Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. N. J. Ekka vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 21 July, 2025
1
2025:CGHC:34708
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPS No. 7839 of 2025
1 - Smt. N. J. Ekka W/o C. L. Khare Aged About 59 Years R/o Sasaha Road,
Pamgarh, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of School
Education, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, District-
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - The Director Directorate Of Public Instruction, Indrawati Bhawan, Nava
Raipur, Atal Nagar, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - The Collector District- Janjgir-Champa, Chhattisgarh.
4 - The District Education Officer District - Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
---- Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Sandeep Dubey, Advocate
For Respondent(s)/State : Mr. Suyashdhar Badgaiya, Deputy G.A.
Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal
Order on Board
21/07/2025
1. The petitioner is questioning her suspension order dated 04.07.2025
(Annexure P/1) issued by the State Government and filed the present
Digitally
signed by
VEDPRAKASH
VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN
DEWANGAN Date:
2025.08.07
13:04:18
+0530
2writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India claiming the
following reliefs:-
“10.1 That, the Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue a writ in the nature of certiorari for set aside /
quash the impugned Suspension order dated
04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1).
10.2 That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
grant any other relief(s), which is deemed fit and
proper in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the
case.”
2. The brief facts of the case as emerges from the pleadings and
documents annexed with the petition are that, the petitioner is
appointed as Lecturer in the year 1989. She has been promoted on the
post of Principal on 07.11.2007. Subsequently, she has been posted on
deputation under the SAGES English Medium School, Pamgarh,
District Janjgir-Champa. On a unanimous complaint received through
online portal on 15.12.2024, that the petitioner has taken illegal
gratification for providing admission of the children in SAGES school,
Pamgarh, the District Education Officer constituted a two members’
inquiry committee on 10.01.2025. The District Education Officer also
sought explanation on 21.03.2025 from the petitioner, which has been
properly replied by the petitioner on 24.03.2025 and thereafter the
impugned order of her suspension has been passed by the respondent
No.1, which is under challenge in the present writ petition.
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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned
order of suspension has been passed in the name of Governor and
has been signed by the Under Secretary, which cannot be done under
the service rules. The impugned suspension order has been passed
violating the circular dated 31.07.2006 issued by the State Government
and no departmental enquiry is contemplated by the said order of
suspension of the petitioner and since the impugned order is passed
by the State Government, no alternative remedy of appeal is available
to the petitioner. He would also submit that in the inquiry committed
constituted by the District Education Officer on 10.01.2025, the junior
employees to the petitioner have been made members of the inquiry
committee, which cannot be done. Therefore, the impugned order of
suspension of the petitioner is bad in law and is liable to be quashed.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State on
instructions opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the
petitioner and would submit that the petitioner is having an alternative
remedy of appeal provided under Rule 23 of the Chhattisgarh Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short
“CCA Rules, 1966”) and the writ petition is not maintainable
challenging the suspension order. He would also submit that though
the order was passed in the name of Hon’ble Governor, but it has not
been passed by the Governor himself. This issue has been settled by
the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in WA No. 80 of 2012 (G.S.
Dewangan v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), order dated
15.02.2012. The allegation against the petitioner includes various
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factual aspects, which cannot be determined in the present writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and this Court cannot
examine the correctness of the allegations against the petitioner in the
writ petition. He would further submit that the judicial review against a
suspension order is very limited, as the suspension does not cast any
stigma upon the employee. After considering the entire material, the
authorities concerned have considered for suspension of the petitioner
and there is sufficient material available before the authorities to
consider the same, and therefore, there is no merit in the present writ
petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. The suspension of the
employee itself involved the contemplation of the departmental enquiry
and the suspension is only to keep away the employee in view of the
fairness of the inquiry proceeding, therefore, the petition is liable to be
dismissed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
annexed with the petition.
6. The petitioner has raised the issue that the impugned order has been
passed in the name of Hon’ble Governor, and therefore, the petitioner
has no alternative remedy to file the appeal before the competent
authority as provided under Rule 22 of the CCA Rules, 1966. In the
matter of “G.S. Dewangan” (supra) the Hon’ble Division Bench of this
Court has settled this issue in para 9 to 15, which reads as under:-
“9. The main contention of learned counsel appearing
for the appellant, it appears, is that the alternative
5statutory remedy of appeal as provided under Rule 23
of the Rules, 1966 is not available to the appellant as
the impugned order was passed in the name of the
Governor. Thus, the same may be deemed to have
been passed by the Governor himself. Under Rule 22
of the Rules, 1966, no appeal lies against the order
passed by the Governor.
