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Delhi District Court
Raja Kumar vs State on 12 August, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. SHIVALI BANSAL
LD. ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-02,
DWARKA COURTS, S-W DISTRICT, NEW DELHI.
In the matter of: -
Appeal No. 140/25.
CNR No. DLSW01-002941-2025.
Raja Kumar
S/o Sh. Meghu Paswan
R/o R. No. WZ-512, Dada Dev Road,
Near Radha Devi,
Dwarka Sector-7, Palam,
Delhi-110045. ... Appellant.
Vs.
State (NCT) of Delhi ... Respondent.
Date of Institution : 04.04.2023.
Date of Arguments : 07.08.2025.
Date of Order : 12.08.2025.
JUDGMENT
1. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose of present Criminal
Appeal No. 140/25 filed against judgment of conviction
dated 31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025
passed by Ld. MM (Mahila Court-04), South-West District,
Dwarka Courts, New Delhi.
2. The present appeal arises against an order of conviction u/s
354/354A IPC whereby the appellant is sentenced for
rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.4,000/-
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 1 of 21.
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signed by
SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
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for the offence u/S 354 IPC and in default of payment of
fine, to further undergo 15 days simple imprisonment
sentence. The appellant has also been sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.2000/- for the
offence u/S 354A IPC and in default of payment of fine, to
further undergo 10 days simple imprisonment sentence.
Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE AS PER APPELLANT
3. Prosecutrix alleged that on 17.10.2021 at rented flat i.e.
10B, FG1 Block, First Floor, Vikas Puri, New Delhi the
present incident occurred when the prosecutirx called for
laundry service. The appellant/accused had been collecting
and delivering laundry for the prosecutirx for the past one
and a half month and that was the third time when appellant
came at her house. On the said day, after collecting the
clothes and handing over the receipt, the appellant/accused
was about to leave when he asked if prosecutrix stayed
alone to which she replied in affirmation and at that
moment, appellant grabbed her breast and attempted to push
her towards the bedroom. Prosecutirx shouted and pushed
appellant away. Appellant made another move but he was
again resisted and pushed back.
4. On the complaint of the prosecutrix, the present FIR was
registered and chargesheet was filed against the appellant.
Thereafter Ld. Trial court framed charges against appellant
U/S 354/354A IPC.
5. That prosecution in support of his case examined four
witnesses and, thereafter, statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C of the
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 2 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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appellant was recorded. Appellant denied all the
incriminating evidence against him and stated that he has
been falsely implicated in the case. Appellant did not lead
defence evidence.
6. That after hearing the case from the side of the prosecution
the Ld. Trial Court passed impugned judgment dated
31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025 and
thereby Ld. Trial Court held guilty to the appellant under
Sections 354/354A I.P.C.
7. That Ld. Trial Court awarded the sentence to the appellant
as rigorous imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.4,000/-
for the offence u/S 354 IPC and in default of payment of
fine, to further undergo 15 days simple imprisonment
sentence. The appellant has also been sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment of one year and fine of Rs.2000/- for the
offence u/S 354A IPC and in default of payment of fine, to
further undergo 10 days simple imprisonment sentence.
Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
8. That being aggrieved from the impugned judgment dated
31.07.2024 and order on sentence dated 27.03.2025 passed
by ld. trial court, the appellant preferred the present appeal
on the following amongst grounds: –
(a) Because the impugned order passed by ld. trial court is
bad in law and Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the
evidence in its true perspective;
(b) Because the Id. trial court erred in holding the
appellant guilty despite contradictions in theCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 3 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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testimonies of prosecution witnesses;
(c) Because the complaint dated 17.10.2021 was written in
the Police Station and statement u/S 164 Cr.PC is
contradictory and contains material improvements;
(d) Because there is no record that PW2 Sunil, who runs
the laundry shop, was ever summoned as a witness.
There is no documentary evidence regarding his shop
registration, employment records or proof of an
established business etc.
(e) Because there are multiple lacunas in the investigation
like appellant’s call details records and location data
was not obtained; there are no injury marks or signs of
struggle on either the prosecutrix or the appellant;
appellant was not provided with copy of FIR not he
was informed the grounds of his arrest; appellant was
not arrested from the spot; the alleged incident
occurred on 17.10.21 between 15.30 to 16.15 IST
while the police received information at 19.55 IST,
there is no explanation for the unjustified delay of 3 ½
hours etc.
