Telangana High Court
Batta Satyanarayana vs State Bank Of India on 31 December, 2024
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE T. MADHAVI DEVI
WRIT PETITION NO.16223 OF 2020
ORDER
In this Writ Petition, the petitioner is seeking a Writ of
Mandamus declaring that
(i) the order of dismissal from service dated 08.12.2015
passed by the Appointing Authority and communicated
vide GM(NW-III) Lr.No.VIG/TPT/ DTV/822 dated
10.12.2015;
(ii) the order of the Appellate Authority dated 26.05.2017
communicated vide DGM & CDO, SBI, LHO, Hyderabad
Lr.No.A&R/153 dated 31.07.2017 confirming the order
of the Appointing Authority; and
(iii) the order of the Reviewing Authority dated 15.12.2018
communicated through the DGM & CDO, SBI, LHO,
Hyderabad in Lr.No.HR/AR/No.419 dated 08.02.2019
communicating the decision of the Central Human
Resources Committee, Corporate Centre, rejecting the
review petition of the petitioner,
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as illegal, arbitrary, without any evidence, violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution of India, violative of principles of law of
evidence and principles of natural justice and consequently to quash
and set aside the same; and
(iv) further declare that the petitioner is entitled to all the
consequential benefits viz., pay and allowances from the
date of suspension till the date of retirement, continuity
of service, seniority and promotions and terminal
benefits including pension, and to pass such other order
or orders.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present Writ Petition are
that the petitioner initially joined in the respondent-Bank on
20.08.1977 as a Clerk-cum-Cashier; was promoted as Trainee Officer
on 01.08.1983; as Assistant General Manager on 01.11.2002.
Thereafter, he was posted as Regional Manager, Regional Business
Office, Kurnool during May, 2007. The petitioner claims to have put
in 36 years of service in the respondents’ organization without any
complaints whatsoever and submitted that he has received highest
accolades and appreciations throughout his service of more than 36
years including two appreciations-cum-felicitations from the
Chairman, SBI and the District Collector for his Commendable
Service during devastating floods in Kurnool in 2009.
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3. It is submitted that while the petitioner was working as an
Assistant General Manager (IOR), SBI, LHO, Hyderabad, a charge
memo dated 07.04.2014 was issued to the petitioner levelling 18
charges, the gist of which is as follows:
(1) The petitioner failed to exercise any control over charges
i.e., travelling allowance / expenses.
(2) He incurred substantial amounts towards travelling
expenses.
(3) He claimed inflated stationary and printing bills.
(4) He unauthorizedly passed advertisement bills.
(5) He sanctioned several loans for particular group of persons.
(6) He exceeded discretionary powers and unauthorizedly
sanctioned term loan to one Sri Ramprasad.
(7) He sanctioned loans without authority for lesser margin.
(8) He exceeded the discretionary powers.
(9) He unauthorizedly sanctioned several loans which fall
under the purview of Network Credit Committee (NWCC).
(10) He approved restructuring of instalments in respect of
certain units.
(11) He has not cautioned and not arranged for an inquiry to
know the reasons for exceeding budget.
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(12) He controlled the sanction of the additional limits in
respect of one Sri R.V. Ramana.
(13) He unauthorizedly allowed one Sri K.Ramanacharlu, CM
(RCPC) to accord sanctions.
(14) He has not referred the matter to LHO Technical Cell for
conducting feasibility and liability study in respect of an
industrial estate.
(15) He has not exercised control over advances portfolio of
the local Kurnool Branches.
(16) He sanctioned the two Rural Ware-house Advances
during the fag end of tenure at Regional Business Office
(RBO), Kurnool.
(17) He has not insisted for additional collateral security from
the promoters of VC Heavens.
(18) By the above actions, bank is likely to incur a loss of
Rs.5789.55 lakhs.
The petitioner submitted his defence statement on 25.04.2014 but,
not being satisfied with the same, the Disciplinary Authority
appointed an inquiry officer vide reference No.VIG/SGN/122 dated
28.04.2014 and thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority placed the
petitioner under suspension vide reference No.(HR-16)/1776 dated
16.09.2014. It is submitted that thereafter, the Disciplinary
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Authority issued a supplementary charge sheet vide proceedings in
reference No.VIG/TPT/DTV/617 dated 22.09.2014, adding charge
No.XIX alleging that the petitioner has sanctioned several credit
facilities to one Sri K.Ramprasad and his wife during 2009-2010, and
that from the account of said Sri K.Ramprasad, remittances have
been sent to the accounts of the petitioner’s sons at Canada. It was
thus alleged that the petitioner gained pecuniary gains to his sons
and had financial dealings with the borrowers. Further, the
Disciplinary Authority, through his letter in Ref.
No.VIG/TPT/DTV/694 dated 16.10.2014 issued a corrigendum to
the additional charge sheet dated 22.09.2014 adding charges
No.XIX(a) to XIX(e) alleging that several credit facilities were
sanctioned by the petitioner to Sri K.Ramprasad, his wife Smt.
