Himachal Pradesh High Court
Raju vs State Of H.P on 8 August, 2025
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 574 of 2023
.
Reserved on: 29.07.2025
Date of Decision: 08.08.2025
Raju ...Appellant
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr. Anil Kumar, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction dated 23.11.2023 and order of sentence dated 02.12.2023
passed by learned Special Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P.
(learned Trial Court) vide which the appellant (accused before the
learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act‘) and was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years, pay a
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |2
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
fine of ₹ 50,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo
further simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of
.
aforesaid offence. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal
are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of
the NDPS Act. It was asserted that ASI Hem Raj (PW13), HC
Jagdish, HC Yashpal, HHC Anant Ram (PW4), HHC Sanjay Kumar
(PW14) and Constable Ram Dass (PW3) were present at Saula near
link road Saroba at about 02:00 pm on 02.10.2016 for traffic
checking. An entry No. 8 (PW-3/A) was recorded regarding their
departure. They were checking the vehicles coming from Kullu.
They had stopped 14-15 vehicles for checking. The police saw the
accused running towards the Saloha road. HC Jagdish Chand, HHC
Sanjay Kumar, Constable Ram Dass and ASI Hem Raj ran after the
accused. They apprehended him at a distance of 60-70 meters
towards Saroha road. ASI Hem Raj asked the accused why he was
running. However, the accused could not give any satisfactory
answer, and he appeared to be frightened. The police party became
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |3
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
suspicious that the accused was carrying some contraband. A
vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01M-0839 stopped in the
.
meantime after seeing the police. The driver identified himself as
Bhup Singh (PW2), and the other person identified himself as Chet
Ram (PW1). The police requested them to become witnesses, and
they agreed. Bhup Singh (PW2), Chet Ram(PW1) and HHC Sanjay
Kumar (PW14) were associated as witnesses. The accused
identified himself as Raju S/o Piyar Singh. The police party gave
their personal search to the accused. No incriminating substance
was found in thier possession. Memo (Ex-PW1/B) was prepared to
this effect. The police checked the carry bag being carried by the
accused and found a T-shirt (Ex-P4). Transparent polythene
having black spheres was found inside the T Shirt. ASI Hem Raj
(PW13) checked the spheres and found them to be charas. He
weighed the charas and found its weight to be 810 grams. Charas
was put in the polythene. The polythene was put in the T-shirt, and
the T-shirt was put in the carry bag in the same manner in which it
was recovered. The carry bag was put in a cloth parcel, and the
parcel was sealed with six impressions of seal “A”. A specimen of
seal “A” (Ex-PW1/C) was obtained on a piece of cloth. Columns No.
1 to 8 of NCB-I form in triplicate were filled. The seal impression
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |4
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
was put on the form, and the seal, after use, was handed over to
witness Chet Ram. The parcel, NCB-1 form, and sample seal were
.
seized vide memo (Ex-PW1/A). HHC Ram Das (PW3) clicked the
photographs (Ex-PW3/B1 to Ex-PW3/B13). ASI Hem Raj prepared
the Rukka (PW8/A) and sent it to the Police Station through
Constable Ram Dass (PW3). Constable Ram Dass (PW3) handed
over the rukka to SHO, Police Station Sadar and got the FIR
(Ex-PW8/B) registered in the Police Station. ASI Achhar Singh
(PW12) issued the CCTNS certificate (Ex-PW12/A) regarding
registration of FIR. The case file was sent to the spot for further
investigation. ASI Achhar Singh (PW12) conducted the
investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ex-PW13/A) and recorded
the statements of the witnesses as per their versions. He arrested
the accused vide memo (Ex-PW13/D). ASI Achhar Singh (PW12)
produced the case property, accused, and the case file before
Inspector/SHO Chet Singh Bhangalia (PW11), who resealed the
parcel with seal impression “H”. He obtained the sample seal
(Ex-PW11/A) on a separate piece of cloth, and the NCB-1 form
(Ex-PW6/A). He issued the resealing certificate (Ex-PW11/B). He
handed over the case property to HHC Dalip Singh (PW6), who
made an entry in the Malkhana register at serial No. 1450
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |5
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
(Ex-PW6/C) and deposited the case property in the Malkhana. The
case property was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate
.
