Telangana High Court
Mir Jaffar Ali Moosavi Alias Mir Abbas … vs The State Of Telangana And 3 Others on 10 July, 2025
Author: B. Vijaysen Reddy
Bench: B. Vijaysen Reddy
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. VIJAYSEN REDDY
C.R.P. Nos.1394 & 1392 OF 2022
AND
W.P. Nos.15769, 18513 & 19649 OF 2021
COMMON ORDER :
1. All these matters arise out of the disputes relating to the
Wakf Institution viz., Bargah-e-Hazrath-e-Abbas (AS), Deevan Devdi,
Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Wakf Institution’), in connection
with appointment of Mutawalli to the Wakf Institution and other
common issues, as such, they are being disposed of by this common
order.
2.1. Both C.R.P. Nos.1394 and 1392 of 2022 are filed by Mir
Hyder Ali Moosavi challenging the common judgment dated
03.12.2021 in O.A. Nos.34 and 49 of 2021 passed by the learned
Telangana State Wakf Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘Wakf
Tribunal’). The said O.As. were filed under Section 83(2) of the Wakf
Act 1995 (for short ‘Wakf Act‘) challenging the order in
F.No.02/Z1/T/HYD/ 2015 dated 01.07.2021 passed by respondent
No.1 – the Telangana State Wakf Board, Hyderabad (for short ‘Wakf
Board’), whereby he (respondent No.2 – Mir Hyder Ali Moosavi) was
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appointed as Mutawalli of the Wakf Institution under Section 42 of the
Wakf Act, only for specific period i.e., from 01.07.2021 to 30.06.2022.
2.2. W.P. No.15769 of 2021 is filed by Syeda Kaneez-e-Sakina
Moosavi challenging the very same proceedings i.e., Memo in
F.No.02/Z1/T/HYD/2015 dated 01.07.2021.
2.3. W.P. No.18513 of 2021 is filed by Mir Jaffar Ali Moosavi
Alias Mir Abbas Ali Moosavi challenging the action of respondent
No.2 – Wakf Board in appointing respondent No.4 – Mir Hyder Ali Al
Moosavi as Mutawalli of the Wakf Institution without considering his
objections and representations dated 16.04.2021 and 10.06.2021 as
violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and
provisions of the Wakf Act.
2.4. W.P. No.19649 of 2021 is filed by Syeda Kaneez-e-Sakina
Moosavi challenging the highhanded action of respondent Nos.1 to 4
and 6 to 9 in evicting her and her family members from the ‘Ladies
Room’ admeasuring 120 square feet in the Wakf Institution, wherein
she along with her family members has been residing for over
fifty-five (55) years, without issuing any prior notice, and also the
inaction of respondent Nos.4 and 5 on the complaint dated 10.08.2021
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lodged by her sister Sahana Moosavi, as arbitrary, illegal, unjust,
violative of principles of natural justice and contrary to the provisions
of the Wakf Act and the Rules made thereunder; and for a
consequential direction to the respondents to put the petitioner and her
family members back in possession of the ‘Ladies Room’ and direct
respondent Nos.4 and 5 to take appropriate action on the complaint
dated 10.08.2021.
C.R.P. Nos.1394 & 1392 of 2022 :
3. For convenience sake, the parties herein are hereinafter
referred to as they are arrayed before the Wakf Tribunal.
4. As the main dispute centres around the appointment of
Mutawalliship to the Wakf Institution which is the subject matter in
O.A. No.34 of 2021 before the Wakf Tribunal, the facts therein are
referred to which are as under:
5.1. O.A. No.34 of 2021 was filed by the applicant – Syed Hadi
Ali Moosavi aggrieved by the order of the Wakf Board in
F.No.02/Z1/T/HYD/2015 dated 01.07.2021 whereby respondent No.2
(Mir Hyder Ali Moosavi) was appointed as Mutawalli to the Wakf
Institution.
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O.A. No.49 of 2021 was also filed by the same applicant – Syed Hadi
Ali Moosavi aggrieved by the proceedings of the Wakf Board in
F.No.02/Z1/T/ HYD/2015 dated 01.07.2021 whereby he was rejected
for the post of Mutawalli to the Wakf Institution.
5.2. As per the Muntaqab dated 19.04.2002 in File No.H1/61/93,
the Wakf Institution is in an extent of 1344 square yards.
This Wakf Institution was founded by Hazrath Syed Noor-ul-Huda
Saheb Qibla about 450 years back. Syed Noor-ul-Huda Saheb Qibla
also dedicated other properties for religious and pious purposes.