K.Sridevi and to the firms in which they were proprietors/partners.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
Inquiry Officer has conducted the inquiry, initially, on charges I to
XVIII and thereafter also on Charge No.XIX and submitted his report
dated 07.05.2015 which was communicated to the petitioner by the
Circle Vigilance Department vide their Ref.No.VIG/TPT/DTV dated
Nil (received by the petitioner on 24.07.2015) and that the Inquiry
Authority, after considering the oral/documentary evidence relied
upon by both the sides, held Charges I to XIV and XVII and XVIII as
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not proved, and two charges i.e., Charges No.XV & XVI as partly
proved and Charge No.XIX as proved. However, the Disciplinary
Authority has opined that the Charges I, III, VI, X, XII and XIII are
also proved, Charges II, V, VIII, IX, XI and XVIII are partly proved
and agreed that Charge No.XIX was proved. It is submitted that
while communicating the report of the Inquiring Authority, the
Disciplinary Authority has conveyed his disagreement to the findings
of the Inquiring Officer by placing his reliance on the documentary
evidence mentioned in the charge sheet but not on the
oral/documentary evidence adduced during the course of enquiry.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner
has submitted his detailed representation dt.05.09.2015 against the
disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority and also against the
Inquiry Officer’s report, once again reiterating that he has not
committed any of the irregularities alleged in the charge sheet and
pointed out the deficiencies in the inquiry and also submitted
another representation dated 07.10.2015 to the Disciplinary
Authority in continuation of his earlier submissions.
5. It is submitted that instead of the General Manager, being the
Disciplinary Authority and having issued the charge memo and
conducted the proceedings up to the stage of conveying disagreement
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with the Inquiry Officers’ findings, deciding the issue, has handed
over the matter for further decision to the CGM, the appointing
authority, in absolute violation of the service rules and in violation of
principles of natural justice. It is submitted that it is the general
principle of disciplinary proceedings that the authority who heard
the matter, alone should decide the case, but in the instant case, the
CGM, the appointing authority, had come into picture after the
submission of disagreement note by the disciplinary authority and
the CGM, without looking into the case and without hearing the
petitioner, has come to a predetermined conclusion to impose major
penalty of ‘Dismissal’ and had thereafter called the petitioner for
personal appearance before him on 18.11.2015 which was later
changed to 19.11.2015 and though the petitioner submitted written
submissions followed by his appearance on 19.11.2015 followed by
further submissions on 20.11.2015, the appointing authority, vide
his proceedings dated 08.12.2015, communicated through the
GM(NW-III) Lr.No.VIG/TPT/DTV/822 dated 10.12.2015 imposed the
penalty of dismissal against the petitioner, further holding that the
period of suspension is to be treated as “not on duty”.
6. It is submitted that the Appointing Authority, the CGM, has
not looked into the evidence on record properly and therefore, the
final orders passed by the CGM/appointing authority lacks the legal
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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sanctity and suffers from improper consideration of the case of the
petitioner in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service. It
is submitted that the petitioner has submitted his appeal to the
Appellate Committee on 11.02.2016 and the Appellate Committee,
vide their letter dt.21.04.2017, sought more information, such as
proof of sale/deposit/utilisation of cash shown in the MoU, and that
the petitioner has submitted the said details through his
representation dt.24.04.2014, but the Appellate Committee has
dismissed his appeal vide orders dt.31.07.2017 without
consideration of the same. It is submitted that against the order of
the Appellate Committee, the petitioner filed a Review Petition on
11.12.2017 but the reviewing authority also has not considered the
case of the petitioner properly and has rejected the review petition
without any basis vide orders dt.28.01.2019 and hence, the present
writ petition has been filed challenging the order of removal which
has merged with the order of Appellate Committee and thereafter
with the order of the reviewing authority.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the order of
the CGM/Appointing Authority is liable to be set aside on the sole
ground of violation of principles of natural justice. It is submitted
that though there is a reference to various documents on the basis of
which, 19 charges have been framed against the petitioner, no
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document in support of the said charges have been supplied to the
petitioner, and in spite of a specific request by the petitioner for the
same, and such documents were produced only during the enquiry
and the petitioner had no opportunity to examine the said
documents and contradict the same, and therefore, it is in clear
violation of principles of natural justice.
8. While reiterating the above submissions, the learned counsel
for the petitioner filed the following documents:
(1) Synopsis-cum-written arguments filed on 21.12.2023,
(2) Supplementary synopsis-cum-written arguments filed on
28.12.2023, and(3) List of citations filed on 12.01.2024.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that though
initially 18 charges have been framed against the petitioner, the 18th
charge assumes importance as it mentions that “there is a likelihood
of incurring a loss of Rs.5789.55 lakhs.” It is submitted that in the
parlance of the disciplinary proceedings and the service law, a loss
has to be definite and clear in terms of the numbers and it cannot be
said to be likely (emphasis provided by this Court) to be incurred and
that this demonstrates the fact that as on the date of issuance of
charge memo dated 10.12.2015, there was no specific loss to the
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bank and that the respondents were also not aware of the definite
loss that was caused to the bank by the alleged acts of the petitioner.
10. It is submitted that where no loss has occurred, there cannot
be any charges of misconduct. It is submitted that only when the
loss is ascertained and made part of the charge memo, a
departmental enquiry can be held on that charge and an employee
can effectively defend his case. It is submitted that though the
Enquiry Officer has held the charges 1 to 14 and 17 and 18 as not
proved and only charges 15 and 16 as partly proved, the Disciplinary
Authority, without giving any reason, has held that he did not agree
with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. It is submitted that the 19th
charge has been made during the course of the enquiry by way of
supplementary charge dt.22.09.2014 which was further subjected to
a corrigendum dt.16.10.2014 without mentioning the documentary
and oral evidence as the basis for such a charge. It is submitted that
no documents were added to the list of documents to the charge
sheet and no further witnesses were added in support of the said
charge.