(f) Because IO failed to record the arrival and departure
entries of the witnesses in the Daily Diary; caller of the
PCR call was not documented; arrest of the appellant
was not entered in Register No.5; medical examination
of the prosecutrix was not conducted; clothes of
prosecutrix were not seized; evidence of tenancy was
not obtained; IO neither recorded the statement of the
landlord or security guard or caretaker nor obtained
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 4 of 21.
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SHIVALI BANSAL
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CCTV footage from nearby places; site plan was not
prepared; invoice dated 17.10.21 is written in different
ink and handwriting raising doubts about its
authenticity; non preparing seizure memo of the said
invoice etc. and;
(g) That appellant was not present at the location at the
specified date and time of occurrence.
9. Ld. Additional PP for State/respondent has strongly opposed
the present appeal and has argued that Ld. Trial Court has
passed well versed impugned judgment of conviction and
order on sentence after perusing the entire material on
record. He prayed that present appeal may be dismissed.
10. Arguments advanced by ld. counsel for appellant as well as
ld. Additional PP for State/respondent. Arguments have
been heard at length. Record of the case including TCR
have been meticulously perused.
11. The facts in nutshell are that on 17.10.2021, the complainant
was subjected to physical touch and criminal force by the
appellant herein, thereby resulting in outraging her modesty.
It is stated by her in her complaint, statement u/s 164 Cr.P.C.
and before the court as PW1, that on 17.10.2021, when
convict Raja Kumar approached her house to deliver
laundry clothes, he had grabbed her breast and attempted to
push her towards the bedroom. Thus, the act of the accused
is “grabbing the breast of the complainant and pushing her
towards the bedroom”
12. The act of the appellant has to be seen in light of section
354 and 354A IPC which are reproduced herein under:
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 5 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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“354- Assault or criminal force to women with intention
to outrage her modesty
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman,
intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he
will there by outrage her modesty1, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than one year but which may extend to
five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
354A – Sexual Harassment and Punishment for Sexual
Harassment
1. A man committing any of the following acts–
a. physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and
explicit sexual overtures; or
b. a demand or request for sexual favours; or
c. showing pornography against the will of a woman; or
d. making sexually coloured remarks, shall be guilty of the
offence of sexual harassment.
2. Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (i) or
clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1) shall be punished
with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.
3. Any man who commits the offence specified in clause (iv) of
sub-section (1) shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with
fine, or with both.”
13. Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) addresses the
offence of assault or criminal force used against a woman
with the intention of outraging her modesty. The key
elements of this offence include an act of assault or criminal
force against a female victim, with the intent or knowledge
that it is likely to outrage her modesty. While “modesty” is
not strictly defined in the IPC, courts determine it based on
facts and circumstances of a case. The Supreme Court links
a woman’s modesty to her sex and virtue, considering
actions that violate her dignity or cause discomfort as
potentially outraging her modesty. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in “State of Punjab v. Major Singh” has held
as under:
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 6 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
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” ‘Criminal force’ is defined in s. 350 of the Code and it
is not in dispute that such force had been used by the
respondent to the child. It is, also not in dispute that the
child was a woman within the Code for in the Code that
word is to be understood as meaning a female human
being of any age: see ss. 7 and 10. The difficulty in this
case was caused by the words “outrage her modesty”. The
majority of the learned Judges in the High Court held that
these words showed that there must be a subjective
element so far as the woman against whom criminal force
was used is concerned. They appear to have taken the
view that the offence could be said to have been
committed only when the woman felt that her modesty
had been outraged. If I have understood the judgment of
these learned Judges correctly, the test ,of outrage of
modesty was the reaction of the woman concerned. These
learned Judges answered the question in the negative in
the view that the woman to whom the force was used was
of too tender an age and was physically incapable of
having any sense of modesty. The third learned Judge who
answered the question in the affirmative was of the view
that the word “modesty” meant, accepted notions of
womanly modesty and not the notions of the woman
against whom the offence was committed. He observed
that the section was intended as much in the interest of the
woman concerned as in the interest of public morality and
decent behavior and the object of the section could be
achieved only if the word ‘modesty’ was considered to be
an attribute of a human female irrespective of whether she
had developed enough understanding to realise that an act
was offensive to decent female behaviour or not. The
reported decisions on the question to which our attention
was drawn do not furnish clear assistance. None of them
deals With a case like the present.