This Wakf Institution was founded with an intention to standardise the
sacred relics in the form of alams for the purpose of mourning in
continuous commemoration of grief for martyrs of Karbala. In view of
the same, one such alam was also installed on every Thursday and laid
to rest on Friday apart from annual muharram alams erection,
processions and laying to rest. Hzt. Syed Noor-ul-Huda Saheb Qibla
died issueless survived by his brother Hazrath Mir Meeran Sab Qibla
who continued and managed the Wakf Institution. He was succeeded
by a male child in every generation for next six generations.
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5.3. Thereafter, in the seventh generation, successor Hazrath
Syed Sardarul Hussaini had two sons viz., (1) Hakeem Mir Dawar Ali
and (2) Syed Noorul Huda Sani and also two daughters. Both the sons
jointly succeeded their father and jointly performed the duties of the
Wakf Institution without any interference of their sisters. The younger
brother Syed Noor-ul-Huda Sani, who has no issues, pre-deceased his
brother Hakeem Mir Dawar Ali. Thus the succession devolves only on
Mir Dawar Ali till his death on 11.06.1969. Mir Dawar Ali was
survived by two sons and three daughters viz., Mir Abdul Qasim
Moosavi, Syed Askari Hussain Moosavi, Hussaini Begum, Zainab
Begum and Zahra Begum.
5.4. It was contended that office of Mutawalliship of the Wakf
Institution was only amongst the male members of the family as the
religious ceremonies, such as installation of alams, taking out
processions, resting of alams, reciting of verses and Nauhas, offering
Fateha and many other ceremonies of the Wakf Institution, have to be
performed by male members only and the female members cannot
perform the same.
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5.5. The disputes arose among the male members. Two sons of
Mir Dawar Ali Moosavi filed suits in O.S. No.250 of 1972 and 152 of
1973 on the file of the learned Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, seeking injunction against each other. After a long time,
the dispute was decided in favour of the applicant’s father.
Challenging the same, two appeals were preferred and the same were
disposed of by the common judgment permitting the appellants to the
Mutawalliship on rotation basis every year; the common judgment was
challenged by both sides in the second appeals i.e., S.A. Nos.116, 117,
127 and 153 of 1983 wherein this Court passed a common judgment
dated 04.10.1983.
5.6. It is submitted that the father of the applicant Syed Askari
Hussain Moosavi, died on 02.12.1989, who was declared as Joint
Mutawalli by this Court in the second appeals. Mir Baqar Ali Moosavi
being the son of one of the Joint Mutawallis, applied for recognition of
Mutawalliship in the place of his father by filing representations dated
24.07.1993 and 11.01.1993, however, as the same were not considered,
he filed W.P. No.3391 of 1994 and pending the same, the applicant
along with other brothers rendering services of alambardari etc.
Consequent to issuance of notifications in Gazette, I.A. No.1012 of
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2001 in O.S. No.80 of 1994 was filed seeking amendment of plaint by
questioning the gazette notification and appointment of Syed Taqiya
Moosavi as Mutawallia. The said application was allowed on
04.09.2001. Challenging the same, C.R.P. No.3161 of 2003 was
preferred and the same was dismissed by this Court on 26.10.2005
granting liberty to the petitioner in C.R.P. to work out the remedies
available under the Wakf Act. However, owing to ill health, Mr. Baqar
Ali Moosavi could not follow the C.R.P. and the orders therein in his
favour or brought the same before the trial Court, and ultimately the
Original Suit was dismissed for default on 27.02.2006. However, on
coming to know about the same, he filed O.A. No.19 of 2010 before
the Wakf Tribunal challenging appointment of Taqia Moosavi and for
other reliefs. Pending O.A., Baqar Ali Moosavi died in 2011.
5.7. It is submitted that the Wakf Board by the proceedings
dated 15.03.1994 has taken the Wakf Institution under its direct
management by appointing an Enquiry Officer to conduct enquiry by
issuing proceedings dated 05.05.2000. However, the enquiry officer
did not conduct enquiry in a fair manner; contrary to the record and by
misinterpretation of Shia Law and contrary to various other provisions
of the Wakf Act, the enquiry officer filed his report in favour of the
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daughter of Mir Abdul Qasim Moosavi viz., Syeda Taqiya Moosavi
and she was appointed as Mutawallia vide proceedings No.251/L4/
HYD/96 dated 11.08.2000. The enquiry officer ignored the fact that
the custom in respect of the Wakf Institution is that only male
members are entitled to be appointed as Mutawalli. Hussaini Begum,
daughter of Mir Dawar Ali Moosavi, was impleaded in the appeals,
but her claim was rejected by the learned Assistant Judge and also by
the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court in A.S. Nos.365 and 382 of
1981. Hence, the applicant and his brother Mir Akbar Ali Moosavi
jointly filed O.A. No.10 of 2016 before the Wakf Tribunal seeking to
suspend operation of the proceedings dated 11.08.2000 appointing
Syeda Taqiya Moosavi as Mutawallia and to direct the Wakf Board to
take the Wakf Institution under its direct management. The appeal is
pending for adjudication.