11. It is submitted that the respondent Bank neither produced any
written or oral complaint made by Sri K.Ram Prasad in the Vigilance
Inquiry nor has brought him as prosecution witness to prove the
allegation that the petitioner has gained any pecuniary benefit from
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him. It is submitted that the respondent management cannot shift
the burden of proof to the accused as held in Vaidhyanathan
Case 1.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of
India Vs. H.C. Goyel Case 2 for the proposition that mere suspicion
cannot be allowed to take the place of proof in domestic enquiry.
13. It is further submitted that the money trail has not been traced
by the vigilance inquiry to ascertain the sources of funds remitted to
the petitioner’s sons’ accounts and there are no complaints either
written or oral, from Sri K.Ramprasad nor has he been subjected to
any enquiry and the petitioner has never been given any opportunity
to submit his explanation before placing him under suspension to
explain the circumstances under which the remittances have been
made to his sons’ accounts in Canada and that it is in clear violation
of principles of natural justice. It is submitted that it is after the
conclusion of the domestic inquiry that the allegation has been made
and the bank has also not summoned Sri K.Ram Prasad as
prosecution witness and that before the Disciplinary Authority, the
petitioner has submitted a notarized sworn affidavit of one Sri
1 1987 SLJ (CAT) 931
2 AIR 1964 SC 364
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Peddireddy Venkataswamy Reddy confirming that he made the
payment of sale proceeds payable to the petitioner for sale of his
property, to Sri K.Ram Prasad for sending the said remittances to
petitioner’s sons accounts in Canada through Axis Bank as SBI,
Kurnool, Main Branch, was not the authorised bank to deal in
foreign exchange. It is submitted that Sri K.Ram Prasad also
submitted a notarized sworn affidavit dated 07.10.2015 explaining
the source of funds for sending remittances to the petitioner’s sons
in Canada through his Axis Bank Account. He also referred to the
question No.343 answered by P.W.1 after going through the relevant
exhibits, to the effect that he had not come across any evidence to
prove that the remittance to petitioner’s sons’ accounts in Canada
was made at petitioner’s insistence. Therefore, according to the
learned counsel for the petitioner, he was not involved in the said
remittances.
14. It is further submitted that when a new charge No.xix, is made
during the course of the domestic enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority
was required to specify, the evidence on the basis of which, the
charge is made and afford a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent
officer to defend the same through the defence evidence, but, in this
case, the 19th charge was raised during the course of the domestic
inquiry alleging that certain credit facilities were sanctioned by the
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petitioner during his tenure at RBO, Kurnool to one Sri K.Rama
Prasad and his wife which has resulted in remittances to his sons’
bank accounts in Canada. The said charge is denied by the
petitioner by submitting that the petitioner has sold one of his
properties to one Sri Peddireddy Venkataswamy Reddy, who in turn,
had requested Sri K.Ram Prasad to remit the sale consideration to
the petitioner’s sons’ bank accounts in Canada. Therefore, it is
submitted that the said transaction had nothing to do with the
discharge of his official duties as a Branch Manager. It is submitted
that the property transactions had happened between the years 2008
and 2010 and the property transaction has been mentioned in the
assets and liabilities statement of the petitioner from the year 2009-
2015 and was also submitted to the Bank as is evident from the
bank record. It is submitted that the petitioner’s vendee, Sri
Peddireddy Venkataswamy Reddy, and Sri K.Ram Prasad both
resided in the flats of the same apartment and were known to each
other and therefore the transaction was done through Sri
K.Ramprasad.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the
respondent Bank has initiated action against the petitioner in
respect of transactions pertaining to the contents of the charge sheet
issued to the petitioner, also against 12 other officers, but all the 12
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officers including those who have conducted the preliminary
inquiries, per-sanction surveys into the entitlement of the loans or
other transactions, those who recommended the transactions and
those who ultimately approved the transitions were let-off with
smaller penalties, whereas the petitioner was the only one, who was
subjected to the grave penalty of ‘Dismissal From service’.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M.V.Bijlani Vs. Union of
India and others 3, for the proposition that in disciplinary
proceedings, which are quasi-criminal in nature, there should be
some evidence to prove the charge. He also referred to the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of United Bank of India Vs.
Biswanath Bhattacharjee 4, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has
reconsidered the entire issue of the role of the departmental
proceedings and the scope of the Court to interfere in such
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that this
is a case of no evidence and hence deserves intervention of this
Court. He submitted that the act of Disciplinary Authority in
conveying the disagreement note dt.24.07.2015 is contrary to the law
3 Civil Appeal No.8267 of 2004 dt.05.04.2006
4 Civil Appeal No.8258 of 2009 dated 31.01.2022
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank
and others Vs. Sh. Kunj Behari Misra 5 and that it was not based
on any evidence adduced during the course of enquiry.