First Class, Court No.4, on 03.10.2016. He passed an order
(Ex-PW11/D) and issued a certificate (Ex-PW11/E) regarding the
correctness of the inventory. He resealed the parcel with 05 seals of
“JMFC-4”. Sample seal (Ex-PW11/F) was taken on a separate piece
of cloth. The parcel and sample seal were handed over to the police
officials after the inventory proceedings. HHC Dalip Singh (PW6)
handed over the parcel, documents, sample seals and NCB-1 in
triplicate to HHC Anant Ram (PW4) with a direction to carry them
to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL), Junga, vide RC
No.293/16 (Ex-PW6/D). HHC Anant Ram (PW4) deposited the case
property in SFSL Junga and handed over the receipt to Malkhana
Muharrir on his return. ASI Hem Raj (PW13) handed over the
special report (Ex.PW9/A), Superintendent of Police to Additional
Superintendent of Police, Kulbhushan Verma (PW10) on
03.10.2016. Additional Superintendent of Police, Kulbhushan
Verma (PW10), made an endorsement on the Special report and
handed it over to his Reader, HC Tilak (PW9), who made an entry at
serial No.66 in the Special Report Register (Ex.PW9/B). HHC
Shriram (PW5) brought the case property and the result of analysis
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |6
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
from SFSL Junga and handed them over to Malkhana Moharrir. The
result of the analysis (Ex-PW11/C) shows that the exhibit was an
.
extract of cannabis and the sample of charas, which contained
28.83% w/w resin. The statements of remaining witnesses were
recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the
investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the
learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS
Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its
case. Chet Ram (PW1) and Bhup Singh (PW2) are the independent
witnesses who have not supported the prosecution’s case. HHC
Ram Dass (PW3) and HHC Sanjay Kumar (PW14) are the official
witnesses to the recovery. HHC Anant Ram (PW4) carried the case
property to SFSL Junga. Shriram (PW5) brought the case property
from SFSL Junga to the police station. HHC Dalip Singh (PW6) was
working as Malkhana Moharrir with whom the case property was
deposited. ASI Suresh Kumar (PW7) proved the entry in the Daily
Diary regarding the departure. SI Ramesh Chand (PW8) signed the
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |7
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
FIR. HC Tilak (PW9) was working as a Reader to whom the Special
Report was handed over. Kulbhushan Verma (PW10) was working
.
as Additional Superintendent of Police Chet Singh Bhangalia
(PW11) was working as SHO, who resealed the case property. ASI
Achhar Singh (PW12) was working as an MHC who proved the FIR
and various entries. Hem Raj (PW13) conducted the investigation.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He
stated that he was sitting inside the bus and was coming from
Kullu. He was going to Jogindernagar with apple boxes. The police
brought a bag and asked him whether the bag belonged to him. The
police filed a false case against him. He left the apple box with the
police. The witnesses deposed against him falsely. He did not
produce any evidence in defence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the
police officials corroborated each other. The mere fact that
independent witnesses have not supported the prosecution’s case
is not significant because they admitted their signatures on the
seizure memo. No reason was elicited in the cross-examination to
doubt the statements of the prosecution witnesses. Minor
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |8
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
contradictions in the statements were not sufficient to discard
them because of the time elapsed between the date of the incident
.
and the date of deposition. The suggestions made by the
prosecution witnesses in the cross-examination materially
admitted the prosecution case. The testimonies of police officials
cannot be ignored because they happen to be police officials. The
integrity of the case property was duly proved; therefore, the
accused was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate
the evidence led before it. The statements were full of
contradictions, inconsistencies, exaggeration and embellishment.
The prosecution witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case.
The link evidence was missing. The seal used to seal the case
property was not produced before the learned Trial Court. The
defence taken by the accused that he was falsely implicated could
not be ignored. The relevant questions were not put to the accused
while recording his statement under Section 313 of Cr.PC.;
therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the
judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
Page |9
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
8. I have heard Mr. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused and Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional
.
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
9. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the accused is innocent and he
was falsely implicated based on suspicion. Independent witnesses
did not support the prosecution’s case. There were various
contradictions in the statements of official witnesses, which made
them highly doubtful. The integrity of the case property was not
established. The seal used for sealing the case property was not
produced. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court is
excessive and disproportionate; therefore, he prayed that the
present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Trial
Court has properly appreciated the evidence led before it. The
accused admitted much of the prosecution’s case in the cross-
examination of the witnesses by putting various suggestions to
them. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that minor
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 10
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
contradictions were bound to come with time and could not have
been used for discarding the prosecution case. The accused was
.
found in possession of 810 grams of charas, and the sentence of 05
years imposed by the learned Trial Court is inadequate; hence, he
prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. Chet Ram (PW1) did not support the prosecution’s case.
He stated that the police did not recover anything from the
possession of the accused. He was permitted to be cross-examined.
He admitted his signature on the seizure memo (Ex-PW1/A). He
denied that the police recovered 810 grams of charas from the
accused. He denied the previous statement recorded by the police.
