Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dhananjay Randive vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 August, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
1 WP-27031-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK JAIN
ON THE 5 th OF AUGUST, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 27031 of 2022
DHANANJAY RANDIVE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Mohan Lal Sharma - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Swapnil Ganguly Advocate with Shri Gaurav Maheshwari,
Advocate for the respondents No. 2 to 5.
ORDER
By way of this petition, the petitioner has sought the following reliefs:-
“(i). To issue a appropriate writ in the nature of MANDAMUS commanding
the respondents to reinstate the present Petitioner on the post
Assistant Engineer (Contract). Accordingly, the respondents be directed to
release the Salary to the Petitioner along with all consequential benefits from
the date when the Petitioner services were terminated/not extended.
(ii). Call for the entire records with regard to performance of the petitioner in
the respondent institution.
(iii) To grant any other relief deemed proper to the facts and circumstances of
the case”
2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Assistant
engineer on contract basis vide order dated 10.01.2013 issued by the
Additional Secretary of the Company. He continued to be in service.
Thereafter the petitioner was transferred from Tikamgarh to Kothi
Distribution Centre under O &M Division-Satna, vide order Annexure P/5
dated 01.11.2014 which the petitioner alleged not to have carried out and
then placed under Suspension vide order Annexure P/6 dated 12.11.2014
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
2 WP-27031-2022
which was then subsequently followed by a show-cause notice which was
replied by the petitioner vide order Annexure P/8 dated 20.12.2014.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that he give explanation vide reply
dated 20.12.2024 Annexure P/8 that he could not see the transfer order sent
on his mail ID upto 05.11.2014 and then since 06.11.2014 he was suffering
from fever and cough on account of which he could not report at Distribution
Centre Kothi at Satna and shortly thereafter he was placed under suspension
on 11.12.2014. After receipt of said reply the petitioner was served with a
charge-sheet Annexure P/9 dated 28.11.2014 which was also replied by the
petitioner and charges were denied. The petitioner contends that the
subsequently vide order Annexure P/11 dated 12.02.2015 show-cause notice
and charge-sheet were dropped on the ground that the contractual tenure of
the service of the petitioner has come to an end which has not been extended
further and therefore, charge-sheet and show cause notice are withdrawn
being infructuous.
4. Learned counsel for the submits that once the respondents have
withdrawn the charge sheet then the petitioner has to be reinstated in service
and also that the decision not to extend the contract has been taken by a
authority who is not the appointing authority.
5. Per contra counsel for the respondents has raised preliminary
objection that the petition suffers from delay and laches inasmuch as the
petitioner is not in service since 14.01.2015 but the present petition has been
filed in the year 2022 and there is no cogent explanation for delay.
6. The said objection was countered by the counsel for the petitioner
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
3 WP-27031-2022
on the ground that the petitioner submitted a representation on 21.10.2021
vide Annexure P/12 and there was also Vidhan Sabha Question in the matter
on 16.03.2021 which is Annexure P/14.
7. On perusal of the said documents it is clear that the petitioner is
not in service since 14.10.2015 and for the first time he submitted a
representation in October-2021 which is almost 7 years after his contract
period was not extended and even the Vidhan Sabha question is of the year
2021 which is also almost 7 years after his contract was not continued.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpon.Ltd.
Vs. K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, has held as under:-
6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the
High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where
fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the
Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has
to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239)
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969)
1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy
either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute ofSignature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:365164 WP-27031-2022
limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice
or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the
remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this
aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of
India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the
petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant
relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR
1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.
If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised
on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated
resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained
delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or
not to exercise such jurisdiction.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of M.P. Ram Mohan Raja. Vs.
State of T.N. & Others Reported in (2007) 9 SCC 78 , has held as under:-
11. So far as the question of delay is concerned, no hard-and-fast rule can be
laid down and it will depend on the facts of each case. In the present case, the
facts stare at the face of it that on 8-10-1996 an order was passed by the
Collector in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court, rejecting the
application of the writ petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease.
The writ petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up
to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious. A person who can sit
tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot be given any benefit.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
5 WP-27031-2022
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Dass Vs. Union of
India reported in (2007) 9 SCC 274 has held as under :-
6. Normally, in the case of belated approach writ petition has to be dismissed.
Delay or laches is one of the factors to be borne in mind by the High Courts
when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the
part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of
the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has
to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum
Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] , PC at p. 239
was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC
1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969
SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or
technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy
either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly
be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and
neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if
the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument
against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of
limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during
the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice
or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the
remedy.”
8. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR
1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic.
If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not
satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant
relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised
on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
6 WP-27031-2022
resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and
public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ
jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained
delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an
important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or
not to exercise such jurisdiction.
11. The Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Jal Nigam & another
Vs. Jaswant Singh and another reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held as
under :-
12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of
England, para 911, p. 395 as follows:
“In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the
chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant’s part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant’s part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a
right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the
claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy
where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not
waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would
not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In
such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches.”
12. The Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish Lal Vs. State of
Haryana reported in (1997) 6 SCC 538 has held as under :-
18. That apart, as this Court has repeatedly held, the delay disentitles the
party to the discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the
Constitution.
13. Therefore, the petition evidently suffers from delay and latches as
the petitioner has accepted the non-renewal of contract on 14.01.2015 and sat
tight over the matter till October 2021 without even submitting any
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-JBP:36516
7 WP-27031-2022
representation or initiating any litigation in the matter. Learned counsel for
the petitioner being faced with such situation argued that since the issue
involved recurring cause of action and therefore, question of delay would not
come in the way of petitioner. The aforesaid assertion is utterly misconceived
because it is a case of non renewal of contract resulting into services ceasing
to exist. It is not a case of pay fixation or pay scale or quantum of pension or
salary which would amount to a recuring cause of action. Therefore, the
petition suffers from delay and latches, the same fails and is dismissed on the
ground of delay.
(VIVEK JAIN)
JUDGE
MISHRA
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: ARVIND KUMAR
MISHRA
Signing time: 06-08-2025
18:41:49