But I do not think that there is anything in them in conflict
with what I propose to say in this judgment. I would first
observe that the offence does not, in my opinion, depend
on the reaction of the woman subjected to the assault or
use of criminal force. The words used in the section are
that the act has to be done “intending to outrage or
knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her
modesty”. This intention or knowledge is the ingredient of
the offence and not the woman’s feelings. It would follow
that if the intention or knowledge was not proved, proof of
the fact that the woman felt that her modesty had been
outraged would not satisfy the necessary ingredient of the
offence. Likewise, if the intention or knowledge was
proved, the fact that the woman did not feel that her
modesty had been outraged would be irrelevant, for theCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 7 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
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necessary ingredient would then have been proved. The
sense of modesty in all women is of course not the same-,
it varies from woman to woman. In many cases, the
woman’s sense of modesty would not be known to others.
If the test of the offence was the reaction of the woman,
then it would have to be proved that the offender knew the
standard of the modesty of the woman concerned, as
otherwise, it could not be proved that he had intended to
outrage “her” modesty or knew it to be likely that his act
would have that effect. This would be impossible to prove
in the large majority of cases. Hence, in my opinion, the
reaction of the woman would be irrelevant.
Intention and knowledge are of course states of mind.
They are nonetheless facts which can be proved. They
cannot be proved by direct evidence. They have to be
inferred from the circumstances of each case. Such an
inference, one way or the other, can only be made if a
reasonable man would, on the facts of the case, make it.
The question in each case must, in my opinion, be: will a
reasonable man think that the act was done with the
intention of outraging the modesty of the woman or with
the knowledge that it was likely to do so? The test of the
outrage of modesty must, therefore, be whether a
reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was
intended to or was known to be likely to outrage the
modesty of the woman. In considering the question, he
must imagine the woman to be a reasonable woman and
keep in view all circumstances concerning her, such as,
her station and way of life and the known notions of
modesty of such a woman. The expression “outrage her
modesty” must be read with the words “intending to or
knowing it to be likely that he will”. So read, it would
appear that though the modesty to be considered is of the
woman concerned, the word “her” was not used to
indicate her reaction. Read all together, the words indicate
an act done with the intention or knowledge that it was
likely to outrage the woman’s modesty, the emphasis
being on the intention and knowledge.
Another argument used to support the view, that the
reaction of the woman concerned decided the question,
was that the section occurred in a chapter of the Code
dealing with offences affecting human body and not in the
chapter dealing with offences relating to decency and
morals. I think this argument is fallacious. None of the
other offences against human body, which occur in the
same chapter as s. 354, depends on individual reaction and
therefore there is no reason to think that the offence
defined in s. 354 depends on it. There is no incongruity in
holding that the commission of an offence against humanCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 8 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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body does not depend on the reaction of the person
against whom it is alleged to have been committed but on
other things.
It will be remembered that the third learned Judge
(Gurdev Singh, J.) had said that modesty in the section
has to be understood as an attribute of a human female
irrespective of the fact whether she has developed a sense
of modesty or not. This view seems to me to be erroneous.
In order that a reasonable man may think that an act was
intended or must be taken to have been known likely to
outrage modesty, he has to consider whether the woman
concerned had developed a sense of modesty and also the
standard of that modesty. Without an idea of these, he
cannot decide whether the alleged offender intended to
outrage the woman’s modesty or his act was likely to do
so. I see no reason to think,, as the learned Judge did, that
such a view would defeat the object of the section. The
learned Judge said that modesty had to be judged by the
prevalent notions of modesty. If this is so, it will also have
to be decided what the prevalent notions of modesty in the
society are. As such notions concerning a child may be
different from those concerning a woman of mature age,
these notions have to be decided in each case separately.
To say that every female of whatever age is possessed of
modesty capable of being outraged seems to me to be
laying down too rigid a rule which may be divorced from
reality. There obviously is no universal standard of
modesty.