18. Without prejudice to the above contentions, on the merits of
the dismissal order, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted
that the petitioner is entitled to payment of gratuity even if he is
dismissed from service. In support of his contentions, he placed
reliance upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of
Jaswant Singh Gill Vs. M/S. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. & Ors 6
and in case of Union Bank Of India Vs. C.G. Ajay Babu 7, wherein
it was categorically held that the gratuity cannot be denied even to
an employee who is terminated from service until the termination is
for one of the reasons available under Sub-Section 6(b)(ii) of the
Gratuity Act. It is submitted that under Sub-Sections 5 and 6 of
Section 4 of the Payment of the Gratuity Act, 1972, forfeiture of
gratuity is not automatic on dismissal from service; but it is subject
to the provisions of the Sub-sections thereunder. Therefore, he
prayed that the authorities may be directed to reconsider the appeal
of the petitioner, and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshethreeya Gramin Bank
5 (1998) 7 SCC 84
6 C.A.No.4770 of 2006 dt.10.11.2006
7 Civil Appeal No.8251 of 2018 dated 14.08.2018
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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Vs. Rajendra Singh 8 in support of his above contentions. He thus
prayed for setting aside of the termination order with all
consequential benefits.
19. The learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent
Bank, however supported the impugned orders and submitted that
reasonable opportunity has been given to the petitioner during the
course of disciplinary proceedings and merely because the Enquiry
Officer has given a finding that most of the charges are not proved,
the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the same and he can
differ from the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proceed with the
matter in accordance with law. In support of his contentions that
reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner, the learned
counsel for the bank has strenuously taken this Court through all
the documents filed along with the counter affidavit. He also placed
reliance upon the following judgments in support of his contentions.
1) Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. Vs. A.Unnikrishnan and
another 9
2) Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and others
Vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik 10
8 LAWS (SC)-2013-7-126
9 (2006)13 SCC 619
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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3) Union of India Vs. Parma Nanda 11
4) State Bank of India Vs. A.G.D. Reddy 12
As regards the orders of dismissal from service being passed by the
CGM/the appellate authority, he submitted that since the
disciplinary/appointing authority has differed with the findings of
the enquiry officer, he could not have passed the final orders in this
case as per Rules and therefore, the matter was referred to his
superior officer who also happened to be the appointing authority,
and after consideration of all the material on record and after giving
an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, the appointing
authority had passed the order of dismissal from service and hence it
needs no interference.
20. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on
record, this Court finds that the following points arise in this Writ
Petition for adjudication.
(1) Whether the authority, who issued the charge memo,
conducted the enquiry and heard the delinquent employee,
10 (1996) 9 SCC 69
11 (1989) 2 SCC 177
12 2023 SCC online SC 1064
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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alone should pass the final order in the disciplinary
proceedings?
(2) Whether the Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary authority
was on the basis of any evidence recorded during the course of
enquiry?
(3) Whether any charges can be framed without the assessment of
loss?
(4) Whether charge No.XIX can be framed without giving the basis
for such a charge and without the list of documents and
witnesses for such charge?
(5) Whether there is violation of principles of natural justice?
(6) Whether the petitioner was solely responsible for the acts of
alleged misconduct?
(7) What is the relief the petitioner is entitled to?
21. As regards Point No.1, this Court finds that in this case, the
Disciplinary Authority has issued the charge memo, appointed the
enquiry officer, but differed with the enquiry report and submitted a
Disagreement Note. It is the cardinal principle and settled law that
the officer who has issued the charge sheet and heard the petitioner,
should alone pass the final order as he would be the person who is
aware of all the facts and therefore, would be able to take an
informed and well considered decision. He would be able to reflect
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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the reasons for coming to any conclusion in his order on the basis of
the material on record. If the said task is entrusted to another officer
who is not aware of the facts of the case and is only partly involved
in the judicial process, his decision may be fractured and
inconsistent with the facts of the case. However, where the
Disciplinary Authority differs from the enquiry officer and issues a
Disagreement Note, it would not be either proper or within his
powers to pass final orders without any prejudice or bias. Therefore,
in such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Disciplinary
Authority to refer the matter to other competent authority to pass
orders. In such circumstances, it would become necessary that the
competent authority permits the delinquent employee to personally
appear and submit his explanation. This is only to ensure that all
the facts and circumstances of the case are made known to the
competent authority to pass an order. Therefore, the contention of
the petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority who issued the charge
memo and conducted enquiry ought to have passed the order, is not
sustainable. Therefore, Point No.1 is answered against the petitioner.
22. As regards Point No.2, this Court finds that against the
enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority has issued a Disagreement
Note and having gone through the Disagreement Note, it is seen that
the Disciplinary Authority is referring to the material referred to in
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the charge memo for coming to the conclusion that the charges
against the petitioner are proved. His findings or observations
against the findings of the enquiry officer are not on the basis of any
evidence produced during the course of enquiry or the witnesses
examined during the course of enquiry. The documents or witnesses
referred to in the charge memo are only for coming to a prima facie
opinion for framing of the charges against the delinquent employee,
but the findings of the enquiry officer are on the basis of the
witnesses and the documents examined during the course of
enquiry. If the Disciplinary Authority were to differ with the findings
of the enquiry officer, he would have to base the same on the
evidence recorded during the course of enquiry and not on the basis
of preliminary information used for framing of charges against the
employee. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Bank
has not been able to bring on record any independent evidence
supporting the stand of the Disciplinary Authority on his
Disagreement Note. Therefore, Point No.2 is answered in favour of
the petitioner. For coming to this conclusion, this Court relies upon
the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following case:
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23. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Chitra
Venkata Rao 13, it was held that
“The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is
held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural
justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which
the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted
and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the
departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or
in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or
where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it
is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could
ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are,
if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if
there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the
adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be
permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a
writ under Article 226.”