5.8. It is submitted that Mutawallia Syeda Taqiya Moosavi died
on 09.04.2021 and the applicant has filed application dated 15.04.2021
seeking to appoint him as Mutawalli of the Wakf Institution.
The Wakf Board without conducting enquiry, without following due
process of law, in violation of the provisions of the Wakf Act and
without giving opportunity of being heard, passed the order dated
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01.07.2021 appointing Mir Hyder Ali Moosavi as Mutawalli of the
Wakf Institution by rejecting the request of the applicant.
5.9. It is submitted that :
(1) The Wakf Board has not followed the procedure as laid
down under Sections 42 and 63 and other provisions of the
(2) The Wakf Board did not look into the father of the applicant
Syed Askari Hussain Moosavi who was the Joint Mutawalli
and the applicant is the alambardar of the Wakf Institution.
(3) Respondent No.2 failed to prove his succession to the
Mutawalliship.
(4) The applicant is son of one of the Joint Mutawallis, as such,
he is entitled to be appointed as Mutawalli to the Wakf
Institution.
6.1. Respondent No.2 filed counter affidavit in O.A. No.34 of
2021 contending that the applicant along with his brothers and sisters
executed the ‘Affidavit of No Objection dated 14.01.1990’ in respect
of Towliath (Mutawalliship) in favour of his father late Mir Baqer Ali
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Al Moosavi. Thus, the applicant gave up his rights to claim
Mutawalliship in respect of the Wakf Institution, as such, the original
application is not maintainable. It is submitted that his great
grandfather viz., late Hakeem Mir Dawar Ali, during his lifetime,
prescribed the line of succession by executing the Will Deed dated
19.06.1953 which was subject matter of the legal proceedings filed by
his grandfather viz., late Syed Askari Hussain Al Moosavi against his
brother late Mir Abul Qasim in O.S. Nos.250 of 1972 and 152 of 1973
on the file of the learned IX Assistant Judge, City Civil Court,
Hyderabad, in A.S. Nos.365 of 1981 and 382 of 1981 on the file of the
learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and in
S.A. Nos.116, 117, 127 and 153 of 1983 of this Court.
6.2. Late Syed Askari Hussain Al Moosavi, grandfather of
respondent No.2 was joint Mutawalli and executed documents styled
as ‘Nomination of Tauliath dated 29.08.1989’ in favour of the father of
respondent No.2 Mir Baqer Ali Al Moosavi Bargahi.
6.3. The civil dispute between the late Mir Abul Qasim and
grandfather of respondent No.2 late Syed Askari Hussain Al Moosavi
with regard to the claim of Mutawalliship was ended by the common
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judgment dated 04.10.1983 wherein both Mir Abul Qasim and
grandfather of respondent No.2 were appointed as Joint Mutawallis,
one among them to function every alternative year. The implead
application filed by late Hussaini Begum to get herself impleaded as
defendant No.2 in both the suits claiming herself to be the rightful
Mutawallia of the Wakf Institution was rejected. Thus, the question of
female member holding the office of Mutawalli does not arise.
6.4. The grandfather of respondent No.2 expired on 02.12.1989
and during his lifetime, he has nominated and appointed the late father
of respondent No.2 as Mutawalli of the Wakf Institution and he
continued as Mutawalli. Other family members including brothers and
sisters of the father of respondent No.2 recognised him as Mutawalli.
They have executed the affidavit dated 14.01.1990 furnishing
‘No Objection’ in respect of Towliathship of the Wakf Institution in
favour of respondent No.2 and he had been in continuous and
uninterrupted Mutawalli of the Wakf Institution.
7. Heard Mr. P. Gangaiah Naidu, learned senior counsel,
appearing for Mr. Shafath Ahmed Khan, learned counsel for
respondent No.2 (revision petitioner in both the C.R.Ps.); Mr. Vedula
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Srinivas, learned senior counsel, appearing for Mrs. Vedula
Chitralekha, learned counsel for the applicant (respondent No.1 in both
C.R.Ps.); Mr. Farhan Azam Khan, learned Standing Counsel for the
Telangana State Wakf Board; and Ms. Nafisa, learned counsel for
respondent No.3 (implead petitioner) in both the revision petitions; and
perused the material on record.
8. Mr. P. Gangaiah Naidu, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent No.2 (revision petitioner), submitted that the Wakf
Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order.
The Wakf Board conducted enquiry and appointed Mutawalli.
The power to appoint Mutawalli is in the exclusive domain of the
Wakf Board in terms of Section 3(i) and 32(g) of the Wakf Act.
The appointment was not under Section 63 of the Wakf Act.