If my reading of the section is correct, the question that
remains to be decided is, whether a reasonable man would
think that the female child on whom the offence was
committed had modesty which the respondent intended to
outrage by his act or knew it to be the likely result of it. I
do not think a reasonable man would say that a female
child of seven and a half months is possessed of womanly
modesty. If she had not, there could be no question of the
respondent having intended to outrage her modesty or
having known that his act was likely to have that result. I
would for this reason answer the question in the negative.
At the Bar, instances of various types of women were
mentioned. Reference was made to an imbecile woman, a
sleeping woman who does not wake up, a woman under
the influence of drink or anesthesia, an old woman and the
like. I would point out that we are not concerned in this
case with any such woman. But as at ‘Present advised, I
would venture to say that I feet no difficulty in applying
the test of the outrage of modesty that I hate indicated in
this judgment to any of these cases with a satisfactoryCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 9 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
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result. If it is proved that criminal force was used on a
sleeping woman with intent to outrage her modesty, then
the fact that she does not wake up nor feel that her
modesty had been outraged would be no defence to the
person doing the act. The woman’s reaction would be
irrelevant in deciding the question of guilt.
Before concluding, I may point out that the respondent
had been convicted by the trial court under s. 323 of the
Code for the Injury caused to the child and sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs.
1,000 / with a further period of imprisonment for three
months in default of payment of the fine. That sentence
has been maintained by the High Court and as there was
no appeal by the respondent to this Court, that sentence
stands. I would, for these reasons, dismiss the appeal.
Mudholkar, J. It has been found as a fact by the courts
below that the respondent had caused injuries to the
vagina of a seven and a half month old child by fingering.
He has been held guilty of an offence under s. 323, Indian
Penal Code. The contention on behalf of the State who is
the appellant before us is that the offence amounts to
outraging the modesty of a woman and is thus punishable
under s. 354, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions
Judge and two of the three learned Judges of the High
Court who heard the appeal against the decision of the
Sessions Judge were of the view that a child seven and a
half month old being incapable of having a developed
sense of modesty, the offence was not punishable under s.
354. The third learned Judge, Gurdev Singh, J., however,
took a different view. The learned Judge quoted the
meaning of the word “modesty”given in the Oxford
English Dictionary (1933 Edn.)-which is, “womanly
propriety of behaviour, scrupulous chastity of thought,
speech and conduct (in men or women) reserve or sense of
shame proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or
coarse suggestions”-and observed: “This obviously does
not refer to a particular woman but to the accepted notions
of womanly behaviour and conduct. It is in this sense that
the modesty appears to have been used in section 354 of
the Indian Penal Code”. The learned Judge then referred
to s. 509 of the Penal Code in which also the word
“modesty” appears and then proceeded to say:
“The object of this provision seems to have been to protect
women against indecent behaviour of others which is
offensive to morality. The offences created by section
354 and section 509 of the Indian’ Penal Code are as
much in the interest of the women concerned as in the
interest of public morality and decent behaviour. TheseCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 10 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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offences are not only offences against the individual but
against public morals and society as well, and that object
can be achieved only if the word “modesty” is considered
to be an attribute of a human female irrespective of fact
whether the female concerned has developed, enough
understanding as to appreciate the nature of the act or to
realise that it is offensive to decent female behaviour or
sense of propriety concerning the relations of a female
with others”.”
14. In the instant case the appellant has intentionally applied
force upon the complainant to commit an offence without
her consent. The force has been applied by the appellant at
the private body part i.e., breast, of the complainant. In State
of Punjab (supra) it has been held that the intention of an
accused person is to be inferred from circumstances as no
direct evidence is available for the same. And the
circumstances have to be evaluated by using test of a
reasonable man. If the act committed by the accused
satisfies the test of a reasonable man i.e, to say that any
reasonable person would say that the act was done with the
intention to outrage the modesty then the same would be so.
In the facts of the present case the appellant has touched the
private body part of the female which will shock the sense
of decency a woman possess. The act of the appellant
cannot tantamount to an accident as the appellant after
grabbing the breast have also pushed the complainant
towards the room which also leads to commission of
another offence u/s 354A IPC. Touching of private part of
women of a body is outrageous and reprehensible conduct.
