidence indicates that he took precautionary measures by
stopping his cart upon observing the jeep’s excessive speed. Nothing was
elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his testimony. His testimony
establishes that he moved his cart to the left side of the road, and the jeep,
travelling at high speed, overturned. The Trial Court noted that the defence did
not dispute the prosecution’s version that the accused was the driver of the
vehicle at the relevant time. The record also shows that the accused himself
shifted the deceased, Darshini, to the village hospital for treatment. The
testimony of independent eyewitnesses further corroborates the accused’s
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identity as the driver of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident, and
their evidence remains unchallenged.
20. Upon a careful reading of the evidence of PWs.1 to 7, both the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court found their testimonies to be cogent,
convincing, and fully supportive of the prosecution’s case. Both courts also
noted that the crime vehicle (jeep) was carrying 25 passengers at the time of
the accident, which, in itself, reflected gross negligence on the part of the
accused. The evidence of PWs.1 to 3 further reveals that immediately after
the accident, they, along with the accused, attempted to reposition the jeep
and shifted the deceased Darshini to the hospital. This establishes that they
had sufficient opportunity to identify the accused as the driver of the vehicle.
21. The defence counsel contends that none of the witnesses specifically
stated that the accident occurred due to the accused’s rash and negligent
driving of the crime vehicle. According to the defence, the witnesses merely
stated that the accused was driving the jeep at a high speed. It is further
argued that, even according to the prosecution witnesses, a bullock cart
driven by PW.4 was approaching from the opposite direction, and there is no
conclusive legal evidence on record establishing that the accused drove the
vehicle in a rash and negligent manner. No doubt the rash and negligent
driving is a prerequisite for the offence punishable under section 304A of the
IPC. The Courts have to base their findings on material on record and not on
assumptions not fully supported by material on record.
22. The record establishes that the defence has not disputed the death of
the deceased, Darshini, resulting from injuries sustained in the accident. It is
also undisputed that PW.5 suffered fracture injuries in the same incident. The
involvement of the offending vehicle is conclusively proven. PW.1, an
eyewitness, lodged the report marked as Ex.P.1, explicitly stating that the rash
and negligent driving of the accused caused the accident. The evidence on
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record indicates that the accused failed to take reasonable precautions while
operating the vehicle.
23. In matters of this nature, particularly involving road traffic accidents, the
revision petitioner/accused, being a direct participant in the incident, is
expected to provide his version of events, either orally or in writing, at least
during the recording of his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The purpose
of recording the accused’s statement in such cases is not a mere procedural
formality, but serves a dual purpose: it offers the accused an opportunity to
explain incriminating circumstances and assists the Court in evaluating the
defence, if any.
24. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Ravi Kapur v. State of
Rajasthan1, has held in paragraph No.39 as follows:
39. It is true that the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt but the provisions of Section 313 CrPC are not a
mere formality or purposeless. They have a dual purpose to discharge,
firstly, that the entire material parts of the incriminating evidence should
be put to the accused in accordance with law and, secondly, to provide
an opportunity to the accused to explain his conduct or his version of
the case. To provide this opportunity to the accused is the mandatory
duty of the Court. If the accused deliberately fails to avail this
opportunity, then the consequences in law have to follow, particularly
when it would be expected of the accused in the normal course of
conduct to disclose certain facts which may be within his personal
knowledge and have a bearing on the case.
25. It is evident from the record that during the examination under Section
313 of the Cr.P.C., the revision petitioner/accused failed to provide any
explanation. The testimony of the eyewitnesses consistently confirms that the
accused was driving the offending vehicle at high speed.
26. Learned counsel for the accused contends that merely driving the
vehicle at high speed does not, by itself, constitute rash and negligent driving.
1
MANU/SC/0659/2012
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In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Satish2, wherein it was held that:
4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a “high speed” does not
bespeak of either “negligence” or “rashness” by itself. None of the
witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even
approximately, as to what they meant by “high speed”. “High speed” is a
relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to
establish as to what it meant by “high speed” in the facts and
circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing
everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an
accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality
is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions.
There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the
absence of any material on the record, no presumption of “rashness” or
“negligence” could be drawn by invoking the maxim “res ipsa loquitur”.
There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle,
there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because
of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who
inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not
forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for
reasons best known to the prosecution. This is a serious infirmity and
lacuna in the prosecution case.