The Wakf Tribunal cannot decide the tenure of Mutawalliship and
transgress the power of the Wakf Board. Under Section 42 of the
Wakf Act, change of the office of Mutawalli has to be notified and
appointment of respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) was strictly in
accordance with the Wakf Act. Thus the impugned order is liable to be
set aside.
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9. Mr. Farhan Azam Khan, learned standing counsel for the
Wakf Board, submitted that the Wakf Tribunal has usurped the power
of the Wakf Board. Only if there is prima facie illegality, the Wakf
Tribunal can interfere with the order or decision of the Wakf Board.
There is no dispute herein about violation of principles of natural
justice. The Wakf Board has power to appoint Mutawalli on the basis
of Wakf Nama or in accordance with the provisions of the Wakf Act.
The appointment of a Mutawalli is purely the discretion of the Wakf
Board as per Section 63 of the Wakf Act. Female family member
cannot be appointed as a Mutawallia as a matter of right. The Wakf
Board has discretion and the Wakf Tribunal cannot step into the shoes
of the Wakf Board and the order of the Wakf Tribunal is not only
contrary to the provisions of the Wakf Act but also Articles 9(6) and
25(2) of the Constitution of India.
10. Mr. Vedula Srinivas, learned senior counsel appearing for the
applicant (respondent No.1), in both the civil revision petitions,
submitted that findings in S.A. Nos.116, 117, 127 and 153 of 1983
have attained finality. Respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) has not
cited any provision to show that the findings given in the earlier round
of litigation by a Civil Court or High Court will be wiped out by virtue
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of provisions of the Wakf Act. The judgment of this Court in Second
Appeal continues to operate. Merely, because there is change in the
Wakf Act, the judgment in the second appeals cannot be ignored.
The Wakf Tribunal has merely given effect to the binding decision of
the High Court in the second appeals. Thus, the revisions are liable to
be dismissed.
11. Ms. Nafisa, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3
(implead petitioner), submitted that the female family member
continued as Mutawallia for 21 (twenty one) years. There is no
embargo for women to be appointed as Mutawallia. A person who is
not a party to the original application can prefer appeal or file implead
application. Wakf Tribunal’s order is in favour of the applicant, and
thus she has locus standi to support the order of the Wakf Tribunal.
The application of respondent No.3 for appointment of Mutawallia was
not considered by the Wakf Board and the Wakf Tribunal has rightly
interfered with the decision of the Wakf Baord to give effect to the
judgments in Exs.P-5 to P-7. Section 63 of the Wakf Act is not
attracted in the instant case.
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CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT :
12. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Wakf Tribunal
framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the impugned proceedings dt.1-7-2021 is
liable to be set aside?
2. Whether the impugned memo dt.1-7-2021 is liable to be
set aside? and
3. To what relief?”
13. The Wakf Tribunal has set out the manner in which the
Wakf Institution was established and notified, and also the
genealogical tree of the family of the Mutawalli. The litigation arising
out of the suit in O.S. Nos.250 of 1972 and 152 of 1973 which
culminated in common judgment in S.A. Nos.116, 117, 127 and 153 of
1983 was also discussed by the Wakf Tribunal.
14. In paragraph No.28 of the order of the Wakf Tribunal, the
following observations of this Court in Exs.P-5 to P-7 are extracted:
“1) That it is be and hereby declared that the plaintiff and
the 1st defendant are the joint Mutawallis of the suit Dargah;
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2) That Sri Mir Abdul Qasim shall hold the post of
Mutawalli for the suit Dargah during the Hijri year 1404
and thereafter in each alternate even Hijri year during his
life time;
3) That Syed Askari Hussain shall function as Mutawalli
during the Hijri year 1405 and thereafter in alternate odd
Hijri year during his life time;
4) That the office of the Mutawalli shall devolve on the
survivor of them for the rest of his life time;
5) That the said Syed Askari Hussain will be restrained by
an injunction from interfering with the Dargah during the
even Hijri years in which said Mir Abdul Qasim shall
function as Mutawalli;
6) That the said Mir Abdul Qasim is likewise restrained by
an injunction from interfering with the Dargah during the
odd Hijri years in which the said Syed Askari Hussain
functions as Mutawalli;
7) That the parties, in the circumstances, do bear their
respective costs throughout;
8) That this decree will be subject to any final orders which
may be passed by the Waqf Board concerning the proper
management of the Dargah by either the plaintiff or the 1st
defendant;”
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15. While adverting to the contention raised by the applicant
(respondent No.1 in the revision) that respondent No.2 (revision
petitioner) was appointed as Mutawalli without conducting enquiry,
the Wakf Tribunal held that the Inspector, Auditor, Wakf Circle,
enquired with all the applicants and submitted his report dated
16.06.2021 which was placed before the Board in its meeting held on
21.06.2021 and the Board passed the Resolution dated 01.09.2021
unanimously. Thus, the Wakf Tribunal held that the proceedings under
challenge before it to the extent of conducting enquiry by the Auditor
Inspector and passing resolution by the Wakf Board are correct.