24. As regards Point No.3, this Court finds that Charge No. XVIII
in this case is that the bank is likely to incur loss on account of the
alleged act of misconduct by the petitioner. Even later, in the counter
affidavit filed by the respondents before this Court, they have not
13 (1975) 2 SCC 557
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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been able to assess the loss caused to the bank, leave alone the
assessment at the time of issuance of the charge memo, charge sheet
or even the final orders of termination from service. Without arriving
at any conclusion about the quantum of loss which was caused due
to the alleged acts of misconduct by the petitioner, the gravity or
otherwise of the offence could not be gauged and the severity of the
punishment to be imposed cannot be decided. If the loss is
quantified, the respondent bank would be in a position to not only
recover the loss so incurred and quantify the compensation to be
recovered from the petitioner, but also decide on the severity of the
punishment to be imposed. Therefore, Point No.3 is answered in
favour of the petitioner.
25. In the case of Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel (2 supra), it ws
held that
“Though we fully appreciate the anxiety of the appellant to root out
corruption from public service, we cannot ignore the fact that in
carrying out the said purpose, mere suspicion should not be allowed to
take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. It may be that the
technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may not
necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the
principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to
see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular
criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory
rules.”
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26. As regards Point No.4, this Court finds that Charge No.XIX was
issued during the course of the enquiry and by way of issuing a
supplementary charge sheet and it did not contain the list of
witnesses or documents, on the basis of which such a charge is
issued. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of
cases, a charge has to be on the basis of the facts and circumstances
of the case and the documents or evidence relied upon by the
management for framing such a charge have to be made known to
the delinquent employee who should also be supplied with such
documents to enable the delinquent employee to go through the
same to submit his or her defence. These are settled principles of
natural justice which have to be followed not only in judicial but also
in quasi-judicial proceedings. It is an admitted fact that the
disciplinary proceedings are quasi-judicial and quasi-criminal and
therefore, principles of natural justice have to be followed and
therefore, Question No.4 is answered in favour of the petitioner.
27. Further, as regards merits of the case, it is an admitted fact
that there was transfer of some money from one of the borrowers i.e.,
Sri K.Ram Prasad to the bank accounts of the petitioner’s sons in
Canada. The respondents, therefore, ought to have required the
petitioner to submit his explanation for the same and should have
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
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brought the said person as a witness and examined him as to the
source of the fund and also the circumstances under which the
transfer has been made. The petitioner has relied upon the
notarised affidavit of one Sri Peddireddy Venkataswamy Reddy who
submitted that due to sale of property to him and since both Sri
Peddireddy Venkataswamy Reddy and the borrower lived in the same
apartment, they were known to each other and that the transaction
has been done through Sri K.Ram Prasad and the said contention
has not been disproved by the respondent Bank. The respondents
ought to have brought the said person on record and tried to elicit
the truth. Further, though several allegations have been made
against the petitioner, unless until, such misconduct has been found
to have caused loss to the bank in any way, the respondent Bank
could not have initiated action against the petitioner. The
respondent has not computed the loss caused by the alleged acts of
misconduct by the petitioner and therefore, the charges are
apparently vague and could not be substantiated with any evidence
and the petitioner has not been afforded an opportunity to counter
such allegations. For coming to this conclusion, this Court relies on
the following judgments:
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
25
28. In the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi
Chand Nalways 14, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that:
” If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the
findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the
evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore,
courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental
enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or
where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to
see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record.”
29. In the case of J. Venkatamani Vs. Principal Secretary,
Vigilance iv Hyderabad and others 15, it was held that
“15. Coming to the case on hand — As observed in the preceding
paragraphs, this Court finds a lot of contradictions in the evidence of
P.Ws.1 and 2, whose evidence was strongly relied upon by the
Tribunal for Disciplinary Proceedings for arriving at the conclusions. In
the considered opinion of this Court, the Tribunal for Disciplinary
Proceedings thoroughly failed in appreciating the evidence available
on record from proper perspective and came to the conclusions without
there being any foundation and basis. While dealing with the career
and future of an individual, the Inquiring and Disciplinary Authorities
are required to conduct the proceedings with care, caution and
circumspection and cannot jump into conclusions on the basis of
assumptions and presumptions.”
30. In the case of Moni Shankar Vs. Union of India and
another 16, it was held that
14 (2011) 4 SCC 584
15 2022 0 Supreme(AP) 274 : 2022 4 ALD 612 : 2022 3 ALT 730
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
26
“17. The departmental proceeding is a quasi-judicial one.
Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable in the
said proceeding, principles of natural justice are required to be
complied with. The courts exercising power of judicial review are
entitled to consider as to whether while inferring commission of
misconduct on the part of a delinquent officer relevant piece of
evidence has been taken into consideration and irrelevant facts have
been excluded therefrom. Inference on facts must be based on
evidence which meet the requirements of legal principles. The Tribunal
was, thus, entitled to arrive at its own conclusion on the premise that
the evidence adduced by the Department, even if it is taken on its face
value to be correct in its entirety, meet the requirements of burden of
proof, namely, preponderance of probability. If on such evidences, the
test of the doctrine of proportionality has not been satisfied, the
Tribunal was within its domain to interfere. We must place on record
that the doctrine of unreasonableness is giving way to the doctrine of
proportionality. (See State of U.P. v. Sheo Shanker Lal
Srivastava [(2006) 3 SCC 276 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 521] and Coimbatore
District Central Coop. Bank v. Employees Assn. [(2007) 4 SCC 669 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 68] ).”