27. Although the witnesses did not explicitly state that the accused drove
the vehicle rashly and negligently, they clearly described the manner in which
the accident occurred. The testimony of PW.4 indicates that upon noticing the
offending vehicle approaching at high speed, he stopped his bullock cart.
Despite this, the accused, who was driving the offending vehicle carrying 25
passengers, including school children, was unable to maintain control,
resulting in the vehicle overturning.
28. It is not the case of either the prosecution or the defence that the jeep
collided with the bullock-cart and overturned as a direct result of the impact.
The accused was driving the offending vehicle (jeep) while carrying
passengers, including school-going children. In such a situation, it was
incumbent upon the accused to drive the vehicle at a speed that would allow
2
(1998) 8 SCC 493
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him to maintain control under any unforeseen circumstances. He was also
expected to anticipate the possibility of vehicles or obstacles appearing from
the opposite direction. Furthermore, it is not the case of the defence that the
bullock-cart was in motion at the time of the incident. Even assuming that the
bullock-cart was not stationary, the fact remains that the accused failed to
control the vehicle. This failure reflects negligence on the part of the accused,
who did not exercise the degree of caution expected of a driver, particularly
when responsible for the safety of children being travelled in the vehicle.
29. According to the defence, as previously noted, it had rained on the day
prior to the incident, and the road was a metal road. Under such conditions,
the accused was expected to drive cautiously and observe the road’s
condition. Notably, the defence has not contended that the road was a
highway to justify high speed. As per the Ex.P.7 report, the accident occurred
on a mud road without any road margins. On such roads, vehicles are
expected to move at a normal, controlled speed. However, the evidence on
record indicates that the accused was driving the offending vehicle (a jeep) at
a high speed and, upon seeing an oncoming bullock cart, lost control in an
attempt to avoid a collision, causing the vehicle to overturn. This clearly
establishes gross negligence on the part of the accused, who is solely
responsible for the accident that resulted in the death of the deceased,
Darshini.
30. Upon consideration of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 12 and Exs.P.1 to P.8,
the trial court concluded that the accident occurred due to the negligent driving
of the revision petitioner / accused, resulting the death of the child, Darshini on
the spot and PW.5 sustaining a fracture and the prosecution had established
the guilt of the accused for the offences under Sections 304A and 338 of the
IPC.
31. It is well settled that, in the absence of perversity or manifest error, a
revision court is not expected to interfere with concurrent findings of fact by
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the courts below. In the present case, there is no material on record to
question the credibility of P.Ws.1 to 12 or to disbelieve the contents of Exs.P.1
to P.8.
32. Upon a careful examination of the evidence on record, both the Trial
Court and the 1st Appellate Court concurrently held that the accident occurred
due to the rash and negligent driving of the accused. This Court has also gone
through the evidence and finds no reason to take a view different from that of
the Trial Court as well as the 1st Appellate Court.
33. In view of the overall facts and circumstances of the case, this Court
finds that both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have rightly
appreciated the evidence and properly assessed the materials placed before
them. The findings were arrived at after a thorough and correct evaluation of
the case from all relevant perspectives. Consequently, there is no justification
to interfere with the concurrent findings of both courts regarding the conviction
of the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 304A and 338 of
the IPC. Accordingly, Point No.I is answered in the negative.
POINT NO.II:
34. Learned counsel for the petitioner/accused submits that the petitioner is
the sole breadwinner of his family, supporting his elderly parents who are
entirely dependent on his income, and that he has no prior criminal record,
including any violations of traffic rules. It is further submitted that in similar
cases involving a higher number of deaths and injuries, this Court has, on
multiple occasions, reduced the sentence of imprisonment.
35. It is a well-established principle of sentencing policy that the punishment
imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the proven offence. The
sentence should be neither nominal nor excessive. What constitutes a
proportionate sentence must be determined on a case-by-case basis, having
due regard to the specific facts and circumstances of each matter.
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36. While ordering the sentence, the facts and circumstances of each of the
case before the Court has to be appreciated on its own merits and the
circumstances in one criminal case cannot be taken as a binding precedent in
so far as the order on sentence in another case, unless the facts and
circumstances of each of the cases corresponds to each other or exactly
tallies. But always, the Court must bear in mind the cardinal principle that the
sentence ordered must be proportionate to the gravity of the proven guilt, and
it should not be excessive or exorbitant.