However, so far as legality of the impugned proceedings are
concerned, the learned Wakf Tribunal held that appointment of
respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) as Mutawalli under the impugned
proceedings under Section 42 of the Wakf Act is not legal.
16. The Wakf Tribunal referred to the judgment of the erstwhile
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.P. State Waqf Board v. Mir
Qamar Hasan Razvi 1 and an unreported decision in Ibrahim Bin
Abdullah v. A.P. State Waqf Board2, wherein it was held that
appointment of Mutawalli under Section 42 of the Wakf Act is not
1
2012 (3) ALT 791
2
W.A. No.213 of 2014 dated 04.03.2014
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permissible. The Wakf Tribunal also referred to the decisions of the
erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in W.A. No.539 of 1996 dated
04.04.2000 and W.P. No.5757 of 1994 dated 04.04.2000 wherein it
was observed that as per the provisions of Section 63 read with Section
65 of the Wakf Act, if the Mutawalli of a wakf institution dies, it is for
the Wakf Board to decide and give appropriate declaration or pass
appropriate orders in accordance with law with respect to the
Mutawalliship of the institution.
17. In paragraph No.37 of the impugned order, by relying on
Ex.P-7, judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in
Second Appeal Nos.116, 117, 127 and 153 of 1983 dated 04.10.1983,
it was held as under:
“… … … The substance of Ex.P5 to Ex.P7 is that Syed
Askari Hussain Moosavi was to function as Mutawalli for a
particular Hijri year and then his elder brother Syed Qasim
Moosavi was to perform as Mutawalli of the subject Dargah
for aparticular Hijri year. This indication equally applies to
the progeny of these two brothers. The daughter of Mir
Qasim Moosavi worked as Mutawallia and she died
recently. Naturally now the turn comes to any of the
eligible children of Askari Moosavi. The applicant is junior
paternal uncle of respondent No.2.”
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18. While dealing with the argument of the learned counsel for
respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) that mere mentioning of Section
42 of the Wakf Act in the impugned proceedings and not mentioning
of Section 63 of the Wakf Act is not material, the Wakf Tribunal held
that under Section 42 of the Wakf Act, changes are only to be
intimated to the Wakf Board about the Mutawalli of a Wakf Institution.
Further, if any Mutawalli is appointed under Section 63 of the Wakf
Act, it is for a specific period. When there is a dispute under Section
63 of the Wakf Act, Mutawalli can be appointed. Once Mutawalli is
appointed under Section 42 of the Wakf Act, he may continue forever
unless there are restrictions imposed under the Wakf Act; ultimately, it
was held that purpose of these two provisions i.e., Sections 42 and 63
of the Wakf Act is diametrically opposite to each other.
19. In paragraph No.44 of the impugned order, it was held that
though the procedure followed by the Wakf Board in appointing
respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) as Mutawalli of the Wakf
Institution to the extent of conducting enquiry etc., are as per law,
since the provision of law is not correctly mentioned which affects the
applicant (respondent No.1), the impugned proceedings are liable to be
set aside; ultimately, the Wakf Tribunal directed to set side the
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impugned memo and directed the Wakf Board to issue modified
proceedings mentioning the correct provision of law as Section 63 of
the Wakf Act restricting the period with effect from 01.07.2021 to
30.06.2022. Accordingly, O.A. No.34 of 2021 was allowed directing
as under:
“46. In the result, the Original Application No.34/2021 is
allowed in part. The impugned proceedings in
F.No.01/Z1/T/HYD/2015, dt.01-07-2021 is set aside.
Respondent No.1 is directed to issue modified proceedings
appointing respondent No.2 as Muttawalli of the subject
Dargah for a period of one year w.e.f. 01-07-2021 to 30-6-
2022. Thereafter respondent No.1 shall appoint the next
Muttawalli of the subject Dargah after due enquiry from
among the progeny of Syed Abdul Qasim and Syed Askari
Hussain including the applicant, unless he is convicted and
sentenced to any offence, and others who are eligible and
willing, as far as possible fixing he period of one year and
giving opportunity to the daughters of Syed Qasim Moosavi
and Syed Askari Hussain alternately, especially keeping in
view the guidelines mentioned in Ex.A5 to A7, common
judgment in S.A. No.116, 117, 127 and 153/1983, dt.04-10-
1983 and also common order in W.A. No.539/96 and
W.P.No.5757 / 94 and the Act.”