13. Bhup Singh (PW2) is another independent witness. He
also did not support the prosecution’s case. He was also permitted
to be cross-examined. He denied that the police had stopped the
accused and conducted his search. He denied that the police
recovered 810 grams of charas from the possession of the accused.
He admitted his signature on the seizure memo (Ex-PW1/A). He
denied the previous statement recorded by the police.
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 11
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
14. It was submitted that the independent witnesses have
not supported the prosecution case, and this is sufficient to discard
.
the same. This submission is not acceptable. Learned Trial Court
had rightly held that these witnesses had admitted their signatures
on the seizure memo, and the mere fact that they had not
supported the prosecution case was not sufficient to doubt the
prosecution case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Hanif Khan v. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2020) 16 SCC 709 : 2019
SCC OnLine SC 1810 that where the hostile witnesses admitted their
signatures on the seizure memo, the prosecution case cannot be
doubted. It was observed at page 712:
“11. The fact that the independent witnesses may have
turned hostile is also not very relevant, so long as they haveadmitted their signatures on the seizure memo. The seizure
memo is also signed by the accused. There has been compli-
ance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act also, as the appellant
was duly informed of his legal rights….”
15. It is apparent from the cross-examination of Chet
Ram(PW14) and Bhup Singh(PW2) that they have denied the
previous statements recorded by the police. These statements were
duly proved by Hem Raj (PW13), who categorically stated that he
had recorded the statements of Chet Ram (Ex.PW13/B) and Bhup
Singh (Ex.PW13/C) on the spot as per their version. This was not
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 12
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
even suggested to be incorrect. Thus, the witnesses are shown to
have made two inconsistent statements, one before the police and
.
another before the Court, and their credit has been shaken under
Section 155(3) of the Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727
that where a witness has been thoroughly discredited by
confronting him with the previous statement, his statement
cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with some
portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that
extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was
observed:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even
in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examinedand contradicted with the leave of the court by the party
calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, betreated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the
Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of
such cross-examination and contradiction, the witnessstands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed
regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in
the process, the credit of the witness has not been
completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering
the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and
care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record,
that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy
and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony
of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness
stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as
a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 13
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
16. This Court has also laid down in Ian Stilman versus. State
2002(2) Shim. L.C. 16 that where a witness has been cross-
.
examined by the prosecution with the leave of the Court, his
statement cannot be relied upon. It was observed:
“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been
called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined
on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibilityand cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support
for the view we have taken from the various authorities of
the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi
Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Courtobserved:
“It is now well settled that when a witness, who has
been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discredit thiswitness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part
of his testimony”.
17. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State
of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4254, that the prosecution’s version cannot be
discarded because the independent witnesses did not support it. It
was observed:
“Though the independent witnesses, PW-1 Rajiv Kumar and
PW-2 Hira Lal, were declared hostile and were cross-
examined, however, the law in respect of appreciating the
testimonies of such witnesses is well settled. Hon’ble Apex
Court in Sudru versus State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 8 SCC 333,
relying upon Bhajju versus State of M.P., 2010 4 SCC 327, has
again reiterated the well-settled principle that evidence of a
hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 14
( 2025:HHC:26706 )version. Merely because a witness has turned hostile, the
same does not render his evidence or testimony
inadmissible in a trial, and such a conviction can be based.
upon such testimony, if it is corroborated by other reliable
evidence.
In a case titled Raja and Others versus State of Karnataka
(2016) 10 SCC 506, the Apex Court observed that the evidenceof a hostile witness cannot be altogether discarded, and as
such, it is open for the Court to rely on the dependable part
of such evidence which stands duly corroborated by other
reliable evidence on record.
In a case titled Selvaraj @ Chinnapaiyan versus State
represented by Inspector of Police, (2015) 2 SCC 662, the Apex
Court has observed that in a situation/case, wherein the
witness deposes falsely in his/her cross-examination, that
itself is not sufficient to outrightly discard his/her testimony
in examination-in-chief. The Court held that a conviction
can be recorded believing the testimony of such a witness
given in examination-in-chief; however, such evidence is
required to be examined with great caution.
In Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2011) 5 SCC 123, it has been held as under: –
“The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very
significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon
phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases
relating to the NDPS Act.”
18. Therefore, the accused cannot be acquitted simply
because the independent witnesses have turned hostile.
19. HHC Ram Dass (PW3), HHC Sanjay Kumar (PW14) and
Hem Raj (PW13) supported the prosecution case in its entirety.