37. True that in the instant case, the petitioner / accused has been found
guilty of offences punishable under Sections 304A and 338 of the IPC for
driving rashly and negligently on a public road, which unfortunately resulted in
the loss of a precious human life. However, it is pertinent to note that there is
no allegation that the accused was under the influence of liquor or any other
substance impairing his ability to drive at the time of the accident. The act was
one of rash and negligent driving simpliciter, and not one involving inebriation,
a factor which, if present, would have constituted an aggravated and
despicable offence warranting a stricter and more severe sentence.
38. The record indicates that the petitioner was approximately 24 years old
at the time of the accident, which occurred on 15.09.2006, nearly 19 years
ago. It is evident that immediately after the accident, the accused attempted to
save the injured, including shifting the child Darshini to a hospital, which
demonstrates that he did not flee from the scene of the offence, and he also
tried to rescue the children from the jeep immediately after the accident. The
record further shows that upon seeing the bullock cart approaching from the
opposite direction, the accused made an effort to avoid the collision, but was
unable to control the crime vehicle due to its high speed. The evidence,
including the testimony of PWs.2 and 3, confirms that the accused did his best
to prevent the accident despite the rainy conditions. In view of the mitigating
circumstances, a reduction in the sentence is fully justified.
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39. It is established that the punishment for an offence under Section 304A
of the IPC may consist of imprisonment for a term of up to two years, or a fine,
or both, with the extent of the sentence left to the Court’s discretion. However,
in 1973, the Indian Parliament introduced a limitation on this judicial discretion
by inserting sub-section (4) into Section 354 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. This provision mandates that when a court imposes a sentence of
imprisonment for less than three months for an offence punishable with
imprisonment of one year or more, the Court must record its reasons for such
a sentence. This amendment clarifies that imprisonment should be the norm,
while imposing only a fine should be the exception in such cases. When
Parliament enacted this subsection, it would have certainly noticed that the
prescribed punishment for an offence under Section 304A of the IPC includes
imprisonment of up to two years, a fine, or both.
40. It is evident from the record that neither the State nor the
complainant/victim has preferred any revision challenging the reduction of the
sentence imposed by the 1st Appellate Court.
41. Considering the nature of the offence committed by the accused, his
age, economic condition, the passage of time since the accident, and the
absence of any prior criminal antecedents, this Court finds that the sentence
imposed against the accused for the offence punishable under section 304A
and 338 of the IPC is on the higher side and can be considered excessive.
Therefore, this Court finds it necessary to interfere with the impugned
judgment of the 1st Appellate Court only to the limited extent of reducing the
quantum of sentence, to ensure that the punishment remains reasonable and
proportionate to the proven guilt. In light of the above, the sentence of six
months’ simple imprisonment under Section 304A of IPC and three months
under Section of 338 IPC, as imposed by the 1st Appellate Court, is reduced to
three months and one month, respectively, in the interest of justice.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances, this Court deems it
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appropriate to allow the Criminal Revision Case partly. Accordingly, Point
No.II is answered.
42. The Criminal Revision Case is partly allowed. The conviction of the
accused under Sections 304A and 338 of IPC, as affirmed by the judgments
of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Madakasira (dated 20.03.2009 in
C.C.No.68 of 2006), and the Additional Sessions Judge, Hindupur (dated
17.02.2010 in Criminal Appeal No.72 of 2009), is upheld. However, the
sentence is modified as follows: (i) under Section 304A of IPC, the sentence is
reduced from six months to three months, and (ii) under Section 338 of IPC,
the sentence is reduced from three months to one month. However, both the
sentences shall run concurrently. The period of imprisonment already
undergone shall be set off under Section 428 of Cr.P.C. The
petitioner/accused shall surrender before the Judicial First Class Magistrate,
Madakasira, within three (03) weeks to serve the remaining sentence, if any.
Failing such surrender, the Trial Court shall take necessary steps to enforce
the remaining sentence. The rest of the 1st Appellate Court’s judgment
remains undisturbed. The Registry shall forward a copy of this order and the
relevant records to both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court forthwith.
Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all
pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 07.08.2025
SAK
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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 319 of 2010
Date: 07.08.2025
SAK