Such an act is against the public morals and decency. All the
acts jointly culminated to evidence the sexual intent of the
appellant. This court finds support from the judgment of the
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 11 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
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Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in T. Manikadan v. The State
(CRL.REV.P. 404/2016 & & Crl.M.B. 1114/2016) has held
as under:
“Whereas Section 354 IPC deals with a single act of
criminal force being used to outrage a woman’s
modesty, Section 354 (A) (1) (i) talks about physical
contact and advances both. The use of word ‘and’
in Section 354A requires that there should be a physical
contact with sexual advances/overtures. Therefore, the
newly added provision is applicable in a situation where
the accused does not stop after committing a single
isolated act of criminal force but rather goes on to commit
several other similar acts which end up converting his
actions into advances of a sexual overture.”
15. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has filed the present appeal on
the ground that there was faulty investigation by the police
officers. It is stated that the police officials have failed to
collect evidence like call detail records and location data of
the appellant, medical examination of the complainant was
not conducted, clothes of complainant were not seized,
evidence of tenancy was not obtained etc. It is well settled
that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a
ground for acquittal and if primacy is given to such design
or negligent investigation or to the omissions or lapses by
perfunctory investigation, the faith and confidence of the
people in the criminal justice administrated would be
eroded. The consequence of defective investigation have
been elaborated in Dhanaj Singh @ Shera And Ors vs State
Of Punjab, (2004) 3 SCC 654, wherein it was observed as
under:
“In the case of a defective investigation the Court has to
be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would
not be right in acquitting an accused person solely on
account of the defect; to do so would tantamount toCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 12 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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playing into the hands of the investigating officer if the
investigation is designedly defective.”
16. The same was reiterated in State Of Gujarat vs Kishanbhai,
2014(1) Scale 177; (2013) 10 SCC 192; Hema v. State,
(2013) 10 SCC 192; Dayal Singh & Ors vs State Of
Uttaranchal (2012) 8 SCC 263; and C. Muniappan v. State
of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567 as well.
17. In the instant case PW1 supports the prosecution case and
accused has not brought anything on record to show that
why PW1 will falsely implicate the appellant herein. There
is nothing on record to show previous animosity between
the complainant and the appellant. The appellant was
working as a delivery boy with PW2 and PW2 has
confirmed the presence of the appellant at the house of the
complainant. The appellant has not lead any evidence to
show that the accused was not present at the spot. The
burden to prove plea of alibi is upon the appellant and not
upon the prosecution. There is no bar in law that the
conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix/complainant. In the instant
case, the complainant has withstood cross-examination and
her testimony is of sterling quality. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India in ” Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR
2012 SC 2488 has held that:
“51. …. The burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay
upon the appellants and the appellants have failed to
bring on record any such evidence which would, even by
reasonable probability, establish their plea of alibi. The
plea of alibi in fact is required to be proved with certainty
so as to completely exclude the possibility of the
presence of the accused at the place of occurrence and in
the house which was the home of their relatives.”
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 13 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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18. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the testimony
of the complainant cannot be the basis of conviction as the
same suffers from contradiction and there is a requirement
of independent corroboration. As regards this, it is observed
that there is not impediment in convicting an accused on the
sole testimony of the complainant. In this regard, it is
imperative to outrightly make a reference to the decision of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit
Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
dealing with the contention of the akin effect, inter alia
noted as under:
“21. …The courts should examine the broader probabilities
of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or
insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an
otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the
prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon
without seeking corroboration of her statement in material
particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to
place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short
of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The
testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the
background of the entire case and the trial court must be
alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with
cases involving sexual molestations.”