31. In the case of M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India and others (3
supra), it was held that
“25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review
is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in
nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although
the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be
proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot
lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial
function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a
conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove
the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he
cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to
16 (2008) 3 SCC 484
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
27
consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He
cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis
of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations
with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with.”
32. In the case of K.Sitaram Vs. The Vice Chancellor, S.V.
University, Tirupati and another 17, it was held that:
“A conclusion even of the disciplinary authority as to the evidence
considered would be vitiated if it is one which would be arrived at by
no reasonable person or on no evidence, is irrational or based on
conjectures, surmises or suspicions-vide Union of India vs.
G.Ganayutham (3) AIR 1997 SC 3387; R.S.Saini vs. State of Punjab
& Ors. (4) 1999 (5) Scale 427.”
33. In the case of S.Nanjundeswar Vs. State of Mysore 18, the
Karnataka High Court held as under:
“In this connection, I would refer to a decision of the Bombay high
Court reported in State of Bombay Vs. Gajanan Mahadev Badley. In
this case, Chief Justice Chagla, sitting with Mr. Justice Dixit held that
the State should not countenance a departmental enquiry in which
action is proposed to be taken against the servant where a witness is
produced only for being cross-examined by the servant without the
servant being given an opportunity of hearing what evidence the
witness is going to give. Their Lordships further held that even
assuming that a statement of such a witness is furnished to the
servant, it is a sound rule that courts of law should follow and which
even domestic tribunals should follow that all evidence must be given
in the presence of an accused person and in the presence of the17 2000 (2) APLJ 473 (HC)
18 (1959) 01 KAR CK 0003
W.P.No.16223 of 202028
person against whom action is proposed to be taken. “It is one thing”,
their Lordships observed, “to make a statement behind the back of a
person and it is entirely a different thing to make a statement in the
presence of a person against whom you are going to make serious
charges.”
I am in full agreement with the view expressed by their Lordships of
the Bombay High Court in the said case. In my opinion, it would make
a great difference if the statement of the witness concerned is taken in
the presence of the tribunal and in the presence of the person charged
rather than to have it behind the back of the said person. I therefore
hold that the principles of natural justice also required that such
statements should be taken in the presence of the persons charged
and, as I have already indicated, Rule 245 of the General circulars
and Standing Orders also makes a provision to that effect. This
contention of the petitioner must therefore succeed.”
34. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Thiru K.V.Perumal
and others 19, it was held that
“The Tribunal seems to be under the impression that the enquiry
officer/disciplinary authority is bound to supply each and every
document that may be asked for by the delinquent Officer/employee.
It is wrong there. Their duty is only to supply relevant documents
and not each and every document asked for by the delinquent
officer/employee. In this case the respondent had asked for certain
documents. The Registrar to whom the request was made called
upon him to specify the relevance of each and every document asked
for by him. It is not brought to our notice that the respondent did so.
The Tribunal too has not gone into the question nor has it expressed
any opinion whether the documents asked for were indeed relevant
and whether their non-supply has prejudiced the respondent case.
The test to be applied in this behalf has been set out by this Court in
19 1996 SCALE (5) 379 : JT 1996 (6), 604
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
29
State Bank of Patiala v. S.K.Sharma [1996 (3) SCALE 202]. It was
the duty of the respondent to point out how each and every
document was relevant to the charges or to the enquiry being held
against him and whether and how their non-supply has prejudiced
his case. Equally it is the duty of the Tribunal to record a finding
whether any relevant documents were not supplied and whether
such non-supply has prejudiced the defendant’s case. Since this has
not been done the Tribunal in this matter it has to go back for a
rehearing.”
35. As regards Point No.5, it is noticed that initially, a charge
memo was issued to the petitioner with 18 charges and during the
course of the departmental enquiry, 19th charge was added and it
was also enquired into. However, when the petitioner has asked for
relevant documents on the basis of which the said charge has been
framed against him, no such documents have been furnished to the
petitioner and the same is in clear violation of the principles of
natural justice. The petitioner should have been given an
opportunity to go through the documents and make his own
submissions about the relevance and admissibility of such
documents. For coming to this conclusion, this Court relies on the
rationale laid down in the following case.
36. In the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. S.
Sree Rama Rao 20, it was held that
20 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6 : AIR 1963 SC 1723
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
30
“The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental
authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of
the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by
some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so
wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds.”
37. As regards Point No.6, it is noticed that along with the
petitioner, 12 other officials of the bank have also been issued charge
memos and enquiry was conducted and the punishment imposed on
the petitioner is quite disproportionate as compared to the
punishment imposed on other employees. Even if the petitioner has
not questioned the findings of the enquiry officer with regard to the
charges which are held as partly proved or proved, the punishment
imposed would be excessive, particularly when it is compared with
the punishment imposed by the respondent bank on other officials.