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20. It is relevant to note that none of the learned senior
counsel appearing for respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) or the
applicant or respondent No.3 or the Wakf Board attacked the
findings recorded by the Wakf Tribunal to the extent of enquiry
conducted by the Auditor Inspector which culminated in the Wakf
Board meeting held on 21.06.2021 and its Resolution dated
01.09.2021. The only objection of respondent No.2 (revision
petitioner) that the common order passed by the Wakf Tribunal to the
extent of holding his appointment as Mutawalli of the Wakf
Institution under Section 42 of the Wakf Act is not legal, is
erroneous. It is contended that Section 42 of the Wakf Act is
applicable as there is no dispute for the claim of Mutawalli Ship.
Therefore, Section 42 of the Wakf Act is applicable and not
Section 63 of the Act. Further, the Wakf Tribunal does not have any
jurisdiction to modify the proceedings of the Wakf Board dated
01.07.2021 by appointing respondent No.2 as Mutawalli with effect
from 01.07.2021 to 30.06.2022.
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21.1 The learned standing counsel for the Wakf Board relied
on the following decisions:
4. State of Tamilnadu v. K. Shyam Sunder 6
5. S V Cheriyakoya Thangal v. S V P Pookoya 7
21.2. In Dadi Jagannadham‘s case (Supra 3), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:
“13. We have considered the submissions made by the
parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the
court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature
did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to
do. The court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction
which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature.
Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words
used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to
correct or make up the deficiency. The court could not add
words to a statute or read words into it which are not there,
especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible
result. The court cannot aid the legislature’s defective
3
(2001) 7 SCC 71
4
(2008) 8 SCC 12
5
(2009) 14 SCC 85
6
(2011) 8 SCC 737
7
2024 Law Suit (SC) 1156
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make up deficiencies which are there.
21.3. In Faqruddin‘s case (Supra 4), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:
“36. It is beyond any doubt or dispute that a mutawalli is
the temporal head. He is the manager of the property …
… …
51. A jurisdictional fact would not attract the principles
of estoppel as there can be no estoppel against the
statute.
57. The question came up for consideration in Gnanasambanda
Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram [(1899-1900) 27 IA 69 :
ILR (1899) 23 Mad 271] wherein the Judicial Committee
held as under: (IA p.77).
“Their Lordships are of opinion that there is no
distinction between the office and the property of the
endowment.”
21.4. In V.K. Ashokan‘s case (Supra 5), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held as under:
“36. The very fact that the State in exercise of its
rule-making power amended the Rule in terms whereof
the original clause (b) was deleted is a clear pointer to
24
BVRJ
CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchshow that a conscious step was taken not to take recourse
of forfeiture of deposit in a case where licence is
cancelled in terms of Rule 6(30). The principles
contained in Heydon’s rule shall squarely be attracted in
this case.
37. It is a settled principle of interpretation of statute
that when an amendment is made to an Act, or when a
new enactment is made, Heydon’s rule is often utilised in
interpreting the same. [See Philips Medical Systems
(Cleveland) Inc. v. Indian MRI Diagnostic and Research
Ltd. [(2008) 10 SCC 227 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 764 :
(2008) 13 Scale 1]] For the purpose of construction of
Rule 6(30), as it stands now, the Court is entitled to look
to the legislative history for the purpose of finding out as
to whether the mischief prior to such amendment is
sought to be rectified or not. Applying Heydon’s rule, we
have no other option but to hold that such was the
intention on the part of the rule-making authority.”
21.5. In K. Shyam Sunder’s case (Supra 6), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court by referring to the following observations made by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Manjula Bhashini v. A.P. Women’s
Co-operative Finance Corporation Limited [(2009) 8 SCC 431 : (2009) 2
SCC (L&S) 441] , SCC pp. 465-66, para 68)];
“64. “68. … the legislature cannot by bare declaration,
without anything more, directly overrule, reverse or
25
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchoverride a judicial decision. However it can, in exercise of
the plenary powers conferred upon it by Articles 245 and
246 of the Constitution, render a judicial decision
ineffective by enacting a valid law fundamentally altering or
changing the conditions on which such a decision is
based.”;
held as under:
“65. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that a judicial pronouncement of a
competent court cannot be annulled by the legislature in
exercise of its legislative powers for any reason
whatsoever. The legislature, in order to revalidate the law,
can reframe the conditions existing prior to the judgment
on the basis of which certain statutory provisions had been
declared ultra vires and unconstitutional.”
21.6. In S V Cheriyakoya Thangal‘s case (Supra 7),
the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“10. The word ‘competent authority’ as mentioned in
the definition clause contained in Section 3(i) makes the
position further clear that it is the Waqf Board which has
got the jurisdiction and not the Waqf Tribunal. After all, the
Waqf Tribunal is only an adjudicating authority over a
dispute while the Waqf Board is expected to deal with any
issue pertaining to administration. The power of
superintendence cannot be confined to routine affairs of a
Waqf but it includes a situation where a dispute arises while
26
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchmanaging the property and that would certainly include a
right of a person to be a Mutawalli after all, it is the
Mutawalli who does the job of administering and managing
the Waqf.”
