Delhi High Court – Orders
M/S Digihive Solutions Pvt Ltd vs M/S Superwave Communication And … on 11 August, 2025
$~54
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 5393/2025, CRL.M.A. 23208/2025 & CRL.M.A.
23209/2025
M/S DIGIHIVE SOLUTIONS PVT LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rohan Jaitley, Mr. Akshay S
harma and Mr. Dev Pratap Shahi, Advs.
versus
M/S SUPERWAVE COMMUNICATION AND INFRASOLUTION
PVT LTD & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajat Wadhwa, Mr. Sahil Kakkar,
Mr. Gurpreet Singh and Mr. Manish Kumar, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
ORDER
% 11.08.2025
CRL MA 23209/2025 (exemption)
1. Exemption allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. This application is disposed of.
CRL.M.C 5393/2025 & CRL M.A 23208/2025 (stay)
3. The present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nyayaya
Sanhita, 2023, has been filed against impugned order dated 16.04.2024
passed by the learned ASJ, Saket Courts, in CA 125/2025, whereby
conviction order dated 18.02.2025 and order on sentence dated 18.03.2025
were stayed, and the sentence of the respondent was suspended without
directions for a deposit as contemplated within Section 148 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
4. The brief facts relevant to the adjudication of the present dispute are
that the petitioner was the complainant before the Court of JMFC (NI Act),
Saket, for a default by the respondent in connection with a purchase order.
The petitioner had supplied material to the respondent, who took delivery
without raising objection, and did not honour payment for goods received.
5. In this regard, ₹54,00,000/- was paid in two tranches of ₹44 lakh and
₹10 lakh on 08.04.2021 and 17.06.2021 respectively. Post this, a sum of
₹54,12,869 lakh remained payable, for the discharge of which a cheque
dated 28.07.2021 was issued by the respondent in favour of the petitioner. It
was this cheque that came to be dishonoured, forming the basis of
proceedings under Section 138.
6. During the pendency of proceedings, an application under Section
143A was filed by the petitioner. While adjudicating this application, the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Saket Court, directed the respondent to
make a deposit of 20% of the cheque amount vide order dated 25.07.2023 on
account of the petitioner being able to prove a prima facie case against the
respondent, as well as the presumption under Section 139 operating in
favour of the petitioner. This order was challenged before the learned
Sessions Court, where it was upheld vide order dated 09.02.2024.
7. The learned JMFC while concluding trial, vide order dated
18.02.2025, found the respondent guilty of committing an offence under
Section 138 of the NI Act on the grounds that the presumption under Section
139 of the Act stood unrebutted. A month later, vide order dated 18.03.2025,
the respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of ₹86,67,738/- along with
simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The Court also went on to
suspend the respondent’s sentence for a period of one month on the
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
condition of furnishing of bail bonds of ₹50,000, in consideration of the
offence being bailable in nature, to allow the respondent to prefer an appeal.
8. These two orders were challenged by the respondent through CA
125/2025 before the learned ASJ, Saket Court, who vide order dated
16.04.2025, suspended the respondent’s sentence and admitted the
respondent to bail, listing the matter on 19.04.2024 for furnishing of bail
bonds. Bail bonds were furnished by the respondent and accepted by Court
vide order dated 19.04.2025, where notice was issued for 13.08.2025.
9. Mr. Rohan Jaitley, learned Counsel for the petitioner, draws this
Court’s attention to para 4 of the impugned order, arguing that it formed the
basis for the learned ASJ to stay judgment dated 18.02.2025 and order on
sentence dated 18.03.2025, as well as suspend the respondent’s sentence.
Considering its brevity, the impugned order is reproduced in its entirety for
ready reference:
”
1. Criminal Appeal u/s 415(3) BNSS has been filed on behalf of appellant
against the impugned judgment and order on sentence dated 18.02.2025
and 18.03.2025 respectively, passed by Ms. Anjali Singh, Ld. JMFC,
SED, Saket Courts, whereby the appellant was convicted and sentenced to
pay a fine of Rs. 86,67,738/- to the complainant/respondent as
compensation and in default, convict/appellant would undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 6 months.
2. An application u/s 430 BNSS for suspension of sentence and releasing the
appellant on bail till pendency of appeal is also on record.
3. Submissions heard on the present application.
4. Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a sum of Rs. 10,80,000/- has
already been paid to the complainant in term of the order dated
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
25.07.2023 for interim compensation to the extent of 50% of the cheque
amount.
5. Heard. Record perused.
6. Thus, impugned judgment dated 18.02.2025 and order on sentence dated
18.03.2025 shall remain stayed till the pendency of present Criminal
Appeal.
7. Appellant is hereby admitted to bail, upon his furnishing personal bond
with surety bond of Rs. 50,000/-.
8. Accordingly, the application u/s 430 BNSS for suspension of sentence and
releasing the appellant on bail till pendency of appeal is hereby disposed
of.
9. At this stage, Ld. Counsel for the appellant submits that since the
appellant has gone out of station, he sought a short adjournment in the
matter.
10. At request of Ld. Counsel for the appellant, be put up again for furnishing
of bail bond on 19.04.2025 at 11:00 AM.”