They consistently stated that the police party was checking the
vehicle when they saw the accused running away towards Saroha
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 15
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
Road and caught him on suspicion. They deposed about the search
of the carry bag being carried out by the accused in the presence of
.
the occupants of the vehicle bearing No. HP-01M-0839. They
deposed about the recovery of a T-shirt and a pouch having 810
grams of charas. Their testimonies corroborate each other, and
nothing was suggested to them to show that they had any motive
to depose falsely against the accused.
20. It was submitted that there are various contradictions in
the statements of the prosecution witnesses, which made the
prosecution case highly suspect. Learned Trial Court had rightly
noticed that the incident had taken place on 02.10.2016, whereas
the statements of HHC Ram Dass (PW3), Hem Raj (PW13), and HHC
Sanjay Kumar (PW14) were recorded on 01.05.2019, 05.09.2023,
and 26.09.2023, respectively. Therefore, the contradictions were
bound to come with time, and these cannot be used for discarding
the prosecution case. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2025) SCC Online SC 69
that the discrepancies are not sufficient to discard the prosecution
case unless they are material. It was observed: –
“51. As we proceed to examine this crucial aspect, it may be
apposite to keep in mind certain observations made by this::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 16
( 2025:HHC:26706 )Court relating to discrepancies in the account of
eyewitnesses.
In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of
.
Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525, it was observed as follows:
“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its
jurisdiction, being the first appellate court to
reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies foundin the ocular account of two witnesses, unless they are
so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of
the witnesses. There are bound to be some
discrepancies between the narrations of differentwitnesses when they speak on details, and unless the
contradictions are of a material dimension, the same
should not be used to jettison the evidence in itsentirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminalcases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but
variations by reason thereof should not render the
evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivialdiscrepancies ought not to obliterate otherwise
acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be
made to the decision of this Court in State ofU.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505: 1985 SCC (Cri)
105]. In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed:
(SCC pp. 514-15)
’10. While appreciating the evidence of a
witness, the approach must be whether theevidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears
to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is
formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court
to scrutinise the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and
infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a
whole and evaluate them to find out whether it
is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witness and whether the earlier
evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render
it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 17
( 2025:HHC:26706 )trivial matters not touching the core of the case,
a hypertechnical approach by taking sentences
torn out of context here or there from the.
evidence, attaching importance to some
technical error committed by the investigating
officer, not going to the root of the matter,
would not ordinarily permit rejection of theevidence as a whole. If the court before whom
the witness gives evidence had the opportunity
to form the opinion about the general tenor of
evidence given by the witness, the appellatecourt which had not this benefit will have to
attach due weight to the appreciation of
evidence by the trial court and unless there are
reasons weighty and formidable it would not be
r proper to reject the evidence on the ground ofminor variations or infirmities in the matter of
trivial details. Even honest and truthful
witnesses may differ in some details unrelated
to the main incident because the power ofobservation, retention and reproduction differ
with individuals.’
10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of
M.P. [(1999) 8 SCC 649: 2000 SCC (Cri) 26], this Court
observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)’24. When an eyewitness is examined at length,
it is quite possible for him to make somediscrepancies. No true witness can escape from
making some discrepant details. Perhaps an
untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non-
discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that
it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a
witness are so incompatible with the credibility
of his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view
to be adopted on mere variations falling in the
narration of an incident (either as between the::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 18
( 2025:HHC:26706 )evidence of two witnesses or as between two
statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic
approach for judicial scrutiny.’.
This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras
25-27)
’25. It is a common practice in trial courts to
make out contradictions from the previousstatement of a witness for confronting him
during cross-examination. Merely because there
is an inconsistency in evidence, it is not
sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. Nodoubt, Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides
scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by
proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a
r reading of the section would indicate that all
inconsistent statements are not sufficient toimpeach the credit of the witness. The material
portion of the section is extracted below:
“155. Impeaching the credit of a witness.–
The credit of a witness may be impeached in
the following ways by the adverse party, or,
with the consent of the court, by the partywho calls him–
(1)-(2) ***
(3) by proof of former statements
inconsistent with any part of his evidencewhich is liable to be contradicted;”
26. A former statement, though seemingly
inconsistent with the evidence, need not
necessarily be sufficient to amount to a
contradiction. Only such an inconsistent
statement, which is liable to be “contradicted”,
would affect the credit of the witness. Section
145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-
examiner to use any former statement of the
witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to
“contradict” the witness, the cross-examiner is
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 19
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
enjoined to comply with the formality
prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also
permits the cross-examiner to use the previous
.
statement of the witness (recorded under
Section 161 of the Code) for the only a limited
purpose, i.e. to “contradict” the witness.
27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be
to discredit the particular version of the witness.