21.7. The aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned
standing counsel for the Wakf Board are not applicable to the present
case. None of these decisions deal with a situation wherein the
judgment in the earlier round of litigation rendered by a competent
civil Court or High Court, as the case may be, in a matter relating to
appointment of Mutawalli is not binding on the Wakf Board.
So also, the principle of “no estoppel against the statute” is also not
applicable to the present lis. The other judgments of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court relied upon by the learned standing counsel for the
Wakf Board in Raza Buland Sugar Company Limited v. Municipal
Board, Rampur 8 dealing with interpretation of statutes, and the
judgment in Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal (dead) through
L.Rs. 9 dealing with the principle of judgment per incuriam are not
relevant to the facts of the present case.
8
1964 LawSuit(SC) 276
9
(1975) 2 SCC 232
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
22. Mr. Vedula Srinivas, learned senior counsel appearing for
the applicant (respondent No.1), relied on the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Telangana State Wakf Board v. Mohamed
Muzafar10, wherein it was held as under:
“17. In that regard it would be appropriate to refer to the
decision of this Court in Kiran Devi v. Bihar State Sunni
Wakf Board [(2021) 15 SCC 15 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC
280] which was authored by one of us (Hemant Gupta, J.)
wherein the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised under
Section 83 of the Wakf Act is crystallised as follows : (SCC
p. 26, para 22)“22. Therefore, when a petition is filed against an
order of the Wakf Tribunal before the High Court, the High
Court exercises the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. Therefore, it is wholly immaterial
that the petition was titled as a writ petition. It may be
noticed that in certain High Courts, petition under Article
227 is titled as writ petition, in certain other High Courts as
revision petition and in certain others as a miscellaneous
petition. However, keeping in view the nature of the order
passed, more particularly in the light of proviso to sub-
section (9) of Section 83 of the Act, the High Court
exercised jurisdiction only under the Act. The jurisdiction
of the High Court is restricted to only examine the
correctness, legality or propriety of the findings recorded by
10
(2021) 9 SCC 179
28
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchthe Wakf Tribunal. The High Court in exercise of the
jurisdiction conferred under proviso to sub-section (9) of
Section 83 of the Act does not act as the appellate court.”
23.1 Ms. Nafisa, learned counsel for respondent No.3, relied on
the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and an
unreported decision of the Division Bench of this Court:
3. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v.
Dilbahar Singh 13
23.2. In Ouseph Mathai‘s case (Supra 11), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:
“4. It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished
from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Article 227
confers a right of superintendence over all courts and
tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is
conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the
said article as a matter of right. In fact power under this
article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior11
(2002) 1 SCC 319
12
(2011) 1 SCC 600
13
(2014) SCC 78
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BVRJ
CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchcourts and tribunals within the limits of their authority and
that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance
of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with
law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments
creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions
may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under
this article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction
of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate
courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.
5. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [AIR 1954 SC 215 :
1954 SCR 565] this Court held that power of
superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised
more sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to
keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their
authority and not for correcting mere errors. This position
of law was reiterated in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of
Hills Division & Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398 : 1958 SCR
1240]. In Babhutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarte
[AIR 1975 SC 1297 : (1975) 1 SCC 858] this Court held
that the High Court could not, in the guise of exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of
appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of
appeal. After referring to the judgment of Lord Denning in
R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, ex p
Shaw [AIR 1952 1 All ER 122 : (1952) 1 KB 338 (CA)]
(All ER at p. 128) this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna
Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [(1986) 4 SCC 447] held: (SCC
p. 460, para 20)]
30
BVRJ
CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch“20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into
the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so
requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of
fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But
the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into
the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where
the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence.
The High Court also should not interfere with a finding
within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where
the findings are perverse and not based on any material
evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice (see Trimbak
Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide, [(1977) 2
SCC 437]. Except to the limited extent indicated above, the
High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion therefore, in
the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that
the High Court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the
High Court has gone into questions which depended upon
appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the
learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the
Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of
the position that two views were possible in this case. In
preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of
evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the
first point, therefore, the High Court was in error.”
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
23.3. In Kokkanda B. Poondacha‘s case (Supra 12), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“8. In Surya Dev Rai case [(2003) 6 SCC 675], the two-
Judge Bench, after a detailed analysis of the various
precedents on the scope of the High Court’s powers under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution culled out nine
propositions including the following: (SCC p. 695, para 38)“38. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts
subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of
revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of
1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to
be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court.