10. The Supreme Court, in State of M.P. & Others v. Dr.
Yashwant Trimbak, (1996) 2 SCC 305 while
considering provisions of Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the M.P.
Civil Services Pension Rules, 1976, wherein, it is
provided that the departmental proceedings, if not
instituted while the government servant was in
service whether before his retirement or during his re-
employment, shall not be instituted save with the
sanction of the Governor. The Supreme Court
observed as under:-
“14. The Rule in question no doubt provides that
departmental proceedings if not instituted while
the government servant was in service whether
before his retirement or during his re-
employment, shall not be instituted save with the
sanction of the Governor. The question that
arises for consideration is whether it requires
the sanction of the Governor himself or the
Council of Ministers in whose favour the
Governor under the Rules of Business has
allocated the matter, can also sanction. It is
undisputed that under Article 166(3) of the
6Constitution the Governor has made rule for
convenient transaction of the business of the
Government and the question of sanction to
prosecute in the case in hand was dealt with by
the Council of Ministers in accordance with the
Rules of Business. Under Article 154 of the
Constitution, the executive power of the State
vests in the Governor and is exercised by him
either directly or through officers subordinate to
him in accordance with the Constitution. The
expression “executive power” is wide enough to
connote the residue of the governmental
function that remains after the legislative and
judicial functions are taken away.
17. The order of sanction for prosecution of a
retired government servant is undoubtedly an
executive action of the Government. A Governor
in exercise of his powers under Article 166(3) of
the Constitution may allocate all his functions to
different Ministers by framing rules of business
except those in which the Governor is required
by the Constitution to exercise his own
discretion. The expression “business of the
Government of the State” in Article 166(3) of the
Constitution, comprises functions which the
Governor is to exercise with the aid and advice
of the Council of Ministers including those which
he is empowered to exercise on his subjective
satisfaction and including statutory functions of
7the State Government. The Court has held in
Godavari Shamrao Parulekar v. State of
Maharashtra that even the functions and duties
which are vested in a State Government by a
statute may be allocated to Ministers by the
Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of
the Constitution. In State of Bihar v. Rani
Sonabati Kumari, where power of issuing
notification under Section 3(1) of the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1950 have been conferred on the
Governor of Bihar, this Court held:
“Section 3(1) of the Act confers the power of
issuing notifications under it, not on any officer
but on the State Government as such though the
exercise of that power would be governed by the
rules of business framed by the Governor under
Article 166(3) of the Constitution.”
Finally, it was held that excepting the matters with
respect to which the Governor is required by or under
the Constitution to act in his discretion, the personal
satisfaction of the Governor is not required and any
function may be allocated to the ministers. In the said
decision, contention of the learned counsel for the
respondent therein that in the Rule itself both the
expressions “Governor” and “Government” have been
used and therefore the expression “sanction of the
Governor” in Rule 9(2)(b)(i) would mean the personal
sanction of the Governor, did not find favour with the
Hon’ble Judges in the matter.
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11. Rule 23(iii) of the Rules, 1966 provides that subject
to the provisions of Rule 22 of the Rules, 1966, a
Government servant may prefer an appeal against an
order of suspension made or deemed to have been
made under Rule 9 of the Rules, 1966. Indisputably,
the order of suspension was passed under Rule 9(2)
of the Rules, 1966 which is an appealable as the order
was not passed by the Governor himself, but in the
name of the Governor which is the requirement Article
166(2) of the Constitution of India, wherein the
allocation of work has been done and business of the
Government has been allocated to various
departments in respect of the employees of the same
department. Thus, the order passed in the name of the
Governor was an executive order and not the order
passed by the Governor himself. Thus, bar under Rule
22 of the Rules, 1966 is not applicable in the case.