The Hon’ble Courts have time and again held that the punishment
has to be commensurate with the severity of the offence and has to
be uniform in respect of all the employees who are involved in the
same or similar misconduct. Though the petitioner has raised a
specific ground in this Writ Petition about the discrimination against
him in awarding the punishment as compared to other employees,
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
31
the respondents have not been able to rebut the same with any
evidence to the contrary except to state that the petitioner was
involved in the said transactions and it required strictest
punishment and therefore they were justified in imposing the
punishment of dismissal from service. Therefore, this Court is
inclined to hold that since the petitioner could not be solely
responsible for the acts of alleged misconduct, the punishment of
dismissal from service is excessive as compared to the misconducts
which have been held to be proved by the enquiry officer.
38. As regard Point No.7, this Court has already held that the only
charge which has been held to be proved by the enquiry officer as
well as the Disciplinary Authority is not maintainable as it did not
contain the list of documents and witnesses on the basis of which
such a charge has been framed. Therefore, the impugned order of
punishment is set aside and the petitioner is directed to be
reinstated into service with liberty to the respondent bank to re-
initiate the proceedings in respect of Charge No.XIX in accordance
with the settled principles of law and as regards the charges which
have been held as proved by the enquiry officer, the respondents are
at liberty to impose punishment commensurate with the alleged acts
of misconduct and also to impose a lesser punishment than the
punishment of dismissal from service. As regards the entitlement of
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
32
the petitioner for back wages for the period between termination and
reinstatement into service consequent to this order, the respondents
are directed to take a decision on the same after conclusion of the
proceedings, if any, on Charge No.XIX. Further, as regards the claim
of the petitioner for payment of gratuity, irrespective of the pendency
of the proceedings/punishment against the petitioner, this Court
finds that the learned counsel for the petitioner relief upon the
following judgments:
39. In the case of Balbir Kaur and another Vs. Steel Authority of
India Ltd., and others 21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“As regards the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (as
amended from time to time) it is no longer in the realm of charity but
a statutory right provided in favour of the employee. Section 4 of the
Act is of some significance and as such the same is set out herein
below:
4. Payment of gratuity. (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee
on the termination of his employment after he has rendered
continuous service for not less than five years, –
(a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or
(c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease;
Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall
not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any
employee is due to death or disablement.”
21 Appeal (Civil) Nos.11881 and 11882 of 1996 dt.05.05.2000
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
33
40. In the case of Union Bank of India and others Vs. C.G. Ajay
Babu and another (7 supra), it was held that
“20. In the present case, there is no conviction of the respondent for
the misconduct which according to the Bank is an offence involving
moral turpitude. Hence, there is no justification for the forfeiture of
gratuity on the ground stated in the order dated 20.04.2004 that the
“misconduct proved against you amounts to acts involving moral
turpitude”. At the risk of redundancy, we may state that the
requirement of the statute is not the proof of misconduct of acts
involving moral turpitude but the acts should constitute an offence
involving moral turpitude and such offence should be duly
established in a court of law.”
41. In the case of Jaswant Singh Gill Vs. M/s. Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd., and others (6 supra), it was held that
“A statutory right accrued, thus, cannot be impaired by reason of a
rule which does not have the force of a statute. It will bear repetition to
state that the Rules framed by Respondent No. 1 or its holding
company are not statutory in nature. The Rules in any event do not
provide for withholding of retrial benefits or gratuity.
The Act provides for a closely neat scheme providing for payment of
gratuity. It is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering
the essential provisions of a scheme for a gratuity. It not only creates a
right to payment of gratuity but also lays down the principles for
quantification thereof as also the conditions on which he may be
denied therefrom. As noticed hereinbefore, sub-section (6) of Section
4 of the Act contains a non- obstante clause vis-`-vis sub-section (1)
thereof. As by reason thereof, an accrued or vested right is sought to
be taken away, the conditions laid down thereunder must be fulfilled.
The provisions contained therein must, therefore, be scrupulously
observed. Clause (a) of Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act speaks of
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
34
termination of service of an employee for any act, willful omission or
negligence causing any damage. However, the amount liable to be
forfeited would be only to the extent of damage or loss caused.”
In view of the above findings of the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is held that
the petitioner is entitled to payment of gratuity on the basis of length
of his service. It is allowed accordingly.
DECISIONS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENTS:
42. In the case of State Bank of India Vs. A.G.D. Reddy 22, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier Judgments and held
thus:
“41. Shri Sanjay Kapur, learned counsel for the Bank relies
on SBI v. Ram Lal Bhaskar [SBI v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC
249 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 402] . In that judgment the scope of judicial
review of departmental proceedings was set out and the principle laid
down in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree
Rama Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6 : AIR 1963 SC 1723] , was
reiterated, which reads as follows : –
” This Court has held in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama
Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6 :
AIR 1963 SC 1723] : (SCC OnLine SC para 7):
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the
decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether
the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf,
and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and22 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1064 : (2023) 14 SCC 391
W.P.No.16223 of 202035
whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where
there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the
duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.’
13. Thus, in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over the
findings of the disciplinary authority and so long as the
findings of the disciplinary authority are supported by some
evidence the High Court does not reappreciate the evidence
and come to a different and independent finding on the
evidence. This position of law has been reiterated in several
decisions by this Court which we need not refer to, and yet by
the impugned judgment the High Court has reappreciated the
evidence and arrived at the conclusion that the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer are not substantiated by any
material on record and the allegations levelled against
Respondent 1 do not constitute any misconduct and that
Respondent 1 was not guilty of any misconduct.”