10. Mr. Jaitley submits that the amount which is payable under Section
143A is separate and distinct from that which may be payable under Section
148, and that the former is to be directed at a pretrial stage, while the latter
concerns the stage of appeal.
11. To buttress his submissions, he relies upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jamboo Bhandari v M.P. State Industrial
Development Corporation Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 446, and Muskan
Enterprises v State of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4107, also
highlighting the proviso contained within Section 148 to state that an
amount paid on directions issued under Section 143A can’t be accounted for
in a deposit that has been directed under Section 148.
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
12. Thereafter, relying upon Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises,
Mr. Jaitley sought to persuade this court that a deposit under Section 148 is
normally sought for, and that it is only when exceptional circumstances are
made out that the same may be waived. He also states that it is in an
application for suspension of sentence made at the time of appealing an
order of conviction which must contain reasons as to why the applicant’s
case is exceptional and warrants a waiver of the deposit as contemplated
under Section 148.
13. Mr. Jaitley then also relies on the aforementioned judgments to argue
that the words “may” and “shall”, as contained in both Section 143A as well
as Section 148, must not be interpreted the same way in a reading of both
provisions, and that the deposit contemplated in Section 148 is mandatory in
nature while that which is contained in Section 143A is discretionary in
nature.
14. Concluding his arguments, Mr. Jaitley submits that the facts
pertaining to the present dispute do not fall into the category of an
“exceptional case” by any measure, and that, above and beyond this, the
impugned order did not substantiate its directions with any findings or
reasoning. Besides a waiver of the deposit to be made under Section 148,
Mr. Jaitley argues that the impugned order, whereby conviction order dated
18.02.2025 and order on sentence dated 18.03.2025 were stayed, was
erroneous to the extent that it was passed in the absence of the petitioner. In
fact, he points out, the learned ASJ went on to stay these orders on
16.04.2025 without hearing arguments on the merits of the case, and only
later, vide order dated 19.04.2025, issued notice to the petitioner.
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
15. Mr. Rajat Wadhwa, learned Counsel for the respondent who appears
on advance notice, sought to defend the discretion exercised by the learned
ASJ in passing the impugned order. He submits that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court’s decisions in Jamboo Bhandari and Muskan Enterprises do not
speak of a mandatory deposit with respect to Section 148 of the Act, and that
an application for waiver of such a deposit is not required. To this effect, he
draws the Court’s attention to para 7 of the decision in Jamboo Bhandari.
16. Mr. Wadhwa also submits that the reasoning to this effect is contained
in para 8 of the impugned order, and the Court’s decision to suspend the
respondent’s sentence without an order directing a deposit under Section
148 is because it rightly considered the payment of 20% of the cheque
amount at the stage of Section 143A which had been directed vide order
dated 25.07.2023.
17. Pressing on, Mr. Wadhwa counters Mr. Jaiteley’s case in an attempt
to persuade this Court that bail might have been granted without hearing the
petitioner, but that fact would not be of material significance, as the offence
in question is bailable and an appeal against a sentencing order is a statutory
right.
18. Before delving into the merits of arguments advanced, it would be
proper that Section 143A and Section 148 stand reproduced for ready
reference:
“143A. Power to direct interim compensation.–(1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Court
trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to
pay interim compensation to the complainant–
(a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not
guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and
(b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim
compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent. ofThis is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid
within sixty days from the date of the order under subsection (1), or within
such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the
Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque.
(4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the
complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation,
with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India,
prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days
from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding
thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being
shown by the complainant.
(5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be
recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of
compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or
recovered as interim compensation under this section.]”
*****
“148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against
conviction.–
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against
conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the
appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per
cent. of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:
Provided that the amount payable under this sub-section shall be
in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under
section 143A.
(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited
within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further
period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on
sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.
(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount
deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the
pendency of the appeal:
Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the
complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with
interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India,
prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty
days from the date of the order, or within such further period notThis is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient
cause being shown by the complainant.”
19. In reliance upon these provisions, specifically the first proviso
contained within Section 148, Mr. Jaitley argues that the learned ASJ did not
exercise his discretion for waiver of the deposit under this section as no
reasoning has been recorded to this extent. Refuting this, Mr. Wadhwa
submits that the acceptance of the respondent’s application for suspension of
sentence was in itself an acceptance of the reasons contained therein,
constituting a valid exercise of discretion by the Court to waive such
deposit.
20. After a thorough reading of the first proviso contained within Section
148, the impugned order, prima facie, appears to suffer from an infirmity. In
light of this, the impugned order is stayed in part- to the extent of waiver of
the deposit stipulated under Section 148. However, the grant of bail to the
respondent shall remain undisturbed.
21. CRL M.A 23208/2025 stands allowed on the aforesaid terms.
22. Issue notice in CRL.M.C 5393/2025. Notice is accepted on behalf of
the respondent by Mr. Wadhwa.
23. Reply be filed within two weeks. Rejoinder, if any, be filed within
four weeks thereafter.
24. List on 06.11.2025.
AJAY DIGPAUL, J
AUGUST 11, 2025/ar/av
This is a digitally signed order.
The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.
The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 12/08/2025 at 22:39:50