(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is
issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a
subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without
jurisdiction – by assuming jurisdiction where there exists
none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction – by overstepping or
crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant
disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in
violation of principles of natural justice where there is no
procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of
justice.
(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts
within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When [the]
32
BVRJ
CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batchsubordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does
not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does
have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised
by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of
justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High
Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.”
23.4. In Dilbahar Singh‘s case (Supra 13), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:
“42. The observation in Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu,
[(2000) 2 SCC 135] that the High Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate
court/authority and it is impermissible for the High Court to
reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed under
Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini Amma
Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana, [(1993) 1 SCC 499] and
D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, [1995 Supp
(4) SCC 675]. Its observation that the High Court can
interfere with incorrect finding of fact must be understood
in the context where such finding is perverse, based on no
evidence or misreading of the evidence or such finding has
been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the material
evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous that if
allowed to stand, will occasion in miscarriage of justice.
Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu, [(2000) 2 SCC 135] does not
hold that the High Court may interfere with the findings of
fact because on reappreciation of the evidence its view is
different from that of the first appellate court or authority.
33
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
The decision of this Court in V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan
Dwarka, [(2006) 9 SCC 606] is again in line with the
judgment of this Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma v.
Kallyani Sulochana, [(1993) 1 SCC 499] .
43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent
Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the
findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first
appellate authority because on reappreciation of the
evidence, its view is different from the court/authority
below. The consideration or examination of the evidence
by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts
is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the
court/authority below is according to law and does not
suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by
court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at
without consideration of the material evidence or such
finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the
evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it
would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to
correction because it is not treated as a finding according to
law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts
shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not
legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself
as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision
or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to
satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or
propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High
34
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to
reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a
different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and
cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all
questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High
Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is
according to law, it may examine whether the order
impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or
irregularity.”
24. It is clear from the decisions cited by the learned senior
counsel appearing for the applicant (respondent No.1) and the learned
counsel for respondent No.3 that this Court in exercise of the
jurisdiction under Articles 227 and 227 of the Constitution of India can
interfere with the decision of the trial Court or Tribunal only if the
findings are perverse or based on no evidence or misreading of
evidence; that this Court would not interfere with the decisions of the
Tribunals merely because another view is possible and this Court in
exercise of revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate Court.
25. It needs to be noted that appointment of Mutawalli by
hereditaryship for the subject Wakf Institution has been settled by
this Court by issuing directions / guidelines in Exs.P-5 to P-7 by the
35
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
common judgment in S.A. Nos.116, 117, 127 and 153 of 1983 dated
04.10.1983 and in W.A. No.539 of 1996 and W.P. No.5757 of 1994.
26. Though the learned Standing Counsel for the Wakf Board
vehemently submitted that the common judgment in S.A. Nos.116 of
1983 and batch dated 04.10.1983 is not binding on the Wakf Board by
virtue of enactment of the Wakf Act 1995, he has not brought to the
notice of this Court any provision of law under the Wakf Act 1995 or
judicial precedent which says that decision given by the competent
Court with regard to Mutawalli rights under the provisions of the old
Wakf Act (1954) would become inoperative by virtue of enactment of
the Wakf Act 1995.
27. According to Mr. P. Gangaiah Naidu, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent No.2 (revision petitioner), when appointment
of Mutawalli was made under Section 42 of the Wakf Act, which was
the question before the Wakf Tribunal and it was held that appointment
is not legal and should have been made under Section 63 of the Act, it
would have been appropriate for the Wakf Tribunal to remand the
matter to the Wakf Board.
36
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
28. However, as discussed above, by reiterating that the
guidelines / directions issued in Exs.A-5 to A-7 are holding the field in
respect of Mutawalliship of the subject Wakf Institution, the Wakf
Tribunal chose to modify the proceedings of the Wakf Board by
confining the appointment of respondent No.2 (revision petitioner) as
Mutawalli for a period of one year, and thereby, directing Mutawalli to
be appointed in accordance with the guidelines mentioned in Exs.P-5
to P-7. Such exercise in the opinion of this Court cannot be said to be
illegal, erroneous or perverse.
29. In the above backdrop of events and circumstances,
specifically rights of the parties having been settled under Exs.P-5 to
P-7 judgments, it cannot be said that the Wakf Tribunal has exceeded
its jurisdiction in modifying the order of the Wakf Board. Thus, there
are not merits in these revisions.
30. For the aforesaid reasons, both the civil revision petitions
are dismissed. No order as to costs.
37
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CRP No.1392 of 2022 & Batch
W.P. Nos.15769, 18513 & 19649 OF 2021
31. In view of dismissal of C.R.P. Nos.1394 and 1392 of 2022,
no orders are required to be passed in these writ petitions.
Therefore, these writ petitions are disposed of. No order as to costs.
______________________
B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J
July 10, 2025.
PV