42. It is now well settled that the scope of judicial review
against a departmental enquiry proceeding is very limited. It is not in
the nature of an appeal and a review on merits of the decision is not
permissible. The scope of the enquiry is to examine whether the
decision-making process is legitimate and to ensure that the findings
are not bereft of any evidence. If the records reveal that the findings
are based on some evidence, it is not the function of the court in a
judicial review to reappreciate the same and arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. This lakshman rekha has been recognised
and reiterated in a long line of judgments of this Court.”
43. In the case of Union of India Vs. Parma Nanda (11 supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
36
“27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment
cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal cannot
interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or competent authority
where they are not arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to
remember that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is
conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of legislature or
rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there
has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with
principles of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of
justice is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on
the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute its
own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of penalty
unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the Tribunal to
concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere with the penalty
if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the competent authority is
based on evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or
extraneous to the matter.
31. In the light of the principles to which we have called
attention and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the order of the
Tribunal imposing a lesser penalty on the respondent cannot,
therefore, be sustained. He was found guilty of the charge framed
against him. He was a party to the fraudulent act for self-
aggrandisement. He prepared bogus documents for withdrawal of
salary in the name of Ashok Kumar who was not working in his
division. He has thus proved himself unbecoming and unworthy to
hold any post. Any sympathy or charitable view on such officials will
not be conducive to keep the streams of administration pure which is
so vital for the success of our democracy.”
44. In the case of Kerala Solvent Extractions Ltd. Vs.
A.Unnikrishnan and another (9 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held as follows:
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
37
“9. Shri Vaidyanathan, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant, submitted, in our opinion not without justification, that the
Labour Court’s reasoning bordered on perversity and such
unreasoned, undue liberalism and misplaced sympathy would subvert
all discipline in the administration. He stated that the management
will have no answer to the claims of similarly disqualified candidates
which might have come to be rejected. Those who stated the truth
would be said to be at a disadvantage and those who suppressed it
stood to gain. He further submitted that this laxity of judicial
reasoning will imperceptibly introduce slackness and unpredictability
in the legal process and, in the final analysis, corrode legitimacy of the
judicial process.
10. We are inclined to agree with these submissions. In recent
times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well meant but
wholly unsustainable tendency towards a denudation of the
legitimacy of judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the
courts must be seen to be logical and tenable within the framework of
the law and should not incur and justify the criticism that the
jurisdiction of the courts tends to degenerate into misplaced sympathy,
generosity and private benevolence. It is essential to maintain the
integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of the conclusions. They
must emanate logically from the legal findings and the judicial results
must be seen to be principled and supportable on those findings.
Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the
expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to
mutually irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of
its dignity, authority, predictability and respectability.”
45. In the case of Lucknow Kshethreeya Gramin Bank Vs.
Rajendra Singh (8 supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
follows:
“13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is
the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which
is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent
W.P.No.16223 of 202038
employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct
committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the
function of the disciplinary authority. In Apparel Export Promotion
Council v. A.K. Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405] this
principle was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 773, para 22)“22. … The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering
with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the
departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven
misconduct. … The High Court should not have substituted its own
discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required
to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a
matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the
High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty.
The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this
ground alone.”
15. As is clear from the above that the judicial review of the
quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope. It is
only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly
disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the courts would
frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order,
it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a decision
afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by
prescribing the quantum of punishment.”
46. In the case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional
Manager and others Vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (10 supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:
“7. It may be mentioned that in the memorandum of charges,
the aforesaid two regulations are said to have been violated by the
respondent. Regulation 3 requires every officer/employee of the bank
to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and
W.P.No.16223 of 202039
diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. It
requires the officer/employee to maintain good conduct
and discipline and to act to the best of his judgment in performance of
his official duties or in exercise of the powers conferred upon him.
Breach of Regulation 3 is ‘misconduct’ within the meaning of
Regulation 24. The findings of the Inquiry Officer which have been
accepted by the disciplinary authority, and which have not been
disturbed by the High Court, clearly show that in a number of
instances the respondent allowed overdrafts or passed cheques
involving substantial amounts beyond his authority. True, it is that in
some cases, no loss has resulted from such acts. It is also true that in
some other instances such acts have yielded profit to the Bank but it is
equally true that in some other instances, the funds of the Bank have
been placed in jeopardy; the advances have become sticky and
irrecoverable. It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading
over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of
transactions. In the case of a bank — for that matter, in the case of
any other organisation — every officer/employee is supposed to act
within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to
act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will
disappear; the functioning of the bank would become chaotic and
unmanageable…..
As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an
organisation and more particularly, a bank is dependent upon each of
its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted
sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline
and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the
meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary
though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several
advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his
authority have become sticky and irrecoverable…..”
However, these decisions are distinguishable on facts. It has been
brought out that there is no evidence on record to prove the alleged
W.P.No.16223 of 2020
40
misconduct of the petitioner and therefore, this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the power of judicial
review.
47. With these observations, the Writ Petition is disposed of. No
order as to costs.
48. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, in this Writ Petition
shall stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MADHAVI DEVI
Date: 31.12.2024
Lpd/Svv
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