Unless the former statement has the potency to
discredit the present statement, even if the
latter is at variance with the former to some
extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that
witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR
1959 SC 1012: 1959 Cri LJ 1231]).”
52. Further, this Court also cautioned about attaching too
much importance to minor discrepancies of the evidence of
the witnesses in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of
Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 as follows:
“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to
enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence
in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly
highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor
discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:
(1) By and large, a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall thedetails of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is
replayed on the mental screen.
(2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is
overtaken by events. The witness could not have
anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an
element of surprise. The mental faculties,
therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to
absorb the details.
(3) The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 20
( 2025:HHC:26706 )person’s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on
the part of another.
(4) By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
.
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic
to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the
time duration of an occurrence, usually, people
make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of
the moment at the time of interrogation. And one
cannot expect people to make very precise or
reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it
depends on the time sense of individuals, which
r varies from person to person.
(6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which take place
in rapid succession or in a short time span. A
witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when
interrogated later on.
(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination made by the counsel and, out of
nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding
the sequence of events, or fill up details from
imagination on the spur of the moment. The
subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so
operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or
being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a
truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him–perhaps it is a sort of
psychological defence mechanism activated on the
spur of the moment.”
53. To the same effect, it was also observed
in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 as follows:
“13. … The court, while appreciating the evidence,
must not attach undue importance to minor::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 21
( 2025:HHC:26706 )discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake
the basic version of the prosecution’s case may be
discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal.
errors of perception or observation should not be
given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory
may be given due allowance. The court, by calling into
aid its vast experience of men and matters in differentcases, must evaluate the entire material on record by
excluding the exaggerated version given by any
witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts
alleged by such a witness, the proper course is toignore that fact only unless it goes to the root of the
matter to demolish the entire prosecution story. The
witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to
their version, perhaps for fear that their testimonybeing rejected by the court. The courts, however,
should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses
altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court
in Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC(Cri) 819] observed : [SCC p. 756, para 8: SCC (Cri) p.
824, para 8]
‘8. … This Court has held that falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the
reason that hardly one comes across a witness
whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or, at any rate, exaggeration,
embroideries or embellishments. In most cases,
the witnesses when asked about details venture
to give some answer, not necessarily true or
relevant for fear that their evidence may not be
accepted in respect of the main incident which
they have witnessed but that is not to say that
their evidence as to the salient features of the
case after cautious scrutiny cannot be
considered….'”
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 22
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
21. It was submitted that the vehicle bearing registration
No. HP-01M-0839 is not visible in any of the photographs, and the
.
presence of independent witnesses on the spot is not established.
This submission will not help the accused. Chet Ram (PW1)
admitted that he was stopped at Nakka Sawla and the documents of
his vehicle were checked. Similarly, Bhup Singh (PW2) admitted
his signature on the memo, which shows his presence on the spot.
Therefore, the presence of the independent witnesses on the spot
was admitted by them, and the fact that the vehicle is not visible in
any of the photographs will not make the prosecution’s case
suspect.
22. It was submitted that the photographs do not show the
spot position correctly. This submission will also not help the
accused. It was suggested to Chet Ram (PW1) that the police had
taken the photographs by asking him to make poses. Similarly, it
was suggested to Bhup Singh (PW2) that the police took him in
their vehicle to the spot where the photographs were taken after
giving them directions. Thus, the suggestions show that taking the
photographs on the spot was not disputed in the cross-
examination. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 23
( 2025:HHC:26706 )SCC OnLine SC 355 that the suggestion put to the witness can be
taken into consideration while determining the innocence or guilt
.
of the accused. It was observed at page 382: –
“34. According to the learned counsel, such suggestions
could be a part of the defence strategy to impeach the
credibility of the witness. The proof of guilt required of the
prosecution does not depend on the satisfaction made to a
witness.
35. In Tarun Bora v. State of Assam [Tarun Bora v. State of
Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], a three-judge
Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal against the
order passed by the Designated Court, Guwahati, in TADASessions case wherein the appellant was convicted under
Section 365IPC read with Sections 3(1) and 3(5) of the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
36. In Tarun Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7
SCC 39: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1568], this Court, while considering
the evidence on record, took note of a suggestion which was
put to one of the witnesses and considering the reply givenby the witness to the suggestion put by the accused,
concluded that the presence of the accused was admitted. Wequote with profit the following observations made by this
Court in paras 15, 16 and 17, respectively, as under : (Tarun
Bora case [Tarun Bora v. State of Assam, (2002) 7 SCC 39: 2002SCC (Cri) 1568], SCC pp. 43-44)
“15. The witness further stated that during the assault,
the assailant accused him of giving information to the
army about the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).