12. A Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court, in
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab & Another, (1974) 2
SCC 831 held as under:
“30. In all cases in which the President or the
Governor exercises his functions conferred on
him by or under the Constitution with the aid and
advice of his Council of Ministers he does so by
making rules for convenient transaction of the
business of the Government of India or the
Government of the State respectively or by
allocation among his Ministers of the said
business, in accordance with Articles 77(3) and
9166(3) respectively. Wherever the Constitution
requires the satisfaction of the President or the
Governor for exercise any or by the President or
the Governor, as the case may be, as for
example in Articles 123, 213, 311(2) proviso (c),
317, 352(1), 356 and 360 the satisfaction required
by the Constitution is not the personal
satisfaction of the President or of the Governor
but is the satisfaction of the President or of the
Governor in the constitutional sense under the
Cabinet system of Government. The reasons are
these. It is the satisfaction of the Council of
Ministers on whose aid and advice the President
or the Governor generally exercises all his
powers and functions. Neither Article 77(3) nor
Article 166(3) provides for any delegation of
power. Both Articles 77(3) and 166(3) provide
that the President under Article 77(3) and the
Governor under Article 166(3) shall make rules
for the more convenient transaction of the
business of the Government and the allocation
of business among the Ministers of the said
business. The Rules of Business and the
allocation among the Ministers of the said
business all indicate that the decision of any
Minister or officer under the Rules of Business
made under these two articles viz. Article 77(3) in
the case of the President and Article 166(3) in the
case of the Governor of the State is the decision
of the President or the Governor respectively.
10
57. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the
President or the Governor acts on the aid and
advice of the Council of Ministers with the Prime
Minister at the head in the case of the Union and
the Chief Minister at the head in the case of State
in all matters which vests in the Executive
whether those functions are executive or
legislative in character. Neither the President nor
the Governor is to exercise the executive
functions personally. The present appeals
concern the appointment of persons other than
District Judges to the Judicial Services of the
State which is to be made by the Governor as
contemplated in Article 234 of the Constitution
after consultation with the State Public Service
Commission and the High Court. Appointment or
dismissal or removal of persons belonging to
the Judicial Service of the State is not a personal
function but is an executive function of the
Governor exercised in accordance with the rules
in that behalf under the Constitution.
88. For the foregoing reasons we hold that the
President as well as the Governor acts on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers in
executive action and is not required by the
Constitution to act personally without the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers or against
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
Where the Governor has any discretion the
11Governor acts on his own judgment. The
Governor exercises his discretion in harmony
with his Council of Ministers. The appointment
as well as removal of the members of the
Subordinate Judicial Service is an executive
action of the Governor to be exercised on the aid
and advice of the Council of Ministers in
accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution. Appointments and removals of
persons are made by the President and the
Governor as the constitutional head of the
Executive on the aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers. That is why any action by any servant
of the Union or the State in regard to
appointment or dismissal is brought against the
Union or the State and not against the President
or the Governor.”
13. Further, a three Judges Bench of the Supreme
Court in Union of India && Others v. Sripati Ranjan
Biswas & Another, held as under:-
“8. The question which is raised in this appeal
relates to the domain of appointment or
dismissal of a government servant. Such a
question falls within the ambit of a purely
executive function of the President in the case of
the Union Government and of the Governor in
the case of a State. In the present case, such a
function being ultimately an executive function
of the President, the fact that the final order is
12preceded or accompanied by a quasi-judicial
enquiry held by the Minister does not affect the
character of the exercise of that function by the
President. There is, therefore, nothing in
principle which can be distinguished in this
appeal from the ratio of the decision in Samsher
Singh’s case (supra).”
14. Reliance of the appellant on Aziz Qureshi, also
reiterates the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in
the cases cited hereinabove as has been observed by
the Tribunal in the following terms:-
“9…It will suffice to say that appeal to the
Governor against, the order of the State
Government under M.P.C.S. (CCA) Rules, 1966,
is an effective remedy and the Governor acts on
the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers
under the Constitution.”
15. Applying the well settled principles of law to the
facts of the case, it is evident that the order of
suspension passed under Rule 9(2) of the Rules, 1966
is an executive order of the State against which, an
appeal is maintainable and the same is effective
remedy.”
7. In the matter of “State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty” 1994 (4)
SCC 126, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 13 that:-
13
“13. It is thus settled law that normally when an
appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks
to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or
contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave
charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious
acts of omission and 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483: 1994 SCC
(L&S) 67: (1993) 25 ATC commission, the order of
suspension would be passed after taking into
consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be
inquired into or investigated and the nature of the
evidence placed before the appointing authority and on
application of the mind by disciplinary authority.
Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should
consider the above aspects and decide whether it is
expedient to keep an employee under suspension
pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an
administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend
an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity
of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations
imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the
Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and
no general law could be laid down in that behalf.
Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of
forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the
duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is
to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate
the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression
among the members of service that dereliction of duty
would pay fruits and the offending employee could get
away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to
14prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to
scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the
witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity
in office to impede the progress of the investigation or
inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be
considered depending on the nature of the allegations,
gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates
on the service for the continuance of the delinquent
employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated
inquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the
action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior
purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the
ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The
authority also should keep in mind public interest of the
impact of the delinquent’s continuance in office while
facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge.”