19. Analogously, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in State
(NCT of Delhi) v. Pratap Singh, 2016 SCC OnLine Del
3207, in the similar context observed as under:
“17. It is now well-settled that conviction for an offence of
rape/sexual assault can be based on the sole testimony of
prosecutrix, if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy
and worth being relied on. If the evidence of the prosecutrix
inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking
corroboration of her statement in material particulars…”
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 14 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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20. Demonstrably, it is observed from above that it is a settled
law that conviction for an offence of sexual assault/rape can
be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. In fact,
even on a general principle, it has been recurrently avowed
by superior courts in a catena of decisions that there is no
legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole
testimony of a single witness if his version is clear and
reliable, reason underlying the same being; ‘the evidence has
to be weighed and not counted’. Notably so, in the instances
of sexual offences, courts have even gone on to the extent to
appreciate and declare that to seek corroboration to the
testimony of the prosecutrix Kusti Mallaiah v. State of A.P.,
(2013) 12 SCC 680. 3 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh,
(1996) 2 SCC 384 and Munna v. State of M.P., (2014) 10
SCC 254 before relying upon the same would amount to
adding insult to the injury sustained by such victim and
have, consequently, deprecated the said
practice. Unmistakably, the reasons for the same can be
easily inferred from the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court4 in State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550, wherein the Hon’ble
Court observed as under:
“17. We think it proper, having regard to the increase in the
number of sex violation cases in the recent past, particularly
cases of molestation and rape in custody, to remove the
notion, if it persists, that the testimony of a woman who is a
victim of sexual violence must ordinarily be corroborated in
material particulars except in the rarest of rare cases. To
insist on corroboration except in the rarest of rare cases is to
equate a woman who is a victim of the lust of another with
an accomplice to a crime and thereby insult womanhood. It
would be adding insult to injury to tell a woman that herCA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 15 of 21.
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SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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story of woe will not be believed unless it is corroborated in
material particulars as in the case of an accomplice to a
crime. Ours is a conservative society where it concerns
sexual behaviour. Ours is not a permissive society as in some
of the western and European countries. Our standard of
decency and morality in public life is not the same as in
those countries. It is, however, unfortunate that respect for
womanhood in our country is on the decline and cases of
molestation and rape are steadily growing. An Indian woman
is now required to suffer indignities in different forms, from
lewd remarks to eve-teasing, from molestation to rape.
Decency and morality in public life can be promoted and
protected only if we deal strictly with those who violate the
societal norms. The standard of proof to be expected by the
court in such cases must take into account the fact that such
crimes are generally committed on the sly and very rarely
direct evidence of a person other than the prosecutrix is
available. Courts must also realise that reference also made
to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharwada
Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217
that ordinarily a woman, more so a young girl, will not stake
her reputation by levelling a false charge concerning her
chastity.”
21. Concurrently, this Court is also cognizant of the fact that the
incidents of sexual offences usually occur in secrecy, out of
public gaze and even in the cases where witnesses to such
events exit, they may not be forthcoming in supporting the
prosecution’s case. Unmistakably, under such circumstances,
to discard the sole testimony of a prosecutrix, consistent in
material particulars and withstanding the rigors of cross-
examination, would amount to causing gross prejudice as
well as aggravating the plight of such victim/prosecutrix on
one hand, while acting as impetus for the potential
perpetrators of similar offences to proceed with their
nefarious designs. Needless to mention the same would not
only perpetuate a sense of blameworthiness in the
prosecutrix/victim of such offences, rather, expose such a
victim to stigmatization and penalization in the hands of the
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 16 of 21.
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society despite the courage exhibited by her to speak out
against her perpetrator. Indisputably, such a recourse would
act antagonist to, both, the rule or law as well as the sense of
justice, on which the entire criminal jurisprudence and rule
of law are premised. Accordingly, the contention of the Ld.
Counsel for the appellant pertaining to the lack of
corroboration in the testimony of the victim/complainant in
the instant case, necessitates appreciation by this Court in
light of the foregoing observations.
22. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the
sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic
of Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But if there are
doubts about the testimony, the courts will insist on
corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but
the quality that is material. The time-honoured principle is
that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. The test is
whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible
and trustworthy or otherwise. The testimony of the
complainant, in the instant case, is not only natural but also
trustworthy and worth being relied upon.
23. Ld. Counsel for the appellant has argued that the uncle, who
is an independent material witness was not examined by the
prosecution and therefore, the appellant is entitled to benefit
of doubt. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Himachal
Pradesh v Gian Chand, AIR 2001 SC 2075, has stated that
non-examination of a material witness is again not a
mathematical formula for discarding the weight of the
testimony available on record howsoever natural,
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 17 of 21.
