This landmark decision of the Supreme Court of India clarified the interplay between unregistered property-related instruments, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, and the enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court examined whether a grant to cut and appropriate timber from a forest, made by a Zamindar to his wife, could be enforced after the proprietary rights in the land had vested in the State. The ruling drew heavily from the precedent in Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa (1955) 2 SCR 919, and revisited the earlier Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. decision.
Case Title: Shrimati Shantabai v. State of Bombay & Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Citation: AIR 1958 SC 532
Bench: Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan, Justice T.L Venkatarama, Aiyyar, Justice S.K Das, Justice A.K. Sarkar and Justice Vivian Bose.
Date of Judgment: 24.03.1958
Facts of the Case
Parties
Petitioner: Shrimati Shantabai, wife of a Zamindar.
Respondents: State of Bombay & Others.
Agreement
On 26 April 1948, the petitioner’s husband, Shri Balirambhau Doye, Zamindar of Pandharpur, executed an unregistered document in her favour.
Rights Granted: To take and appropriate all kinds of wood—building timber, fuel wood, and bamboo—from specified forests in his Zamindari.
Term: From the date of the document until 26 December 1960.
Consideration: ₹26,000.
Nature of Rights: No express transfer of land ownership; permission to enter forests and cut wood with certain restrictions.
Legislative Change
The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, vested all proprietary rights in land in the State under Section 3.
- In the concerned area, vesting occurred on 31 March 1951.
Subsequent Events
- After vesting, the petitioner could no longer cut wood.
- She applied under Section 6(2) of the Abolition Act for validation of her lease.
- Deputy Commissioner’s Order (16 August 1955): Held that Section 6(2) did not apply as the transfer was before 16 March 1950, but allowed her to work the forest subject to certain conditions.
- She began cutting trees; the Divisional Forest Officer (19 March 1956) ordered cancellation of her name and forfeiture of cut material.
- Representations to the State Government failed.
- Petition under Article 32: Alleged violation of fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g).
Issues
- Whether the unregistered document conferred any enforceable proprietary interest, licence, or contractual right upon the petitioner after vesting under the Abolition Act.
- Whether refusal by State authorities to permit her to cut and remove timber amounted to infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g).
- Whether such rights, if based purely on contract or unregistered grant, could be enforced through a petition under Article 32.
- Whether the rights granted constituted ‘moveable property’ or ‘immoveable property’ for purposes of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act, and the General Clauses Act.
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The document conferred valid rights to cut and appropriate forest produce for the term agreed.
- These rights constituted property protected under Article 19(1)(f) and occupation/trade protected under Article 19(1)(g).
- The Divisional Forest Officer’s order unlawfully deprived her of these rights without due process.
- Relied on Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Co. v. State of M.P. (1953 SCR 476), where similar rights were enforced.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The document was unregistered and therefore ineffective to transfer any interest in immovable property.
- Upon vesting under Section 3 of the Abolition Act, all proprietary rights passed to the State; any licence or right dependent on the grantor’s proprietary title stood extinguished.
- If construed as a contract, it created only personal rights against the grantor, not enforceable against the State.
- Relied on Ananda Behera v. State of Orissa (1955), which held that such profits-à-prendre in immoveable property require registration and cannot be enforced under Article 32.
Analysis of Law
Character of the Document
The Court considered three possible interpretations:
1) Transfer of proprietary interest – Ineffective without registration; in any case, vested in the State under the Abolition Act.
2) Grant of a profits-à-prendre – i.e., right to enter land and take produce (trees/wood).
- By nature, immovable property requires compulsory registration.
- Unregistered → no title passes.
3) Purely personal contractual right – Enforceable only against the grantor, not the State; breach gives rise to damages, not constitutional remedy.
Constitutional Context
- Article 32 can be invoked only for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
- Property rights under Article 19(1)(f) require demonstrable legal ownership or interest; mere breach of contract is not a constitutional wrong.
- State was not a party to the contract; thus, it was not bound.
Movable v. Immovable Property
- Standing timber under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 2(6) of the Registration Act is not immoveable property if meant to be cut soon.
- Trees, however, are immovable property under Section 3(26) of the General Clauses Act as they are attached to the earth.
- Here, the grant allowed felling over 12 years, including trees not yet ready for felling → involved continuing benefit from soil → immovable property.
- Value exceeding ₹100 → compulsory registration.
Precedent Analysis
Ananda Behera: Rights to cut and remove produce from land constitute profits-à-prendre, immoveable property; unregistered instrument conveys no interest; no Art. 32 remedy.
Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel: Allowed writ in similar circumstances, but here the Court preferred Ananda Behera, a later and larger bench decision.
Court’s Reasoning
Per Chief Justice S.R. Das, Venkatarama Aiyar, S.K. Das & A.K. Sarkar, JJ.
No need to conclusively determine the document’s character; in every possible construction, the petitioner fails:
- Proprietary interest → vested in State; unregistered.
- Profits-à-prendre → immoveable property; unregistered.
- Personal contract → not enforceable against State; remedy lies in civil suit for damages.
Without a subsisting legal right in property, no fundamental right is infringed.
Per Bose, J. (separate but concurring)
- Analysed the document in detail; found it conferred right to enter, cut, and remove trees, including those not yet ready for felling.
- This went beyond “standing timber” → immoveable property, as grantee derived ongoing benefit from soil.
- Value ₹26,000 → compulsory registration; unregistered → conveyed no enforceable interest.
- Cited forestry principles and distinction between timber and trees.
- Concluded petitioner had no fundamental right enforceable under Art. 32.
Holding
- Petition dismissed with costs.
- No infringement of Articles 19(1)(f) or 19(1)(g).
- An unregistered document is ineffective to convey immovable property; any personal rights are not binding on the State.
- Remedy, if any, lies in civil court against the grantor for breach of contract.
Key Takeaways
- Profits-à-prendre (right to take produce from another’s land) is immovable property; it requires compulsory registration if value > ₹100.
- After vesting under abolition laws, all proprietary rights pass to the State; licences dependent on such rights lapse.
- Breach of purely personal contractual rights does not amount to infringement of fundamental rights.
- Ananda Behera is binding over Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel in such matters.
- The distinction between “standing timber” (movable) and “trees” (immovable) depends on readiness for felling and continued benefit from the soil.
Significance
The decision reinforces that Article 32 is not a panacea for all disputes and cannot be used to enforce personal contracts, especially against the State when the State is not a party. It also clarifies property classification in relation to forestry rights and underscores the importance of registration in property transactions.
Important Link
Law Library: Notes and Study Material for LLB, LLM, Judiciary, and Entrance Exams