8. A plain reading of the aforesaid judgments makes it clear that, whether
charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive, cannot be gone into at
the stage of examining the validity of suspension order. At the stage of
suspension, the correctness of allegations is not required to be looked
into. The public interest is also an element on the consideration of
which an employee can be placed under suspension. This is within the
province of the Disciplinary Authority to decide, whether an employee
is required to be suspended or not, because suspension is a step
towards ultimate result of an investigation or an inquiry.
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9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “M. Paul Anthoni v.
Bharat Gold Mines Limited” 1999 (3) SCC 679 has held in para 26
that:-
“26. To place an employee under suspension is an
unqualified right of the employer. This right is conceded
to the employer in service jurisprudence everywhere. It
has even received statutory recognition under service
rules framed by various authorities, including Govt. of
India and the State Governments. (See: for example, Rule
10 of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules. Even under the General Clauses Act, this
right is conceded to the employer by Section 16 which,
inter alia, provides that power to appoint includes power
to suspend or dismiss.”
10. Further, in the matter of “Union of India and another v. Ashok
Kumar Aggarwal” 2013 (16) SCC 147, in para 22 and 27, it has been
held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that:-
“22. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that suspension order can be
passed by the competent authority considering the
gravity of the alleged misconduct i.e. serious act of
omission or commission and the nature of evidence
available. It cannot be actuated by mala fide,
arbitrariness, or for ulterior purpose. Effect on public
interest due to the employee’s continuation in office is
also a relevant and determining factor. The facts of each
case have to be taken into consideration as no formula
16of universal application can be laid down in this regard.
However, suspension order should be passed only
where there is a strong prima facie case against the
delinquent, and if the charges stand proved, would
ordinarily warrant imposition of major punishment i.e.
removal or dismissal from service, or reduction in rank
etc.
27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of
the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the
proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim
measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the
delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or
take any advantage of his position. More so, at this
stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as
which version is true when there are claims and counter
claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an
appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review.”
11. Rule 23 of CCA Rules, 1966 provides for a departmental appeal
against the order of suspension of the employee to the State
Government, which reads as under:-
“23. Orders against which appeal lies.- Subject to the
provisions of Rule 22, a Government servant may prefer an
appeal against all or any of the following orders, namely-
(i) an order imposing any of the penalties specified in
Rule 10 whether made by the disciplinary authority or
by any appellate or reviewing authority;
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(ii) an order enhancing any penalty, imposed under
Rule 10;
(iii) [an order of suspension made or deemed to have
been made under Rule 9;]
Explanation. – In this rule the expression “Government
servant” includes a person who has ceased to be in
Government service.”
12. It is settled law that the order of suspension is not that of punishment.
The requirement of the law is that the reason should be there in the
order of suspension. In the present case, the reason for the
suspension of the petitioner is mentioned that, she obtained illegal
gratification of students for their admission in the school and the
matter was preliminary inquired by the two members’ committee and
found the allegation true, which is the misconduct as provided under
Rule 3 of Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965. The
petitioner is having specific remedy of appeal before the State
Government as provided under Rule 23 of the CCA Rules. Though,
the petitioner tried to establish that the members of inquiry committee
were junior to the petitioner and the matter should be inquired by the
senior to the petitioner, but in the present case from perusal of the
order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P/1), it transpires that the matter
has already been inquired and the report has been submitted by the
two members’ inquiry committee, even otherwise, it is only a
preliminary enquiry to ascertain the correctness of the complaint. No
prejudice or mala fide is alleged against them; therefore, this Court
18
does not find it to be sufficient to interfere with the impugned order. It
further transpires from the document (Annexure P/6) that the petitioner
was also served with a notice to submit her explanation and she
submitted her explanation on 24.03.2025. Thus, the opportunity to
explain the allegation was also provided to the petitioner.
13. In view of the foregoing analysis and also in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, this Court does not find any mala
fide or arbitrariness in passing the suspension order and further is of
the opinion that the petitioner does not make out any exceptional case
to interfere with her suspension order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure
P/1) invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The petitioner is at liberty to challenge her suspension order
before the State Government as provided under Rule 23 of CCA
Rules, 1966, if so advised.
14. In the result, the petition is liable to be and hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)
Judge
ved