He further stated that on the third night, he was carried
away blindfolded on a bicycle to a different place, and
when his eyes were unfolded, he could see his younger
brother Kumud Kakati (PW 2) and his wife Smt Prema
Kakati (PW 3). The place was Duliapather, which is about
6-7 km away from his Village, Sakrahi. The witness
identified the appellant, Tarun Bora, and stated that it is::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 24
( 2025:HHC:26706 )he who took him in an Ambassador car from the
residence of Nandeswar Bora on the date of the incident.
16. In cross-examination, the witness stated as under:
.
‘Accused Tarun Bora did not blind my eyes, nor did he
assault me.’
17. This part of the cross-examination is suggestive of the
presence of the accused Tarun Bora in the whole episode.
This will suggest the presence of the accused, Tarun Bora,
as admitted. The only denial is that the accused did not
participate in blindfolding the eyes of the witness, norassaulted him.”
37. In Rakesh Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rakesh
Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1987) 2 SCC 34: 1987 SCC (Cri)
256], this Court was dealing with an appeal against the
judgment of the High Court affirming the order of the
Sessions Judge whereby the appellant and three other
persons were convicted under Section 302 read with Section
34IPC. While reappreciating the evidence on record, this
Court noticed that in the cross-examination of PW 4 Sube
Singh, a suggestion was made with regard to the colour of
the shirt worn by one of the accused persons at the time of
the incident. This Court, taking into consideration the
nature of the suggestion put by the defence and the reply,
concluded that the presence of the accused, namely, Dharam
Vir, was established on the spot at the time of the
occurrence. We quote the following observations made by
this Court in paras 8 and 9, respectively, as under (SCC p. 36)
“8. PW 3, Bhagat Singh, stated in his examination-in-
chief that he had identified the accused at the time of the
occurrence. But curiously enough, he was not cross-
examined as to how and in what manner he could identify
the accused, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge.
No suggestion was also given to him that the place was
dark and that it was not possible to identify the assailants
of the deceased.
9. In his cross-examination, PW 4 Sube Singh stated that
the accused, Dharam Vir, was wearing a shirt of white
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 25
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
shirt. It was suggested to him on behalf of the accused
that Dharam Vir was wearing a cream-coloured shirt of
cream colour. In answer to that suggestion, PW 4 said it is
.
not correct that Dharam Vir, the accused, was wearing a
shirt of a cream colour and not a white colour at that
time.’ The learned Sessions Judge has rightly observed
that the above suggestion at least proves the presence of
accused Dharam Vir on the spot at the time of
occurrence.”
38. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the suggestion
made by the defence counsel to a witness in the cross-
examination, if found to be incriminating in nature in any
manner, would definitely bind the accused, and the accused
cannot get away on the plea that his counsel had no implied
authority to make suggestions in the nature of admissions
against his client.
39. Any concession or admission of a fact by a defence
counsel would definitely be binding on his client, except for
the concession on a point of law. As a legal proposition, we
cannot agree with the submission canvassed on behalf of the
appellants that an answer by a witness to a suggestion made
by the defence counsel in the cross-examination does not
deserve any value or utility if it incriminates the accused in
any manner.”
23. Thus, the suggestions made to the prosecution
witnesses can be used to appreciate the prosecution evidence and
learned Trial Court had rightly held that the suggestions admitted
much of the prosecution case.
24. The accused stated in his statement recorded under
Section 313 of the Cr.PC that he was coming from Kullu and was
going towards Jogindernagar when police brought a bag and asked
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 26
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
him whether the bag belonged to him. It was not suggested to any
witness why the police should have picked him up out of the many
.
passengers present in the bus. Nothing was suggested to the police
officials in their cross-examination as to why they would depose
falsely against the accused; therefore, the only explanation
provided by the police officials that they were making a correct
statement has to be accepted as correct.
25. Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the
testimonies of police officials cannot be discarded because they
happen to be police officials. The presumption that an official act is
done regularly applies to the acts done by police officials as well. It
was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020
Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be
discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was
observed:
“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony
of the police official, which if otherwise is reliable,
trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other
admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground
that he is a police official and may be interested in the
success of the case. There is also no rule of law which lays
down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of
a police officer, even if such evidence is otherwise
trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful
scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever the evidence of a police::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 27
( 2025:HHC:26706 )officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is
found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of
conviction, and the absence of some independent witness of.
the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness
of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the
testimony of the police officers merely because they belong
to the police force.”
26. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State
AIR 2003 S.C. 3011 wherein it was held:
“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the
same manner as the testimony of any other witness, and
there is no principle of law that without corroboration by
independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be reliedupon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies,
as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons,
and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and
suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend uponthe facts and circumstances of each case, and no principle of
general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied)
27. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 986, wherein it was observed:
22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police
officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. Inother words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of
such a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy, then
basing the conviction thereupon cannot be questioned, and
the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod
Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588
13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil
Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri)
248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC
229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently
in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 28
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
2013 SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law
that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and
their testimony should always be treated with suspicion.
.
Ordinarily, the public at large shows their disinclination
to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of
the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy,
the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the
course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the
evidence of the police officer as unreliable and
untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him, but it
should not do so solely on the presumption that a witness
from the Department of Police should be viewed with
distrust. This is also based on the principle that the
quality of the evidence outweighs the quantity of
evidence.
23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1)
SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC
674, this court held that: —
“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be
rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses
have not been examined when, on the perusal of the
evidence on record, the Court finds that the case put forthby the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of
the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there isno reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their
evidence.”
24. We must note that in the former it was observed: —
“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are untrustworthy.
As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the
other way around. That official acts of the police have
been regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If
the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness
of such records of the police, the court could certainly
take into account the fact that no other independent
person was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 29
( 2025:HHC:26706 )legally approvable procedure to presume the police action
as unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action
merely for the reason that police did not collect.
signatures of independent persons in the documents
made contemporaneous with such actions.”
25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of
Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the
testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out
memos, do not stand vitiated due to the absence of
independent witnesses.
26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as
reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official
witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent
witnesses were not examined. The correctness or
authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”
which, quite apparently, is missing from the present case.
No reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to
challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2,
which the courts below have found absolutely to be inspiringin confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on the basis
of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken by the
trial court and confirmed by the High Court vide theimpugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.”
28. The learned Trial Court found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Goverdhan (supra) that the Appellate Court
should not interfere with the findings regarding the credibility of
the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court unless there is
some illegality in it. It was observed: –
“83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the
PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her
evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 30
( 2025:HHC:26706 )question the assessment about the credibility of the witness
by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has.
been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach
of fundamental law to warrant taking a different view of the
evidence of PW-10.
In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable
observations made by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri
Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, in the following words:
“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is
expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding
recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should
not be forgotten that the trial court had an advantage
and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnessesand, hence, the trial court’s conclusions should not
normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court
possesses the same powers as the original court, but
they have to be exercised with proper care, caution
and circumspection. When a finding of fact has beenrecorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of
oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless
the approach of the trial court in the appraisal ofevidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established
principles of law or unreasonable.
29. …………………………………..
30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75
IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on
the point, stated [Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1
All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.] : (IA p. 255)
“… but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably
be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived
at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion
has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a
tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the
appellate court will bear in mind that it has not::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 31
( 2025:HHC:26706 )enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of
the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is
entitled to great weight. This is not to say that.
the Judge of the first instance can be treated as
infallible in determining which side is telling the
truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like
other tribunals, he may go wrong on a questionof fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a
Judge of first instance, when estimating the
value of verbal testimony, has the advantage
(which is denied to courts of appeal) of havingthe witnesses before him and observing how
their evidence is given.”
29. Nothing was shown in the cross-examination of the
prosecution’s witnesses to shake their credibility, and the finding
of the learned Trial Court regarding the credibility of the witnesses
is to be accepted as correct.
30. It was submitted that the seal was not produced before
the Court, and the same is fatal to the prosecution’s case. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in
Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73:
2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal
before the Court. It was observed at page 4614:
“62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re-sealing
the bulk case property and the samples have not been
produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh‘s case (2001 (2) Cri LJ
(CCR) 74) (supra), while dealing with the effect of non-
production of the seal, this Court held as under:
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 32
( 2025:HHC:26706 )“In the absence of any mandatory provision in the
law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case
property, that the seal used in sealing the case property.
must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that
failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the
case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case whether, by non-productionof the seal at the trial, any doubt is raised about the safe
custody of the case property or not.”
63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion
we have already arrived at hereinabove that there isunchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case
property was not tampered with at any stage, the non-
production of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the
bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the
accused.”
31. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to
produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed:-
“6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is
stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent
the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy. S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At
3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar, stoppedPW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness,
Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant
was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his
Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’.
PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had
arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his
consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms.
Each were taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with
the seals ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the
Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The
conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 33
( 2025:HHC:26706 )produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the
two specimen seal impressions having been marked as
Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the.
seals were found tampered with in any manner.”
32. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that
when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the
conclusion of the Trial Court that the seals were produced before
the Court was perverse.