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trustworthy and convincing it may be. The charge of
withholding a material witness from the court levelled
against the prosecution should be examined in the
background of facts and circumstances of each case so as to
find whether the witnesses were available for being
examined in the Court and were yet withheld by the
prosecution. The Court has first to assess the trustworthiness
of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the
Court finds the evidence adduced worthy of being relied on
then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though
there may be other witnesses available who could also have
been examined but were not examined. However, if the
available evidence suffers from some infirmity or cannot be
accepted in the absence of other evidence which though
available has been withheld from the Court then the
question of drawing an adverse inference against the
prosecution for non-examination of such witnesses may
arise. In the present case, the testimony of the PW1 and
PW2 are reliable and does not suffer from any infirmity so
that other material witnesses are required to be examined.
24. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the
appellant that there is delay in lodging the FIR, this
submission again is devoid of merits. The delay in lodging
the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting
the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the
ground of delay in lodging the first information report.
Delay has the effect of putting the Court on its guard to
search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 18 of 21.
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SHIVALI BANSAL
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if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution
fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is
possibility of embellishment in prosecution version on
account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the
prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the
satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a
ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire
prosecution case.
25. In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1973 SC 501,
dealing with the aspect of delay in lodging the FIR, the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“12. First information report in a criminal case is an
extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the
purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the
trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be
overestimated from the standpoint of the accused: The
object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the
police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain
early information regarding the circumstances in which the
crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and
the part played by them as well as names of eye witnesses
present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the
first information report quite often results in embellishment
which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay,
the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of
coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story
As a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore,
essential that the delay in the lodging of the first
information report should be satisfactorily explained.”
26. However, in Ram Jag And Others vs The State Of
U.P (1974) 4 SCC 201, the position was explained that
whether the delay is so long as to throw a cloud of suspicion
on the seeds of the prosecution case must depend upon a
variety of factors which would vary from case to case. Even
a long delay can be condoned if the witnesses on whose
evidence the prosecution relies have no motive for
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 19 of 21.
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SHIVALI BANSAL
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implicating the accused and / or when a plausible
explanation is offered for the same. On the other hand,
prompt filing of the report is not an unmistakable guarantee
of the truthfulness of authenticity of the version of the
prosecution. In the instant case there is no delay in lodging
of the FIR as such. The FIR was lodged after 3.5 hours
which is explainable in the facts and circumstances of the
present case. The alleged incident had taken place between
3:30 PM to 4:15 PM and police has lodged the FIR at 5:55
PM. As per the testimony of PW3 the police made a DD
entry no. 52A thereafter the complainant upon reaching the
police station had submitted a written complaint on which
tehrir was prepared i.e, Ex. PW3/A and FIR was lodged.
The delay of 3.5 hours is self -explanatory as procedural
formalities are time consuming. Thus, it cannot be said that
there is an unexplainable delay in lodging of FIR and
consequently, miscarriage of justice.
27. This court has given a thoughtful consideration whether the
appellant should be released on probation. Since the offence
committed by the appellant is against a woman, this court is
not inclined to release the appellant on probation. Releasing
the appellant on probation would tantamount to perpetrating
crimes of similar nature.
28. In view of foregoing reasons, findings of the Ld. Trial Court
are sustained. Prosecution has been able to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt and there, is no merit in the
contentions of the appellant. The present appeal is
dismissed. The impugned judgment dated 31.7.2024 and
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 20 of 21.
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signed by
SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
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order on sentence dated 27.3.2025 of Trial Court are upheld.
Appellant be taken into custody to undergo sentence
awarded to him. Sentence warrant be prepared accordingly.
29. Copy of this judgment be given dasti to appellant free of
cost. The convict has been informed about his right to
prefer an appeal against this judgment.
30. A copy of this order be attached with the warrant of
appellant.
31. TCR alongwith copy of this judgment be sent to concerned
Ld. Trial/Successor Court for information and compliance.
32. The Criminal Appeal alongwith pending application, if any,
stands disposed of.
33. Appeal file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
(SHIVALI BANSAL)
Announced in the open ASJ-02, DWARKA COURTS,
Court on 12.08.2025. S-W DISTRICT, NEW DELHI
CA No. 140/25
Raja Kumar Vs. State. Page No. 21 of 21.
Digitally
signed by
SHIVALI
SHIVALI BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.08.12
16:44:57
+0530
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