33.
In the present case, the seal impression was obtained on
the NCB-I form. The sample seals (Ex-PW1/C and Ex-PW11/F) were
also produced before the Court. When the case property was
produced before the Court on 02.01.2018, the parcel was found
sealed with 06 impressions with seal “A”. 06 impressions of seal
“H” and 05 seal impressions of SFSL and all the seals were found to
be intact. The Court had the seal impression to compare the seal
and had satisfied itself about the correctness of the seal
impression; therefore, the failure to produce the seal was not
material and could not have been used to discard the prosecution
case.
34. Hem Raj (PW13) admitted in his cross-examination that
16 seals were broken and were not intact. However, this admission
will not make the integrity of the case property suspect. The case
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 34
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
property was produced during the examination of Chet Ram (PW1)
and was opened and shown to him; therefore, the seals were bound
.
to be broken in the process of opening the parcel. Hence, the fact
that the seals were broken during the examination of Hem Raj
(PW13) does not show any tampering with the case property.
35. The parcel was produced before Chet Ram (PW11), who
resealed the same. It was produced before the learned Magistrate
who certified the integrity of the case property and issued a
certificate. The parcel was taken to SFSL, Junga, for analysis. The
report of analysis (Ex-PW11/C) reads that the parcel was bearing 06
seals of seal impression “H” and 05 seals of seal JMIC-4, Mandi.
The seals were found intact and were tallied with the specimen
seals sent by the forwarding authority and the seal impression
impressed on the form NCB-I. This report establishes the integrity
of the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P.
2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals
were intact, the case of prosecution that the case property
remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed:
“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that
the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner,
and the sample seal was separately sent, tallied with the
specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 35
( 2025:HHC:26706 )was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions
were separately taken and sent to the expert also.”
36. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of
.
Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:
“It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the
sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the
seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves
and establishes that there was no tampering with the
previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, andthe sample received by the analyst for chemical
examination contained the same opium, which was
recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view
of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending thesamples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to
the appellant.”
37. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402,
the High Court had concluded that there could have been
tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven
days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the seals were found to be intact, which would
rule out the possibility of tampering. It was observed:
“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that
the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained
poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after
taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The
defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure
and seal put on the samples were in any manner tampered
with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner.
There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the
samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 36
( 2025:HHC:26706 )how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said
examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the
sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having.
been found intact at the time of the examination by the
Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in
his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the
case property might have been tampered with, in ouropinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot
take the place of proof.
17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in
Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 inwhich there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the
sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the
said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable
evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that thesamples were intact till they were handed over to the
Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal
to the prosecution case. In our considered opinion, the ratio
of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the
present case in this regard.
18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is
no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.
38. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it was
held: –
“10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed
over the case property for producing the same before the
Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after
such production was not examined, as such, the link
evidence was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed
that Yogi Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder
Singh, ASI, for production before the Court. After producing
the case property before the Court, he returned the case
property to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 37
( 2025:HHC:26706 )also to be noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in
possession of the seals of either the investigating officer or
Yogi Raj, SHO. He produced the case property before the.
Court on 13.09.1996 vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned
Judicial Magistrate of First Class, after verifying the seals on
the case property, passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that
since there was no judicial malkhana at Abohar, the caseproperty was ordered to be kept in safe custody, in Police
Station Khuian Sarwar, till further orders. Since Joginder
Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the seals of either the
SHO or the Investigating Officer, the question of tamperingwith the case property by him did not arise at all.
11. Further, he has returned the case property, after
production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with
the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter,the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the
non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way,
affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from
the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex. P-10, that the sample
was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sampletallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the
chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied)
39. Therefore, the submission that the integrity of the case
property has not been established cannot be accepted.
40. The report of analysis shows that the exhibit was an
extract of cannabis and the sample of charas, which contained
28.83% W/w resin. Since the integrity of the case property was
established, therefore, it was duly proved that the substance
recovered from the accused was charas, and the learned Trial Court
had rightly held him guilty of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the NDPS Act.
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS
P a g e | 38
( 2025:HHC:26706 )
41. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 05 years. If the principle of
.
proportionality is applied, a person who possesses 01 kg can be
held liable for punishment up to 10 years of imprisonment. Thus,
the sentence of 05 years for possessing 810 grams of charas is
inadequate. However, no appeal was filed by the State seeking the
enhancement of the sentence, and no interference is required with
the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.
42. No other point was urged.
43. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the
judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the
present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
44. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial
Court be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
08th August 2025
(Shamsh Tabrez)
::: Downloaded on – 08/08/2025 21:36:19 :::CIS